The following article analyses Russia’s hybrid warfare, Ukraine’s military transformation, and NATO’s forward defence posture in the Baltics. It also examines Crimea, eastern Ukraine, the use of drones, critical infrastructure, and strategic security challenges in Europe.
In February–March 2014, Russian soldiers without insignia seized Ukrainian administrative and military facilities in Crimea. Volunteers from InformNapalm international intelligence community quickly published detailed information about Russian military forces in multiple languages.
Using OSINT (open-source intelligence) methods, they identified hostile units, their affiliations, and even the personal data of individual soldiers. Through social media, they appealed to NATO and especially to Ukraine’s security guarantors under the Budapest Memorandum. The aim was to prompt swift intervention to halt the escalation of the hybrid war that the Kremlin had launched in Europe. Even at that time, clear parallels could be drawn with territorial annexations that preceded the Second World War.
Reactions from political leadership and international actors
Neither the Ukrainian political leadership—still in a precarious position after the Revolution of Dignity—nor leaders in Europe or the United States took immediate action. Caution was prioritized over intervention. This allowed Moscow the time and opportunity to draw NATO countries into protracted consultations.
During the period marked by terrorist actions in eastern Ukraine, there were numerous attacks on Ukrainian positions launched from Russian territory. These assaults frequently involved armoured vehicles, artillery, and other weapons systems. Many of these operations have been viewed as part of a broader strategy aimed at destabilising the region.
The Annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Ukraine
After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine took no decisive action to send reinforcements to the peninsula, which might have enabled the liberation of Ukrainian units. One possible reason was concern over a severe escalation and potential bloodshed. The situation was considered best managed through dialogue with Western allies.
The Russian invasion and occupation of eastern Ukraine expanded gradually, under the pretext of local resistance. Kyiv took more decisive measures, but they remained insufficient. Instead of declaring full mobilisation and a state of emergency, an anti-terrorist operation was announced. Ukraine began gradually developing an independent military capability, moving away from the Soviet legacy. Ukrainian forces, however, lacked experience in offensive warfare—unlike Russian units, which had conducted such operations since 1991. This inexperience made them hesitant to quickly employ weapons against the aggressor.
Hopes for a peaceful and just resolution, backed by the international community, faded as Russia repeatedly escalated aggression. These included violations of agreements, murders, torture, and kidnappings of Ukrainians—often targeting those who resisted the occupation or obstructed Russian and collaborator armed groups operating under the protection of Russian forces.
Lessons learned and preparations ahead of a large-scale invasion
From 2014 to 2022, Ukraine gained hard-won experience countering Russian hybrid warfare, facing recurring escalations and battles of high, medium, and low intensity in the east. This served as preparation for the most active parts of society, who defended the nation as both military personnel and volunteers.
The large-scale Russian invasion came as a shock to society but did not undermine the country’s resilience. Society had accumulated experience from conflicts over eight years. This practical knowledge enhanced preparedness for the escalation of hostilities.
Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the trajectory of a state already subjected to hybrid warfare and Russian hybrid aggression. The Kremlin failed to achieve its objectives through hybrid operations and localized conflict between 2014 and 2022. As a result, Moscow escalated to full-scale invasion, committing its entire military.
The offensive against Kyiv failed, and the Russian army became bogged down on all fronts. Larger territories occupied during the first month of the invasion were subsequently reclaimed.
The city of Kherson was the only regional centre initially captured by Russian forces. After eight months of occupation, the city was liberated by the Ukrainian army. The recovery of territories highlighted the limitations of the Russian military strategy and Ukraine’s capability to conduct counteroffensive operations.
Geographical vulnerability in the Baltics
The NATO member states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania face challenges due to their proximity to Russia and Belarus. Limited territory complicates strategic retreats, necessitating rapid response and deterrence. Russian hybrid aggression may include infiltration and cyber-attacks, similar to the methods used in Crimea in 2014. NATO is strengthening its defence through multinational battlegroups and Operation Baltic Sentry, launched in 2025, which protects the Baltic Sea’s infrastructure using advanced technology.
Ukraine’s experience with drones and electronic warfare can enhance the Baltic states’ capacity to counter threats. Forward defence now includes permanent brigades, such as Latvia’s brigade established in 2024, equipped with armoured vehicles and air defence systems. The Baltic Defence Line, under construction between 2024 and 2025, will create physical barriers to prevent infiltration.
Documented escalation of sabotage operations
Documents show a sharp escalation of Russian hybrid operations against NATO countries between 2023 and 2025. According to analyses from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the number of Russian attacks on European targets nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. At least 110 Russia-linked sabotage or physical attacks have been documented across Europe since 2022. Poland has been the hardest hit, with 20 incidents, followed by France with 15.
These operations have included sabotage of critical infrastructure, violent acts, cyberattacks, and the exploitation of migration as a political tool. Russian military intelligence directs the campaign, which relies on criminal proxies and online recruitment to carry out arson, incendiary packages, and vandalism. The purpose is to destabilize Western countries both economically and politically.
Notable incidents include an attack on a DHL cargo aircraft and an assassination attempt against the CEO of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The number of suspected Russian sabotage incidents rose to at least 44 in 2024, compared to 13 in 2023 and six in 2022. The escalation coincided with Western approval for Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles against Russian targets.
Damage to underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea
Damage to underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea represents a particularly serious form of hybrid aggression. On 25 December 2024, damage was reported to underwater cables between Estonia and Finland, prompting consultations within NATO. A similar incident was documented earlier the same year.
These events underscore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the Baltic region and the urgent need for enhanced protection. Danish intelligence has reported a continuing escalation of hybrid warfare against NATO states, involving cyberattacks, covert sabotage operations, and widespread GPS disruptions.
A summit with Baltic Sea allies was held on 14 January 2025, led by Secretary-General Mark Rutte, alongside Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Estonia’s Prime Minister Kristen Michal. In January 2025 NATO launched Operation Baltic Sentry in response to escalating threats against critical infrastructure. The operation coordinates allied naval forces, maritime surveillance equipment, and private sector actors to enable real-time responses to destabilising actions in the Baltic Sea.
Coordination between NATO and the European Union is being strengthened through the establishment of high-level working groups aimed at enhancing existing cooperation on the defence of underwater infrastructure and critical systems.
On 13 January 2021, the Swedish Armed Forces published a series of videos on its YouTube channel under the collective title “When War Comes.”
The uncertain future
The grey zone
The future battlefield
Total defence
What is worth defending
Transformation to forward defence
NATO’s military presence in the Baltics is undergoing a significant transformation from a forward presence to forward defence. At the Madrid summit in 2022, a decision was made to upgrade forces to brigade size where and when required. NATO established multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. These groups consist of combat-ready units from several member states and demonstrate the alliance’s combined capabilities.
Latvia became the first country to upgrade to brigade size in July 2024 with the formation of NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia. Canada took the lead and committed to expanding a battalion-sized task force into a fully operational brigade by 2026 at the latest. This task force includes contributions from Albania, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Germany formally inaugurated the multinational brigade it leads in Lithuania in May 2025. The German brigade includes contributions from the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Croatia, Luxembourg, and Iceland.
Defence spending within NATO has seen a significant increase in response to the deteriorating security situation. In 2024, NATO allies in Europe and Canada invested $485 billion in defence, representing an increase of nearly 20 per cent compared to 2023. Forecasts indicate continued growth in defence expenditure throughout 2025. Implementing forward defence will require sustained investments over the coming decade to acquire and develop the necessary capabilities.
The Baltic Defence Line represents a physical reinforcement of border security between the Baltics and Russia as well as Belarus. Construction began in Latvia on 2 May 2024 and in Estonia in June 2025. Lithuania plans to commence construction in late summer 2024. According to Latvia’s Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, completion of the defence line may take up to a decade. This infrastructure aims to strengthen territorial defence and hinder infiltration and rapid advances into Baltic territories.
Transformation of Ukraine’s defence industry
Between 2014 and 2024, Ukraine’s Armed Forces underwent a comprehensive transformation, enhancing their combat capabilities and ability to counter modern threats. The establishment of a military training system aligned with NATO standards is underway in Ukraine, with an institutional review by NATO experts planned for October 2025. Following this review, Ukraine will be able to apply for certification of professional military training in accordance with NATO standards. NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine was established at the Washington summit in July 2024 and became operational in December of the same year. In January 2025, NATO assumed command and control from the United States over air defence in Poland, protecting logistical hubs for this operation.
Ukraine’s defence industry is undergoing rapid modernisation, with domestic weapons production designated as a priority sector. The government planned to invest 1.3 billion US dollars in military research and development during 2024. Expenditure on domestically produced weapons was estimated at approximately $10 billion over the same period. The Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar is establishing production facilities in Ukraine, demonstrating international confidence in the country’s industrial capacity.
Ukrainian drone production and international support
Drone production represents a particularly prominent aspect of Ukraine’s military-industrial transformation. In 2024, at least one million drones were produced, with plans to manufacture 2.5 to 3 million units in 2025. The Ministry of Defence intends to procure 4.5 million unmanned aerial vehicles during 2025. Deliveries to the Ukrainian Armed Forces rose from 20,000 drones per month at the start of 2024 to 200,000 a year later—a tenfold increase. Domestically manufactured drones accounted for more than 96 percent of all UAVs used by the armed forces in 2024.
An international drone coalition has pledged to provide approximately €2.75 billion to assist Ukraine in procuring an additional one million drones by 2025. Funding covers purchases from Ukrainian manufacturers—supporting the domestic industry—as well as delivery of critical components. In the second half of 2024, Ukraine unveiled new Palianytsia and Peklo drone missiles, with plans to produce at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025..
Strategic implications for European security
Security in the Baltic Sea region is shaped by both Russian hybrid aggression and conventional threats. The small geographic depth of the Baltic states creates unique challenges for defense, requiring strong deterrence and rapid response. Kaliningrad’s position as a Russian exclave and Belarus’s status as a Kremlin ally further complicate the regional picture. Russia’s use of Belarusian territory to launch the 2022 invasion of Ukraine illustrates the potential for similar operations targeting the Baltic states
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are continuously gaining experience from ongoing combat operations. These insights can be used to develop and adapt NATO doctrines and operational concepts. They include, among other things, the use of unmanned systems, electronic warfare, integrated air defence, and countermeasures against hybrid aggression. Ukraine has developed the ability to identify, document, and counter hybrid operations through more than a decade of practice—experience that can strengthen preparedness and defense planning across NATO. Established cooperation with NATO training and standardization programs allows for the transfer of this operational expertise directly into alliance structures.
The combination of combat experience, growing defence production, and the implementation of NATO standards creates the foundation for significant military capability in Ukraine. This development requires continued international support. A successful conclusion to the ongoing war is essential to enable Ukraine to secure its territories and begin reconstruction under stable security conditions.
Support for Ukraine’s defence and transformation represents an investment in European security that extends beyond the current conflict. The costs of addressing aggression promptly are always lower than the costs of dealing with the consequences of passivity and delay.
Ukraine’s role in an alternative security order
The first 48 hours following an armed aggression against Estonia, Poland, or Scandinavia represent a critical period for NATO’s cohesion and credibility. Any hesitation or lack of resolve among member states to fulfill their Article 5 commitments could create the need for an interim coalition of willing states to mount an initial defense. In such a scenario, Ukraine could emerge as a central actor and driving force, leveraging its combat experience and readiness.
Ukraine’s special forces make use of drones and missiles, enhancing combat effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the time required to respond to attacks. NATO forces operate with limited freedom of action due to extensive consultation and decision-making procedures. A potential U.S. withdrawal from its role as the principal guarantor of the Euro-Atlantic security order provides justification for Ukraine to assume this role.
For such a shift to be viable, Ukraine’s endurance must be secured through long-term financial and material support from states seeking collective protection against aggression. An alternative security order would also require not only demonstrated military capability but verified political will among all participants.
The article was prepared by R. Tavan.
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