Did a video show an Indian drone falling to the ground and causing an explosion, after being shot down by Pakistani forces in May 2025? No, that's not true: The video had been online since April 29, one week before India struck locations in Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack by Pakistani militants, and Pakistan, in response, shot down Indian fighter jets. An earlier version of the clip suggests it was recorded in Ukraine.

The claim appeared in a May 8, 2025, post on X (archived here), which consisted of a video of an object falling from the sky, hitting the ground, and causing an explosion, along with the following text caption:

🚨Exclusive footage of an Indian drone, shot down by Pakistani forces.

The post can be viewed below:

🚨Exclusive footage of an Indian drone, shot down by Pakistani forces. pic.twitter.com/VMZ8UYYHzy

-- Ihtisham Ul Haq (@iihtishamm) May 8, 2025

In reality, the clip was not recorded in the context of Indian-Pakistani clashes on May 7 or May 8, 2025. The earliest version we could find was posted to Telegram on April 29, 2025, along with the following caption (translated from Russian using Google Translate):

An epic dive by a Geranium on a target somewhere in Ukraine during a recent raid.

We are confirming the location.

The word "Geranium" is a Russian nickname ("Герань") for Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze drones used by Russian forces since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Thus, the video is likely to show a drone engaged in a deliberate attack, rather than a drone falling to the ground after being shot out of the sky.

The earlier footage was also longer, and before and after the moment of impact, featured at least two voices speaking Russian. Readers unable to access the video on Telegram can view a cropped re-posting of it on YouTube below:

Russian military forces in Syria find themselves becoming victims of sabotage. As a result, Russia has reached out to Syria with an urgent appeal for immediate measures to put an end to this crisis, reports Defense Express citing unnamed sources. Despite the fall of President Bashar Assad and the subsequent change in leadership, Russia maintains a strong military presence at the Khmeimim Airbase and shows no intention of withdrawing. However, the situation remains unstable, as unknown perpetrators consistently target them, damaging military assets and causing fatalities among Russian soldiers.

According to Defense Express, Russia's request for immediate action is directed at Syria's new leadership, specifically Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, to counteract sabotage attacks reportedly carried out by Ukrainian special services on Khmeimim Airbase. These appeals came in late April following a series of attacks on the base.

Ukrainian operations have successfully targeted critical radio communication nodes and power substations, and on April 28, a Russian IL-76 transport aircraft was fired upon by small arms, resulting in the confirmed deaths of two Russian service members whose documents later surfaced online. In a bid to protect its assets in Syria, Russia has pledged $5 million in humanitarian food assistance to Damascus through the UN World Food Program.

Earlier reports indicated tensions when Syrian forces hindered Russian attempts to transport missile containers for S-300 and S-400 systems out of the country via the port of Tartus, turning back the convoy.

Additionally, it's reported that Syria's new leader has demanded that Moscow extradite former Syrian President Bashar Assad, who fled to Russia following the rebels' victory.

Ukrainian forces are actively engaging in battles around the Tetkino railway station in the Kursk region, with the conflict intensifying daily. Recent reports from pro-Russian sources claim that Russian troops fended off Ukrainian attacks near Noviy Put and Volfino.

However, analysts from the Institute for the Study of War, while examining the unfolding events in Kursk, observed escalating clashes.

Russian military bloggers are currently reporting combat activity near the Tetkino railway station. Some Russian channels further claim that Ukrainian forces have gained control over two streets in the southwestern part of Tetkino. However, ISW analysts have been unable to independently verify these claims.

The involved factions reportedly include elements of the Russian 83rd Air Assault Brigade and the 217th and 56th Air Assault Regiments, according to pro-Russian Z-channels. Ukrainian forces are noted for carrying out artillery and air strikes while employing drones to isolate the defenders of Tetkino.

Geolocated footage dated May 6 showed Ukrainian forces deploying JDAM munitions on Russian positions near Tetkino railway station.

Russian reporters insist that Ukrainian forces are using drones and artillery to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication, aiming to isolate units near Tetkino. Z-channels also report that Ukrainian forces, utilizing drones, have complete control over a section of highway 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzha.

Ukrainian drones attacked several key Russian military sites overnight on May 7, including critical defense industry plants in Saransk and Tula, as well as the airbase in Kubinka near Moscow, home to MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets, reported Andriy Kovalenko, chief of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation.

“In Russia, important military-industrial enterprises were attacked, while Moscow once again targeted civilian infrastructure in our cities, killing people,” Kovalenko stated.

The threat of UAVs in Saransk was declared by the Head of the Republic of Mordovia, Artem Zdunov, at 5:27 AM.

Videos of a fire in the city were published by Russian Telegram channel Astra, noting that flames erupted near the Khimmash plant.

Readers subsequently reported that the drone strike on Saransk, the capital of Mordovia, caused two fires, notably impacting the Optic Fiber Systems plant, situated a few kilometers from the Saransk Mechanical Plant and Saranskkabel-Optik. Optic Fiber Systems is the first and only producer of optical fiber in Russia, according to Astra Telegram channel.

Exilenova+ Telegram channel mentioned that the Saranskkabel and Optic Fiber Systems plants, which were attacked, have been producing cable and fiber-optic products for Russian arms for over 20 years.

At 7 AM, the Saransk city administration announced that classes were canceled in preschools, schools, and higher education institutions on May 7.

Astra Telegram also reported fires in the vicinity of two major Russian defense industry enterprises, part of the state corporation "Rostec," following a drone strike in Tula

"In Tula, the attack targeted AO 'Instrument Design Bureau,' a flagship of the Russian defense industry specializing in developing modern weapon systems, including anti-tank complexes, firearms, and combat modules. Its products see active use in the war in Ukraine,” highlighted CPCD chief Andriy Kovalenko.

He further stated that "SPLAV," known for developing the "Grad," "Uragan," and "Smerch" multiple rocket launch systems, also came under attack. SPLAV is a priority manufacturing site for the Russian army.

The "Crimean Wind" Telegram channel, citing satellite data, reported a fire at the Kubinka airbase, located 63 km from Moscow, and shared footage captured by locals showing the drone attack.

Exilenova+ Telegram channel also published footage of the UAV attack on Kubinka, along with satellite images of the airfield, noting that MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters are based there.

On the evening of May 6, drones attacked Moscow; Moscow region residents also reported explosions. During the attack, mobile internet service was disrupted in Tula, Yaroslavl, Tver, Saransk, and Kursk.

Russia's Aeroflot stated that between 1:00 AM and 5:30 AM on May 7, due to temporary flight restrictions at Sheremetyevo Airport, some flights were diverted or delayed. Russian media outlet Astra reported a "collapse" at Moscow airports in light of the UAV attacks, quoting eyewitnesses.

A Russian pro-military blogger on the Telegram channel "Voievoda Speaks" claimed that on the night of May 7, one of the most massive drone attacks involved 447 long-range pilotless aircraft and missiles launched into Russia.

Media outlets on May 6 speculated that Ukrainian Defense Forces might attack Russia on Victory Day, May 9, but not Moscow, as the Russian capital will have heightened air defense.

Hungary

On March 20, 2025, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated on his X page that Ukraine’s EU membership would cost each Hungarian household 500,000 forints (1,200 euros) annually:

“9,000 billion HUF – that’s how much the war has already cost Hungarian families. 500,000 HUF per household, every year – that’s the price tag of Ukraine’s EU membership.  Brussels wants Hungarians to pay the bill, but no decision will be made without the voice of the Hungarian people. A new member can only join with the unanimous support from all Member States. There can be no decision until the Hungarian people cast their votes. This decision belongs to our citizens, not Brussels!”

First of all, where does this data come from? These are calculations by the Századvég Foundation, a think tank affiliated with Orbán. According to the foundation, “Ukraine has cost each Hungarian household 2.2 million HUF” (5,500 euros) or 9,000 billion HUF (22.5 billion euros) in total. The basis for the supposed losses includes three components: rising prices for imported gas, increased state spending due to higher yields on government bonds, and losses from reduced exports to Russia.

In reality, it refers to increased prices for imported gas due to changes in spot prices at the TTF Gas Hub in the Netherlands and additional budget expenditures due to the higher cost of state debt (due to geopolitical risks and inflation shocks, the yield on 5-year Hungarian government bonds rose from 2% to 4–6%). Additionally, bilateral sanctions – imposed by the EU on Russia and by Russia on the EU – affected Hungary’s trade volumes with the aggressor state. However, the root cause of these losses – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – is not mentioned in the Századvég Foundation’s analysis.

Secondly, what does 500,000 HUF (1,250 euros) from each Hungarian household for Ukraine’s EU accession mean? In reality, Ukraine will not “take” money from every Hungarian family. It is more about potentially foregone aid from the EU budget that the country currently receives, and possible increased expenditures from Hungary’s state budget.

These calculations are based on the potential reduction in receipts from the EU Cohesion Fund and subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), contributions to support Ukraine amounting to 0.25% of GDP, additional pension costs for Ukrainians who supposedly will move to Hungary, and estimates of Hungary’s share in financing Ukraine’s reconstruction.

In general, there are several issues with the 500,000 HUF figure:

• They are based on the assumption that Ukraine would join the EU today. In reality, the years leading up to Ukraine’s EU integration will bring changes both in Ukraine (for example, we need to harmonize legislation with EU standards) and in the EU itself. By the time of Ukraine’s accession, both the CAP and the distribution of Cohesion Fund expenditures will likely have been significantly revised. Discussions on such revisions have already begun.
• Reconstruction costs for Ukraine are a separate international initiative, not part of the EU accession process, and not solely the responsibility of member states. Therefore, treating them as “future losses” for the population related to Ukraine’s EU accession is unfounded and manipulative.
• The calculations of migration and pension burdens are based on speculative assumptions. For example, the claim that 5% of Ukrainian pensioners will move to Hungary. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of February 2025, the share of Ukrainians who chose Hungary as a refuge was about 1% of the total number of refugees in European countries.

Finally, the estimates by the Századvég Foundation do not consider the positive economic effects of enlargement: new markets, investments, enhanced security, and stability in the region. According to IMF calculations, EU enlargement, particularly due to the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan countries, could increase the bloc’s GDP by 14% over 15 years.

By the way, Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 also involved both pre-accession financial aid and post-accession funding to support its integration and development through three programs: ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). Between 1990 and 2006, Hungary received €1.987 billion (in prices of that time). But even after joining, the country continued to receive support — financial aid for 2021–2027 is planned at around €30 billion.

Hungary receives several times more from the Cohesion Fund and other EU funds than it contributes to the EU budget. Its contribution is relatively small (about €2 billion with a GDP of more than €200 billion), while the amount received is one of the highest in the EU among recipient countries (after subtracting contributions, Hungary received around €4.5 billion from the EU budget in 2023). If calculated per capita, each Hungarian hypothetically gives “out of their pocket” about €200, while receiving nearly €700.

Poland and Slovakia

Concerns and myths about Ukraine’s accession to the European Union exist not only in Hungary. Polish presidential candidate from the opposition party Law and Justice (PiS), Karol Nawrocki, stated that Poland cannot afford actions that would harm its economy:

Russian propaganda media, citing Nawrocki’s interview for Sieci, picked up on the narrative that Ukraine’s EU membership would be economically disadvantageous for Poland.

Polish journalist and commentator Łukasz Warzecha pointed out that large amounts of money would go to Ukraine, which would be a direct competitor to Poland:

In Slovakia, social media users circulated several false claims about the negative impact of Ukraine’s accession to the EU on the national economy. In particular, they manipulated the words of MP Ľubica Karvašová from the “Progressive Slovakia” party, who said that Slovak farmers would have to grow different products if Ukraine joins the EU. Social media users claimed the politician proposed that farmers grow camels and oranges. The post added that farmers would go bankrupt because Ukraine would supply products that Slovaks have “been growing for centuries”.

Slovak politician and deputy chair of the “Hungarian Alliance”, György Gyimesi, claims that under current rules, Cohesion Fund money is allocated to those member states where GNI (gross national income) per capita is below 90% of the EU average:

He also noted that if Ukraine joined the EU, supposedly 30% of all money allocated under the Common Agricultural Policy would go to Ukraine. Gyimesi concluded that if Ukraine joined the EU, it would become the largest beneficiary of the EU budget:

A new formula for solidarity: transform, not compete

It is precisely the allocation of funds from these programs – the European Structural and Investment Funds and within the CAP – that Ukraine’s Eastern European neighbors mainly refer to when discussing potential losses (or rather, forgone income) for their households.

For example, the Cohesion Fund supports EU member states with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average to strengthen the EU’s economic, social, and territorial cohesion. Under the current 2021–2027 program, 15 out of 27 countries are eligible for funding (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). And the allocation of funds within the CAP depends on the area of arable land and the number and size of farming households.

Currently, all EU spending estimates related to Ukraine’s accession are based on the “here-and-now” assumption, that is, they consider the country’s current economic status, relative population size, and the configuration of the current EU institutional system. Under these assumptions, the potential volumes of support are impressive. For instance, according to estimates of researchers from the German Economic Institute in Cologne, if Ukraine had been an EU member in 2023, it would have received €130–190 billion: €70–90 billion in agricultural aid and €50–90 billion under cohesion regional policy. EU estimates are similar – €186 billion.

A transformation of budget priorities always accompanies EU enlargement. However, these changes are not a burden but an investment in economic, social, and political stability across the continent. Even before new members join, the EU begins investing in their transformation: supporting reforms, strengthening institutions, and modernizing infrastructure.

The example of Croatia, which joined the Union in 2013, demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach. Between 2007 and 2013, it received €998 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). After accession, Croatia received €12.2 billion through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), of which €9.1 billion came from EU Cohesion Policy funds. Additionally, in 2014–2020, Croatia received €2.3 billion under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Rural Development Programme.

The EU assisted Croatia in building institutional capacity, focusing primarily on preparing government institutions to comply with EU legislation and meet necessary criteria. The main focus was accelerating reforms in key areas such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration reform, public finances, economic restructuring, and the business environment.

This strengthened the Croatian economy and the EU single market, into which local businesses integrated, expanding production chains. Accordingly, trade volumes increased. Add to this the new labor force and strengthened EU influence in the region. Croatia’s EU accession became a signal to other Balkan countries about the possibility of integration, provided reforms are implemented.

Under current conditions, Ukraine could become a net recipient of aid. At the same time, European countries that currently receive support would lose it, since Ukraine has the lowest GNI per capita and a high share of arable land. To integrate current candidates (which, in addition to Ukraine, include Moldova, Balkan countries, and Georgia), the EU needs to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. The EU budget and structural funds should consider current country indicators, growth potential, strategic importance, and benefits to the entire European Union.

Scholars and experts believe that if the EU enacts institutional reform, the costs of adapting Ukraine will be lower. Moreover, the efficiency of Ukraine’s agricultural sector is underestimated, and thus, subsidies for Ukrainian farmers may be significantly lower than the cited estimates.

Support for less developed regions is not only a matter of solidarity but also a mechanism for developing the internal market: new consumers and producers, reduced migration pressure, and strengthened regional security. People stay to live and work at home while purchasing goods produced in other EU countries.

Ukraine will bring unique assets to the EU: digital transformation, military resilience, flexible institutions, and civic engagement. While some European countries are slowly adapting to changes, Ukraine is already acting as a transformation accelerator.

Yes, integration requires investment. But these are investments in a new market, new energy, and a more resilient European space. Ukraine is not a “beneficiary” but a partner capable of strengthening and renewing the European Union.

Russian forces remain resolute in their plans to seize territories on the right bank of the Kherson region, including the regional center and parts of Mykolaiv. In an interview with Novini.LIVE, Yuriy Tkachuk, an officer of the "Omega" National Guard unit of Ukraine, revealed that the occupiers have already readied boats and vessels for a large-scale landing operation.

"We are seeing increased activity. The enemy is preparing for an amphibious operation, and hundreds of boats have been spotted, about 300 in total. These preparations include landing on small islands currently under the control of Ukrainian Defense Forces.

These attempts are being countered, and enemy targets are being eliminated," Tkachuk explained. He noted that by capturing the Dnipro islands, the Russian objective is to extend their strike zone on the right bank, aiming to push back Ukrainian forces to land more substantial airborne troops.

Additionally, Russian forces are active along the Kinburn Spit in the Mykolaiv region, shelling Ochakiv, while Defense Forces continue to neutralize Russian personnel and equipment.

With the Kremlin preoccupied by military operations in Ukraine and preparations for grand parades, tensions in Dagestan—still part of the Russian Federation—are nearing a boiling point that could exceed the Kremlin’s ability to control them.

Dmitry Steshin, a well-known Russian correspondent, paints a grim picture of the current situation in Dagestan: rampant radicalization, unemployment, a record-high birth rate, and the collapse of administrative verticals. In a post on May 6, he acknowledges that the region functions under its own set of rules, drifting further away from Moscow's influence. Steshin notes that despite a staggering birth rate—59% higher than Russia's average--Dagestan lacks jobs and real opportunities, pushing youth to emigrate en masse. Those who remain often find themselves drawn into radical movements. According to locals, "brashness and bluster are valued over intellect," Steshin reports.

Of particular concern to Steshin is the rise of radical Islam's appeal among educated families. He references a 2010 incident where one of the Moscow metro bombers was a young woman from a family of a school principal and PhD candidate. The father, reportedly thrilled by his daughter's act, exemplifies the alarming indoctrination, as Steshin highlights, “Father congratulated his daughter for becoming a martyr.”

Steshin insists that given the multitude of nationalities, languages, and clan structures, no effective governance exists within the republic. Officials are less concerned with lawfulness and more with not offending anyone, he notes.

The depth of the crisis transcends radical elements, reflecting a tapestry of systemic issues: frail state infrastructure, chronic poverty, tribal allegiances, rampant crime, and a sense of impunity amid a burgeoning population. Increasingly, this transforms Dagestan from a "Russian region" to an autonomous political zone.

With memories of Russia's bloody campaigns in Chechnya just two decades ago, today's escalating tensions in Dagestan evoke a threatening déjà vu. The 1950s and 1990s illustrated a disgruntled Caucasus's capacity for widescale insurgency.

Dagestan was ground zero in August 1999 for notorious warlords Basayev and Khattab's incursion, sparking the Second Chechen War. Recent hostilities, including an assault on police resulting in two officer fatalities, eerily resemble that lethal narrative.

Against the backdrop of a demographic decline in Central Russia and a growing southern population, Russia's power dynamics are under flux. Although Moscow maintains a façade of control, effective governance is fracturing—exacerbated by an army embroiled in Ukraine and an overworked National Guard and Interior Ministry.

In stark contrast to its external military pursuits, Russia faces a growing internal crisis. With failing regional governance and social decay, Moscow squanders trillions on expansionist politics, overlooking its domestic instability.

Ukrainian forces have killed Russian Colonel Abduzazid Shikhabidov, personally appointed by President Vladimir Putin to lead a key airborne division. Shikhabidov, commander of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, was killed less than two months into his appointment, according to a report by Agentsvo.

His death was announced on May 6 by schools in Dagestan, where mourning activities have commenced. Widely known for his leadership in one of Russia's most renowned airborne divisions, Shikhabidov’s death has been confirmed by several regional sources and pro-military channels.

Dagestan schools and public forums reported that farewell ceremonies were held at the Troyekurovskoye Cemetery in Moscow. In his hometowns of Kaspiysk and Buynaksk, commemorative events featuring photos, speeches, and symbols were organized. The Ministry of Education in the republic distributed a message to students following the colonel's passing. Notably, some mentions of his death were later removed, though the information surfaced across many pro-war Telegram channels and “VKontakte” communities.

The 76th Guards Air Assault Division, often referred to as the Pskov Division, has played a significant role in Ukraine since 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. Its troops have been active in fierce clashes in the Donetsk region and, post-2022, in areas such as occupied Bucha within the Kyiv region. An investigation by Reuters linked this division to civilian violence, highlighting its involvement in the most intense parts of the conflicts. Since the onset of the full-scale war, the division has reportedly sustained significant casualties amounting to thousands.

Prior to leading the 76th Division, Shikhabidov served in other conflict zones including South Ossetia and Syria and was awarded multiple honors, including the Orders of Courage and Suvorov, as well as "For Bravery" and "For Merit to the Fatherland" medals of both first and second degree. Following his appointment by Putin in March, the Russian President had publicly praised the division’s "daily successes." In Dagestan, Shikhabidov was celebrated with billboards and classroom sessions dedicated to him. His demise marks another event in the continuous loss streak among high-level military officers.

Shikhabidov's death underscores a troubling trend of high attrition in the officer ranks of Russian Armed Forces. In recent months, multiple reports have confirmed the fatalities of battalion, regiment, and brigade commanders. Operating in grueling war conditions, Russian forces face not just the loss of personnel but a significant erosion of their leadership echelon—officers whose positions are hard to swiftly replace. Even appointments made with "Putin’s blessing" appear to serve as one-way tickets.

Ukrainian Alina Petrauskaite has chosen to live her life in the service of God. Although she once dreamed of having a family, a deeper calling led her to the convent to serve as a nun.

In their daily prayers, many Catholic believers worldwide pray for Ukraine, and were previously led by Pope Francis until his death last month.

Now, during the election for the new pope, Alina and her fellow nuns are intensifying their prayers so that the cardinals can choose a good pope.

"We desire the Holy Spirit to show them who it should be," she said.

The death of Pope Francis has revived discussions about the Vatican's role in the world’s most pressing conflicts. In the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Holy See has long walked a diplomatic tightrope, criticized for ambiguity – yet it continues to maintain dialogue with both Kyiv and Moscow.

Unlike other world powers, the Vatican offers no weapons, only moral leverage — and increasingly, it is using it to help Ukraine reclaim prisoners, deported children, and even the remains of fallen soldiers.

With protocol-breaking moments like Zelenskyy’s placement at the papal funeral, quiet signals from Moscow – such as the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to papal appeals for peace – and even a brief, symbolic meeting with Trump, the Vatican is emerging as an unlikely but important ally for Ukraine — and a rare channel of dialogue in a polarized world.

Alina is a Roman Catholic nun who belongs to the Congregation of the Little Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was founded in Poland in 1888 and began operating in Ukraine in 1969. She and her fellow sisters serve God and do charitable work through social, educational, and pastoral activities. They do not wear traditional monastic habits like other nuns to stay closer to other people and serve among them.

Just like priests, nuns prepare for life in a monastery, which can take several years, gradually discerning their calling. After that, the nuns have to take three vows – of purity, poverty, and obedience – pledging to dedicate themselves to God, community, and service to others.

Alina now serves in Kyiv at the Catholic Media Centre. She is the editor-in-chief of the official website of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine. She has commented on Pope Francis' foreign trips, meetings, and solemn services on major holidays. They also cover the activities and life of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine.

Ukraine is a predominantly Orthodox country where traditional Catholicism represents a small share of the population – just 1 percent. In addition, about 9 percent of the population identify as Greek Catholics, mostly in western Ukraine. Most Ukrainians belong to Orthodox churches – around 70 percent.

But Christians and non-Christians all around the world are awaiting the election of the next pope – and its geopolitical consequences. Alina says she doesn’t focus on individual candidates — she believes that the most worthy one will be chosen.

The Pope is elected during a conclave, a secret vote of cardinals in the Sistine Chapel. Only cardinals under 80 can vote, and the winning candidate has to gain a majority of two-thirds of the votes in order to be elected. After a successful conclave, white smoke comes out of the Chapel's chimney, to signal that a new pope has been chosen.

Whoever the next Pope is, there will be consequences for Ukraine, as different candidates have different views on the war.

Possible Papal Candidates:

1. Pietro Parolin: Many believe that the most likely successor to Pope Francis is his former chief advisor, the Vatican Secretary of State. Parolin recognizes Ukraine's right to self-defense, but is cautious about Western military support for fear of escalation. In 2024, he visited Kyiv, and in 2025, he supported the idea of negotiations with Russia for a just and lasting peace.

   

2. Luis Antonio Tagle: The Filipino would be the first ever Asian pope if selected. Tagle has spoken about the war mainly in a humanitarian context, without mentioning Russia.

“No gun can kill hope, the goodness of the spirit in the human person. There are so many testimonies to this… The mission to always remind the world that every conflict, every disaster has a human face…. For example, the war in Ukraine and conflicts in other countries of the world are generally presented as political, military conflicts but people are forgotten!” said Tagle in an interview.

3. Matteo Zuppi: Zuppi – who was chosen by Pope Francis to lead an initiative for peace in Ukraine – has visited Kyiv and Moscow, but has avoided condemning Russian aggression, speaking instead of suffering and the need for peace. Like Tagle, he’s known for being progressive but also cautious in their statements about Ukraine and Russia.
   

4. Peter Tarkson: Hailing from Ghana, Tarkson avoids political statements. Calls for prayer for peace and often blames world leaders for nuclear threats, but does not directly condemn Russia.

“With war, everything is lost; but with peace, there is everything to gain. The devastation of Ukraine corresponds to Russia's wobbling economy, Germany's recession & U.S.A's mounting domestic debt etc. But talk about Economic malaise skips pain their economies cause in Ukraine,” Tarkson wrote on Twitter.

5. Péter Erdő: сlose to Hungarian Prime Minister Orban - a close ally of Russia. For example the cardinal has largely avoided critisizing Orban over democratic backsliding and rule-of-law concerns, including the controversial 2021 anti-LGBT law that closely mirrors Russian legislation, and shares his cautious rhetoric on the war.
   
   Although not openly pro-Russian, he refrains from criticizing Russia and maintains a dialogue with both Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

6. Pierbattista Pizzaballa: Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pizzaballa expressed concern over the war in Ukraine. In 2022, he performed a rite of consecration of Ukraine and Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary – a symbolic request to help the two peoples to rebuild trust, without which, according to him, peace is impossible – and called for the restoration of trust between nations.

“So that they may listen to each other again, that she may help them to rebuild relationships of trust between them, without which there will be no future," said Pizzaballa in 2022.

The conclave will begin on May 7th, and many predict it will not last long, Andrii Yurash, Ukraine's Ambassador to the Holy See, explained that there are different views in the modern church.

"I think that in this situation, it would be more logical for the Church to choose someone who can represent and be acceptable to those groups that envision and plan the future development of the Church. So, a centrist would currently seem to have the strongest prospects," Yurash said.

Today’s cardinals are divided into different groups. Some seek to continue Pope Francis' socially progressive course, others want to return to traditional forms of church life, while some centrists try to combine these approaches, he told The Counteroffensive.

Far from the cardinals’ deliberations in Rome, Alina’s journey into religious life began in Kyiv.

The monk who founded this group believed that sisters should serve in the areas where they came from. That is why Alina continues her ministry in Ukraine.It wasn’t always easy for Alina to become a nun. Alina was baptised in a Catholic church. She attended church with her family only on major holidays. But her life changed when, at age 15, her friends invited her to participate in religious classes at St Alexander Church in the centre of Kyiv.

“At that time, being closer to the church, I realized that I also wanted to be like the nuns I had seen, that I wanted to be in the church like them, and serve God more in this way,” Alina told.

Since then, she has seen the Church as a place of personal faith and a global voice in the world’s most challenging moments.

The Vatican is not involved in military conflicts and does not support any side with arms. Instead, it acts as a moral mediator in wars and conflicts.

Although Alina mentioned that the Pope’s position may not directly influence the aid level, she believes it still matters.

“It’s not just about Pope Francis — this is a long-standing Vatican policy, developed over centuries, with its justification and tradition. Pope Francis, in particular, was more of a pastor at heart than a diplomat,” Alina explained.

Pope Francis's statements have often been quite controversial among Ukrainians. His messages about fraternal nations and the importance of a truce, even with territorial concessions from Ukraine, were not universally popular.

"They are brothers, cousins. Let them come to an understanding! War is always a defeat. Peace to the whole world!" said Pope Francis, addressing the bishops, clergy and religious of the French island of Corsica in December 2024.

“Perhaps we [Ukrainians] wanted to put our words in the pope's mouth and expected the pope to say precisely that. But we see that certain things have now opened up to what the pope did. I realized one thing: Evaluating the pope's words and actions is challenging because we don't know the truth and the mechanisms,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

Russia has systematically taken steps to develop relations with the Holy See for centuries.

“It was [Francis’] dream because no pope had ever been to Moscow, and he wanted to establish closer contacts, ” Yurash said.

After 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in Eastern Ukraine, the Vatican found itself in a difficult diplomatic position, trying to balance condemnation of aggression with maintaining a dialogue with Moscow.

The ‘Pope for Ukraine’ initiative was created to allow people worldwide to donate funds for Ukrainians affected by the war in the country's east. In its first two years, the initiative raised around €16 million, including a personal contribution from Pope Francis.

During the full-scale invasion, a special humanitarian mission, headed by Cardinal Konrad Krajewski, was established. Ten such missions have been carried out since March 2022.

The Pope had general audiences every Wednesday and Sunday, and speeches were broadcast all over the world. In almost all of his speeches, he reminded people about the war in Ukraine, Alina explained.

" While the whole world has forgotten, the news doesn't talk about it anymore, because the bombings are not so tragic, the casualties are not so great, we are all used to the same shelling, but the Pope kept saying ‘Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine.’”

Even in his last Easter address in 2025, Francis mentioned Ukraine.

"Pope Francis, in his Urbi et Orbi [traditional Pope`s address to the ‘city and the world’] address, spoke to the world about the most painful places. He said, "We pray and call on everyone to support martyred Ukraine and to establish a just and lasting peace," Yurash told The Counteroffensive.

Pope Francis died on Monday, 21 April, as a result of a stroke and cardiac arrest. He was 88.

According to the rules, the funeral seating arrangements for world leaders are allocated alphabetically by their country's name in French, the traditional language of diplomacy in which protocols were established.

As President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy should have been seated in the third row or even further back. Instead, he was put in the front row, 11 seats away from Donald Trump, who sat to his right, and next to French President Emmanuel Macron.

The Vatican broke protocol and ensured the Ukrainian president was at the centre of attention at the ceremony. Zelenskyy was also greeted with spontaneous applause when he took his seat in St Peter's Square after a brief meeting with Trump in St Peter's Basilica.

Despite previous agreements between the two sides, this “would not have happened without coordination with the Vatican,” because everything that happens on Vatican territory must be agreed upon in advance, explained Tetiana Izhevska, a former ambassador for Ukraine to the Holy See. “This is definitely an exception to the general rule.”

The meeting lasted 15 minutes and took place in private before the farewell ceremony. Details of the conversation were not disclosed, but Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it good. “It was a very symbolic meeting that could become historic if we achieve joint results,” the Ukrainian President wrote in his Telegram channel.

As the Cardinals weigh the future direction of the Catholic Church, many believers in Ukraine carry their faith through darkness, far from the Vatican.

The Pope's position has not always been clear to all Ukrainians, but perhaps this was his strength - his choice to act not loudly but carefully, considering each life.

“It seems that Pope Francis was given to us at this time to show that the church should be merciful, simple, and close to everyone,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

RUSSIA TRIES TO INFLUENCE POLAND'S ELECTIONS: Poland is witnessing unprecedented attempts by Russia to interfere in the presidential election, according to Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski.

According to him, Moscow is using disinformation and hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, such as water utilities, thermal power plants and government agencies, to paralyze the state. The number of cyber attacks has doubled since last year, and dozens of incidents were recorded during his speech alone.

Gawkowski believes its support for Ukraine has made it a target for Russian sabotage. Poland has already faced cyber attacks on its space agency and state media, and accuses Russia of arson and sabotage in Europe.

PRICE OF RUSSIAN OIL FALLS TO RECORD LOW: The average price of Russian Urals and ESPO crude oil fell to 3,987 rubles per barrel, more than 40 percent below the planned budget level and the lowest in two years. This collapse is due to the growth of global reserves, OPEC+'s decision to increase production, and expectations of a slowdown in the global economy. In March, oil cost more than 5,000 rubles, and in April it was 4,562 rubles.

The collapse in prices forced the Russian government to cut its energy revenue forecast by a quarter and raise the expected budget deficit for 2025. At the same time, Moscow is increasing military spending to a record 6.3 percent of GDP, which is putting more pressure on finances. Analysts believe that the Kremlin will have to raise taxes, cut social spending, or increase borrowing if it does not plan to reduce funding for the war.

LITHUANIA TO INVEST €1.1 BILLION TO PROTECT THE BORDER WITH RUSSIA, BELARUS: Lithuania plans to invest €1.1 billion to strengthen the defense of its eastern border over the next decade. The bulk of the funds - 800 million euros - will be spent on installing anti-tank mines to deter possible aggression from Russia or Belarus. The measure is aimed at blocking and slowing down a potential invasion, in particular through the strategically important Suwalki corridor.

Vilnius also announced an increase in the defense budget to 5-6 percent of GDP starting in 2026. In March, Lithuania, along with Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, announced its intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel mines, which provoked a sharp reaction from Moscow.

DOG OF WAR:

Today’s Dog of War is the cute dog Myroslava saw in the coffee shop near our office.

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Myroslava

UKRAINE, KHARKIV, May 6 — For the fourth time, classical music sounded for Kharkiv residents against Russian attacks. On May 2, the Kharkiv Music Fest took place at the “loft stage” of the Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre, one of the safe places for art in the city located just 19 miles south from the Russian border.

“Kharkiv Music Fest existed for eight years, but we made just three normal events over all this time. It’s my personal tragedy,” said Serhii Polituchyi, the president of the festival, to Gwara Media.

Russia attacked Kharkiv relentlessly since the start of the full-scale invasion. In 2022, Music Fest’s team planned the concerts of Lucas Debargue and Nils Wanderer, but had to cancel everything. The festival still happened —  in the Kharkiv subway with the symbolic name “Concert between explosions.”

“It should have been a set of events introducing world-famous musicians to Ukrainian fans of classical music. Now, we can’t invite most performers because of war, but we got a new meaning for our festival. The Kharkiv Music Fest is a powerful “code” of our city’s revival, which can fill the empty souls of Kharkiv locals affected by the war,” said Polituchyi.

In the following years, the Kharkiv Music Fest was held under this new motto — revival — uniting those who stayed or come back to Kharkiv, performers, and guests. 

Today, almost all theatrical plays or music shows in Kharkiv begin by the audience going down long stairs to the underground stages, so that performances and the joy at watching them aren’t interrupted by air raid alerts.

The Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre started hosting its opening concerts — it’s one of the few safe venues of the city. 

In 2025, the festival's theme is “The CODES of revival: Gratitude. Calmness. Harmony. Experience. Hope. Tradition. Reflection. Empathy” — and performers aim to uncover how emotions of our time are expressed through music. 

The most famous Kharkiv Music Fest initiative is art-pianos placed around the city so that everyone could play under the open sky or in frequented public areas like university’s hall.

“It is an opportunity to be more open to people — and some of them improvise concerts at piano’s locations. I’m very happy to announce that there will be pianos at different subway stations this year. The first one will be at Yaroslav Mudryi’s station,” said Mariia Horbonos, the program director of the festival.

The National Ensemble of Soloists “Kyiv Camerata” opened the festival with the National anthem of Ukraine and expressing gratitude to the Armed Forces.

The program was divided into two parts. During the first one, Julian Milkis, a famous clarinetist from the States, played “Letters to Friends” by Georgian composer Giya Kancheli — a deep, emotional, and honest message, dedicated to the composer's loved ones.

“This is my fourth visit to Ukraine during the war, and I realized that art and music are now as important as weapons. They give people the impulse to fight and live,” said Milkis.

Bohdana Pivnenko, the violinist (she’s called "Ukrainian Paganini in a skirt") and Kateryna Suprun, the viola player, performed the second part of the opening concert. 

“It is an amazing feeling to come to Kharkiv and see how people need art, music, and culture. All visitors returned after the break, and it says a lot. I’m happy to play for people who prove their unbreakability every day. Last year, we were afraid to come, but there weren’t any questions for this time because people and their emotions countered all (our) fears,” said Kateryna Suprun.

Pivnenko and Suprun played “Sinfonia concertante for violin, viola, and orchestra” by Valentyn Bibik, the world-known composer from Kharkiv.

The performers also said that, in Kharkiv, people react more emotionally to the music by Ukrainian composers than elsewhere — probably because of the close frontline and constant Russian attacks. 

Ukrainian classical music, though, is now living through revival globally. 

“Many Ukrainian classical compositions are performed now (compared to pre-full-scale war), which is very pleasing,” Bohdana Pivnenko says, adding that she feels like the Ukrainian classical music got more popular not only abroad but within the country.

At the end of the concert program, “After reading Lovecraft’s” by contemporary Ukrainian composer Oleksandr Rodin was played in Kharkiv for the first time. The audience heard a mysterious reflection of Lovecraft’s horror stories philosophy, realized through the sound of string orchestra.

Gwara Media talked to people in the audience — they said they enjoyed the professionalism of the soloists, got curious about the concert program, and resonated with the importance of Kharkiv Music Fest’s idea.

“I have been to all the events of Kharkiv Music Fest. I’m a real fan of the team and their work. Art is our cultural defense, and we try to show our resilience through these new meanings. We are not just surviving, we have (methods) of revival, and music is one of the symbols of future Ukrainian renaissance here,” said Volodymyr Chystylin, journalist and activist.

Locals think that Kharkiv Music Fest is vital for people who are subjected to Russian aggression every day.

“We really need music now because it supports our spirit. It is very important to us because life under attack is difficult,” said Kateryna, one of the visitors.

Mariia Horbonos said that the registration for the Music Fest’s opening was closed in one day because the “loft stage” has seat limits. She invites guests to other events of the festival, noting that all of them are free (but require registration.) 

The Kharkiv Music Fest will continue from May 2 to June 10, and each event will be connected with a certain “revival code.”

The organizers said that the schedule could be changed because of the city's safety situation.

In the evening of May 2, after the festival opening concert ended, Russia attacked Kharkiv with drones. More than 17 explosions followed the sounds of music. Russian drones injured more than 50 people, including two children.

Read more

• “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war

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In a significant move, European Union nations are positioned to ramp up their military aid to Ukraine, should President Donald Trump not successfully convince Vladimir Putin to swiftly end the conflict, according to EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. To date, the EU and the U.S. have jointly provided Ukraine with military assistance totaling approximately €40 billion annually; however, Kubilius emphasizes the potential to utilize these funds more efficiently. This strategy could effectively double the weaponry supply to Ukraine without increasing the budget.

Kubilius highlighted a newer tool available for EU countries to assist Ukraine, suggesting that the concept of "Peace through strength" could be put into tangible practice. "Loans are strength for Ukraine!" he proclaimed, underscoring the plan.

As part of an extensive rearmament plan adopted this year, the European Commission is earmarking €150 billion in loans to ensure rapid joint procurement and production of weaponry. These financial avenues enable EU nations to invest in Ukraine's arms manufacturing or collaborate with local companies—integrating Ukraine's defense industry with Europe's.

According to a recent report by The Washington Post, a growing number of EU countries are considering investments into Ukraine's defense sector rather than direct arms shipment. This shift comes amid dwindling weapon supplies across Europe after three years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of tangible contributions, the European Union has already provided Kyiv with €1 billion to bolster howitzer production. Ukrainian manufacturers are rolling out both self-propelled and towed "Bohdana" howitzers, with over 85 percent of components produced domestically. By year’s end, this figure is expected to rise to 95 percent, marking a scale of local production unprecedented in Europe according to Kubilius.