Ukraine and the United States played a long game of cat and mouse, each trying to secure more favorable terms in the minerals deal.

Months of delays, disagreements, manipulations, and even a temporary suspension of aid led to a ratification of the deal by the Ukrainian legislature today.

338 out of 347 Ukrainian MPs voted in favor.

Now, only its implementation remains.

“This quick turn of events [ratification] means that we are, roughly speaking, serious and responsible. Ukraine does not renounce its commitments and demonstrates confidence and consistency in its actions,” Ivan Valiushko, an expert at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, explained in an interview to The Counteroffensive.

Despite lengthy negotiations and some public disagreements, Ukraine and the United States finally signed an agreement establishing a United States-Ukraine reconstruction investment fund on April 30.

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Hungary

On March 20, 2025, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated on his X page that Ukraine’s EU membership would cost each Hungarian household 500,000 forints (1,200 euros) annually:

“9,000 billion HUF – that’s how much the war has already cost Hungarian families. 500,000 HUF per household, every year – that’s the price tag of Ukraine’s EU membership.  Brussels wants Hungarians to pay the bill, but no decision will be made without the voice of the Hungarian people. A new member can only join with the unanimous support from all Member States. There can be no decision until the Hungarian people cast their votes. This decision belongs to our citizens, not Brussels!”

First of all, where does this data come from? These are calculations by the Századvég Foundation, a think tank affiliated with Orbán. According to the foundation, “Ukraine has cost each Hungarian household 2.2 million HUF” (5,500 euros) or 9,000 billion HUF (22.5 billion euros) in total. The basis for the supposed losses includes three components: rising prices for imported gas, increased state spending due to higher yields on government bonds, and losses from reduced exports to Russia.

In reality, it refers to increased prices for imported gas due to changes in spot prices at the TTF Gas Hub in the Netherlands and additional budget expenditures due to the higher cost of state debt (due to geopolitical risks and inflation shocks, the yield on 5-year Hungarian government bonds rose from 2% to 4–6%). Additionally, bilateral sanctions – imposed by the EU on Russia and by Russia on the EU – affected Hungary’s trade volumes with the aggressor state. However, the root cause of these losses – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – is not mentioned in the Századvég Foundation’s analysis.

Secondly, what does 500,000 HUF (1,250 euros) from each Hungarian household for Ukraine’s EU accession mean? In reality, Ukraine will not “take” money from every Hungarian family. It is more about potentially foregone aid from the EU budget that the country currently receives, and possible increased expenditures from Hungary’s state budget.

These calculations are based on the potential reduction in receipts from the EU Cohesion Fund and subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), contributions to support Ukraine amounting to 0.25% of GDP, additional pension costs for Ukrainians who supposedly will move to Hungary, and estimates of Hungary’s share in financing Ukraine’s reconstruction.

In general, there are several issues with the 500,000 HUF figure:

• They are based on the assumption that Ukraine would join the EU today. In reality, the years leading up to Ukraine’s EU integration will bring changes both in Ukraine (for example, we need to harmonize legislation with EU standards) and in the EU itself. By the time of Ukraine’s accession, both the CAP and the distribution of Cohesion Fund expenditures will likely have been significantly revised. Discussions on such revisions have already begun.
• Reconstruction costs for Ukraine are a separate international initiative, not part of the EU accession process, and not solely the responsibility of member states. Therefore, treating them as “future losses” for the population related to Ukraine’s EU accession is unfounded and manipulative.
• The calculations of migration and pension burdens are based on speculative assumptions. For example, the claim that 5% of Ukrainian pensioners will move to Hungary. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of February 2025, the share of Ukrainians who chose Hungary as a refuge was about 1% of the total number of refugees in European countries.

Finally, the estimates by the Századvég Foundation do not consider the positive economic effects of enlargement: new markets, investments, enhanced security, and stability in the region. According to IMF calculations, EU enlargement, particularly due to the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan countries, could increase the bloc’s GDP by 14% over 15 years.

By the way, Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 also involved both pre-accession financial aid and post-accession funding to support its integration and development through three programs: ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). Between 1990 and 2006, Hungary received €1.987 billion (in prices of that time). But even after joining, the country continued to receive support — financial aid for 2021–2027 is planned at around €30 billion.

Hungary receives several times more from the Cohesion Fund and other EU funds than it contributes to the EU budget. Its contribution is relatively small (about €2 billion with a GDP of more than €200 billion), while the amount received is one of the highest in the EU among recipient countries (after subtracting contributions, Hungary received around €4.5 billion from the EU budget in 2023). If calculated per capita, each Hungarian hypothetically gives “out of their pocket” about €200, while receiving nearly €700.

Poland and Slovakia

Concerns and myths about Ukraine’s accession to the European Union exist not only in Hungary. Polish presidential candidate from the opposition party Law and Justice (PiS), Karol Nawrocki, stated that Poland cannot afford actions that would harm its economy:

Russian propaganda media, citing Nawrocki’s interview for Sieci, picked up on the narrative that Ukraine’s EU membership would be economically disadvantageous for Poland.

Polish journalist and commentator Łukasz Warzecha pointed out that large amounts of money would go to Ukraine, which would be a direct competitor to Poland:

In Slovakia, social media users circulated several false claims about the negative impact of Ukraine’s accession to the EU on the national economy. In particular, they manipulated the words of MP Ľubica Karvašová from the “Progressive Slovakia” party, who said that Slovak farmers would have to grow different products if Ukraine joins the EU. Social media users claimed the politician proposed that farmers grow camels and oranges. The post added that farmers would go bankrupt because Ukraine would supply products that Slovaks have “been growing for centuries”.

Slovak politician and deputy chair of the “Hungarian Alliance”, György Gyimesi, claims that under current rules, Cohesion Fund money is allocated to those member states where GNI (gross national income) per capita is below 90% of the EU average:

He also noted that if Ukraine joined the EU, supposedly 30% of all money allocated under the Common Agricultural Policy would go to Ukraine. Gyimesi concluded that if Ukraine joined the EU, it would become the largest beneficiary of the EU budget:

A new formula for solidarity: transform, not compete

It is precisely the allocation of funds from these programs – the European Structural and Investment Funds and within the CAP – that Ukraine’s Eastern European neighbors mainly refer to when discussing potential losses (or rather, forgone income) for their households.

For example, the Cohesion Fund supports EU member states with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average to strengthen the EU’s economic, social, and territorial cohesion. Under the current 2021–2027 program, 15 out of 27 countries are eligible for funding (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). And the allocation of funds within the CAP depends on the area of arable land and the number and size of farming households.

Currently, all EU spending estimates related to Ukraine’s accession are based on the “here-and-now” assumption, that is, they consider the country’s current economic status, relative population size, and the configuration of the current EU institutional system. Under these assumptions, the potential volumes of support are impressive. For instance, according to estimates of researchers from the German Economic Institute in Cologne, if Ukraine had been an EU member in 2023, it would have received €130–190 billion: €70–90 billion in agricultural aid and €50–90 billion under cohesion regional policy. EU estimates are similar – €186 billion.

A transformation of budget priorities always accompanies EU enlargement. However, these changes are not a burden but an investment in economic, social, and political stability across the continent. Even before new members join, the EU begins investing in their transformation: supporting reforms, strengthening institutions, and modernizing infrastructure.

The example of Croatia, which joined the Union in 2013, demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach. Between 2007 and 2013, it received €998 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). After accession, Croatia received €12.2 billion through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), of which €9.1 billion came from EU Cohesion Policy funds. Additionally, in 2014–2020, Croatia received €2.3 billion under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Rural Development Programme.

The EU assisted Croatia in building institutional capacity, focusing primarily on preparing government institutions to comply with EU legislation and meet necessary criteria. The main focus was accelerating reforms in key areas such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration reform, public finances, economic restructuring, and the business environment.

This strengthened the Croatian economy and the EU single market, into which local businesses integrated, expanding production chains. Accordingly, trade volumes increased. Add to this the new labor force and strengthened EU influence in the region. Croatia’s EU accession became a signal to other Balkan countries about the possibility of integration, provided reforms are implemented.

Under current conditions, Ukraine could become a net recipient of aid. At the same time, European countries that currently receive support would lose it, since Ukraine has the lowest GNI per capita and a high share of arable land. To integrate current candidates (which, in addition to Ukraine, include Moldova, Balkan countries, and Georgia), the EU needs to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. The EU budget and structural funds should consider current country indicators, growth potential, strategic importance, and benefits to the entire European Union.

Scholars and experts believe that if the EU enacts institutional reform, the costs of adapting Ukraine will be lower. Moreover, the efficiency of Ukraine’s agricultural sector is underestimated, and thus, subsidies for Ukrainian farmers may be significantly lower than the cited estimates.

Support for less developed regions is not only a matter of solidarity but also a mechanism for developing the internal market: new consumers and producers, reduced migration pressure, and strengthened regional security. People stay to live and work at home while purchasing goods produced in other EU countries.

Ukraine will bring unique assets to the EU: digital transformation, military resilience, flexible institutions, and civic engagement. While some European countries are slowly adapting to changes, Ukraine is already acting as a transformation accelerator.

Yes, integration requires investment. But these are investments in a new market, new energy, and a more resilient European space. Ukraine is not a “beneficiary” but a partner capable of strengthening and renewing the European Union.

Ukrainian Alina Petrauskaite has chosen to live her life in the service of God. Although she once dreamed of having a family, a deeper calling led her to the convent to serve as a nun.

In their daily prayers, many Catholic believers worldwide pray for Ukraine, and were previously led by Pope Francis until his death last month.

Now, during the election for the new pope, Alina and her fellow nuns are intensifying their prayers so that the cardinals can choose a good pope.

"We desire the Holy Spirit to show them who it should be," she said.

The death of Pope Francis has revived discussions about the Vatican's role in the world’s most pressing conflicts. In the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Holy See has long walked a diplomatic tightrope, criticized for ambiguity – yet it continues to maintain dialogue with both Kyiv and Moscow.

Unlike other world powers, the Vatican offers no weapons, only moral leverage — and increasingly, it is using it to help Ukraine reclaim prisoners, deported children, and even the remains of fallen soldiers.

With protocol-breaking moments like Zelenskyy’s placement at the papal funeral, quiet signals from Moscow – such as the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to papal appeals for peace – and even a brief, symbolic meeting with Trump, the Vatican is emerging as an unlikely but important ally for Ukraine — and a rare channel of dialogue in a polarized world.

Alina is a Roman Catholic nun who belongs to the Congregation of the Little Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was founded in Poland in 1888 and began operating in Ukraine in 1969. She and her fellow sisters serve God and do charitable work through social, educational, and pastoral activities. They do not wear traditional monastic habits like other nuns to stay closer to other people and serve among them.

Just like priests, nuns prepare for life in a monastery, which can take several years, gradually discerning their calling. After that, the nuns have to take three vows – of purity, poverty, and obedience – pledging to dedicate themselves to God, community, and service to others.

Alina now serves in Kyiv at the Catholic Media Centre. She is the editor-in-chief of the official website of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine. She has commented on Pope Francis' foreign trips, meetings, and solemn services on major holidays. They also cover the activities and life of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine.

Ukraine is a predominantly Orthodox country where traditional Catholicism represents a small share of the population – just 1 percent. In addition, about 9 percent of the population identify as Greek Catholics, mostly in western Ukraine. Most Ukrainians belong to Orthodox churches – around 70 percent.

But Christians and non-Christians all around the world are awaiting the election of the next pope – and its geopolitical consequences. Alina says she doesn’t focus on individual candidates — she believes that the most worthy one will be chosen.

The Pope is elected during a conclave, a secret vote of cardinals in the Sistine Chapel. Only cardinals under 80 can vote, and the winning candidate has to gain a majority of two-thirds of the votes in order to be elected. After a successful conclave, white smoke comes out of the Chapel's chimney, to signal that a new pope has been chosen.

Whoever the next Pope is, there will be consequences for Ukraine, as different candidates have different views on the war.

Possible Papal Candidates:

1. Pietro Parolin: Many believe that the most likely successor to Pope Francis is his former chief advisor, the Vatican Secretary of State. Parolin recognizes Ukraine's right to self-defense, but is cautious about Western military support for fear of escalation. In 2024, he visited Kyiv, and in 2025, he supported the idea of negotiations with Russia for a just and lasting peace.

   

2. Luis Antonio Tagle: The Filipino would be the first ever Asian pope if selected. Tagle has spoken about the war mainly in a humanitarian context, without mentioning Russia.

“No gun can kill hope, the goodness of the spirit in the human person. There are so many testimonies to this… The mission to always remind the world that every conflict, every disaster has a human face…. For example, the war in Ukraine and conflicts in other countries of the world are generally presented as political, military conflicts but people are forgotten!” said Tagle in an interview.

3. Matteo Zuppi: Zuppi – who was chosen by Pope Francis to lead an initiative for peace in Ukraine – has visited Kyiv and Moscow, but has avoided condemning Russian aggression, speaking instead of suffering and the need for peace. Like Tagle, he’s known for being progressive but also cautious in their statements about Ukraine and Russia.
   

4. Peter Tarkson: Hailing from Ghana, Tarkson avoids political statements. Calls for prayer for peace and often blames world leaders for nuclear threats, but does not directly condemn Russia.

“With war, everything is lost; but with peace, there is everything to gain. The devastation of Ukraine corresponds to Russia's wobbling economy, Germany's recession & U.S.A's mounting domestic debt etc. But talk about Economic malaise skips pain their economies cause in Ukraine,” Tarkson wrote on Twitter.

5. Péter Erdő: сlose to Hungarian Prime Minister Orban - a close ally of Russia. For example the cardinal has largely avoided critisizing Orban over democratic backsliding and rule-of-law concerns, including the controversial 2021 anti-LGBT law that closely mirrors Russian legislation, and shares his cautious rhetoric on the war.
   
   Although not openly pro-Russian, he refrains from criticizing Russia and maintains a dialogue with both Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

6. Pierbattista Pizzaballa: Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pizzaballa expressed concern over the war in Ukraine. In 2022, he performed a rite of consecration of Ukraine and Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary – a symbolic request to help the two peoples to rebuild trust, without which, according to him, peace is impossible – and called for the restoration of trust between nations.

“So that they may listen to each other again, that she may help them to rebuild relationships of trust between them, without which there will be no future," said Pizzaballa in 2022.

The conclave will begin on May 7th, and many predict it will not last long, Andrii Yurash, Ukraine's Ambassador to the Holy See, explained that there are different views in the modern church.

"I think that in this situation, it would be more logical for the Church to choose someone who can represent and be acceptable to those groups that envision and plan the future development of the Church. So, a centrist would currently seem to have the strongest prospects," Yurash said.

Today’s cardinals are divided into different groups. Some seek to continue Pope Francis' socially progressive course, others want to return to traditional forms of church life, while some centrists try to combine these approaches, he told The Counteroffensive.

Far from the cardinals’ deliberations in Rome, Alina’s journey into religious life began in Kyiv.

The monk who founded this group believed that sisters should serve in the areas where they came from. That is why Alina continues her ministry in Ukraine.It wasn’t always easy for Alina to become a nun. Alina was baptised in a Catholic church. She attended church with her family only on major holidays. But her life changed when, at age 15, her friends invited her to participate in religious classes at St Alexander Church in the centre of Kyiv.

“At that time, being closer to the church, I realized that I also wanted to be like the nuns I had seen, that I wanted to be in the church like them, and serve God more in this way,” Alina told.

Since then, she has seen the Church as a place of personal faith and a global voice in the world’s most challenging moments.

The Vatican is not involved in military conflicts and does not support any side with arms. Instead, it acts as a moral mediator in wars and conflicts.

Although Alina mentioned that the Pope’s position may not directly influence the aid level, she believes it still matters.

“It’s not just about Pope Francis — this is a long-standing Vatican policy, developed over centuries, with its justification and tradition. Pope Francis, in particular, was more of a pastor at heart than a diplomat,” Alina explained.

Pope Francis's statements have often been quite controversial among Ukrainians. His messages about fraternal nations and the importance of a truce, even with territorial concessions from Ukraine, were not universally popular.

"They are brothers, cousins. Let them come to an understanding! War is always a defeat. Peace to the whole world!" said Pope Francis, addressing the bishops, clergy and religious of the French island of Corsica in December 2024.

“Perhaps we [Ukrainians] wanted to put our words in the pope's mouth and expected the pope to say precisely that. But we see that certain things have now opened up to what the pope did. I realized one thing: Evaluating the pope's words and actions is challenging because we don't know the truth and the mechanisms,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

Russia has systematically taken steps to develop relations with the Holy See for centuries.

“It was [Francis’] dream because no pope had ever been to Moscow, and he wanted to establish closer contacts, ” Yurash said.

After 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in Eastern Ukraine, the Vatican found itself in a difficult diplomatic position, trying to balance condemnation of aggression with maintaining a dialogue with Moscow.

The ‘Pope for Ukraine’ initiative was created to allow people worldwide to donate funds for Ukrainians affected by the war in the country's east. In its first two years, the initiative raised around €16 million, including a personal contribution from Pope Francis.

During the full-scale invasion, a special humanitarian mission, headed by Cardinal Konrad Krajewski, was established. Ten such missions have been carried out since March 2022.

The Pope had general audiences every Wednesday and Sunday, and speeches were broadcast all over the world. In almost all of his speeches, he reminded people about the war in Ukraine, Alina explained.

" While the whole world has forgotten, the news doesn't talk about it anymore, because the bombings are not so tragic, the casualties are not so great, we are all used to the same shelling, but the Pope kept saying ‘Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine.’”

Even in his last Easter address in 2025, Francis mentioned Ukraine.

"Pope Francis, in his Urbi et Orbi [traditional Pope`s address to the ‘city and the world’] address, spoke to the world about the most painful places. He said, "We pray and call on everyone to support martyred Ukraine and to establish a just and lasting peace," Yurash told The Counteroffensive.

Pope Francis died on Monday, 21 April, as a result of a stroke and cardiac arrest. He was 88.

According to the rules, the funeral seating arrangements for world leaders are allocated alphabetically by their country's name in French, the traditional language of diplomacy in which protocols were established.

As President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy should have been seated in the third row or even further back. Instead, he was put in the front row, 11 seats away from Donald Trump, who sat to his right, and next to French President Emmanuel Macron.

The Vatican broke protocol and ensured the Ukrainian president was at the centre of attention at the ceremony. Zelenskyy was also greeted with spontaneous applause when he took his seat in St Peter's Square after a brief meeting with Trump in St Peter's Basilica.

Despite previous agreements between the two sides, this “would not have happened without coordination with the Vatican,” because everything that happens on Vatican territory must be agreed upon in advance, explained Tetiana Izhevska, a former ambassador for Ukraine to the Holy See. “This is definitely an exception to the general rule.”

The meeting lasted 15 minutes and took place in private before the farewell ceremony. Details of the conversation were not disclosed, but Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it good. “It was a very symbolic meeting that could become historic if we achieve joint results,” the Ukrainian President wrote in his Telegram channel.

As the Cardinals weigh the future direction of the Catholic Church, many believers in Ukraine carry their faith through darkness, far from the Vatican.

The Pope's position has not always been clear to all Ukrainians, but perhaps this was his strength - his choice to act not loudly but carefully, considering each life.

“It seems that Pope Francis was given to us at this time to show that the church should be merciful, simple, and close to everyone,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

RUSSIA TRIES TO INFLUENCE POLAND'S ELECTIONS: Poland is witnessing unprecedented attempts by Russia to interfere in the presidential election, according to Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski.

According to him, Moscow is using disinformation and hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, such as water utilities, thermal power plants and government agencies, to paralyze the state. The number of cyber attacks has doubled since last year, and dozens of incidents were recorded during his speech alone.

Gawkowski believes its support for Ukraine has made it a target for Russian sabotage. Poland has already faced cyber attacks on its space agency and state media, and accuses Russia of arson and sabotage in Europe.

PRICE OF RUSSIAN OIL FALLS TO RECORD LOW: The average price of Russian Urals and ESPO crude oil fell to 3,987 rubles per barrel, more than 40 percent below the planned budget level and the lowest in two years. This collapse is due to the growth of global reserves, OPEC+'s decision to increase production, and expectations of a slowdown in the global economy. In March, oil cost more than 5,000 rubles, and in April it was 4,562 rubles.

The collapse in prices forced the Russian government to cut its energy revenue forecast by a quarter and raise the expected budget deficit for 2025. At the same time, Moscow is increasing military spending to a record 6.3 percent of GDP, which is putting more pressure on finances. Analysts believe that the Kremlin will have to raise taxes, cut social spending, or increase borrowing if it does not plan to reduce funding for the war.

LITHUANIA TO INVEST €1.1 BILLION TO PROTECT THE BORDER WITH RUSSIA, BELARUS: Lithuania plans to invest €1.1 billion to strengthen the defense of its eastern border over the next decade. The bulk of the funds - 800 million euros - will be spent on installing anti-tank mines to deter possible aggression from Russia or Belarus. The measure is aimed at blocking and slowing down a potential invasion, in particular through the strategically important Suwalki corridor.

Vilnius also announced an increase in the defense budget to 5-6 percent of GDP starting in 2026. In March, Lithuania, along with Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, announced its intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel mines, which provoked a sharp reaction from Moscow.

DOG OF WAR:

Today’s Dog of War is the cute dog Myroslava saw in the coffee shop near our office.

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Myroslava

UKRAINE, KHARKIV, May 6 — For the fourth time, classical music sounded for Kharkiv residents against Russian attacks. On May 2, the Kharkiv Music Fest took place at the “loft stage” of the Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre, one of the safe places for art in the city located just 19 miles south from the Russian border.

“Kharkiv Music Fest existed for eight years, but we made just three normal events over all this time. It’s my personal tragedy,” said Serhii Polituchyi, the president of the festival, to Gwara Media.

Russia attacked Kharkiv relentlessly since the start of the full-scale invasion. In 2022, Music Fest’s team planned the concerts of Lucas Debargue and Nils Wanderer, but had to cancel everything. The festival still happened —  in the Kharkiv subway with the symbolic name “Concert between explosions.”

“It should have been a set of events introducing world-famous musicians to Ukrainian fans of classical music. Now, we can’t invite most performers because of war, but we got a new meaning for our festival. The Kharkiv Music Fest is a powerful “code” of our city’s revival, which can fill the empty souls of Kharkiv locals affected by the war,” said Polituchyi.

In the following years, the Kharkiv Music Fest was held under this new motto — revival — uniting those who stayed or come back to Kharkiv, performers, and guests. 

Today, almost all theatrical plays or music shows in Kharkiv begin by the audience going down long stairs to the underground stages, so that performances and the joy at watching them aren’t interrupted by air raid alerts.

The Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre started hosting its opening concerts — it’s one of the few safe venues of the city. 

In 2025, the festival's theme is “The CODES of revival: Gratitude. Calmness. Harmony. Experience. Hope. Tradition. Reflection. Empathy” — and performers aim to uncover how emotions of our time are expressed through music. 

The most famous Kharkiv Music Fest initiative is art-pianos placed around the city so that everyone could play under the open sky or in frequented public areas like university’s hall.

“It is an opportunity to be more open to people — and some of them improvise concerts at piano’s locations. I’m very happy to announce that there will be pianos at different subway stations this year. The first one will be at Yaroslav Mudryi’s station,” said Mariia Horbonos, the program director of the festival.

The National Ensemble of Soloists “Kyiv Camerata” opened the festival with the National anthem of Ukraine and expressing gratitude to the Armed Forces.

The program was divided into two parts. During the first one, Julian Milkis, a famous clarinetist from the States, played “Letters to Friends” by Georgian composer Giya Kancheli — a deep, emotional, and honest message, dedicated to the composer's loved ones.

“This is my fourth visit to Ukraine during the war, and I realized that art and music are now as important as weapons. They give people the impulse to fight and live,” said Milkis.

Bohdana Pivnenko, the violinist (she’s called "Ukrainian Paganini in a skirt") and Kateryna Suprun, the viola player, performed the second part of the opening concert. 

“It is an amazing feeling to come to Kharkiv and see how people need art, music, and culture. All visitors returned after the break, and it says a lot. I’m happy to play for people who prove their unbreakability every day. Last year, we were afraid to come, but there weren’t any questions for this time because people and their emotions countered all (our) fears,” said Kateryna Suprun.

Pivnenko and Suprun played “Sinfonia concertante for violin, viola, and orchestra” by Valentyn Bibik, the world-known composer from Kharkiv.

The performers also said that, in Kharkiv, people react more emotionally to the music by Ukrainian composers than elsewhere — probably because of the close frontline and constant Russian attacks. 

Ukrainian classical music, though, is now living through revival globally. 

“Many Ukrainian classical compositions are performed now (compared to pre-full-scale war), which is very pleasing,” Bohdana Pivnenko says, adding that she feels like the Ukrainian classical music got more popular not only abroad but within the country.

At the end of the concert program, “After reading Lovecraft’s” by contemporary Ukrainian composer Oleksandr Rodin was played in Kharkiv for the first time. The audience heard a mysterious reflection of Lovecraft’s horror stories philosophy, realized through the sound of string orchestra.

Gwara Media talked to people in the audience — they said they enjoyed the professionalism of the soloists, got curious about the concert program, and resonated with the importance of Kharkiv Music Fest’s idea.

“I have been to all the events of Kharkiv Music Fest. I’m a real fan of the team and their work. Art is our cultural defense, and we try to show our resilience through these new meanings. We are not just surviving, we have (methods) of revival, and music is one of the symbols of future Ukrainian renaissance here,” said Volodymyr Chystylin, journalist and activist.

Locals think that Kharkiv Music Fest is vital for people who are subjected to Russian aggression every day.

“We really need music now because it supports our spirit. It is very important to us because life under attack is difficult,” said Kateryna, one of the visitors.

Mariia Horbonos said that the registration for the Music Fest’s opening was closed in one day because the “loft stage” has seat limits. She invites guests to other events of the festival, noting that all of them are free (but require registration.) 

The Kharkiv Music Fest will continue from May 2 to June 10, and each event will be connected with a certain “revival code.”

The organizers said that the schedule could be changed because of the city's safety situation.

In the evening of May 2, after the festival opening concert ended, Russia attacked Kharkiv with drones. More than 17 explosions followed the sounds of music. Russian drones injured more than 50 people, including two children.

Read more

• “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war

The post “Art is now as important as weapons.” Kharkiv Music Fest opens with classical music concert appeared first on Gwara Media.

Oil prices have slipped below $60 per barrel, adding pressure to a strained Russian economy. At the same time, China—Moscow’s largest trading partner—is locked in a high-stakes tariff war with the United States, triggered by the new U.S. administration. These converging disruptions are unlikely to leave Russia's economic footing - and by extension, its capacity to fund the war in Ukraine—unaffected.

To better understand the current landscape, we once again spoke with Vladimir Milov, former Russian Deputy Minister of Energy and a prominent critic of the Putin regime. An economist and energy expert, Milov was a close ally of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and currently serves as Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation. Our previous conversation with him took place in December 2024. In this latest interview, we revisit his earlier forecasts and examine how recent developments have altered Russia’s economic trajectory.

Question (Q): There’s increasing talk about a potential easing of economic sanctions on Russia—at least from the U.S. While a full rollback seems unlikely, some form of relief may be on the horizon. In your view, could this act as a lifeline for the Kremlin, enabling it to sustain the war effort?

Answer (A): I have written about it in much detail in a recent op-ed for The Insider - please have a look. Long story short - Trump won't be able to reverse Western sanctions policy, and European actions matter more than those of the U.S. Before the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe was Russia's key investor and trade partner - over 67% of accumulated FDI stock came from Europe and around 50% of Russian exports went to Europe. The U.S. - 1% and 4% respectively. Russia needs markets and investment, and the U.S. won't provide that - even in better times, American investors didn't particularly like Russia.

However, Russia may get some benefits from U.S. sanctions being lifted, which will help to keep Putin's ailing economy afloat for a bit longer. Crucial thing is access to the U.S. technology which may boost the Russian military production - this assessment is shared in a brilliant recent report by the Kyiv School of Economics on the status of the Russian military industries - quite worth a read, I strongly recommend

Another problem is that Europe doesn't have anything comparable to the U.S. global sanctions enforcement mechanism - experienced agencies like the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control and Bureau of Industry and Security. If the U.S. lifts sanctions against Russia - or simply continues the crackdown on its own Government institutions like that executed by DOGE - the EU, Britain, and other Western democracies simply don't have its own institutional capacities to secure proper sanctions enforcement on a global scale, as currently provided by the U.S. There will be a major sanctions enforcement vacuum which Putin will inevitably use for his own benefit, boosting sanctions circumvention.

(Q): The U.S.-China tariff war has dominated headlines in recent weeks, signaling historic geopolitical and economic shifts. While Russia isn't directly involved, key trade partners like China are heavily impacted. Beyond oil, should we expect any spillover effects on the Russian economy?

(A): Yes, there's so much more than just oil. China's economic slowdown closed their market for many Russian products, due to which major Russian industries suffer badly. For once, China-oriented Russian coal industry is collapsing right in front of our eyes. Fisheries suffer from contraction of Chinese imports of Russian fish. Russian steelmakers face output contraction and sharply falling profits because cheap Chinese steel is flooding global markets - Chinese economic slowdown turned China from being a major importer to a net exporter of steel. And so on. Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels, and are not rebounding - China doesn't allow Russia to access its market, and it won't change once Chinese economic growth slows down.

Tariff war will obviously exacerbate Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth - the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.

(Q): In a recent interview, you mentioned that further declines in oil prices might actually benefit Russia more than if prices remain stagnant just below a certain threshold—an idea that might seem counterintuitive to many. Could you explain how that works?

(A): Biggest loser from the falling oil prices is not Russia, and not OPEC - its the American shale oil industry. Oil production costs in the U.S. are significantly higher than in Russia or OPEC. This means that, if global oil prices fall below $50, large part of the U.S. oil production will be wiped off the market, and prices will quickly rebound. We already saw these effects after 2014 and 2020 oil price crashes.

Russians know that, which is why they weren't too scared with Trump's threats to "radically bring down the oil prices". Their strategy is to wait out for mass extinction of the U.S. oil production under $50/bbl, and to wait for prices to rebound thereafter. Russian oil producing companies are OK under $30-40 prices - it is the state budget which will suffer, but Putin and his people believe they can last for some time under low oil prices, given that they will be rebounding later.

In these circumstances, I'd say the best scenario if the international oil prices will stay somewhere around $60. Given the sanctions-driven discounts, that means Russian oil cheaper than $50. These are the prices which will significantly hurt Russia (Russian budget is drafted under $70/bbl oil price assumption), but will prevent the collapse of the U.S. shale oil industry and further rebounding of prices. Oil at $50 or cheaper is a much worse scenario, as it will most likely mean that low oil prices will be short-lived, which will make Putin happy.

(Q): During our last conversation, there was an expectation that Russia’s central bank would raise interest rates, yet it held steady at around 21%. What factors led to that unexpected decision?

(A): After their February Board meeting, Central Bank has admitted that "consequences of further raising rates will be worse than keeping the rates steady" - meaning that it would exacerbate economic slowdown or probably lead to a recession. To avoid that, they partially sacrificed the goal of bringing down inflation - which still remains high, preventing the Central Bank from much-anticipated easing of monetary policies. At the recent March meeting of the Central Bank board, only two signals were discussed - neutral and tough (further increasing the rate).

Central Bank faces tough dilemma now - interest rate of 21% is still very high (Russia has 12th highest Central Bank rate in the world), rapidly cooling the economy, but inflation is not really receding. The root causes of inflation - heavy budgetary spending on the war, output gap created by output not catching up with demand due to Western sanctions against Russian manufacturing sector - are not going away. At the same time, Russian industrial output has zeroed out in February (0,2% year-on-year growth and 0,4% seasonally adjusted growth compared to January), and March figures may be even worse - soon we'll see the statistics. So, Central Bank has managed to rapidly cause stagnation with its tight monetary policies - risking further slipping into recession - but it failed to bring inflation under control.

(Q): Your latest FRF Think Tank report points to high inflation and near-zero output growth in Russia—classic signs of stagflation. However, some economists argue that high unemployment is a necessary component. Given that unemployment remains relatively low, does this mean Russia hasn’t yet entered stagflation, or is this just a statistical distortion due to the mass recruitment of the male population?

(A): True, Russian situation is unique. The term "stagflation" was coined in the 1960s and 1970s in the Western economies none of which experienced such a mass diversion of the workforce to the war as Russia today. If the current war is suddenly over, Russia will indeed experience high unemployment - masses of soldiers returning to civilian life won't easily find jobs.

Russia also continues to experience very high hidden unemployment - workforce which is nominally employed, but in reality is either on unpaid leave, part-time workweek, or downtime. Rosstat estimated hidden unemployment to be as high as 4,7 million people in Q4 2024, or over 6% of the total workforce. Together with official unemployment, that would make about 9% of the workforce.

These workers would have significantly eased the pressure on labor market should they have left their enterprises, but Russian labor market traditionally features low mobility (remember how people in the 1990s preferred to continue working for years at enterprises which haven't paid them salaries, instead of leaving them looking for new jobs). So, companies nominally keep the workers, but effectively don't pay them - hoping for recovery, which is not coming (nearly three quarters of hidden unemployment are people on unpaid leave).

So, if we're into a macroeconomic debate by the book here, Russia does have high unemployment - but in hidden or delayed forms. And stagflation is real. If the current situation lingers on, even nominal unemployment will rise quite soon.

(Q): What is the current situation with Russia's National Wealth Fund — the main financial reserve that has supported Putin's economy through years of war? What are the implications for the Kremlin and the ongoing war?

(A): As of April 1st, the liquidity portion of the National Wealth Fund (NWF) stood at $39 billion, or just over RUR 3 trillion. That's lower than the federal budget deficit recorded in 2024 (RUR 3,5 trillion). As it goes, 2025 budget deficit will likely be much higher - costs are rising (over 20% federal expenditure growth in Q1 2025), while revenues will be depressed by both the falling oil prices, as well as economic slowdown. Already now, non-oil revenue in Q1 2025 grew only by 11% year-on-year, against 26% growth in 2024, and 18% planned growth for 2025. Of which VAT - by just 9%, as opposed to 22% in 2024 and 17% planned for 2025. Slowing economy generates less taxes, which will undermine budget revenues to an extent not lesser than falling oil prices, and lead to further depletion of the NWF. As it looks from today, there's no other way but for the liquidity portion of the NWF to be fully depleted by the end of 2025 (usually they draw the funds from NWF in December to close the fiscal year).

There's also a non-liquidity portion of the NWF, but it largely exists only on paper, with money invested in various securities and not being easily recoverable. For those interested in details, I have analyzed this in my February brief on the Russian economy. The liquidity portion of the NWF has shrank from $116,5 billion in February 2022 to just $39 billion now as a result of heavy war-related spending. Essentially, this was the model of much-praised Putin's "economic resilience": heavily draw the available cash reserves to compensate for the negative effects of sanctions. But this "economic miracle" appears to be over, disappearing along with cash being spent.

What next after the liquidity part of the NWF is fully spent? I also analyze this in one of my recent reports in detail. Bottom line: nothing is working except monetary emission, printing the money. Government can't borrow - they are cut off from international financial markets, and domestically, with yields as high as over 16% for OFZ government bonds, Russia spends more on repaying and servicing the debt than it actually raises from the domestic debt market. Net debt raising was just around zero in 2024 and negative in Q1 2025. They can raise taxes, but that would further undermine economic growth and curb tax base - they'll lose more in the end. Hypothetically, they can try to privatize state assets, but there's not really much to sell if they don't opt to privatize control equity shares in major state companies - and they don't seem to even consider that for strategic reasons. As far as smaller-scale privatization is concerned, it won't solve their fiscal problems on a large scale, and there won't be much demand given the rapid deterioration of investment climate, ongoing rampant nationalization, etc.

So printing the money seems to be the only viable option left. Russian authorities seem to increasingly tolerate high inflation - "we're not Turkey or Argentina yet, so what difference does it make if inflation is 12-13% instead of 10% - let's print a couple of trillion rubles, no one will notice" (that was literally said by some State Duma deputies during Nabiullina's report debate on April 9th). Central Bank clearly shifted to limited emission schemes in the past few months through repo auctions - banks buy government bonds, and are immediately allowed to use them as collateral while borrowing cash from the Central Bank through repo auctions. Central Bank promised to use repo auctions as temporary mechanism in November 2024, but keeps rolling them over - switching from monthly to weekly repo auctions. Effectively, it is little different from Central Bank's credit to the government, or, in simple words, printing the money.

No question that filling the budgetary gap with printed money will lead to even higher inflation, which will destroy any prospect for economic recovery. So, basically, the Western sanctions are working - albeit not as fast as we hoped, but still.

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Independent theater Nafta came back to Kharkiv to explore how war transforms not only cities but people — and discover how theater can embrace that transformation.

For seven years, Nafta Theater has navigated both creation and disruption. Founded as an independent, alternative space in Kharkiv, it was displaced by the Russian full-scale invasion. Then, in 2023, the ensemble reignited its presence in the city. As director and co-founder Nina Khyzhna recalls, “Life somewhere else was meaningless for me, so we reopened the theater—it was like a dream.”

By creating socially responsible performances, Nafta Theater puts value in freedom, human-centeredness, mutual respect, — and aims to inspire societal change. In their recent performance Khartede 20, the crew explores postcolonialism, centering on the Executed Renaissance. It was a generation of Ukrainian poets, writers, and artists from the 1920s. Many of them lived in Kharkiv, particularly in the building called “Slovo” (“Slovo” translates from Ukrainian to “word”) before being silenced, — executed or sent to forced labor camps — by the Soviet regime. 

Khartede 20 not only revisits this erased chapter of Ukrainian cultural history but also poses a series of haunting questions: Does memory live in objects, trees, rivers, buildings? Can the presence of those who once walked these streets still be felt? Is reality shaped by the lives of people who were here — and, in some way, still are? 

Kharkiv’s history deeply informed Khyzhna’s preparation for the performance:

“In this landscape near the Slovo building, I imagined what those poets and artists might have seen — how they went hunting farther from (the building), where the city used to end. I thought of how the landscape looked like for them, and what remained of it now. There have been no high-rise apartment buildings yet, but there was this rock, on which, most likely, Khvylovyi and Yohansen (one of the most influential writers of that time – ed.) would walk on. I can’t help but be inspired by that. We live among the same decorations. Nearby, there’s a military hospital, a little further is my home, and farther, there’s Khvylovyi’s grave. All of it coexists in a chimeric symbiosis, all of it forms our urban space,” Khyzhna reflects. 

Nafta crew’s latest production, Cyborg Orgy, confronts the issue of ecocide. The performance reflects on the earth, humus, and the right to die on one’s land—right that’s both political and human.

The play draws a powerful connection between the destruction of nature and human suffering. When weapons tear through buildings, plants, animals, and humans, and when chemicals from rockets contaminate the soil and water, can one recognize the non-human, although living, victims of this violence? The ongoing, unpunished losses of countless creatures and ecosystems remain largely unseen. Uncertain of how to address it, Nafta’s crew takes to the stage to name the crimes, mourn the victims, and bear witness to the disaster unfolding before them (and the audience).

The large-scale environmental damage caused by Russia—such as the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023—represents a clear act of ecocide. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin called it “a crime against Ukraine as a state and (against) our future.” By incorporating non-human agents into their war stories, Nafta is pushing the boundaries of post-war justice to incorporate all the living. 

Healing and rebuilding after conflict must include both human and non-human lives, as well as the planet itself; that is what, in Nafta’s words, Cyborg Orgy is about.

 Shedding light on social responsibility is deeply personal to Khyzhna: “I think the imperfection of this world inspired me. I started looking either for alternative worlds or how to improve this one using some other way of seeing. I did not feel safe in this reality, so I decided to create a safe space; theater became a place of escape and a place of arrival.” 

When Nafta Theater was founded, many people were not ready for its alternative vision. Kharkiv’s theater scene was steeped in conventional traditions, shaped by a Soviet-era dramaturgical school that prioritized socialist realist narratives—idealized depictions of Soviet life that promoted values of communist state ideology. Nafta’s emerging collective of performers challenged that status quo. 

In opposition to the system, the theater pursued experimental and provocative approaches and urged reevaluation of fundamental narratives—such as, for instance, how women should act and exist within the theatrical space. As a child shaped by sexist stereotypes, Khyzhna used to say that she doesn’t like female directing. As she grew, she started to look for other perspectives and ways to think about women's behavior, body, and modalities of both being on stage and beyond it. 

Khyzhna remembers how first performances were perceived: “In the performance Naїve, I took on the roles of both director and actress for the first time. I came back to Kharkiv from Poland in 2015, where I was working in the independent theater Brama. Driven by an extraordinary thirst for creation, I began posting announcements everywhere, inviting people to acting classes—that’s how I found my first crew.”

"I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance"

“Naїve was a performance dedicated to naïve idealism and marginalized segments of society—those who are pushed to the edges of their communities. I felt very frustrated when I realized that theater is a very ephemeral field. That was unfortunate. It was crucial for me to know that I can influence reality somehow. At one point, we contacted an animal rescue center, and started looking for new owners for animals during the performance itself. I remember well how, later, they sent me photos of the cats they adopted. I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance,” Nina Khyzhna says. “In some scenes, we simply sat in silence, looking the audience in the eyes—it was something new. Someone even cried during the performance, which was a striking thing for me — realizing that, through my expression, I could impact someone’s world, start an exchange of feelings. It felt like a door opening into creative subjectivity, into obtaining agency within my profession.”

In spring of 2023, Kharkiv administration introduced a controversial ban on mass events in theaters, concert halls, clubs, museums, libraries, and open spaces for gatherings exceeding 50 people. Citing relentless Russian shelling and a lack of shelters, authorities said the restriction will remain in place until the end of martial law. Active cultural communities found the restriction unbearable. 

As Artem Vusyk, an actor from Nafta Theater, put it: “Obviously, I don’t support these restrictions. Kharkiv is a culturally significant city, and authorities should support its culture. Many theaters have adapted, finding spaces that meet State Emergency Service’s requirements. We’re lucky our partners, Some People [Center of New Culture — ed.], offered their certified venue.” That’s where independent initiatives outshine government-run ones, finding flexible ways to keep culture alive despite restrictions.

When Nafta returned to Kharkiv, their first performance defied expectations.

They staged Rat, an absurd comedy strikingly out of sync with the surrounding reality.

Khyzhna looks back at it with a smile: “There were people who said it was needed. One woman told me, ‘I had forgotten I could be that way—laugh in a theater, experience culture, enjoy things again.’ For some people, like one of my acquaintances whose husband served in the military, it was hard to watch. People are different, and their needs differ, too. We also opened a bar on the first floor, Rat’s Bar; it was like rebooting a life. Of course, life in a different form but still undeniably real.”

In Kharkiv, there's no need for retreats in the mountains to learn the art of "living in the moment." Nothing serves as a sharper lesson than a Russian missile. 

"One hand torn apart while the other one is still filming"

Khyzhna recalls Kharkiv’s landscape as both challenging and inspiring: “Once in a dialogue with Serhii Zhadan (famous Kharkiv poet), he told me that Russians ironically call their aerial bombs 'landscapers' because it literally changes the scenery of the city. We often discuss this idea of blank spaces that missiles leave. What appears in these blank spaces? What do we fill them with? How do we look at them, both physically and metaphorically? I remember a colleague saying that artists in times of war are people who have one hand torn apart while the other one is still filming. A bright metaphor to answer the question of ‘how is it to create art amid war?’ You are part of the city. Your body becomes a part of it. I hope to become the very soil of this land.”

In such an environment, artists must be especially careful not to create an illusion of life, nor to deepen the hole of despair—it's about finding the balance, Khyzhna says. 

For Nafta Theater and Khyzhna, it is crucial not to turn away from wounds and pain, not to create taboos; death and severed limbs exist together with the oncoming spring and new life being born. 

She reflects on that: “It is important for us to be in reality, to have balance between seeing life as it is and as an artistic code. Keep being alive and even playful. The very fact that people come together to live through such a cultural experience is an act of manifestation of life. When we are together, we create a feeling that we are not alone in this experience, in this grief; none of us are unique in a good sense of this word.”

Author: Matvii Suminov

Cover photo: "Nobody Died Today" play, 2022. / Source: Nafta Theater

Read more

• “Dali: I will get my life back.” Kharkiv remembers poet, soldier Maksym Kryvtsov 1 year after he was killed in combat mission in Russia’s war
• “Kharkiv is a printing capital.” Consequences of Russians destroying largest printing house in Kharkiv 

The post “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war appeared first on Gwara Media.

A tank roars down a Taiwanese street, past a pair of frightened cyclists.

It’s seven days until China invades Taiwan.

Seconds earlier, these chilling words appeared on screen:

“Day Z Minus 7. The PLA [People’s Liberation Army of China] navy and airforce surrounds Taiwan in the pretext of search and rescue, spreading the idea of abandoning the fight, and coercing Taiwan to sign a peace agreement.”

Luckily, this isn’t news footage, but scenes from the trailer for the highly anticipated Taiwanese TV show ‘Zero Day,’ which comes out next month. It’s a dramatic visualization of what might happen if Beijing tries to take over Taiwan.

As the threat of Chinese invasion continues, Taiwanese culture has become almost fixated with the concept, expressing its fears through representations in television shows, movies, comics and even board games.

Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a democratic country facing the threat of annexation and cultural annihilation by its much larger, authoritarian neighbor. In a way, these cultural artefacts are signals of how violent acts – even war – are constantly on the minds of the Taiwanese who are bracing for a terrible geopolitical shift.

While many in Taiwan used to find it hard to believe that China could wage war on them, watching Russia’s invasion of Ukraine broke these illusions.

Now, the Taiwanese know they need to prepare.

In 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense published a report, ‘The Ambitious Dragon,’ which claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping wanted to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2030. Some believe this could happen earlier: the former head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Phil Davidson, and the ex-Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday have a different opinion. They believe that it will happen by 2027.

“The [prospect of] war has never been so close to us,” Zero Day producer Hsin-mei Cheng told The Counteroffensive. “The situation between Taiwan and China is so similar to Ukraine and Russia. We’ve been facing a possible war for so long and haven’t realized.”

Cheng, a former journalist with 16 years of experience, found a new passion in film production in recent years.

“Writing about news can’t change the world much,” said Cheng, “but a good story can instantly resonate with the public.”

The TV show ‘Zero Day,’ which is set for release in May, contains 10 episodes imagining what could happen in Taiwan if China invades. In the 17-minute trailer, the audience senses the panic attack in Taiwan after seeing the PLA put forces in Taiwan. The Taiwanese fear of the unknown spreads across different generations, diverse immigrant laborers, and the local gangsters who try to take advantage of the chaos.

The show imagines the war starting in 2028, after President Xi Jinping has left office and as the Chinese Communist Party is holding a new presidential election. Xi’s successor decides to “finish the mission of unifying the motherland” by attacking Taiwan and building a legacy at the beginning of the term. At the same time, Taiwan and the U.S. are also facing government transitions, as it is an election year in both countries.

The imagined war in Zero Day reflects situations that have become well-known to people in Ukraine. Disinformation has become a common tactic in war. In the trailer, China uses its technology to spread confusion among the Taiwanese public, using AI to create a fake video of the president.

China is hundreds of times larger than Taiwan, with far more resources. How are Taiwan’s chances?

“We need to have people acknowledge everything about the war first so that people can be prepared,” said Cheng. “Winning a war is never about how much or how strong your weapons are. We need faith.”

Creating ‘Zero Day’ was controversial in itself. Some Taiwanese politicians and their supporters have been anxious about “poking the bear,” saying it would jeopardize business cooperation between Taiwan and China. They also questioned its legitimacy, pointing out that the show received 3.43 million USD from government sponsorship and claiming that the motivation behind it was to create anti-China propaganda.

“We would love Chinese people to watch the show. I think they should watch the show to understand Taiwan better,” Cheng said, denying all the accusations.

Some members of the production team caved in advance to Chinese censorship and asked to be anonymous on the credits so that the work wouldn’t affect their family working in China.

The sensitive topic has gotten Zero Day a huge amount of media attention, but it is one of several fictional works that have gained traction in recent years.

A comic book published in 2018, ‘Western Pacific War: The Invasion of Taiwan,’ has an even more timely scenario: an invasion during Trump’s presidency. It has gotten positive reviews, reflected in relatively high sales numbers when it came out, but its popularity skyrocketed after Trump was re-elected in November last year.

“My prediction was quite accurate, including Trump’s actions,” said Liang. “My story is close to the real world. We spiced it up with some exaggeration, so people love it.”

In the Western Pacific War series, the invasion of Taiwan is something of an accident. In order to show his strength, the fictional Trump has ambitions to counter China, but his administration screws up the plan.

At the same time, a few senior officials inside the Chinese government are planning to rebel. Both sides want to use Taiwan for political gains, which accidentally accelerates the Chinese invasion.

Its author, Liang Shao-shien – who uses ‘Fur Ball’ as a pseudonym – has a military background that helped him compose the story. He served the country for almost 20 years until he retired in 2016. Before he joined the army, he went to art school. His superintendent noticed his talent and asked him to draw for the military's ROC National Defense Report publication.

As a veteran and a civilian, Liang shared his thoughts about the Taiwanese being ready to fight the PLA.

“We have a good barrier [the Taiwan Strait] … War is not going to happen today. But now, as a civilian, I believe it depends on how the attack affects your life,” said Liang. “If you’re not mentally prepared, you’re never gonna be ready.”

While Chen and Liang imagined how China would invade Taiwan, the board game company Mizo Games had another idea. What about letting the Taiwanese play out the invasion?

The founder of Mizo Games, KJ Chang, developed the board game ‘2045,’ deliberately designed for a Chinese invasion that could happen in 2045.

According to KJ, it’s a zero-sum game, meaning the player’s goal is to do whatever they can to win points from the others.

“I don’t want to make this game too romantic because that’s not what a war is like,” said KJ. “The game is not for everyone to work together and fight the Chinese. There will be some Taiwanese people trying to gain benefits from the war.”

There are six players in 2045. Players who take the role of the Taiwanese government and civil defense team get points if they beat the PLA in conflicts.

Also active in the game is the semiconductor association, who try to protect all business assets during the war. Other players take the role of the China's Peaceful Unification Organization – which provides intel for the PLA – and they play against the Taiwanese defense. Meanwhile, arms dealers and local gangsters can play in favor of both sides to get points.

“You need to have the players feel they are playing a new game every time they play,” KJ said, explaining how he made the board game. “Whether good guys or bad guys, they all have different interests to protect. It is why the game never ends the same.”

KJ watches the Ukraine war closely, and has used it to improve his game. He was especially inspired by the battle for Mariupol.

To make the game align with real war, KJ created major tragic incident cards that could cost players more points. Though the war is unpredictable, KJ has strong faith.

“The most determined Taiwanese will decide our history,” said KJ.

TIM MAK x GARRY KASPAROV:

On the nature of human freedom, on whether Garry still feels Russian, and the future of America’s role in the world.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

TAIWAN CELEBRATES END OF WWII FOR FIRST TIME AMID CHINA AGGRESSION: Next week Lai Ching-te, president of the Republic of China, will commemorate the end of World War Two in Taiwan for the first time, according to Reuters.

Taiwan has been using WWII as an example to China about why imperial expansion will end in failure, the news agency notes.

Two sources, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said Taiwan will host foreign diplomats from allied nations in Taipei on Thursday. Lai is expected to deliver a speech marking the 80th anniversary of the war’s end and urge allies to stand united against growing threats from China, Iran, and North Korea.

In the meantime, Chinese President Xi Jinping will be in Moscow next week to attend President Putin’s Victory Day parade to mark the end of World War Two.

U.S.-UKRAINE MINERAL DEAL TRIGGERS CONCERN IN RUSSIA:
Concern is growing among in Russia over the U.S.-Ukraine economic partnership agreement signed this week, which they fear could weaken Moscow’s position in future negotiations with Kyiv.

“The deal worsens the situation for Russia,” a political analyst with Kremlin ties told The Washington Post. “A major source of tension between Trump and Zelensky has now been removed.”

Another Russian official said pressure is mounting on President Putin: “He understands that he needs to be more cooperative,” the official noted.

The United States’ approach to the war has shifted under the Trump administration, with Putin finding a more sympathetic ally in the White House. Trump and Putin have held several personal phone calls, while U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff has appeared increasingly receptive to Russian perspectives on the invasion.

ZELENSKYY REJECTS RUSSIA’S 3-DAY CEASEFIRE: President Zelenskyy dismissed Putin’s proposal for a three-day ceasefire as theatrical, instead calling for a month-long pause in hostilities. “It’s impossible to reach any agreements in three, five, or even seven days,” Zelenskyy told reporters on Saturday.

Putin had suggested a ceasefire from May 7–9, coinciding with visits from foreign dignitaries for Moscow’s Victory Day parade marking the end of World War Two. During the press conference on Saturday, Zelenskyy said Ukraine could not guarantee the safety of any officials visiting Russia during that time.

“We do not recommend visiting Russia from a [safety] standpoint. And if you do choose to go, do not ask us. That is your personal decision,” Zelenskyy said.

PIGGY OF PEACE:

Today’s dog of peace… is not a dog! The piggy of peace played an important role in the Zero Day scene. If you want to know why there is a piggy, you’ll have to watch the show!

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Elaine

Ce cas d’étude a d’abord été présenté à la Conférence Cyber du FIC le 1er Avril 2025

Cette enquête dévoile les sombres pistes de l’or reliant la Russie à la République centrafricaine, à la RDC et aux Émirats arabes unis. Depuis son arrivée en RCA, le groupe Wagner se comporte comme un État prédateur dans l’État, s’emparant du pouvoir et pillant les ressources. INPACT/AEOW a exposé à plusieurs reprises son réseau de sociétés écrans gérant des opérations d’or et de diamants, avec des sociétés comme Lobaye Invest, Midas Resources (mine de N’dassima) ou Diamville, ainsi que des transactions douteuses dans le bois et les boissons. Après la mort de Prigojine, Wagner est resté en RCA et la Russie a renforcé sa présence dans la région. « Allez creuse bébé» est un exposé direct des mines, des routes de l’or et du resserrement de l’emprise russe en Afrique centrale.

Une mine d’or artisanale sous contrôle russe en RCA

Mine d’or artisanale de Yidere

En mai 2023, Heavy Industrial sarl, société sans historique d’activité et créée en mars 2023, signe une convention minière de 25 ans aux conditions très avantageuses avec la République centrafricaine. Cette convention prévoit un rôle à long terme pour Heavy Industrial dans le pays, exploitant une mine d’or et vendant ses revenus à l’étranger.

Le 4 janvier 2024, Heavy Industrial s’est vu attribuer un permis minier de 100 km2 pour 10 ans permettant à l’entreprise de démarrer l’exploitation de cette petite mine située à YIdere/Baboua dans la région de Nana-Mambere au Nord-Ouest du pays connue pour
ses mines artisanales d’or et de diamant .

Région instable avec présence de Wagner

Depuis 2022, Wagner est présent dans la région. Le nord-ouest de la RCA est confronté à une
nouvelle vague d’instabilité  , avec une insécurité croissante dans la région de la Nana-Mambéré et la présence du groupe armé 3R. Plusieurs incidents perpétrés par des groupes armés sont signalés au
groupe d’experts des Nations Unies . Le 21 janvier 2023, des éléments armés ont attaqué le principal poste de douane de Beloko, à la frontière camerounaise. Deux soldats des FACA et un membre du groupe Wagner auraient été tués. En mars, à Ndiba, trois ouvriers chinois ont été pris en otage puis libérés après le paiement d’une rançon dans une mine d’or. Bouar  reste une ville sujette à la criminalité malgré la présence des FACA et du groupe Wagner . En septembre 2023, des affrontements  auraient eu lieu entre Wagner et des groupes rebelles. Parallèlement, des combattants Wagner seraient postés dans la région  sur des sites miniers à Irdéré, Lamy-Pont, Kpandé, Nguia-Bouar, Abba, Sagaini, etc. En janvier 2022, une vingtaine de corps  sont retrouvés à Yidéré, prétendument tués par
des combattants Wagner . Depuis 2024, les forces Wagner apparaissent sur des photos officielles lors de cérémonies.

Un site actif en décembre 2023

D’après les images satellites, le site est en exploitation depuis au moins décembre 2023. Cette mine dispose d’importantes installations, notamment d’équipements de construction et de logements pour les ouvriers. Entre décembre 2023 et février 2025, le développement de la zone désignée dans le permis d’exploitation sous le timbre « Point G » sera observé. Cela comprend une extension significative du site et la création d’une piste d’atterrissage de base.

Série d’images satellite montrant l’expansion de la zone minière d’Idere en RCA – Source : Copernicus.eu

Série d’images satellite du site minier de l’IRDERE en République centrafricaine, montrant les différentes zones industrielles et le cantonnement militaire. – Sources : Image : GoogleMaps / SentinelHub – Analyse : Inpact

Un écran russe?

Basé sur des recherches open source, Heavy Industrial est dirigé par une Centrafricaine, Murielle Gaombalet Binguiremo Jossyca.

INPACT/AEOW a contacté Heavy Industrial et Murielle Gaombalet Binguiremo Jossyca pour obtenir des commentaires, mais ils n’ont pas répondu à nos appels.

Selon les propres sources d’INPACT et les médias locaux , elle serait un prête-nom à la tête de Heavy Industrial mais aussi d’une autre société créée une semaine auparavant et appelée General Ressource qui serait détenue par des ressortissants russes et est l’actionnaire de Heavy Industrial.

Que fait-on de l’or produit par Heavy Industrial et où est-il exporté ? Ces questions restent encore sans réponse. INPACT/AEOW n’a pas non plus pu trouver plus d’informations sur General Ressource  en RCA à ce stade, mais il semble que ce soit un nom populaire pour créer des sociétés discrètes liées à des bénéficiaires russes dans la région.

Un bureau de vente d’or artisanal russe en RDC

General Ressource sarl  apparaît sur Linkedin sur les profils de deux ressortissants russes, Daniil Karpievich et Yuriy Adamian.

Tous deux affirment que General Ressource sarl  est une entreprise qui « réhabilite la filière café en RDC en partenariat avec l’Office national du café » (aujourd’hui ONAPAC). Il n’existe aucune trace de partenariat avec des agences congolaises ni d’exportation de café à l’étranger, mais nous savons qu’en décembre 2023, Generale Ressource sarl importe des céréales de Géorgie. D’après un courriel récupéré appartenant à Generale Ressource sarl, la société pourrait avoir été créée en 2017. L’INPACT/AEOW n’a pas eu accès au registre du commerce pour vérifier si la société a une existence légale en RDC. Selon les bases de données russes, Karpievich dirige depuis l’âge de 19 ans deux sociétés russes spécialisées dans l’importation de produits alimentaires et de café, Kinik Ltd  et Rusexport Ltd.

Les deux hommes mentionnent une autre société sur leur profil Linkedin : Oxor Capital. Créée le 11 juin 2021, cette société est un bureau de vente d’or artisanal en RDC. Selon les statistiques officielles  du gouvernement, en 2024, ce bureau positionnera la région de Kinshasa au quatrième rang des exportateurs d’or provenant des mines d’or artisanales de RDC, après le Sud-Kivu, l’Ituri et le Nord-Kivu.

Depuis 2022, Oxor Capital a envoyé aux Émirats arabes unis pour 1 385 900 USD d’or à une société que nous n’avons pas pu identifier appelée Ayou Metals Trading FZCO aux Émirats arabes unis.

De plus, Oxor Capital semble être en partenariat avec une société nouvellement créée au Kirghizistan appelée A-Invest LLC  et qui fait la promotion du commerce de l’or et du diamant avec des partenaires congolais, à savoir la Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), ODMINIER SARL et Oxor Capital sarl.

Oxor Capital est également partenaire de Regolith , une plateforme de financement alternatif créée par les Russes Den Kerzhemen, Egor Kerzheman et Antonon Zinoviev. La société est immatriculée à Saint-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines depuis avril 2023, mais aurait des bureaux aux États-Unis et aux Émirats arabes unis. Selon son site web, Regolith propose de nombreuses solutions pour soutenir les entreprises, mais aussi des solutions de financement alternatives, notamment un fonds de matières premières : les investisseurs achètent l’équivalent d’un montant en or et obtiennent un retour sur investissement.

En août/septembre 2024, le gouvernement russe a autorisé et encouragé le recours à des financements alternatifs pour les entreprises afin de contourner les sanctions internationales et d’accéder au financement.

Bien qu’INPACT/AEOW n’ait pas pu relier les deux histoires auparavant, nous avons jugé important de les présenter ensemble, montrant comment le groupe Wagner continue de s’emparer de mines d’or en RCA pour financer son organisation et comment la Russie continue d’investir dans l’or et les minéraux précieux dans des pays déchirés par des conflits, par le biais de sociétés aux noms similaires. Les Émirats arabes unis restent le principal centre de concentration de l’or.

Translated using GPT

25 апреля 2025 года на конференции FIC Cyber был представлен доклад, раскрывающий деятельность российских структур в золотодобыче Центральной Африки.

Исследование, проведенное INPACT/AEOW, выявило сеть компаний, связанных с группой «Вагнер», действующих в Центральноафриканской Республике (ЦАР), Демократической Республике Конго и Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах. Компании, такие как Lobaye Invest, Midas Resources (рудник Ндассима) и Diamville, участвуют в добыче золота и алмазов, а также в сомнительных сделках с древесиной и напитками. После гибели Евгения Пригожина присутствие «Вагнера» в регионе сохранилось, а влияние России усилилось.

Золотой рудник в Йидере под контролем России

Yidere Artisanal gold mine

В мае 2023 года компания Heavy Industrial SARL, зарегистрированная в марте того же года и не имеющая предыдущего опыта в горнодобывающей отрасли, подписала 25-летнее соглашение с правительством ЦАР на эксплуатацию золотого рудника в районе Йидере/Бабуа (префектура Нана-Мамбере). 4 января 2024 года компания получила 10-летнюю лицензию на добычу на площади 100 км².

Спутниковые снимки показывают, что с декабря 2023 года на участке ведутся активные работы: установлено строительное оборудование, построены жилые помещения для рабочих, а также создана взлетно-посадочная полоса.

Нестабильная ситуация и присутствие «Вагнера»

По состоянию на 2022 год Вагнер находится в этом районе. Северо-западная часть ЦАР сталкивается с новой волной нестабильности  с ростом небезопасности в регионе Нана-Мамбере из-за присутствия вооруженной группировки 3R. Несколько инцидентов, совершенных вооруженными группировками, доложены группе экспертов Организации Объединенных Наций . 21 января 2023 года вооруженные элементы напали на главный таможенный пост Белоко на границе с Камеруном. Сообщается, что двое солдат FACA и один член группировки Вагнера были убиты. В марте в Ндибе трое китайских рабочих были взяты в заложники и освобождены после уплаты выкупа на золотом руднике. Буар  остается склонным к преступности, несмотря на
присутствие FACA и группировки Вагнера . Сообщается, что в сентябре 2023 года между группировкой Вагнера и мятежными группировками произошли столкновения . В то же время, как сообщается, бойцы Вагнера размещены в регионе  на шахтерских участках в Ирдере, Лами-Понте, Кпанде, Нгия-Буаре, Аббе, Сагайни и т. д. В январе 2022 года в Йидере было найдено около 20 тел  , предположительно убитых бойцами Вагнера . По состоянию на 2024 год, силы Вагнера появляются на официальных фотографиях во время церемоний.

Действующий сайт по состоянию на декабрь 2023 г.

На основе спутниковых снимков можно увидеть, что объект находится в эксплуатации по крайней мере с декабря 2023 года. Этот рудник имеет значительные объекты, включая строительное оборудование и жилье для рабочих. В период с декабря 2023 года по февраль 2025 года будет наблюдаться развитие территории, обозначенной в разрешении на эксплуатацию под маркой «Point G». Это включает в себя значительное расширение объекта и создание базовой взлетно-посадочной полосы аэродрома

Серия спутниковых снимков, показывающая расширение района рудника Идере в ЦАР – Источник: Copernicus.eu

Серия спутниковых снимков горнодобывающего объекта IRDERE в Центральноафриканской Республике, на которых показаны различные промышленные зоны и военный городок. – Источники: Изображение: GoogleMaps / SentinelHub – Анализ: Inpact

Русский фронт?

Согласно исследованиям с открытым исходным кодом, Heavy Industrial возглавляет гражданка Центральной Африки Мюриэль Гаомбале Бингиремо Джоссика

INPACT/AEOW обратились за комментариями к Heavy Industrial и Мюриэль Гаомбалет Бингуиремо Джоссике, но они не ответили на наши звонки.

По данным собственных источников INPACT и местных СМИ , она будет подставным лицом, отвечающим за Heavy Industrial, а также за другую компанию, созданную неделей ранее и называемую General Ressource, которая предположительно принадлежит гражданам России.

Что делается с золотом, произведенным Heavy Industrial, и куда оно экспортируется? Эти вопросы пока остаются неизвестными. INPACT/AEOW также не удалось найти больше информации о
General Ressource  в ЦАР на данном этапе, но, похоже, это популярное название для создания скрытных компаний, связанных с российскими бенефициарами в регионе.

Российское представительство по торговле кустарным золотом в ДРК

General Ressource sarl   появляется в профилях Linkedin двух граждан России: Даниила Карпиевича и Юрия Адамяна.

Оба утверждают, что
General Ressource sarl  — это компания, «восстанавливающая кофейную промышленность в ДРК в партнерстве с Coffee National Office» (теперь ONAPAC). Нет никаких следов какого-либо партнерства с агентствами ДРК или экспорта кофе за рубеж, но мы знаем, что в декабре 2023 года Generale Ressource sarl импортировала зерновые из Грузии. На основании восстановленного электронного письма, принадлежащего Generale Ressource sarl, компания могла быть создана в 2017 году. INPACT/AEOW не имел доступа к коммерческому реестру, чтобы проверить, существует ли у компании какое-либо законное существование в ДРК. Согласно российским базам данных, Карпиевич с 19 лет работал директором двух российских компаний, специализирующихся на импорте продуктов питания и кофе, Kinik Ltd  и Rusexport Ltd.

Двое мужчин указывают на другую компанию в своем профиле Linkedin: Oxor Capital. Компания была создана 11 июня 2021 и работает как офис по торговле кустарным золотом в ДРК. Согласно официальной статистике  правительства, в 2024 году этот офис позиционирует регион Киншаса как четвертого экспортера золота из кустарных золотых рудников ДРК после Южного Киву, Итури и Северного Киву.

С 2022 года компания Oxor Capital отправила золото на сумму 1 385 900 долларов США в ОАЭ компании Ayou Metals Trading FZCO, которую нам не удалось идентифицировать, в Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах

 Кроме того, Oxor Capital, по-видимому, сотрудничает с недавно созданной в Кыргызстане компанией под названием
A-Invest LLC  , которая занимается продвижением торговли золотом и алмазами с конголезскими партнерами, а именно Societe Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), ODMINIER SARL и Oxor Capital sarl.

Oxor Capital также сотрудничает с Regolith , альтернативной финансовой платформой, созданной гражданами России Деном Кержеменом, Егором Кержеманом и Антоном Зиновьевым. Компания зарегистрирована в Сент-Винсенте и Гренадинах с апреля 2023 года, но, как утверждается, имеет офисы в США и ОАЭ. Согласно ее веб-сайту, Regolith предлагает множество решений для поддержки бизнеса, а также предлагает альтернативные решения по финансированию, включая товарный фонд: люди покупают эквивалентную сумму в золоте и получают возврат своих инвестиций.

В августе/сентябре 2024 года российское правительство разрешило и поощряло использование
компаниями альтернативного финансирования с целью обойти международные санкции и получить доступ к финансированию.

Хотя INPACT/AEOW ранее не могли связать эти две истории, мы посчитали важным рассказать о них вместе, показав, как группа Вагнера продолжает захватывать золотые рудники в ЦАР для финансирования своей организации и как Россия продолжает инвестировать в золото/драгоценные минералы в странах, охваченных конфликтами, используя компании с похожими названиями. ОАЭ остаются центрами внимания для золота.

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community received CYBINT data from the Ukrainian hacker group 256 Cyber Assault Division which gained access to the personal email of Pavel Fradkov, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense. Pavel is the son of former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and the brother of Petr Fradkov, the head of Promsvyazbank, a vehicle to finance Russian activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine. 

The analysis of the obtained data gives us a better understanding which of the Russian elites is getting rich from the occupation of Ukrainian lands. In particular, companies close to Ramzan Kadyrov and the father of Putin’s common-law wife Alina Kabaeva are commissioned to do construction in the occupied territories. Read more on this topic below. 

Fradkov in the Administrative Directorate: a caretaker for the elite

During Putin’s second term as President of Russia, his government was headed by Mikhail Fradkov from 2004 to 2007. He remained close to the head of the Kremlin thereafter. This is evidenced by his subsequent career: for almost a decade, he headed the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (2006-2017), and later received a cozy “retirement” post as the head of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.

The activity of Fradkov Sr. laid the foundation for one of the Kremlin’s family clans. He has two sons: Petr Fradkov, born in 1978, and Pavel Fradkov, born in 1981. Both are actively pursuing careers after the retirement of their father. The elder, Petr, went into banking. He currently heads Promsvyazbank, a key financial institution for the Russian defense industry and the main bank in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

The younger one, Pavel, went to work as a government official. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FSB, and in 2015 he joined the Administrative Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, where he became the first deputy head of the agency. On June 17, 2024, Pavel Fradkov was appointed deputy to the newly named Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov.

Pavel Fradkov is the protagonist who made this text possible. The hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division gained access to the personal mailbox of this Putin’s bureaucrat. 

The mailbox contains personal documents of Pavel Fradkov…

Petr Fradkov…

The wife of Petr Fradkov…

And an array of other personal information, like medical certificates, etc.

All important data about the Fradkovs’ property and locations were transferred to the Ukrainian Defense Forces. 

However, the main topic of this feature is the work of Pavel Fradkov. His role over the years is best described as the “elite property manager.” This is the hallmark of the agency where he worked the longest – the Administrative Directorate (ADP) of the President of the Russian Federation. Despite its name, the structure is not so much concerned with administering Putin’s daily routine, but rather acts as one of the major managers of Russian state property. 

The ADP owns property complexes, in particular, in Russia’s trophy locations, such as Rublevka near Moscow or Sochi at the Black Sea. In addition, this agency owns a significant portion of the former USSR’s real estate holdings abroad – in particular apartments and houses in European capitals. The ADP not only holds all this property, but also actively develops, repairs, leases, and sells it. 

Fradkov’s typical task in the ADP was to distribute dachas among Russian bureaucrats who were considering “exclusively the Rublevka area.”

Another example of Fradkov’s activities is the “grand opening” of a billiard room in a hotel, where, in the midst of the war in Ukraine, “tournaments with the participation of political figures” are planned.

Fradkov’s interests also included more serious issues. For example, in 2022, for some reason, he ordered documents from the archive on a certain Yefim Brandmann, a native of Chernivtsi, Ukraine and now a citizen of Germany, who acts as the Kremlin’s trusted agent in Europe and manages part of the already mentioned foreign property inherited from the USSR. The mailbox contains examples of Fradkov lobbying for the transfer of certain property to certain individuals or companies.

Fradkov’s key responsibilities included overseeing repairs and construction within Russia. This is evidenced by his travel schedules, examples of which are also in the mail.

Fradkov’s kept the same focus in his position at the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Fradkov in the Russian MoD: most favored treatment for Kadyrov’s and Kabayev’s companies in the occupied territories of Ukraine

Pavel Fradkov’s archive contains a document indicating that the current Russian Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov, was involved in war issues long before his formal appointment. In June 2022, Belousov, as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, convened a meeting regarding budget planning for the next three years (i.e. 2023, 2024 and 2025). There were some issues from the competence of the Russian Ministry of Defense among those tackled by Belousov. It was Fradkov who attended the meeting from the Presidential Administration.

Two years passed and in June 2024, Belousov invited Pavel Fradkov to the position of his deputy in the Russian Ministry of Defense. In the MoD, Fradkov continued to deal with issues of construction, real estate management and land resources. Interestingly, during the time of former Minister Sergei Shoigu, the position had been held by Timur Ivanov, who was then arrested after the dismissal of his boss.

Fradkov’s archive shows that he was actively involved in the “repartition of the market” in the area entrusted to him. Some of the documents concern Russia’s economic activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine in the construction and related industries.

In particular, in September 2024, Fradkov, out of habit, forwards a message to his own official email address with a telling subject: “About Ukraine.” He attaches a document listing eight companies, each highlighted in a different color and marked with a note, saying “Approved. Sent to the PA RF” (probably referring to the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation).

The names and owners of these companies are unknown to the general public. Some of the LLCs are notable for the sharp growth in revenue in 2024. For example, Krasnodar’s Stroyotdel K grew by 2738%. Its owner, Zalina Batyrovna Toldieva, does not run any other businesses.

However, a closer look into the companies gives an idea of the earnings of the Russian elite in the occupied territories. For example, IRS 2000 LLC is registered in Chechnya. Its owner, Sultan Abbazovich Usmanov, was previously in the management of Grozny Grazhdanstroy LLC, one of the major contractors in Chechnya. All the business in modern Chechnya has one thing in common: everything belongs to the Kadyrov clan, but nothing is legally registered to the Kadyrovs.

Another company mentioned in the document also leads to Kadyrov: Eurostroy-3 LLC from Tyumen. It is owned by Medni Ruslanovna Ilyasova, who, of course, does not run anything else too. Her company also increased its revenue last year, but by a modest 156%.

There was no obvious connection between Ilyasova and Kadyrov, except for one detail. Kadyrov’s representative office in the Ural Federal District operates in Tyumen, and Adam Ilyasov is its secretary. He is an architect by education and a successful developer, owning the company Alyans-A. Kadyrov’s media outlet Grozny Inform proudly informs us about it.

However, it’s not only the Kadyrovs clan that is milking the Russian budget funds allocated for the construction in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The most interesting company on the Fradkov’s list turned out to be PK Prombeton LLC, managed by one Marat Yagfarovich Khaibulin. This CEO is also rather obscure, with no trace of any other business activity. However, the company under his management has a flashy address: Moscow, Maly Tatarsky lane, 5, room. 1, room 3b. This is the very center of the Russian capital.

The building houses mainly public organizations of Russian Muslims. For example, the same address—Maly Tatarsky lane, 5, room. 1—is shared with an organization with the complex name MOORND Alliance of Civilizations. Its president is Marat Vazikhovich Kabaev, the father of Putin’s common-law wife Alina Kabaeva.

In the Russian media, the Kabaev has long been positioned as a Muslim social activist, an outstanding athlete, and God knows what else, as long as his son-in-law is happy.

However, in reality, Kabaev indirectly controls companies like PK Prombeton, which are “approved” by the Presidential Administration and conduct business in the territories occupied by Russia. Kabaev has repeatedly mocked the sanctions and openly expressed his readiness to do business in the occupied territories even before the full-scale invasion. However, no sanctions have been imposed on him yet.

Why sanctions are still important

A significant portion of the Russian budget spent on maintaining the occupied territories of Ukraine goes into construction. This serves a number of functions. On the one hand, it gives the Russian elite the opportunity to milk the budget. On the other hand, a large number of workers who would spend their wages in the areas where they work can at least slightly reduce the burden of the occupied territories on the Russian budget.

However, Fradkov’s mail makes it abundantly clear that Russia is a country where bureaucracy equals corruption. In order to supply cement to occupied Mariupol, one must not only have the desire and means to do it, but also be “approved” by the Presidential Administration.

This is precisely why sanctions, both international and Ukrainian, are still important. Sanctions force the stakeholders to replace some legal entities with others, which slows down or disrupts supply and cooperation chains. In other words, each new LLC takes time to get “approved”.

And for people like Kabaev, sanctions are harmful to their reputation and business connections in Asian countries.

This text is the first in a series about Russian business interests in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Our goal is to inflict maximum sanctions damage on them. We hope that the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine will enact sanctions against all the persons mentioned in this material, as an initial measure. We encourage our readership to also contribute to this process internationally.

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For more relevant investigations visit our CYBINT section

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The post Hacked: Deputy Defense Minister of Russia Pavel Fradkov. Business interests of Kadyrov and Kabaev in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine appeared first on InformNapalm.org (English).

Before our team ended up here in Kyiv reporting on the full-scale invasion, we were all different people.

One of us was a journalist far from Ukraine, who never thought they would end up living here. Some of us were freshmen at university, with dreams far removed from writing about the military and war. Some were still in their hometowns, while others already had a settled career in journalism.

But now we all are a part of one team at the Counteroffensive, carrying the burden from a fight we couldn’t even imagine not long ago.

So we made a map of places in Ukraine that stop our hearts from growing cold.

It is easy to grow numb to headlines – to see war as another distant crisis. When we look past ruins and numbers, we see that the war in Ukraine has become a personal story for many – and not only Ukrainians.

These places are not just random pins marking beautiful places in Ukraine. Each one carries a link to something deeply meaningful for one of us: be it from the first days of the invasion, to childhood memories, or just a fragment from a peaceful life.

Every day, we have to find inner peace and beauty that will keep us going in the midst of the war – the time of our biggest crises.

A couple of weeks ago we had a live stream ‘Inside The Counteroffensive Editorial Meeting’ to introduce the team and show how we work.

We also ran a poll asking readers what they would like to read, and many people told us they wanted to get to know the team more. That’s when many of us realized we didn’t really know the people we spend most of our days with.

As well as hopefully being interesting for our readers, this map has brought us closer together as a team, teaching us what our colleagues love and care about around Ukraine:

Read more

Does video labelled on social media as "...footage of the Indian Army's attack on Sialkot, Pakistan" authentically show a 2025 Indian Army assault on its neighbor? No, that's not true: It is misleadingly re-labelled Al Jazeera footage lifted from 2023 coverage of the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas. At the time of writing this, there had been no credible reporting of an all-out Indian Army attack on Sialkot, a regional capital near the India-Pakistan border.

The video was posted April 30, 2025 (archived here) by the @kiranpatel1977 account under a "Breaking News" headline. It was captioned:

Al Jazeera Channel has released new footage of the Indian Army's attack on Sialkot, Pakistan.

#Sialkot #IndianArmy #IndiaPakistan #PahelgamTerroristattack #PehalgamTerroristAttack

At the time this fact check was written, the X post looked like this:

(Source: X.com screenshot by Lead Stories.)

The footage used to claim Al Jazeera had an April 30, 2025 breaking news report on an Indian Army attack on Sialkot, Pakistan had been aired by Al Jazeera more than a year earlier, in a report about an Israeli airstrike near an Indonesian hospital in northern Gaza (archived here):

(Source: X.com and YouTube.com screenshots arranged into comparison graphic by Lead Stories.)

Lead Stories searched the Google News index of thousands of websites, using the search terms "Indian Army AND attack AND Sialkot" and found no credible reporting of April, 2025 airstrikes by India in Sialkot, Pakistan. Instead, the search turned up reports on tensions in the region and preparations being undertaken by the Pakistani defense forces.

Lead Stories searched Al Jazeera's website for reporting about Sialkot (archived here) and found no 2025 reports of Indian airstrikes or attacks on Sialkot:

(Source: AlJazeera.com screenshot taken by Lead Stories.)

The claim was also checked in an April 30, 2025 fact check by Digital Forensics, Research and Analytics Centre, based in New Delhi, India.

Read more fact checks about hoaxes and misinformation that use Al Jazeera video here.

In 2024, the EU held its European Parliament elections. The center-right, led by Ursula von der Leyen, secured the most seats and claimed victory. However, it was also the most successful year for the far right, with various Eurosceptic fringe groups winning 220 out of 720 seats—roughly 30.6% of the total in the European Parliament.

This victory was particularly significant for the far right, especially Marine Le Pen’s National Rally. Her party won the European elections in France, securing twice as many votes as President Macron’s Ensemble, prompting him to call early parliamentary elections. Le Pen is known for her pro-Russian stance in international affairs, having claimed that annexed Crimea belongs to Russia and repeatedly urged an end to military aid for Ukraine.

In an opinion piece for The Hill, American lawyer Gregory Wallance observed that Russia has shifted its focus from the far left to the far right, using the latter as a vehicle for propaganda in U.S. politics. Research by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism further indicates that Russia funds far-right parties across Europe to expand its influence and undermine support for Ukraine.

Russian propaganda in Europe

In June 2024, The Washington Post published an investigation revealing a large-scale Kremlin-backed influence operation conducted through the far-right media outlet Voice of Europe. Officially registered in Prague, the platform was used to funnel funds to far-right politicians across Europe, promoting pro-Russian narratives and eroding support for Ukraine.

The Post’s investigation cites European intelligence reports linking Artem Marchevsky—a former Ukrainian television producer with ties to pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk—to a coordinated influence campaign. Marchevsky reportedly held meetings with far-right representatives in Germany, France, Poland, the Netherlands, and other EU countries, offering monthly payments of up to €1 million in exchange for amplifying pro-Russian narratives through media and public appearances.

Maksym Vikhrov, Senior Analyst at Ukraine’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Information Security, told Gwara Media that platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, TikTok, Facebook, and YouTube are especially susceptible to Russian disinformation. Unlike traditional media with editorial oversight, these platforms struggle to moderate the overwhelming flow of content. Telegram, in particular, serves as a direct channel for Russian intelligence-led information operations targeting both Ukrainian and European audiences.

Vikhrov also noted that X hosts sprawling multilingual networks of Russian-linked accounts and “bot armies,” while TikTok’s rapid-fire video format leaves little room for critical analysis, making it fertile ground for manipulation. Beyond social media, Russia has developed a vast disinformation ecosystem, including hundreds of websites, in an attempt to construct an “alternative internet” under Moscow’s control.

In 2023, the European Commission study highlighted X's role in amplifying Russian disinformation about Ukraine. Now, Russia is ramping up its efforts on the platform, pushing narratives about Ukraine's supposed loss of sovereignty and discrediting Western support.

Gwara Media fact-check editor Olga Yakovleva shares examples of Russian propaganda using X as a propaganda tool. An anonymous user on X posted a fake claim about Hollywood stars being paid for their visits to Ukraine. However, it gained traction after being amplified by Elon Musk and Donald Trump Jr. — Russian propaganda channels, some with over 100K followers, quickly picked it up, pushing the fake to hundreds of thousands of viewers.

Similarly, the false claim that Zelenskyy bought a private bank in France originated from an anonymous X user and was then spread by Russian pro-Kremlin media such as eNews and news.ru.

Ukrainian state against Russian propaganda

Alina Bondarchuk, deputy head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, told Deutsche Welle that the fight against disinformation in Ukraine is coordinated at the state level. Since 2021, the Center—operating under the National Security and Defense Council—has been actively debunking Russian falsehoods and tracking their spread across social media platforms.

"We have established a partnership with Google. We provide expert assessments of narratives circulating on various channels. YouTube reviews these cases as a Google subsidiary and decides to block content. Over 200 channels have already been blocked."

Information security expert Andriy Bidenko noted that Ukraine has been effective in countering Russian propaganda, thanks in large part to the work of strategic communications centers. He emphasised that Ukrainians have developed a strong resilience to crude and simplistic propaganda, which now rarely reaches them and is virtually absent from domestic media and social networks.

An essential part of Ukraine’s effort to combat Russian propaganda involves broadcasting Ukrainian content to occupied territories. On July 5, 2024, the Zaporizhzhia regional administration launched a TV network offering free access to nine Ukrainian channels, including in areas under Russian control. Vladyslav Moroko, head of the regional Department of Culture and Information Policy, unveiled a roadmap to restore Ukrainian broadcasting starting from Zaporizhzhia. The network is expected to eventually cover 90% of the country’s territory.

Maksym Vikhrov concludes, “Ukraine has amassed significant experience in countering Russian FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) influences, developed through real-world challenges.” He explained that Ukraine's tools evolved not from theoretical frameworks but from urgent practical needs.

However, Vikhrov cautioned that existing tools will never suffice—neither in Ukraine nor globally—since Russian propaganda also adapts and adopts new technologies.

For instance, he noted that Moscow currently aims to "poison" large language models like ChatGPT with its narratives. At the same time, Moscow promotes an alternative "fact-checking" system globally (Russian project "War on Fakes," for instance, simply promotes Russian narratives via loud claims and links to Russian sources under the guise of fact-checking — ed.) While resembling legitimate fact-checking in form, this system would "debunk" facts by referencing statements from figures like Lavrov.

Fact-checking tips from Ukraine

Olga Yakovleva said that cooperation between newsrooms and knowledge sharing is needed to address the disinformation problem worldwide. Most fakes spread in several countries at once. For example, the Russian network Pravda creates fakes in Russian and then translates them into other languages.

Knowledge sharing, Yakovlieva notes, helps to find patterns of disinformation, to recognize manipulations and debunk them faster, and creates an ecosystem of experts and media workers for countering disinformation.

Kyrylo Perevoshchykov , analyst of an independent fact-checking project, VoxCheck, in the interview with Detector Media, described the algorithm they use to check information.

First, they verify who spread the fake information and whether the source—a blogger, politician, media outlet, or other organization—has previously disseminated disinformation. The next step is to search for other publications with similar content to identify variations or "mutations" of the fake, ensuring the fact-check addresses all false claims comprehensively.

Depending on the case, VoxCheck verifies whether statements, news, laws, scientific articles, statistical studies, or investigations are accurately represented in the publication or manipulated. If the fake includes photos or videos, experts make sure they are authentic.

"Fact-checkers' challenges are not significantly different from those encountered by other media professionals. These include handling large volumes of information that must be regularly analyzed and responding quickly to challenges and threats," Perevevoshcykov said.

Olga Yakovleva recommends to connect to professional fact-checking platforms like European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) and International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) platforms and join OSINT communities like GeoConfirmed, the Bellingcat Community, r/OSINT on Reddit.

“It’s very important to be part of a professional community — to keep learning, share knowledge, and avoid isolating in the bubble.”

It’s also good to try out new fact-checking tools like InVID (video verification), Maltego (OSINT platform), and Hunchly (data organization tool), Yakovlieva says. Investigations into fakes can be then published to open libraries like EUvsDisinfo, DFRLab, and OpenFact. 

Yakovlieva said that psychological resilience must also be taken care of, recommending having an action plan in case of hate or attacks and a support team, such as a newsroom, legal advisors, or trusted colleagues.

"Fact-checking that deals with sensitive topics — such as war, politics, elections, or disinformation campaigns — can make you a technical and psychological target. Cyber hygiene and personal safety are just as crucial as fact-checking skills," Yakovlieva noted.

The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.

The project is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

The post Kremlin propaganda finds voice in Europe’s alternative media. Ukraine shares experience in how to counter it appeared first on Gwara Media.

Brian Dooley is a Senior Advisor at Washington-based NGO Human Rights First and Honorary Professor of Practice at Queen’s University, Belfast. He specializes in working with human rights activists in war and other conflict zones and is a regular visitor to Kharkiv. 

USA, WASHINGTON, D.C. — This Wednesday, April 30, marks 100 days since Donald Trump became American president for the second time.

For almost a century, the first 100 days of new U.S. presidents have been a sort of checkpoint to assess how they’ve started. President Franklin Roosevelt passed an intense amount of legislation in a 100-day burst at the start of his presidency in 1933, and the marker has since become an important, if symbolic, point of judgment.

Trump has certainly made a fast start, starting a global tariff war, cutting U.S. overseas government funding, threatening to take over Greenland, and attacking all sort of government departments. But he hasn’t managed to keep his promise to end the war on Ukraine in a day. 

Seems it was trickier than he thought.

Between March 2023 and October 2024 (the month he won the election), he claimed at least 53 times that he would end the war either within 24 hours of becoming president, or even before he was official sworn in.

Now he says he didn’t mean it literally: “I said that figuratively, …as an exaggeration… it was said in jest.”

But here in Washington, not having found a way to end the war in his first 100 days is seen as a failure after so much boasting. In July last year, when he was nominated for president by the, we examined the tensions within the party over Ukraine, noting that while some Republicans seemed okay with being friendly to Russia, others were still backing Ukraine in the war.

But it doesn’t look like internal Republican divisions are the problem. “There are a few Republican members of Congress still publicly supporting Ukraine, but the rest have been bullied into silence,” one Senate aide and foreign policy expert told me. “There isn’t any real opposition to Trump from his own party over Ukraine.”

Instead, it seems the reality of dealing with President Vladimir Putin is what’s prevented a deal from being struck.

According to a poll this week, more than half of Americans (including one in five Republicans) now say that Trump is "too closely aligned" with Russia, although nearly half also said they support Trump's plan of "conditioning U.S. military support for Ukraine on the U.S. getting a share of Ukraine's mineral wealth.”

Of course, the war looks different from Washington than is does in Kharkiv. Armchair experts in the U.S. and Europe offer unhelpful suggestions while Ukrainian cities get bombed and civilians killed.

Trump’s tactics of publicly attacking both Ukraine and Russia, plus various senior level meetings involving combinations of American, Ukrainian, European and Russian officials, haven’t been able to make any breakthrough. This makes Trump look weak, undermining his claims to being an expert dealmaker.

The war was never going to be ended in 24 hours. It’s a complicated process to end the invasion, and maybe even more complicated to ensure any agreement sticks.

Whenever the outlines of a real peace deal begin to emerge, they should not trade away human rights for a political fix. 

As Tetiana Pechonchyk of Ukrainian human rights NGO ZMINA and I argue in the New York Law Journal, the prosecution of war crimes suspects mustn’t be surrounded in any deal. Nor should the International Criminal Court case against Putin and other Russian officials be dropped, Ukrainians children abducted into Russia have to be returned, and adults taken prisoner should be too. 

There are many other rights that have to be protected in any peace deal, and we know, too, that involving women human rights activists in negotiations is a good idea. Evidence from all over the world shows that women’s participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years by 20%, and by 35%, the probability of a peace agreement lasting 15 years.

Getting a deal that lasts is vital. Trump couldn’t make one in his first 100 days, and this will rightly be seen as a failure. Now what matters is what happens in the next 100 days.

Opinion pieces reflect the thoughts of their authors and do not reflect Gwara Media’s views.

The post Opinion: Trump’s 100-day failure on Russia’s war in Ukraine appeared first on Gwara Media.

Biologist Svitozar Davydenko used to be one of the world's most remote Ukrainians.

For a year, he lived 10,000 miles away from his troubled homeland.

He worked at a scientific center – known as the Akademik Vernadsky Station – in Antarctica.

The ‘White Continent’ is harsh and unyielding, but Ukrainians know how to find beauty in everything.

"I was stunned by the sheer amount of ice, these enormous icebergs. The natural conditions here are quite severe. Cold. Windy. And yet, life thrives here," said Svitozar, recalling his first thoughts upon setting foot in Antarctica."

While Trump imposes tariffs even on penguins near Antarctica, Ukrainians study and care for them. Ukrainians understand that Antarctica is not just a continent for research.

It holds the key to the future.

Today, Antarctica is considered one of the last formally neutral territories, used exclusively for scientific purposes.

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine demonstrates its commitment to protecting nature not only within its own borders but around the world. It is here in Antarctica that Ukrainians study climate change, its impact on wildlife, and contribute to the preservation of flora and fauna on the only continent still without permanent human habitation.

Ukraine cares not only about Russian ecocide on Ukrainian territory, but also about addressing global challenges and safeguarding the planet’s future.

Last year, Svitozar Davydenko was selected as a biologist for Ukraine’s 29th Antarctic Expedition, which set off for the Akademik Vernadsky Station — Ukraine’s only research base on the continent.

Although Svitozar is from Zhytomyr, he has spent most of his life near Kyiv.

In October 2022, the museum of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, where he often worked, was hit nearby by a Russian missile during one of the mass attacks.

"​​I can hardly imagine what it was like for those who were in Antarctica in 2022, but we were still calmer. The situation was still better than at the beginning of the war. Of course, we were worried about our families [while we were in Antarctica]," shared Svitozar.

Despite that, Svitozar decided to test his luck. Since his university years, he has wanted to go to Antarctica. And after he earned a Ph.D. in biology, his dream came true. He matched all the selection criteria from the first try and went to explore Antarctica in March 2024.

The station is located on Galindez Island, just off the western coast of Antarctica. There, Svitozar had the rare opportunity to live among penguins, swim near majestic whales, and even meet a newborn seal pup, which would later be named in his honor.

The Vernadsky Research Base is Ukraine’s only permanent presence in Antarctica.

In fact, Ukraine’s history on the continent is relatively recent.

The station was previously British and known as Faraday. In 1996, the UK handed it over to Ukraine free of charge, since after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had not inherited a single Antarctic base. Russia took over all five of the functioning stations.

The UK didn’t ask for any money in return, but the Ukrainian team still decided not to leave the gesture unanswered. In a symbolic act, a member of the first Ukrainian expedition pulled a one-pound coin from his pocket and handed it to the British representatives.

Since then, the station has been home to a wide range of scientific research. Scientists there collect meteorological data to help forecast global weather patterns, track glacial melt, and measure ozone levels.

In fact, the ozone hole was discovered at this very station, back when it was still operated by the British. They found that the earth's ozone layer, which is supposed to protect the planet from radiation, is much thinner than it should be.

The wildlife of the frozen continent is also a subject of deep study, and that’s where Svitozar Davydenko comes in.

"For me, it was a unique opportunity to understand extinct whales through the living ones," Svitozar told The Counteroffensive.

Since childhood, Svitozar had dreamed of becoming a paleontologist, fascinated by extinct animals — especially ancient whales that once swam through what is now Ukrainian land. At university, some of his professors were veterans of the Vernadsky Station. That’s how he first learned that not only did the station still exist, but that biologists could apply to go there.

And last year, it happened — he was selected through a competitive process to join the expedition. After interviews, psychological evaluations, and time spent living in isolation with the expedition team, he finally got the chance to witness the forbidding Antarctic ice with his own eyes.

The journey to Antarctica was long. To reach the end of the Earth, Svitozar had to travel by bus to Poland, then fly across the Atlantic to Tierra del Fuego in Chile — the bottom tip of South America.

There, the Ukrainian icebreaker Noosfera — a floating laboratory — was waiting for the team of fourteen scientists.

As a biologist, Svitozar had to study the local waters, setting off early each morning in motorboats to search for whales, plants, lichens, and other marine life. Everyone at the station must know how to drive a motorboat, just as they must know how to cook and carry out basic repairs.

Whales and orcas are of particular interest to Svitozar. Usually, the animals are indifferent to humans — you can calmly approach them by boat, for example, to take samples of skin or blubber. For a whale, according to Svitozar, it feels like a mosquito bite. But with the sample scientists can determine, for instance, whether a female is pregnant – or they can analyze the animal’s genetic makeup.

"When whales get curious about your boat, inspect you, stick out their fins and faces, and look straight at you — you realize they’re intelligent creatures, that they’re studying you too," recalled Svitozar.

However, during tourist season – winter in the northern hemisphere – when the Antarctic waters are filled with many boats and ships, whales become skittish.

They get ‘tired’ of people, so sometimes they even flee from the scientists.

Meeting between a humpback whale and Ukrainian scientists, including biologist Svitozar Davydenko:

A large part of his responsibilities also includes studying seals.

It was Svitozar who discovered a Waddell seal pup born near the research station last year.

It was named by subscribers on social media, and his colleagues, as SeaBaby Svitozarovych.

The first part of the name refers to a Ukrainian marine drone. The second part is the patronymic form of Svitozar’s name. So, in a way, this scientist became a father in Antarctica.

According to Svitozar, the animals least afraid of humans are the penguins. Entire colonies live around the station. Just a meter away from their buildings, thousands of penguins nest: they are small, have red beaks, and white stripes on their temples.

"The noise from the station, the light it emits, the warmth — none of it scares them. They've gotten used to it and happily wander around the station," said Svitozar.

Last year, a total of 7,000 penguins were recorded on the island where the station is located. They arrive during the mating season, in September and October, when penguins begin to build nests out of pebbles. Both bird parents take turns incubating the eggs, then feeding their babies and protecting them from predators until the young ones are grown.

Until 2007, subantarctic penguins didn’t live near the station at all. But due to global warming, they have gradually migrated further south in search of a harsher climate.

Scientists do not interfere in the lives of penguins. The Protocol on Environmental Protection, signed in 1991, prohibits touching, feeding, or in any way influencing the lives of penguins.

So, using drones, he monitors the birds, recording how colonies are developing, the number of babies born during the season, and whether penguins are settling on other islands.

Once, during one of Svitozar’s expeditions, an emperor penguin visited the station — a species not usually found at the latitudes where Vernadsky Station is located. The nearest known colonies are over 300 km away from the Ukrainian scientists.

The penguin wandered up to the station to inspect it.

"He spent about a week and a half, maybe two weeks, near the station. Sometimes he went into the water to eat, other times he just rested near the buildings. And then one day, he simply swam off somewhere to go about his business," Svitozar joked.

At first glance, one might wonder, “Why spend money on penguins when there are more urgent problems, like war?”

In 2024, Ukraine allocated approximately $11.6 million to support the operations of its Antarctic research station, Akademik Vernadsky, and to conduct scientific expeditions and research activities.

Beyond being an exceptional opportunity to contribute to global science, its research base means that Ukraine also holds a voice in determining Antarctica’s future.

Since 2004, it has held Consultative Party status, meaning it has veto power. Decisions regarding Antarctica must be made by full consensus — all votes must be ‘yes.’

Although Antarctica is currently a neutral and peaceful continent, this status could change in the future. Given the region’s wealth in natural resources, a scramble for minerals may eventually begin.

Additionally, the continent borders three oceans — the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific — making it strategically important for global trade routes. Eventually, it could even be used for military purposes.

And Russia is already in the game. Like the U.S. and China, it has territorial ambitions on the continent. That’s why Ukraine needs at least some levers of influence to counter Moscow — even in the harsh Antarctic latitudes.

And it's already doing so. For example, in 2024, Ukraine, along with other countries, blocked Belarus from gaining Consultative Party status in the Antarctic Treaty.

"[Presence in Antarctica] is about political weight, prestige, and the country’s scientific potential," Svitozar summarized.

Svitozar’s expedition came to an end in early April. Now that he has left, he plans to continue working at the Institute of Zoology, where he previously worked, and will continue his research on animals.

But it’s unlikely that Antarctica will let Svitozar go easily; he may return for seasonal research or study the continent at other stations.

"Of course, it would be very interesting to return and continue studying whales and perhaps explore other aspects of Antarctica. For example, paleontology can also be studied here, not necessarily at Vernadsky Station, but, for instance, in the vicinity of other stations with which we collaborate," Svitozar said.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

GOP FOR UKRAINE LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN: Republicans for Ukraine are launching a new campaign urging the GOP to support Ukraine. The campaign features over 60 first-person testimonies from lifelong Republicans and conservatives, many former Trump voters.

This initiative comes at a time when the Trump administration wants to get a peace deal done, proposing Ukraine give up Crimea and other regions that Russia occupied.

N. KOREA NOW OFFICIALLY SENDING TROOPS TO RUSSIA: For the first time, North Korea confirmed sending troops to Russia, BBC reported. Pyongyang’s military claimed its soldiers helped Russian forces "completely liberate" the Kursk region.

Days earlier, Moscow praised the "heroism" of North Korean troops, publicly acknowledging their involvement for the first time. However, South Korean and Western intelligence had reported North Korean troop deployments in Russia's war against Ukraine much earlier.

On January 11, 2025, two North Korean soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces. The POWs said they were initially told they would be fighting against South Korea but were instead sent to fight in the Kursk region against Ukraine.

TRUMP BELIEVES ZELENSKYY WILL CEDE CRIMEA: Shortly after meeting in Vatican City, Donald Trump said he believes Zelenskyy is ready to concede Crimea to Russia as a part of a ceasefire deal, France24 reported.

Speaking to reporters, he also mentioned the Ukrainian President asking for more weapons.

Previously, Volodymyr Zelenskyy vowed Ukraine ‘will not legally recognize the occupation of Crimea’. Now Trump’s pressure switched to Moscow as he urged Putin to ‘stop shooting’ and sign a deal.

PENGUINS OF PEACE:

In this photo by the Ukrainian Antarctic Scientific Center, the first newborn penguin chicks of the season were discovered near the Vernadsky Station by Svitozar Davydenko.

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Veronika

This analytical article contains documents, analysis and examples of typical sanctions dodging schemes by Russian suppliers of the Russian military-industrial complex. Here, you will find names of numerous Russian companies and plants involved in sanctions evasion schemes, learn what typical forgeries Russians resort to in invoices and other documents to conceal supply routes and identifying data of suppliers providing access to Western products. This article provides extensive context so that every reader could follow the logic of the investigation and understand how the Russia finds its way around sanctions. This information can come handy to both experts specializing in sanctions and investigative journalists who can conduct their own investigations on sanctions. Exposing the sanctions evasion schemes and disrupting the logistics of the Russian military-industrial complex makes the Russian army less equipped, which converts into saving the lives of Ukrainian military and civilians and bringing the victory over the aggressor closer.

In March 2025, we published in 14 languages some findings of a high-profile investigation conducted by InformNapalm the international intelligence communitytogether with the Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division.

In this context, let us recall that the operation exposed and disrupted a scheme for the supply of critical sanctioned equipment for the Russian military-industrial complex. The supply scheme was organized by the Russian company EMT. Today’s publication is in a way a continuation of that investigation, so let us recall some of the highlights for better context:

EMT procured the sanctioned European equipment through the Indian company Park Controls & Communications (PCC), which falsified documents by listing India as the end user of the contracted products to circumvent sanctions. Payments were processed via Sberbank India. The Indian company not only passed to the Russians the hardware together with the software keys required for its operation, but also forwarded to them all the communications with the European manufacturer.

EMT, in turn, carried out the procurement on behalf of the Russian company Zenit-Investprom, which is part of the Public Joint Stock Company Krasnogorsk Plant named after S.A. Zverev (KMZ). In this investigation, we will reveal how these two entities operate, the types of products they manufacture, and why they are strategically important to the Russian military-industrial complex.

KMZ is one of the largest optoelectronic equipment producers in Russia. The plant manufactures a wide range of both military and civilian products.

It is located at 8 Rechnaya Street, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region, Russian Federation. OGRN: 1025002863247, INN/KPP: 5024022965 / 502401001

The top governing body of KMZ is the Board of Directors, which includes representatives from Rostec / Shvabe and other shareholders. Operational management is carried out by the General Director, who serves as the sole executive body. As of 2025, the position of General Director is held by Anton Sergeyevich Klokov, appointed on February 3, 2025, by the Board of Directors.

As of December 31, 2023, the Board of Directors of KMZ is composed of the following members:

• Alexander Valeryevich Novikov
• Valery Alexandrovich Tatsky
• Vadim Stanislavovich Kalyugin
• Alexander Nikolayevich Rastorguyev
• Lev Valeryevich Borisov
• Alexander Nikolayevich Statsenko
• Sergey Vladimirovich Voloshin
• Villen Arnoldovich Baloyev
• Sergey Viktorovich Popov

KMZ is part of the optical holding Shvabe, which in turn belongs to the Russian state corporation Rostec. Thus, KMZ functions as a structural unit of Rostec within its optical division, Shvabe. Within KMZ, operate CJSC Zenit-Investprom and JSC Zenit-Techservice, which perform specific functions that will be discussed in more detail later.
KMZ is a diversified manufacturer of optoelectronic devices.

Its main areas of military production include:

• Sight systems for small arms (optical sights, night sights, and thermal imaging attachments for firearms of various calibers);
• Fire control systems for armored vehicles (digital targeting systems for modernized tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, laser rangefinders and target designators, anti-aircraft fire control systems, etc.);
• Targeting and navigation stations for aviation (collimator-type aircraft sights, surveillance and targeting stations for helicopters, and targeting systems for strike UAVs);
• Space and aerial surveillance equipment (optical systems for space monitoring, including satellite telescopes and optical stations for observing space objects, as well as Earth remote sensing systems from satellites and airborne platforms);
• Night vision and thermal imaging devices (goggles, monoculars, night vision sights for small arms, and thermal imagers for military vehicles and infantry. This includes thermal sights for firearms, cupola-type observation devices for armored vehicles, and stationary thermal cameras for security systems);
• Laser rangefinders and target designators (laser rangefinders and laser target illuminators for artillery and aviation).

As we can see, KMZ manufactures strategic equipment for the Russian military-industrial complex using the production capabilities of the Shvabe holding (which will be the subject of a separate investigation).

[Translation] “In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated July 10, 2008, No. 1052, PJSC KMZ is a subordinate entity of the State Corporation Rostekhnologii (hereinafter referred to as the State Corporation Rostec).

The legal entity exercising control (clause 7 of RAS 11/2008) over the activities of PJSC KMZ is JSC Shvabe.

Shvabe is an innovative holding company consolidating the main enterprises of Russia’s optoelectronic industry. The holding is fully owned by the State Corporation Rostec.
JSC Shvabe holds a 56.46% stake in the authorized capital of PJSC KMZ.

The State Corporation Rostec holds 100% of the authorized capital of JSC Shvabe.

Most of KMZ’s production is carried out under the State Defense Contracts (SDC) for the Russian Ministry of Defense—ranging from sights for small arms to complex optoelectronic systems for armored vehicles and aircraft. Accordingly, this equipment is actively used by the Russian army in the war against Ukraine. Other major clients include the following entities: enterprises of the defense-industrial complex (the plant supplies components to Uralvagonzavod, the Kazan Instrument Engineering Design Bureau, the Shvabe holding, among others), as well as to Roscosmos and Rosatom (for space vehicles and observation instruments).

Specifically, in its cooperation with Rosatom, some of KMZ’s products are supplied to the Mars Design Bureau (MOKB Mars), which develops autopiloting and navigation systems for aviation and space vehicles, as well as control systems for upper-stage boosters and onboard control systems for the Raduga Design Bureau’s X-series cruise missiles (find more details in this investigation: Not a Peaceful Atom: How “Rosatom” Helps Create Cruise Missiles

KMZ has also supplied optical equipment for remote sensing satellites (such as the Geoton for Resurs-DK and the Aurora for Aist-2D) and for military space systems (such as the Okno system and others).

In addition to military products, KMZ also produces civilian goods, such as medical equipment for Russian health care institutions (clinics, hospitals) and commercial medical centers, photographic equipment (Zenitar lenses and accessories). However, the share of civilian products is much smaller than that of military output.

KMZ and the Russian Military-Industrial Complex

KMZ is one of the key enterprises in the Russian military-industrial complex specializing in optoelectronic instrumentation. Its products are widely used by the Russian Armed Forces: optical sights for small arms are installed on standard-issue sniper rifles (such as the SVD and SVDK), thermal imaging sighting systems are integrated into combat helicopters (notably in the modernization of the Mi-24/35), and laser rangefinders and target designation systems are installed on armored vehicles and artillery systems. The plant also manufactures fire control systems for main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. After France ceased supplying thermal imaging matrices (Thales Catherine-FC) for tank sights, KMZ, together with other Shvabe plants, launched a production of domestic analogs, allowing full replacement of imported components in the Sosna-U sighting system for the T-72B3 and T-90 tanks. According to the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, these domestic photodetectors have been supplied to Uralvagonzavod since 2018 for serial tank production, eliminating a critical bottleneck in equipping armored vehicles. Obviously, KMZ directly impacts the combat readiness of Russia’s ground forces by providing essential targeting systems.

For Russia’s Aerospace Forces, KMZ has historically participated in the development of space surveillance systems. For example, the Okno—an optoelectronic complex located in Tajikistan for tracking space objects—was equipped with KMZ instruments and entered combat duty in 2004. The plant has also produced imaging equipment for reconnaissance satellites (such as the Geoton system used on the Resurs series), which serve both civilian monitoring and military intelligence purposes.

KMZ is an active participant in state arms modernization programs. As an integrated part of Rostec, the plant receives substantial government funding under the State Defense Contracts. In addition to manufacturing, KMZ provides maintenance services for military equipment and conducts technical oversight during its operational lifecycle. Plant specialists support the use of optical equipment in the field, ensuring warranty repairs and life cycle extensions—a critical capability during wartime, as night vision devices, sights, and other gear often require urgent repair.

KMZ’s role in the military-industrial complex also extends to arms exports. KMZ is activey involved in Russia’s international military-technical cooperation (MTC) with its optical instruments integrated in larger systems. For instance, in the sale of T-90S tanks to India or Algeria, the optics (sights, rangefinders) were likely produced by KMZ. The enterprise is authorized to carry out MTC activities under international agreements of the Russian Federation—naturally, through the state special exporter, Rosoboronexport.

In conclusion, KMZ is an indispensable component of the Russian military-industrial complex, supplying the Russian Armed Forces with targeting systems, optics, and specialized equipment. It is a strategically significant defense-related enterprise that has been justly subject to international sanctions due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

However, these sanctions are routinely violated, as KMZ continues to source Western instruments, machinery, and tools to manufacture equipment for Russia’s military sector. Zenit-Investprom and Zenit-Techservice

As previously mentioned, KMZ has two subsidiaries: CJSC Zenit-Investprom and JSC Zenit-Techservice, each fulfilling specific roles.

Zenit-Techservice is located at the same address as KMZ (8 Rechnaya Street, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region) and primarily performs production and servicing functions for the main plant.

The core activity of Zenit-Techservice is the manufacturing of components for devices and instruments used in navigation, control, measurement, and monitoring. This includes the production of optical instrument parts, metal components (the enterprise operates steel and non-ferrous metal foundries), and the provision of maintenance services for technical equipment.

This structure functions essentially as a production branch of KMZ, responsible for a segment of the technological workflow—such as machining, body fabrication, and maintenance of instruments.

Zenit-Techservice is also integrated into the Rostec system: its shareholder registry is managed by JSC RT-Registrar , a Rostec-affiliated entity, indicating direct oversight by the state corporation. Both geographically and administratively, Zenit-Techservice is closely tied to KMZ—its general director reports directly to the KMZ management.

One of the KMZ-related entities brought to light in the recent investigation mentioned earlier is Zenit-Investprom.

CJSC Zenit-Investprom is a closed joint-stock company that operates under KMZ and serves as its trade, investment, and supply arm.

Zenit-Investprom is procuring equipment and technologies, including the import of critical components and technological systems required by KMZ.

In addition, Zenit-Investprom manages the distribution of civilian products under the Zenit brand (such as photographic equipment and optics) through dealership networks and online stores. This company appears in the privacy policies of the websites selling Zenit-branded optics and medical devices.

While financially much smaller than its parent company KMZ, Zenit-Investprom has experienced a sharp activity spike since 2020. In 2021, the company’s revenue reached approximately 1.376 billion rubles, up from around 187 million rubles in 2020. However, its net profit remained modest at around 6 million rubles,

indicating its function as a low-margin intermediary responsible for procurement and sales of KMZ products.

And now, we turn to the most critical question: how exactly does KMZ circumvent international sanctions?

Zenit-Investprom and the circumvention of international sanctions

As previously noted, Zenit-Investprom operates as an intermediary between its parent company KMZ and both Russian and foreign suppliers that provide imported components and equipment to Russia in violation of international sanctions.

One notable example is the case referenced at the beginning of this report: the investigation into the supply of IRCOL Collimators produced by the French company HGH Infrared Systems. These collimators were initially sold to the Indian firm PCC Pvt. Ltd., which misled the French supplier regarding the end user of their equipment. PCC then transferred the equipment through the Russian intermediary EMT to Zenit-Investprom, a subsidiary of KMZ.

Given that KMZ is part of the Shvabe holding, which in turn is a subsidiary of the Rostec Corporation, it is clear that Zenit-Investprom acts as one of the main conduits for importing sanctioned Western equipment and components for the Russian military-industrial complex.

This represents a typical sanction circumvention scheme employed by Russian defense companies.

Another example of such a scheme is the cooperation between Zenit-Investprom and the Russian company LLC UMAK (Tax ID: 7727655443). The latter is engaged in wholesale trade of industrial equipment and machinery. Its director and sole owner is Mikhail Viktorovich Melyokhin.

UMAK specializes in the supply of high-precision equipment, including computer numerical control (CNC) machines, as well as lathes, milling, and grinding machines. Following the imposition of sanctions against Russia in 2022, the company became a partner of the Chinese firm Dongguan Qiandao, becoming the exclusive distributor of Chinese 5-axis machines to replace European counterparts.

The primary products supplied by UMAK include:

CNC lathes (e.g., German GDW and Spinner), electrical discharge machines (e.g., Japanese FANUC Robocut), grinding and sharpening machines (e.g., Chinese Dongguan Qiandao), universal lathes (domestically manufactured in Russia), milling centers (e.g., Taiwanese Litz and PROMPT).

According to data obtained by the Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division, UMAK was involved in the delivery of CNC machines from China—specifically, the YK36200 model (produced by the Chinese company Push Ningjiang Machine Tool Co.) and the YK5115A model (manufactured by Tianjin No.1 Machine Tool Works)—to Zenit-Investprom (i.e., KMZ). It is evident that this equipment is intended for use in military production.

Another notable fact is that UMAK and Zenit-Investprom agreed to declare the equipment produced by the Italian company SAMS S.r.l. as allegedly originating from a Turkish company called OTASIS MACHINERY, which is difficult to identify or verify. This tactic is common among Russian companies and their international “partners” as a means of complicating tracking efforts and evading sanctions targeting the supplier or the supply chain itself.

The next company whose equipment is supplied by UMAK to Zenit-Investprom is the German company GDW.

The commercial offer presented by UMAK specifically lists CNC lathes manufactured by GDW.

The delivery time for this equipment is listed as 11–12 months, indicating a degree of effectiveness of sanctions. However, it is still possible for the Russian company to procure European-made equipment for its military-industrial complex, guaranteed within 12 months. This strongly suggests that the company maintains active communication with the supplier and possibly even with the German company GDW itself.

It is evident that there are numerous such examples. But we will continue to identify and expose them.

Regional Production Company and PromInspect

Let us briefly mention two more Russian companies — LLC Regional Production Company (Tax ID: 5012051721, OGRN: 1085012006474) and LLC PromInspect (Tax ID: 9721121400, KPP: 772101001). These companies supply equipment to Zenit-Investprom.

For instance, Regional Production Company is an active player in the high-tech equipment supply market, including for enterprises within the Russian military-industrial complex. It delivered VTT-1100 E2 I R2 vacuum systems to Zenit-Investprom.

More interesting, however, is the delivery from PromInspect, which supplies the Leica TM6100A theodolite manufactured by the Swiss company Leica Geosystems (part of the Hexagon Group).

The Leica TM6100A is frequently used for the measurement and alignment of large-scale equipment, including:

• Radar leveling
• Alignment of launch platforms
• Calibration of satellite and missile systems

As such, this device is classified as dual-use equipment, and its supply to Russia falls under sanctions control, given its potential for military applications.

InformNapalm has officially contacted Leica Geosystems regarding the delivery of their equipment by the Russian company PromInspect to Zenit-Investprom. We received to response at the moment of writing this feature.

Reconstruction and technical modernization of the production facilities at JSC Plant No. 9

In addition to supplying Western equipment, Zenit-Investprom is also involved in the so-called reconstruction and technical modernization of the production facilities at JSC Plant No. 9.

Plant No. 9 is a leading Russian enterprise specializing in the development and production of cannon artillery, particularly tank guns.

The facility is state-owned and, until mid-2023, was part of the Uralvagonzavod Corporation—one of the key structures under the Rostec State Corporation. In June 2023, Rostec’s supervisory board decided to transfer Plant No. 9, the Burevestnik Central Research Institute, and the Ural Transport Engineering Plant (Uraltransmash) from the Uralvagonzavod conglomerate to the management of the Techmash Concern.

This reorganization is part of Rostec’s strategy to create a vertically integrated “gun to round” production cycle by integrating the development and manufacturing of artillery systems and munitions into a single complex aimed at improving the efficiency of weapons production.

Following the transfer, Plant No. 9 is under the management of Techmash Concern (Moscow), specializing in munitions, while Uralvagonzavod has focused on tank production.

Interestingly, journalists from the German outlet Handelsblatt recently uncovered that the German company EKC, headed by a Russian citizen, had been one of the key suppliers of chromium to Russia for over a year—particularly to Uralvagonzavod, the main tank manufacturer for the Russian army.

From January 2023 to April 2024, EKC exported over €24 million worth of chromium to Russia. This metal is used to coat the barrels of artillery systems and shells, significantly increasing their durability and wear resistance.

It is clear that the chromium did not go exclusively to Uralvagonzavod but also reached Plant No.9, whose reconstruction is being handled by Zenit-Investprom (that is, KMZ).

More on KMZ, Shvabe, and the Belarusian Connection

One of the documents mentions the company TD Belorusskie Stanki LLC (OGRN: 1126732012230, INN: 6732043677). This company, registered in Russia and owned by Belarusian nationals, is responsible for importing machine tool equipment from Belarus, thereby integrating itself into the supply chains of the Russian military-industrial complex.

This company serves as an export trading agent for a number of Belarusian machine-building enterprises. According to its own statements, the trading house is the official dealer of “almost all Belarusian machine tool plants”, supplying their products to Russia and other countries. Confirmed partnerships include at least eight Belarusian factories, among them: OJSC Gomel Machine Tool Units Plant

OJSC Smorgon Optical Machine Tool Plant

Vistan Precision Engineering Plant (Vitebsk)

OJSC Kuzlitmash (Kuznetsk) and others.

This suggests that the company likely supplies both Belarusian and Western-made equipment to KMZ, and by extension, to the Rostec Corporation.

Conclusion

KMZ and Zenit-Investprom are strategic manufacturers of optical instruments for the Russian military. KMZ is part of the Shvabe optical holding, which operates under the umbrella of the Russian state corporation Rostec, ensuring close cooperation with various Russian military structures, including the Ministry of Defense, Roscosmos, and Rosatom. The plant produces a wide range of equipment—from targeting sights to space surveillance systems—that is actively used by the Russian army in its war against Ukraine.

Zenit-Investprom acts as an intermediary, orchestrating the procurement of sanctioned European technologies, often via Indian companies that falsify end-user documentation to evade export restrictions. This scheme is widely employed to deliver Western equipment to KMZ, using Chinese and Belarusian companies as a cover to circumvent international sanctions.

Identifying and exposing such schemes is critical in order to prevent Western technology from reaching the Russian military-industrial complex. Every tank, satellite, or missile produced with this equipment could soon be used against European nations or the United States.

Read more publications based InformNapalm on the data from Cyber Resistance hacktivists

• European sanctions disrupt state contract of Russian MOD to supply Granat-4 UAV system
• Hacking the Infocomms Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Katyusha and the secrets of General Konashenkov
• Hacking a Russian war criminal, deputy commander of the OMON of the Krasnoyarsk Krai
• Hacking a Russian war criminal, commander of 960th Assault Aviation Regiment
• BagdasarovLeaks: hacking ex-member of the Russian State Duma Semyon Bagdasarov. Iranian gambit
• Hacked: Russian GRU officer wanted by the FBI, leader of the hacker group APT 28
• Hacking “James Bond”: medical service commander of 960th Assault Aviation Regiment doxed key personnel of his own unit
• Hacking Andrey Lugovoy, member of the Russian State Duma, First Deputy Head of the Security Committee
• Ukrainian hacktivists acquired first-ever photo of the GRU hacker unit commander wanted by the FBI for meddling in the U.S. election
• New evidence of collaboration of former Slovak Justice Minister Štefan Harabin with the Russian Federation
• Hacking Colonel Leonid Rusin, ex-commander of Russian AWACS unit
• Ukrainian hackers posted lists and documents of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (TOP-10 files)
• Economic summit Russia–Africa 2023 databases hacked by Ukrainian hacktivists
• Hacking Lieutenant Colonel Kasatkin, Russian war criminal, head of Combat Training of A-50 early warning aircraft, military unit 41520
• BabakovLeaks: hacking Alexander Babakov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma
• Cuban mercenaries continue to join the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence of new recruitments of Cuban citizens
• Hacked: Russian pilot reveals schemes for weapons supply from Iran, South Africa and Mali to Russia
• CYBINT investigation: how the Orlan-10 manufacturer imports parts bypassing sanctions
• Hacking assistant to vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma: agents of influence in Serbia and media campaigns in the EU
• Hacktivists uncovered new classified documents from STC, Russian manufacturer of Orlan-10 drones
• CYBINT. Hacking Russian UAV manufacturer. Part 1: who assembles Geran-2?
• AlabugaLeaks. Part 2: Kaspersky Lab and neural networks for Russian military drones
• AlabugaLeaks. Part 3: Albatross, war, NVIDIA, Sony and Saito
• MedvedevLeaks: Blackmail by Dmitry ‘Nuclear Teddy’ Medvedev, Aggressive Russian Actions in the Arctic, and Rosatom
• Russian MOD officer conducting PSYOPS via Facebook in France
• BaumankaLeaks. Part 2: secret details of the “contract of the century” for the Supply of S-400 missile systems between Russia and India
• Sanctions at work: $6 million to maintain Russian Su-30SMs stranded
• Hacking Kadyrov’s network of representatives: untouchable Chechens, raped Russians and lucky Milchakov
• Leaked documents reveal how Ukrainian ex-official helps Russia circumvent sanctions
• Russia building its navy despite sanctions: hacking of the 243rd Military Representative Office of the Russian MoD
• 256 Cyber Assault Division and InformNapalm blocked a scheme for supplying sanctioned military equipment to Russia via India
• Hacking of Z-volunteer Ivanov, a member of Putin’s United Russia party: real estate scheming in the occupied territories

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The post In the shadow of sanctions: role of Krasnogorsk Plant and Zenit-Investprom in supplying russia’s military-industrial complex appeared first on InformNapalm.org (English).

The day has come.

I wake up before my husband, and tiptoe to the bathroom. I’m holding the test in my hand, which I haven't dared to take for three days.

My heart pounds, and my hands shake.

"Breathe in, breathe out... You've always wanted a baby," I repeat to myself, but for some reason, I'm afraid.

I wait, and after a few seconds, I see two bright red stripes.

Everything stops.

Deep down, I knew it would happen, but I doubted it until the very last moment.

I'm pregnant.

I thought I would cry, but I can't even blink – no tears, no relief, just silence.

"I'm going to be a mother,” says a voice inside my head. “Damn it, I'm going to be a mother when there's a war going on?"

Despite the daily sirens, death, and uncertainty, Ukrainian women continue to choose to give birth. It may seem paradoxical, but in times of darkness, giving birth becomes an act of faith, resistance, and love. It demonstrates how naturally brave Ukrainians are and their deep belief: that even amid war, Ukraine has a future.

This piece is personal. It is written by me, a journalist who found out she was pregnant during the war, and for the first time in my life, I was not afraid just for myself.

I struggled to express my news verbally for the whole day.

Andrii, my husband, and I had talked about having a child for a long time. But no one prepares you for what it's like to wait for new life while others are dying every day.

At first, I was silent, even to him. It seemed better to keep it to myself – a secret, small light in the great darkness. But I knew I couldn't stay silent for long. This news, so big and so fragile, was about to break.

That evening, I prepared dinner — something tasty and homemade: potatoes baked in clay pots with meat and sour cream (I would say it's a traditional Ukrainian dish).

It takes a long time to cook, so I make it for important dates. I chose it intentionally, to keep our home warm and inviting, our way. As well as the food, I also put a small box on the table. A gift that would change everything.

That evening, there was silence in the candlelit apartment, with no sirens – a miracle in itself. I handed him the box, holding my breath as if I were about to jump into an abyss. He opened it... and remained silent.

The silence seemed to last forever. Then he looked up: "Is it true?"

No, I'm f**king kidding, I thought, but instead I nodded in the affirmative.

His face conveyed it all – joy, shock, but mostly fear. Not just of becoming a father, but of raising a child in a war-torn country.

This wasn’t just two lines on a pregnancy test; it’s a vow – to protect our child, and to endure. And that vow feels even heavier than the emergency suitcase we usually grab during an air raid.

I am not the only one. There are thousands of women like me in Ukraine, though their numbers have decreased significantly since the onset of the full-scale invasion.

Critically few children are born in Ukraine today. In 2024, nearly 177,000 newborns were registered. For comparison, 278,000 children were born in 2021 – meaning there’s been a 40 percent drop in just three years.

For every child, there are almost three deaths during the war. The situation is worse in the East and South: in the Kherson region, there are 11 deaths for every child born.

According to the Institute of Demography, if this trend persists, by 2050, there will be only 25 million Ukrainians. That would be less than half the size of the population of Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Overall, the birth rate in Ukraine has been declining since 2013. Even before the war, the low standard of living in Ukraine resulted in ongoing migration, leading to a continually decreasing number of children. Ukraine's fertility decline was also significantly affected by the start of Russian aggression in 2014.

Cost is another reason Ukrainians have small numbers of children. I was also an only child in my family. Every time I asked for a brother or sister, my parents said they couldn't afford it; it was too complicated and expensive. Many of my friends had a similar situation: most of them grew up alone. These days, having multiple children is the exception rather than the rule.

War brings constant stress, which is harmful during pregnancy, built up by ongoing worry and anxiety. I never thought of myself as an anxious person, but with the onset of pregnancy, I became this way.

I always have thoughts in my head, and it's interesting that many of them revolve around work. Being a journalist means constantly worrying about articles, ensuring everything is written correctly, and that I haven't forgotten anything. Now, being pregnant, I have a new and bigger concern on top of my career. But the worries about work have not disappeared, and sometimes it seems that there are even more of them.

Living in Ukraine today, there is a constant influx of men into the army who must fight. Every one of those men faces the risk of not returning home.

It's difficult to fathom what pregnant women experience when their loved ones are at war. Sometimes I catch myself thinking that I could end up like those women, if my husband was called to fight. The thought scares me, even though I know it could happen to any of us.

The presence of your partner during pregnancy is a critical factor. In fact, I could never have imagined how much men change during their wives' pregnancy.

I’m endlessly grateful to Andrii for the breakfasts, the massages, the music, the care, and the messages he sends me all day long. That’s what fills me with strength and calm. No matter what’s happening, he drops everything, starts the car, and takes me wherever I need to go. He’s always by my side at doctor visits, smiling widely as he watches our baby on the screen.

By the way, here is our tiny baby! Currently, it is much bigger, but this is the best picture because it turns out that all babies love covering their faces with their hands.

Now our little unborn baby is almost 8 months old. It weighs about two kg. I still can't believe a real person is living inside me!

This baby is so lucky to have a daddy like Andrii – someone who talks to him every evening, kisses him through my belly, and counts down the days until they meet. That kind of love and presence is the most precious thing you can have during pregnancy, even when there’s a war outside the window.

From the start, Andrii said he’d be there with me at the birth to support me. I know I can count on him completely. That’s why I never once considered going abroad or even to another city in Ukraine to give birth.

Some pregnant mothers have decided to move for safety, knowing that the Russians often shell hospitals and maternity wards, even in Kyiv. Moreover, a missile hit near the maternity hospital where I plan to give birth during winter. Everything ended well, and no one was hurt, but this also puts me under pressure.

I now have only two months left before I give birth... I just hope everything works out — that I make it to the hospital, that Andrii is there, and that there are no Russian attacks that day.

But despite everything, I believe that everything will be alright, and I will give birth in Kyiv.

In January this year, I wrote a story about journalist Anastasiia Fedchenko, who lost her husband in the war while eight months pregnant. She gave birth to a daughter a month later. Although her husband was supposed to be with her during the birth, she was instead assisted by two friends.

"My beloved husband Andrii should have been with me that day. He would have held my hand and wiped the sweat from my brow, he would have loved Katrusia at first sight," Anastasiia wrote on her Facebook page.

Being pregnant during the war presents another challenge. Have you ever been in a bomb shelter? If you haven't, I hope you never have to. The closest bomb shelter to my house is the subway. If you have ever been in the subway, you know that it is very cold, especially in winter. Additionally, there is limited seating space, making it challenging for pregnant women to stand.

Usually, my husband handles it — he wakes me when explosions shake our apartment in the night, checks how serious the attack is, and decides whether we need to rush to the subway. Last time, we drove because I was already walking slowly.

Carrying two cats, a blanket for warmth, and a chair to sit on makes getting to the shelter a struggle. I can’t imagine doing it all with a stroller.

Oh, and I haven't yet told you the most important thing: Are we having a boy or a girl?

To be honest, I had dreamed of a gender reveal — balloons, confetti, that shared moment of surprise. But our doctor slipped up and told us right away at the first ultrasound. Andrii and I just hugged in silence and decided: let it at least be a surprise for our family.

We ordered cupcakes with a secret inside – pink or blue. Before the first bite, we asked everyone to guess. It was simple, sweet, and filled with joy.

What are your thoughts? While you ponder, I'll maintain the intrigue a bit longer.

I’ve been thinking for a long time about how to answer the question of why couples decide to have a child during a war. To be honest, I don’t have a clear answer.

Everyone has their own reasons. One of my friends, who is currently fighting in the army, said his wife wanted him to leave something behind if he didn’t come back. Another friend said she wanted to find meaning, after the war deeply affected her mental health. My other friend doesn’t want to have a child at all.

For me, I think it’s about feeling alive despite the war. It’s about living in the moment, no matter what happens. Having a child during a war isn’t just about fear and uncertainty; it’s about endless love. It’s the realization that, even though we are afraid, we are also ready to protect a whole new world from all the bad things out there.

Already, he has become the thing for whom we have to live!

Yes, he: we are expecting a baby boy.

And while I'm writing these last lines, he gives me a sign – my son kicks me from the inside, as if to say: “I'm here, mom.”

He hasn't been born yet, but he already feels everything. He hears my heart, my worries, my words. And he probably knows that he is greatly anticipated here.

I haven't held him in my arms yet, but I'm already talking to him in my mind, sharing everything from the morning news to my fears.

And while the world around me falls apart, a whole new universe grows inside me.

Thank you, my boy, for choosing us and coming to us right now, when we need faith that life goes on. Your daddy and I already love you very much, and we are waiting for you…

In the meantime, watch this wonderful video of my baby at 5 months, weighing only 300 grams, January 2025:

Upgrade Now!

Tip Jar!

NEWS OF THE DAY:

TRUMP: RUSSIA, UKRAINE “VERY CLOSE TO A DEAL”: U.S. President Donald Trump said Friday marked a “good day” for negotiations after his envoy, Steve Witkoff, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

The Kremlin described the talks as "constructive," while Trump stated that "most of the major points are agreed to" and urged Ukraine and Russia meet "at very high levels" to "finish it off."

Reports suggest that the U.S. expects Ukraine to concede the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014 — a move Zelenskyy has repeatedly rejected.

Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met in Rome on Saturday before Pope Francis’ funeral. After the meeting, Zelenskyy said: “It is a very symbolic meeting that has the potential to become historic if we achieve joint results.” The White House called it a “very productive discussion.”

KREMLIN: UKRAINE FORCES REMOVED FROM KURSK: Ukrainian troops have been pushed out of Russia’s Kursk region, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on Saturday.

According to Russian state media, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, reported the development to President Vladimir Putin on Saturday.

Ukraine has not yet responded to the claim.

In a statement, Putin congratulated Russian forces, declaring that Ukraine’s attempted incursion had "completely failed."

"The complete defeat of the enemy along the Kursk border creates favorable conditions for further advances by our troops in other key areas of the front," he said.

UKRAINE, EU PRESENT PEACE PLAN: Ukrainian and European officials have submitted a peace proposal to the U.S. that includes "robust security guarantees" and rejects any discussion of territorial concessions until a "full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea" is in place.

The proposal also calls for an "Article 5-like agreement," backed by the United States, as the Trump administration stated this month that NATO membership for Kyiv is currently off the table.

The plan further requests that sanctions on Russia be eased only after a peace agreement is fully implemented. Washington has reportedly been considering easing sanctions even before a formal peace deal is reached.

CATS OF CONFLICT:

Today's cats of Conflict are Myroslava's Sherri and Stuhna, who seem to be the most excited about the new family member.

They never leave Myroslava's side, and wherever she goes, they always come running to snuggle up next to her.

Stay safe out there,

Best,
Myroslava

This case study was first presented at the FIC Cyber conference on April 1st 2025

This investigation uncovers the shadowy gold trails linking Russia to the Central African Republic, the DRC and the UAE. Since arriving in CAR, the Wagner group has acted like a predatory state within a state – seizing power and plundering resources. INPACT/AEOW has repeatedly exposed their network of front companies running gold and diamond operations, with companies like Lobaye Invest, Midas Resources (N’dassima mine) or Diamville, as well as shady deals in timber and beverages. After the death of Prigozhin, Wagner has been remaining in CAR and Russia has been more and more present in the region. Dig Dig Baby is a raw exposé of the mines, the gold routes and the Russian grip tightening across Central Africa.

An artisanal gold mine under the control of Russia in CAR

Yidere Artisanal gold mine

In May 2023, Heavy Industrial sarl, a company with no existing track records and  created in March 2023, signs a 25 years mining convention with very favorable terms with the Central African Republic. This convention describes a long term role for Heavy Industrial in the country operating a gold mine and selling its proceeds abroad.

On January 4^th 2024, Heavy Industrial is awarded a 100km2 mining permit for 10 years enabling the company to start exploiting this small mine located in YIdere/Baboua in the region of Nana-Mambere in the North West of the country known for its gold and diamond artisal mines.

Unstable region with Wagner presence

As of 2022, Wagner is in the area. The North-Western part of CAR is facing a renewed wave of instability with an increase of insecurity in the Nana-Mambere region with the presence of 3R armed group. Several incidents perpetrated by armed groups are reported to the United Nation panel of experts. On 21 January 2023, armed elements attacked the main customs post of Beloko, on the Cameroonian border. Two FACA soldiers and one member of the Wagner group were reported killed. In March, in Ndiba, three Chinese workers were taken hostage and released following the payment of a ransom at a gold mine. Bouar remains prone to criminality despite the presence of the FACA and the Wagner group.  In September 2023, confrontations are said to take place between the Wagner and rebellious groups. At the same time, Wagner combatants are said to be posted in the region on mining sites in Irdéré, Lamy-Pont,  Kpandé,  Nguia-Bouar, Abba, Sagaini, etc.  In January 2022, around 20 bodies are found in Yidéré and were allegedly killed by Wagner fighters. As of 2024, Wagner forces appear on official photos during ceremonies.

An Active Site as of December 2023

Based on satellite images, it is possible to see the site is in operation since at least December 2023. This mine has substantial facilities, including construction equipment and worker housing. Between December 2023 and February 2025, the development of the area designated in the operating permit under the “Point G” stamp will be observed. This includes a significant expansion of the site and the creation of a basic airfield runway.

Satellite image series showing the expansion of the Idere mine area in CAR – Source: Copernicus.eu

Series of satellite images of the IRDERE mining site in the Central African Republic showing the different industrial zones and the military cantonment. – Sources: Image: GoogleMaps / SentinelHub – Analysis: Inpact

A Russian Front?

Based on open source research, Heavy Industrial is directed by a Central African national,  Murielle Gaombalet Binguiremo Jossyca.

INPACT/AEOW has reached out Heavy Industrial and Murielle Gaombalet Binguiremo Jossyca for comment but they did not answer our calls.

According to INPACT’s own sources and local media, she would be a straw person in charge of Heavy Industrial but also another company created a week before and called General Ressource allegedly owned by Russian nationals.

What is done with the gold produced by Heavy Industrial and where is it exported? These questions remain unknown so far. INPACT/ AEOW has also not been able to find more information about General Ressource in CAR at this stage but it appears to be a popular name to create discreet companies linked to Russian beneficiaries in the region.

A Russian Artisanal Gold Trading Office in DRC

General Ressource sarl  appears on Linkedin on the profiles of two Russian nationals, Daniil Karpievich and Yuriy Adamian.

Both claim General Ressource sarl is a company “rehabilitating the coffee industry in DRC in partnership with the Coffee National Office» (now ONAPAC). There is no trace of any partnership with DRC agencies or export of coffee abroad, but we do know that in December 2023, Generale Ressource sarl imports cereals from Georgia. Based on an email recovered and belonging to Generale Ressource sarl, the company may have been set up in 2017. INPACT/AEOW has not had access to the commercial registry to check whether the company has any legal existence in DRC.  According to Russian databases, Karpievich has been working as the director of two Russian companies specialised in importing food stuff and coffee, Kinik Ltd and Rusexport Ltd since he is 19 years old.

The two men are indicating another company on their Linkedin profile: Oxor Capital. The company was created on June 11^th 2021 and operates as an artisanal gold trading office in DRC. According to official statistics from the government, in 2024, this office positions Kinshasa region as the fourth exporter of gold from DRC artisal gold mines after South Kivu, Ituri and North Kivu.

Since 2022, Oxor Capital has sent to the UAE for 1,385,900 USD of gold to a company we have not been able to identify called Ayou Metals Trading FZCO in the United Arab Emirates.

 In addition, Oxor Capital seems to be in partnership with a newly created company in Kyrgyzstan called A-Invest LLC and which is promoting gold and diamond trading with Congolese partners, namely Societe Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), O.D.MINIER SARL and Oxor Capital sarl.

Oxor Capital is also in partnership with Regolith, an alternative finance platform created by Russian nationals, Den Kerzhemen, Egor Kerzheman and Antonon Zinoviev. The company is incorporated in St Vincent and the Grenadines since April 2023 but allegedlyhas offices in the US and in the UAE. According to its website, Regolith offers many solutions to support businesses but also propose alternative financing solutions including a commodity fund: people purchase a gold equivalent amount and get a return on their investment.

In August/September 2024, the Russian government authorised and encouraged the use of alternative financing for companies in order to circumvent international sanctions and access financing.

While INPACT/AEOW could not link formerly the two stories, we thought it was important to report on them together showing how the Wagner group keeps capturing gold mines in CAR to finance its organisation and how Russia keeps investing in the gold/precious minerals in conflict torn countries using companies with similar names. The UAE remains the focal points for gold.

Russian troops attacked the city of Pavlohrad in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with drones on April 25, killing three people, including a child, and injuring at least 10 others, Governor Serhii Lysak said.

A five-story building in Pavlohrad came under attack and several fires were reported in the city.

A 17-year-old boy is among the injured, Lysak said. Eight people were hospitalized.

The number of casualties could increase as the search and rescue operation is ongoing.

Pavlohrad, a city with a population of over 100,000, lies roughly 70 kilometers (over 40 miles) east of the regional center, Dnipro, and over 110 kilometers (70 miles) west of the front line.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in central-eastern Ukraine is a regular target of Russian missiles, drones, and artillery strikes. A Russian missile attack on Kryvyi Rih in early April killed 20 people, including nine children, and injured over 70.

Recent weeks saw Russia intensify its strikes against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and residential areas as Moscow continues to reject a full ceasefire backed by Washington and Kyiv.

‘No point in negotiating:’ Russia’s deadly attack on Kyiv sows distrust in Trump peace plan

Liudmyla Kapatsii, 75, and her daughter lingered in their apartment for a couple of extra minutes, doubting whether to go to the shelter after the air raid alarm woke them up around 1 a.m. on April 24, warning of a potential Russian missile attack. Though they were tired of

The Kyiv IndependentNatalia Yermak

Ukraine may be forced to temporarily give up some territories to Russia, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said in an interview with BBC published on April 25, as U.S. pressure mounts for a peace deal with Moscow.

“Right now (there are) a lot of conversations about a possible solution. One of the scenarios is… to give up territory. It’s not fair. But for peace, temporary peace, maybe it can be a solution. Temporary,” Klitschko said in a released excerpt of the interview.

He added that Ukrainians would “never accept occupation” by Russia.

Klitschko’s remarks come amid renewed diplomatic activity following a deadly Russian missile and drone attack on Kyiv that killed 12 people and injured almost 90 on April 24. The strike took place just a day after the Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede occupied territory and that the West end its military aid to Kyiv.

The Trump administration’s latest proposal for ending Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine reportedly includes U.S. de jure recognition of Moscow’s control over Crimea, along with de facto recognition of its partial occupation of other Ukrainian regions — Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Klitschko appears to be the first senior Ukrainian politician to suggest that Ukraine may need to consider temporary territorial compromises.

Earlier this week, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine has not received any official proposals for territorial concessions as part of potential peace talks with Russia from the U.S. or other partners. He has also repeatedly said that Kyiv won’t recognize occupied territories as Russian.

Despite his popularity abroad, Klitschko faces criticism in Ukraine for his handling of the capital. The Kyiv mayor has had a long-standing conflict with Zelensky. He claims ongoing pressure from government authorities.

Asked whether Zelensky had talked to him about any possible war settlement details, the Kyiv mayor said, “No."

‘No point in negotiating:’ Russia’s deadly attack on Kyiv sows distrust in Trump peace plan

Liudmyla Kapatsii, 75, and her daughter lingered in their apartment for a couple of extra minutes, doubting whether to go to the shelter after the air raid alarm woke them up around 1 a.m. on April 24, warning of a potential Russian missile attack. Though they were tired of

The Kyiv IndependentNatalia Yermak