Despite the significant assistance Warsaw has provided to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, themes of historical responsibility and social balance have become increasingly prominent in Polish political discourse. The victory of Karol Nawrocki, former head of the Institute of National Remembrance, in the 2025 presidential election reflected this demand for a more pragmatic political model. Let us turn to his public statements and speeches to understand how Poland’s position toward Ukraine is transforming in the first months of his presidency and what opportunities for constructive dialogue this new reality opens.

Karol Nawrocki before the presidency: institutional career and the election campaign

Karol Nawrocki is a historian by training. In 2013-2017, he headed the Public Education Office at the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in Gdańsk, and later served as the Director of the Museum of the Second World War (2017-2021). In 2021, the current president was appointed President of the IPN, a position he held until 2025. Prior to this period, Nawrocki was not a political actor at the national level, and his public statements were primarily academic in nature. Until 2021, his remarks did not reflect a consistent position on Ukraine as a state, Polish-Ukrainian relations, or foreign policy more broadly. The turning point came with his appointment as head of the IPN — an institution that plays a key role in shaping Poland’s official memory policy. It was at this point that, for Nawrocki, historical memory gradually transformed from a subject of academic research into a political instrument.

Even before Nawrocki assumed leadership of the IPN, Poland’s relations with Ukraine in the sphere of historical memory were tense. Between 2014 and 2017, around fifteen acts of vandalism targeting Ukrainian burial sites and memorials were recorded in Poland. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM) responded by suspending the issuance of permits for Polish search operations until the protection of Ukrainian sites of memory was guaranteed. This was followed by major disputes over who was responsible for destroying monuments to UPA members: Ukrainian or Polish actors. Against this backdrop, Karol Nawrocki’s consistent position took shape, emphasizing the need for Ukraine to officially condemn the OUN and UPA. He repeatedly demanded that Kyiv recognize their activities as criminal and publicly apologize to the Polish side. This position disregards Ukraine’s earlier gestures — most notably Petro Poroshenko’s apology in the Sejm in 2014 regarding the Volhynia tragedy. Nawrocki emphasized that between 2017 and 2024, the institute sent nine requests for search operations that allegedly went unanswered, and argued that war cannot serve as a justification for failing to grant permits. Such a stance constructs an image of a “historically irresponsible” Kyiv, enabling the Polish side to continually reproduce the conflict without acknowledging the steps Ukraine has already taken.

The 2025 election campaign marked the final politicization of Nawrocki’s historical rhetoric and its integration into broader right-wing conservative discourse. Nawrocki positioned himself as a candidate of the “patriotic camp“, appealing to voters disillusioned with liberal policies, particularly the EU’s openness toward migrants. Within this logic, historical memory ceases to be a matter of the past — it becomes a marker of national sovereignty.

In his statements, Karol Nawrocki directly linked Ukraine’s prospects for European and Euro-Atlantic integration to the resolution of issues related to shared history, effectively presenting this as a precondition for further support. Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly responded to these remarks. In his comment, he ironically advised Karol Nawrocki to work out in the gym and be prepared to take up arms if Ukraine does not obtain NATO membership, thereby clearly outlining the security dimension of such political signals. In early 2025, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Nawrocki’s statements as manipulative and short-sighted regarding Poland’s strategic interests. The ministry also emphasized that Karol Nawrocki’s words were met with applause in the Kremlin.

Under Nawrocki’s pressure, the situation gradually began to change: starting in 2025, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory began issuing permits for exhumations, and a Ukrainian-Polish working group agreed on joint exhumation activities in both Ukraine and Poland. Despite this, Nawrocki initiated amendments to the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance and to the Criminal Code in order to equate OUN-UPA ideology with Nazism and communism. The absence of historical context in the draft law is not surprising, as the relevant explanations are typically contained in accompanying documents. The problem lies rather in the content and the manner in which the provision is justified: ignoring the complexity of historical processes and scholarly debate may indicate an attempt to entrench a dominant interpretation of the past. By comparison, Ukraine’s decommunization laws also had a political dimension; however, they were accompanied by expert discussions and references to historical research. The Sejm rejected a draft law proposing penalties for promoting “Banderism”, including up to 3 years’ imprisonment.

Karol Nawrocki as president: pragmatism instead of solidarity

Following his inauguration on August 6, 2025, Nawrocki’s historical rhetoric was transformed into an element of state policy. He declared support for Ukraine in the war against Russia, but emphasized that Polish assistance cannot run counter to national interests: economic, social, and security interests.

In Poland’s domestic politics, Ukrainians are becoming part of a broader migration issue. Demands directed at Ukraine regarding Volhynia and the condemnation of the OUN-UPA fit within the same framework as the slogan “Poland without migrants”: the state must firmly defend its own interests, even at the cost of conflicts with its partners. Nawrocki’s veto of a bill expanding assistance to refugees and his statement about ending the “exceptional regime” of support for Ukrainians signal the withdrawal of special provisions for Ukrainian refugees. At the same time, they are not, of course, being discriminated against: the Ukrainian community in Poland will instead remain within the same legal framework that applies to all migrants and national minorities. This decision aligns with Nawrocki’s rhetoric while simultaneously reducing the space for right-wing populist attacks against him.

Other statements and actions by Karol Nawrocki as president suggest that cooperation between our countries will continue. However, Poland’s position will be more assertive and pragmatic, requiring the use of more sophisticated diplomatic instruments in dialogue with it. In particular, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, Oleksandr Alfiorov, noted Nawrocki’s delicacy during a meeting in Warsaw on December 19, 2025. The Polish president deliberately avoided familiar ideological references to “Banderites” or “Ukrainian nationalism”. The Ukrainian historian considers this shift in tone a significant signal: both Ukrainians and Poles are finally demonstrating readiness for a mature conversation characteristic of neighbors with a thousand-year history, capable of seeking mutual understanding without mutual offense. This may also be linked to Ukraine’s decision to unblock exhumations in 2025.

At the same time, the idea of a possible rapprochement between Warsaw and Moscow has no real basis. For Nawrocki, Russia remains an aggressive post-Soviet state and a threat to the European order. He consistently emphasizes that the Kremlin never honors its commitments and that Ukraine must have the decisive voice in peace negotiations. He also expressed this position in a conversation with Donald Trump, describing Putin as an unreliable partner who cannot be trusted. This logic on the part of the Polish president removes any concerns about a potential drift of Poland toward Russia and keeps our countries within the same security framework despite disagreements over history.

Karol Nawrocki’s rhetoric as president has brought an end to the period of “emotional diplomacy” and shifted Polish-Ukrainian relations onto a transactional footing. Strategic support for Ukraine in the war remains a security priority, but it is no longer separate from issues of historical memory or economic competition. Today, we are witnessing the parallel development of three processes: the preservation of military-technical cooperation, the gradual reduction of social commitments to Ukrainian refugees, and the transformation of historical disputes into an instrument of realpolitik. Whereas previously Nawrocki’s views reflected only the position of the head of a specialized institution, they have now become the official state policy line, in which each step is accompanied by an assessment of benefits for Warsaw.

Because the Polish leader openly links European integration to progress on issues of national memory, ignoring these demands will only deepen the crisis. A rational step would be to move historical issues into the technical domain of bilateral expert commissions. The first permits for exhumations are a positive signal; however, this process should not become an ad hoc measure but a systematic instrument for reducing tensions. This would deprive anti-Ukrainian forces of any ground to exploit narratives of Kyiv’s “ingratitude”.

Modern communication with Poland must be based on sober calculation rather than appeals to Europe’s moral obligation. In working with a president who makes military assistance contingent on resolving historical disputes and economic considerations, Ukraine should speak the language of concrete shared interests. Such an approach will allow Nawrocki to maintain his status as a “defender of national dignity”, while preserving Poland as the key strategic and logistical hub, which is vital for the survival of both states.

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