Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has conducted both open and covert mobilization.
Beginning in February 2022, after the invasion started, authorities pushed contract service under the guise of recruiting “volunteers” and forming new units. According to Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Defense Ministry (GUR), the Kremlin sought to replenish forces without formally declaring mobilization to avoid public backlash.
In September 2022, after a series of battlefield setbacks, President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial” mobilization, officially aiming to call up 300,000 reservists. The move sparked anger across Russia, prompting thousands of men to flee. Despite officials later claiming the mobilization had ended, no decree was ever issued to formally close it.
Since then, Russia has relied on active covert mobilization, focusing on contract service with large financial incentives to avoid mass protests while maintaining troop levels. In 2024 alone, 407,000 contract soldiers were reportedly recruited. Since the start of 2025, about 280,000 contracts have been signed, HUR deputy chief Vadym Skibitskyi told Ukrinform.
Skibitskyi said Russia is bringing in at least 35,000 personnel a month. He noted new recruits receive substantial payouts, including a 2 million ruble bonus for a first contract.
“There are clear signs they’ll fully meet their recruitment targets by year’s end,” Skibitskyi concluded.
Even so, analysts say Russia has been unable to fully offset its losses. That is one of the main reasons Moscow continues to weigh a new, open mobilization.
Russia’s summer offensive largely faltered, but Moscow is already preparing an autumn push with a new strategic concept. Pavlo Lakiychuk, head of military programs at the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI,” said Russian forces have been tasked with seizing three cities in Donetsk region: Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Dobropillya.
Speaking on FREEДОМ, Lakiychuk said taking those cities would allow Russia to eliminate Ukraine’s defensive hub in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad area and move into the rear of another agglomeration: Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. He said it signals a new plan after a failed summer operation in which Russian forces lacked resources and fell short of objectives.
The US-based Institute for the Study of War has also reported signs of Russian preparations for an autumn offensive in Donetsk region, including around Dobropillia, Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. Analysts say Russia has reduced the priority of operations in Sumy region and redeployed units to Donetsk.
Lakiychuk stressed that success will depend on Russia’s manpower and resources.
“Whether Russia can assemble the necessary personnel, conduct additional mobilization or draw on allies is hard to predict,” he said.
Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, also said Putin could opt for a new mobilization. In an interview with Apostrof TV, Budanov noted that after the 2022 draft, Russia did everything possible to avoid repeating it. Still, while mobilization would be painful for Russia, it remains a realistic option, he said.
Budanov argued there is little sense in sending conscripts to the front. But if Moscow proceeds with mobilization, it could quickly swell troop numbers to throw even more manpower into assaults. He added that mobilization would likely trigger public discontent—as in 2022—but wouldn’t stop Russia’s war effort.
Lakiychuk likewise believes Russia lacks sufficient mobilization capacity to cover current losses and needs fresh recruits. He said the decision ultimately rests with one person: Vladimir Putin.
Lakiychuk said Putin understands that while many Russians voice support for the war, they are reluctant to fight themselves—a reality laid bare by the 2022 mobilization and the public pushback it sparked.
Vadym Denysenko, head of the “DeloVaya Stolitsa” analytical center and a political analyst, also believes Putin has so far avoided a new draft out of fear - uncertainty and potential instability.
For now, Denysenko said, the Kremlin’s main hope is North Korean manpower. He added China could influence the situation given its leverage over Pyongyang. If the “Korean option” fails, Putin may have to return to mobilization, Denysenko argued.
Lakiychuk outlined other possible avenues beyond North Korea:
- Covert mobilization: try to lure recruits with higher payouts. He believes this mechanism is losing effectiveness.
- Open mobilization: conduct partial or nationwide mobilization.
- Foreign mercenaries: bring in fighters from abroad.
He also pointed to the upcoming Zapad-2025 strategic command-and-staff drills. In his view, Putin could use the exercises to assert control over the Belarusian army. Given close ties between the two countries’ officer corps and the readiness of Belarusian forces, this could temporarily plug Russia’s mobilization gap. Lakiychuk said Putin is unlikely to seek Alyaksandr Lukashenko’s consent—and warned the drills could end badly for the Belarusian leader.
Russian forces are also expected to step up mobilization of Ukrainians in temporarily occupied territories, according to the Center for National Resistance. Facing manpower shortfalls, Moscow is likely to lean on forced conscription there.
Russia continues to recruit inmates as well. Since the full-scale invasion began, up to 180,000 prisoners have been sent to fight in Ukraine, typically for less pay than other servicemembers.
A new nationwide mobilization in Russia cannot be ruled out. Denysenko noted the fall 2022 draft was launched without a prior information campaign. He said Putin now has all the legal tools ready to do it again.
From Prague, Russian opposition figure Alexander Morozov told Espreso that the Kremlin is not seeking compromise in its war against Ukraine. That is why, he argued, Russia will likely turn to some form of mobilization. With no clear frontline gains and Putin demanding results from the General Staff, “talk that the Kremlin will ultimately have to conduct mobilization sounds more convincing now than six months or a year ago,” he said.
Morozov described mobilization as complex and chaotic, requiring major logistics—one reason the Kremlin has avoided it. But the expanding drone war demands new military contingents, he said, and Russia won’t abandon its aims in Ukraine.
He believes mobilization would be less about decisive battlefield success and more about signaling “very strong intentions” to Ukraine and its allies - an effort to spark panic and fatigue in Ukraine and Europe while demonstrating Russia’s resolve.
