Hacktivists of the Ukrainian Cyber Resistance group handed over to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community a dump of email correspondence of Yuri Pavlenko, the head of the 243rd Military Representative Office (MRO) of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This mailbox contains tens of gigabytes of data on the construction, repair and maintenance of ships for the Russian navy. In this feature, we will touch on how sanctions against the Russian Federation affect the repair of the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, how the threat of Ukrainian naval drones forced the Russians to refit ships, which foreign components are still used on Russian ships, how Russia continues to expand its capabilities in the Arctic despite the sanctions.

Given the mass of data in the dump of 243rd MRO, we are presenting the material not in our customary investigation format, but rather as a brief overview of the analyzed documents. If you are a journalist or an analyst, and if you would like to have the whole dump, please contact with a private message through Cyber Resistance or InformNapalm pages.

243rd MRO of the Russian MoD

In Russia, a military representative office (MRO) is a department responsible for quality control and acceptance of products contracted from the military-industrial complex. There is a directorate at the MoD with a number of MROs in its structure. The 243rd MRO is located in St. Petersburg, it is focused on the navy procurement and the construction of the fleet. It is headed by Yuriy Pavlenko, and from his mail it becomes clear that there are at least 18 military-industrial complex enterprises operating under the supervision of 243rd MRO. Among them, for example, are Saint Petersburg Shipbuilding Company (SPSC), Research and Production Enterprise PUSK, etc. Here is the list: Рапорт 243 ОП.pdf

In particular, the mail dump contains a lot of information about these entities subordinate to the MRO. For example, there company records with information about managers, number of employees, signature samples of the officers, etc.

There also are lists of employees and contractors of military-industrial complex companies involved, and the SPSC plant is among them.

The mail also contains a lot of technical documentation. Here, for example, are the operational requirements for the production of an assault and landing boat: 20220906-ТТТ на создание ДШЛ.pdf

At the same time, the mail sheds light on significant problems in the Russian Navy.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV

This “pride of the Russian Navy” has been under repairs for almost 8 years and, according to all plans, should have already been returned to service. However, Pavlenko’s mail contains dozens of documents on meetings, conferences and consultations regarding the progress of the ship’s repairs.

Apart from the desire of Russian officials, admirals and contractors to continue embezzling money, delays in modernization of the ship are also attributable to the sanctions. Apparently, some mechanisms and installations were replaced with Russian products. And some had to be abandoned on the go. For example, Admiral Kuznetsov is equipped with hydropneumatic accumulators. They need stroke counters for normal operation, but the counters are foreign-made and the Russian Federation cannot obtain them. What is the Russian response? They call another technical meeting and come to the conclusion that “it’ll work fine without those”.

Here is the text of the resolution: 8877ф Совместное решение.pdf

Accordingly, this is further evidence that anti-Russian sanctions are an effective security mechanism, and that Russia feels their bite. And there is something to show here.

FOREIGN-MADE COMPONENTS IN THE NAVY

The Russians keep fairly meticulous records of foreign-made components that are critical to their navy. This is done for the two-fold purpose: a) to form reserves of components; b) to gradually replace them with domestic analogues. Russian military sector companies submit tables of foreign-made components to the MRO, indicating the availability of Russian analogues or suppliers. Usually the latter are not available.

With regard to the reserve components inventory, the example of the “top secret” ship Akademik Ageyev is indicative. According to the Russian media, it is an oceanographic research vessel, but in reality it is a reconnaissance and sabotage ship belonging to the MoD.

Russian bloggers like to stress that the technical documentation for this vessel is classified. However, the data from the 243rd MRO of the Russian MoD reveals the scope of foreign-made components used on the ship. It should be noted that the ship was officially launched in 2019, before the start of the full-scale invasion. Only one ship of this type was manufactured, and serial production is not planned. However, a number of sanctions against Russia have been introduced since the beginning of its hybrid aggression against Ukraine, and therefore the Russians decided to stock up on foreign components at the construction stage. Accordingly, if something breaks down, Russians still can replace parts without any problems. In total, the ship has 78 foreign-made components, including the power plant (HFJ 7638-06P three-phase alternating current diesel generator based on the MAN 9L21/310 engine) and its main working attachment – a 45-ton lifting crane (DKF80).

Original documents: *.xlsx

Tracing foreign-made components sometimes gets ridiculous. For example, the Russians are modernizing the heavy nuclear missile cruisers of Project 1144 Orlan.

One of the ships is an old Soviet cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, another never ending Russian construction project, which has been under modernization since 1999. The Russians planned to take the ship on sea trials as early as 2024. However, the sailing date was postponed until the spring of this year. In principle, there is no surprise, as the list of foreign components which have no Russian analogues contains even the M 21 Junior coffee machines made in Italy.

Original document: 11442М_09.2023.xlsx

The same situation applies to the newest Russian Project 22160 class patrol ships — they cannot function without a Mondo coffee maker and a Panasonic microwave oven.

Original document: 22160.09.2023.xlsx

Jokes aside, among the coffee-maker spam in the Russian documentation, it is easy to overlook really critical units and assemblies of foreign production.

For example, information on the newest large landing ships (LLS) of Project 11711 Ivan Gren class shows more critical foreign components.

Original documents on the Ivan Gren ship: Сведения о продукции ИП для пр.11711 зав.302.xlsx

Original documents on the Petr Morguniv ship: Копия Сведения о продукции ИП для пр.11711 зав.302.xlsx

These ships were commissioned back in 2018 and 2020, respectively. The next ships, serial numbers 303 and 304, were scheduled to be delivered in late 2023 and 2024. However, they are still being built. Apparently, this is due to difficulties in purchasing components because of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Another example of the sanctions impact is the pace of construction of the Project 23550, a class of armed icebreaking patrol ships.

The refusals of disciplined suppliers who comply with sanctions against Russia delayed the construction of the ship with the factory number 235 (Purga) for almost a year.

Full version of the document: 430-08-23 ПАО ВСЗ (Исакову, Фомину).pdf

The document suggests that the Russians have found replacements for foreign components. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the document whether those are purely Russian products or parallel import. This example also shows that although the sanctions are working, the Russians are not standing idle either. At the same time, it is important to note the application of this class of ships. These are Arctic ships that the Russian Federation is preparing for the upcoming confrontation in the Arctic Ocean. Thus, even tougher restrictions are needed if world leaders do not want to have another problem at the planet’s North Pole.

Since 2014, the Russians have been developing a ground-based test and training naval aviation simulator Razgon-VMF. The documentation for this system very carefully indicates foreign components, manufacturers, countries of origin, functional significance, etc. The sender probably wanted to protect these documents from prying eyes, so they were encrypted.

The documents show that the Russians continued to purchase components as of 2023, therefore InformNapalm will contact the manufacturers on this list with inquiries about the use of their products by the Russians.

Full version of the documents: 1.pdf, 2.pdf, 3.pdf, 4.pdf

QUALITY COMPLAINTS AND BREAKDOWNS

The mail of the 243rd MRO also contains many documents concerning warranty service by factories for their products that have failed. Taken together, this documentation provides a general picture of the state of affairs in Russian shipbuilding.

For example, a number of Russian ships, including modern frigates of Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class, are equipped with UV-450 naval sighting devices. This device is used for guidance and target designation. It facilitates maritime operations by improving situational awareness and target acquisition capabilities.

Since the manufacturer of this device is reporting to 243rd MRO, the mail contains all the failure cases of this sight. Most of the defects are related to manufacturing.

Here is a case of malfunctioning horizontal guidance motor and periodic motor failures on the Admiral Gorshkov frigate.

Or here is a defect in the azimuth guidance motor on the Admiral Kasatonov frigate.

And here are the defects discovered at the stage of the ship’s sea trials (poor target tracking, the sight goes blind its own electronic warfare system is on, the screen quality is poor, etc.):

On the Rasul Gamzatov patrol ship there are problems with fixing the device—it wobbles from side to side:

In total, at least 11 complaints regarding the operation of the device were received in 2023. However, we believe that the real state of affairs is much worse.

Original documents and list of recorded problems:

At the same time, the UV-450 contains more than 242 foreign-made components, mainly from the USA, Japan and Taiwan . Here is the list:

Every year, the Russians are prolonging permits for the use of foreign-made components, quote “until the production of domestic analogues was mastered.” This is a strong indication that the Russians continue to illegally purchase components for guidance an targeting systems through intermediaries.

All of these documents are more than a collection of isolated cases of quality complaints and procurement problems of the fleet. Researchers who will study the dump of 243rd MRO will have a chance to make some systemic findings. For example, here are 11 pages of detailed descriptions of equipment failures and other problems on specific ships from 2018 to 2023 from just one contractor.

FEAR OF UKRAINIAN DRONES

In conclusion of this review, we will show a couple of documents on how the Russians are adapting to Ukraine’s effective actions at sea. Through the use of naval attack drones, Ukraine, having no strong navy, managed to significantly limit Russia’s capabilities in the Black Sea and forced the Russians to withdraw the backbone of their fleet from Crimea.

Of course, the Russians began to adapt to new methods of warfare at sea. In June 2023, a decision was made to strengthen a number of Russian large landing ships with additional anti-aircraft modules. Among such ships are the Project 11711 LLS Petr Morgunov (mentioned above), the LLS Georgy Pobedonosets, and the unlucky LLS Olenegorsky Gornyak.

According to the documents, the Yantar shipyard must develop technical documentation as soon as possible and later carry out work on installing anti-aircraft modules on the large landing ships. The deadline for these works was set for October 31, 2023. However, on August 4, 2023, Ukrainian drones successfully hit the LLS Olenegorsky Gornyak in the waters off Novorossiysk.

Original documents:

If you are a journalist or an analyst, and if you would like to have the whole dump (20Gb), please contact with a private message through Cyber Resistance or InformNapalm pages.

Read more publications based InformNapalm on the data from Cyber Resistance hacktivists

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