Mass protests have again shaken Iran, and the regime looks more vulnerable—economically, militarily, and politically—in 2026 than it has been in decades. A key but often overlooked reason for this vulnerability is that Russia no longer has the capacity to meaningfully support its most important Middle Eastern partner.
For years, Moscow functioned as Iran’s strategic backstop. Russian weapons, diplomatic cover, and military cooperation allowed Tehran to expand its influence through proxies from Gaza to southern Lebanon. Today, that system is under strain, and not just because of Israel’s and United States’ military action in the Middle East. Russia’s war in Ukraine has depleted Russia’s military stockpiles, distracted its leadership, and significantly limited its ability to project power beyond its immediate neighborhood.
The collapse of Assad’s regime underscores this shift. Once Russia and Iran withdrew meaningful support, Damascus fell with surprising speed. The lesson for Tehran was unmistakable: Moscow’s guarantees are no longer reliable. Going forward, Iran will have to confront internal dissent and external pressure without the assurance that Russia can intervene decisively on its behalf.
This shift matters because Russia has long viewed Middle Eastern instability as strategically useful. Conflicts involving Israel, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah divert Western attention and resources, weaken U.S. alliances, and elevate Moscow’s role as an indispensable power broker. Russia’s partnerships with Iran and its proxies were never ideological. They were transactional, designed to frustrate American influence and constrain democratic states.
The military cooperation between Russia and Iran illustrates this logic. Over the past decade, Moscow supplied Tehran with weapons and operational know-how. Iranian drones have been sustaining Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian cities. Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile barrage against Israel reflected tactics Russia has refined in Ukraine: saturation attacks combining drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to overwhelm air defenses.
But Russia’s ability to support Iran is being gradually eroded by the war in Ukraine. Arms transfers are harder to sustain, even as Iran is becoming asymmetrically more dependent on Russia. And Moscow has little appetite for a direct confrontation with Israel or the United States while its forces remain bogged down in Eastern Europe.
The same dynamic applies to Russia’s ties with Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Moscow has maintained working relationships with both Hamas and Hezbollah, hosted their leadership in Russia, and benefited from the global distraction created by wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Yet even here, Russia’s leverage is waning. A weakened Russia cannot simultaneously sustain a major European war and act as a guarantor for Iran’s proxy network.
For Europe, the United States, and other allies, the connection between Russia and bad actors in the Middle East creates a strategic opportunity: strong action in Europe has positive spillovers to other regions. Supporting Ukraine is not merely about defending European borders. It directly constrains Russia’s ability to fuel instability in the Middle East. A Russia forced to prioritize its own survival has fewer resources to arm Iran, fewer incentives to provoke regional crises, and less capacity to shield authoritarian partners from the consequences of their actions.
The recent unrest in Iran was not necessarily caused by Russia’s decline. But it unfolded in a geopolitical environment far less favorable to Tehran than in years past. That environment was shaped in large part by Ukraine’s resistance and the West’s support for it.
Thus, far from being competing priorities, Ukraine and the Middle East are inherently linked. Weakening Russia’s war machine creates ripple benefits on all fronts. Sustained military aid to Ukraine, tougher enforcement of sanctions, and fewer self-imposed limits on Ukraine’s ability to strike legitimate military targets inside Russia would accelerate this effect.
The lesson of recent events is straightforward: when Russia faces large enough losses in Ukraine, its capacity to destabilize other regions declines. That is a strategic dividend worth recognizing and reinforcing.
Фото: depositphotos.com
