Successful Ukrainian strikes on two tankers in Russia’s “shadow fleet” in the Black Sea are a lawful military operation, blogger Maksym Gardus argues - and they carry global consequences. Rising risks around oil transport could cut Russia’s revenues in ways Western sanctions have not.
On November 28–29, two tankers - KAIROS (IMO 9236004) and VIRAT (IMO 9832559 - that belong to Russia’s so‑called shadow fleet and are sanctioned by the U.S., EU and UK were hit in separate incidents. According to sources, both vessels were struck by Ukrainian Sea Baby maritime drones in a joint operation by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy.
KAIROS is a crude oil tanker, deadweight 115,000 tons; flag through November 2025: Gambia (after that - stateless). Operator: Chinese company ALAFIA TRADING LTD (Shanghai). The UK and EU have sanctioned the ship. Monitoring reports say KAIROS made at least eight voyages with Russian crude over the past 18 months, totaling about 1.2 million tons.
The second target, VIRAT, has a deadweight of 105,000 tons; flag through November 2025: Gambia (previously Comoros). Operator: Glory Shipping HK Ltd (Hong Kong); owner: East Honest Hong Kong Ltd. It is sanctioned by the U.S., EU, UK and Canada. The tanker made at least seven voyages carrying roughly 0.8 million tons.
Both tankers were sailing empty to Novorossiysk to load, minimizing environmental impact at the time of the strikes.
The operation’s organizers argue: “The SBU continues active measures to cut Russia’s financial capacity to wage war against Ukraine. Sea Baby maritime drones disabled vessels that could have transported nearly $70 million worth of oil and helped the Kremlin evade international sanctions.”
KAIROS and VIRAT are typical of the “shadow fleet”: opaque ownership, shifting flags and gray‑market insurance. Such tankers handle an estimated 25–35% of Russia’s oil exports under sanctions. Both ships regularly switched off AIS transponders (a SOLAS violation), conducted ship‑to‑ship transfers in non‑conventional areas and worked with sanctioned terminals.
International reaction has been muted. Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu acknowledged an “external strike” and “possible use of drones,” and Turkey’s maritime authority released photos of the damaged vessels. Western officials have so far declined to comment.
Black Sea exports are critical for Russia’s budget. Crude shipments from Black Sea ports account for about 23% of Russia’s total oil exports - roughly 1.5–1.8 million barrels per day - bringing in an estimated $100–130 million in daily revenue, depending on prices.
The IEA estimates that in 2025 more than 31% of Russia’s tax revenues will come from the oil sector. The shadow fleet is central to moving volumes sold above the price cap without Western insurance, effectively allowing the Kremlin to earn around $1 billion weekly while skirting sanctions. The strikes signal that this fleet is not “untouchable.”
Insurance risk is likely to rise for all ships moving Russian oil - raising logistics costs and squeezing Russia’s profits. That amplifies the sanctions’ impact by adding a physical risk to a legal one. In the coming weeks, the cost to charter tankers for Russian oil should indicate how much less profitable reselling that crude becomes.
Gardus argues Ukraine’s strategic priority remains a full embargo on Russian oil and gas through diplomatic and political means. But not all countries respond to moral or legal arguments, and some prioritize profit. Alongside sanctions diplomacy, Ukraine is employing targeted kinetic actions to reduce Russia’s ability to finance its aggression.
Sea Baby maritime drones are thus more than technology - they’re a new deterrence tool that can cut Russian revenues more effectively than statements alone. And Russian oil is not irreplaceable: global supply is sufficient, and buyers can source elsewhere.
A combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure and modern Ukrainian technology should persuade Russia’s international counterparties to change course.
The author expresses a personal opinion that may not reflect the editorial stance. Responsibility for data in the Opinions section rests with the author.
