Hungarian Milspace Kft helping Russian arms manufacturers evade international sanctions (DOCUMENT)

OpsHackRussia’sDay

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community, together with specialists from the Militant Intelligence group (INTMILIT), continue to release materials obtained through the multi-level cyber operation OpsHackRussia’sDay (#OHRD). During this operation, hacktivists infiltrated an entire network of Russian companies associated with the Russian military-industrial complex and gained access to their corporate correspondence. Some of these documents expose shady collaboration with foreign contractors and reveal how companies from NATO countries are helping Russia bypass international sanctions. We believe that these actions are not only morally and politically unacceptable—they allow Russia to profit and access restricted components, sabotaging the EU’s sanctions regime and undermining the collective security of NATO.

On 25 July 2025, InformNapalm released materials detailing a request from Indian Defence Attaché Sunil Kumar concerning the Slovak state-owned company LETECKÉ OPRAVOVNE TRENČÍN (LOTN). This case is currently under investigation, and we await further action from the Slovak authorities.

Milspace Kft

Today we publish a new document from the OHRD dataset, exposing a scheme to circumvent sanctions through the Hungarian company Milspace Kft.

Screenshot of the official letter from Milspace Kft. . Journalists and other interested parties are welcome to request an unredacted version of this document, provided they cite this publication with a direct link.   

In an official letter to the Mexican company Personas y Paquetes Por Aire SA de CV, Milspace Kft clearly outlines a workaround for avoiding sanctions imposed on the Russian military-industrial complex. Milspace openly states: “The Russian factory in Kazan, Mil Design Bureau and Holding of Russian Helicopters are under sanctions because of Ukrainen war. So, nobody can work with them directly.[Editor’s note: original wording and spelling preserved].” They then propose a workaround involving:

• Milspace Kft acting as the formal contractor;
• Maintenance performed at a plant in Kazakhstan licensed by the Russian Mil Design Bureau;
• Spare parts supplied from Moscow, from the company Mi-INTER Ltd;

All the work coordinated with the Mil Design Bureau and Russian Helicopters, both of which are part of Rostec, the Kremlin’s defense industry powerhouse.

Viktor Orbán’s Shadow

Milspace Kft formally is not a state-owned company. It is registered as a private limited liability company (Korlátolt Felelősségű Társaság, or Kft) in Hungary.

However, in NATO member states, military-technical activities involving Soviet- or Russian-made helicopters are rarely conducted without at least informal government coordination.

The fact that Milspace has access to documents from the Mil Design Bureau, collaborates with Kazakh factories, and imports parts from Moscow suggests that Hungary’s government either tacitly supports or deliberately ignores this work.

The broader context matters: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has consistently shown loyalty to the Kremlin, delaying EU sanctions and blocking military aid to Ukraine through NATO and EU structures. Therefore, Milspace Kft’s involvement in these operations aligns with Budapest’s geopolitical position, which often conflicts with the core interests of both the EU and NATO.

Conclusion

Despite being a NATO and EU member, Hungary—through companies like Milspace Kft—is enabling Russia to sidestep sanctions. The implications are serious:

• Undermining EU and NATO sanctions policy;
• Breaching NATO’s collective security principles;
• Directly aiding Russia’s war machine by supporting maintenance of its military equipment.

The $92,000 in services cited in this document reflects the value of only one such shadow transaction. There may be hundreds—possibly thousands—more. But if Hungary’s government and EU authorities take note and act, these networks could be exposed and dismantled. This document also illustrates a broader pattern of using Kazakhstan for organizing maintenance schemes—similar to what was uncovered in our previous report #SU30Leaks: Kazakhstani specialists maintain Russian Su-30SM aircraft using French equipment from Thales and Safran.

We call on journalists, policymakers, and public servants in EU and NATO member states to launch investigations and expose these networks. Left unchecked, they compromise the very foundation of Western security.

We will continue our disclosures under the #OpsHackRussia’sDay tag. Additional revelations involving other companies from NATO countries are coming soon.

Therefore, if any country or company is considering cooperation with the Russian defense sector, think twice. Leaks from inside Russia are inevitable. Just look at the OpsHackRussiasDay series or our earlier exposé BaumankaLeaks. Part 2: secret details of the “contract of the century” for the Supply of S-400 missile systems between Russia and India.

To be continued. Stay tuned…

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