256 Cyber Assault Division and InformNapalm blocked a scheme for supplying sanctioned military equipment to Russia via India
This investigation was performed byInformNapalm volunteer intelligence community on the CYBINT data received from the Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division. In this feature, we will expose the supply scheme for sanctioned critical equipment to the Russian military-industrial complex and describe how it was disrupted. The information intercepted from Russians, revealed a sanctions-dodging scheme organized by the Russian company EMT. It ordered restricted European equipment through the Indian company Park Controls & Communications (PCC) and paid for the orders in rupees through Sberbank India. The Indian side criminally conspired with the Russians and tried to deceive the European manufacturer, assuring them that India was the end destination, and that the goods were not transferred to Russia. At the same time, the Indians sent the Russians not only the sanctioned equipment and its software keys, but also forwarded all the correspondence with their European manufacturers. However, the documents obtained by the 256 Cyber Assault Division and the investigation conducted by InformNapalm resulted in a special operation to inform European manufacturers about the dishonest practices of the Indian company. Thus, we could disrupt any further use of the European equipment in question by the Russians, as well as block further deliveries worth millions of euros through a channel that was deemed “priority, convenient and reliable.” Find more details and evidence below.
Russian EMT and Indian PCC
Meet the main player in the scheme—the Russian Limited Liability Company EMT. According to their official website, EMT was founded in 2000 by Elena Mur and is the official representative of more than 20 foreign companies in the Russian Federation. According to open data, EMT supplies virtually all types of equipment and technology used in ground and flight (field, road, sea) testing of products in the aerospace industry, shipbuilding, automotive, electronics and other industries.
Over the past year, a long-term CYBINT and HUMINT operation and a data leak from EMT through its CEO Nikolay Ludin let us monitor and then expose a scheme for the supply of equipment and machinery worth millions of euros to Russian defense plants, culminating on October 30, 2024 with EMT LLC coming under the US sanctions.
Unfortunately, we saw that the sanctions imposed by the US did not deter the Indian company Park Controls and Communications Private Limited (PCC) from doing business with Russians. Moreover, neither the Russian nor the Indian company actually hide the fact that they are conducting their business in the interests of the military-industrial complex. For example, the Indian PCC’s client list includes the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Indian Air Force, and its website states:
“We have built up a diverse portfolio of products including Telemetry Data Acquisition Systems, Precision Timing & Control Systems, and various other components for the Air Force, Navy, and Military Ground Forces. PCC gained a good reputation quickly thanks to our future-ready approach and the ability to completely customize products for highly specific requirements in the defence sector. As we look to the future, we hope to build a legacy of trust, collaboration, and progress—one that will continue to inspire and empower the industry and nation.”
However, the talk of “reputation” by this Indian company did not get in the way of making blood money and cooperating with the Russians, who are waging an aggressive war of conquest against Ukraine as well as conducting terrorist operations in Europe.
Let us now consider a specific example of such cooperation.
IRCOL COLLIMATOR
In September 2023, the Russian Zenit-Investprom CJSC (Krasnogorsk) ordered from EMT LLC the supply of foreign equipment and related services worth 59 million Indian rupees. Please note that the payment was made through Sberbank India in the Indian currency.
Important detail—Zenit-Investprom is part of the Russian Shvabe Holding (came under the US sanctions back in 2015), and it, in turn, is part of the Russian State Corporation Rostec. Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, most Rostec companies were engaged in state defense contracts.
The ordered equipment is the IRCOL Collimator test bench manufactured by the French company HGH Infrared Systems. As the manufacturer notes on its website, “The IRCOL test bench is a test equipment dedicated to the characterization and performance validation of any Electro-Optical system: visible to SWIR cameras, Night Vision devices, Thermal imagers, laser Rangefinders, multi-axes sighting devices.”
The French company does not supply this equipment to Russia. Therefore, Russian EMT purchased this product via India. There is a clear list of actors in this track:
- a) The end customer is a Russian company that is part of the largest Russian defense corporation (Zenit-Investprom);
- b) The supplier in Russia is a Russian company under sanctions (EMT LLC);
- c) The intermediary is an Indian legal entity that expressly admits being a defense contractor in India (PCC Pvt. Ltd.).
- d) The goods are sanctioned equipment of French origin, used for testing night vision devices and thermal imagers.
This is what the scheme looks like:
The Indian intermediary (Park Controls & Communications Ltd.) ordered the collimator from the French HGH. The Russians were supposed to receive the equipment by the end of June 2024. However, the manufacturer had certain technical issues. During the factory testing phase, a defect was discovered which delayed the delivery schedule. We monitored the private correspondence of the Russian side, and noticed that the Indian side kept the Russians informed all this time and forwarded them all their correspondence with the French manufacturer. Here is the letter from PCC to EMT:
The Indian side took care to attach what the French side wrote to them (of course, without the latter’s knowledge):
EMT forwarded all this confidential correspondence, with official translations into Russian, to its customers from Zenit-Investprom. Here is the full version of the letter: 20240515-3942 [PDF]
In December 2024, following two delivery delays, the Russians finally received the equipment sold to them by the Indian side. Moreover, this happened after the US sanctions were imposed on EMT. The Indian PCC, understanding all the risks, deliberately continued to participate in the criminal scheme. This is confirmed by the latest letter from EMT, where the Russians wrote:
“Due to sanctions against EMT LLC, shipping the Goods from India to the Russian Federation was associated with a certain risk for the Indian supplier. However, following the business trip to India of the head of EMT LLC from November 10 to 13, 2024, all circumstances preventing the shipment were resolved.”
And here is a travel order for the CEO of EMT Ludin to India, where he persuaded the Indian side to join the sanctions evasion scheme.
Here is the air waybill for the transportation of the sanctioned equipment by the Russian airline Volga-Dnepr from Bangalore to Moscow.
Ludin also attached photos of the equipment to the messages with the documentation:
- Full version of the documents: 20241203-3942 [PDF]
As shown above, the Indian PCC was fully aware that the French supplier was complying with the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the PCC management committed a deliberate deception and declared itself the end user of the equipment. Moreover, representatives of the Indian company provided consultations on debugging the equipment already installed in Russia at PJSC Krasnogorsky Zavod named after S. A. Zverev (PJSC KMZ) on the orders of Zenit-Investprom.
This is confirmed in a letter dated January 16, 2025, where the Russians wrote:
“As the Manufacturer is located in France, the supplier of the Equipment is PARK CONTROLS & COMMUNICATIONS (P) LTD., India (which is also the end user to the Manufacturer), we were referred to the Technical Director Mr. MP Sastri as our contact person who, on behalf of the Supplier, will organize technical support based on our information about any Equipment malfunction.
MANUFACTURER’S POSITION
Having all the evidence, documents and correspondence in hand, and having tracked the movement of the equipment, we officially contacted HGH Infrared System, the French manufacturer of the collimator bench. The manufacturer promptly responded to our request for comment, answered all follow-up questions. Based on the totality of facts and cross-evidence from the correspondence between the Russian and Indian sides, we have no doubt that the manufacturer complied with the sanctions and acted in good faith adequately to the situation.
Out of respect for the French side, we will not disclose all the details of our correspondence with them, but we will quote the official comment from a representative of HGH Infrared System:
“HGH takes very seriously its obligations under applicable laws. We do not sell our products to Russia and require all third parties with whom we transact to adhere to this requirement. On learning that a customer may be in breach of the terms of sale, we have terminated our relationship with the business given they could not provide evidence to the contrary.”
In addition to this statement, while monitoring the reaction of the Russians, we could see that the French side is truly committed to sanctions and their statement had direct documentary confirmation. On March 4, 2025, we received a letter from the Russian EMT addressed to its customer at Zenit-Investprom, where the supplier complained about a “malfunction” of the equipment. The temporary license key of the collimator bench expired and the Russians were unable to complete the equipment setup. At the same time, EMT representatives point out that
“The Supplier [PCC] has a good reason to fear that the Manufacturer (the HGH company, France) has suspicions regarding the end use of the supplied Equipment in India. In this regard, the Supplier requests to return [the equipment] for the purpose of demonstrating the Equipment to the Indian representative of the French company at the Supplier’s premises in Bangalore, India.”
The most cynical thing about this situation is that the Indian side realized that they had been caught violating their contractual obligations, and instead of ceasing cooperation with the Russians they began to come up with schemes to further mislead the manufacturer. Both sides (Russian and Indian) actually considered the option of returning the equipment to India to demonstrate it to the HGH representatives, and prove that their equipment allegedly “never left India.” They expected that after this, the equipment would be unlocked and could be sent back to Russia.
Tellingly, the Russian EMT considered a number of lines of action. The first was to send all the equipment to India. The second was to send only the PC with the locked software to reinstall the license key. And the third was to try to solve the problem on their own in Russia. As for the last option, it is worth quoting the position of the Russians:
“However, such behavior on our part would threaten our business relations with Park Controls and Communications and, a breakup with them could result in the loss of the opportunity for EMT LLC to supply equipment from unfriendly countries through this reliable Supplier. The severance of such relations is highly undesirable both for our organization, which has several promising contracts for the supply of equipment for the needs of defense enterprises in the Russian Federation, and for the promising contracts of PJSC KMZ for optoelectronic testing equipment. For an Indian supplier, there is a risk of restrictions being imposed by unfriendly countries.”
So according to the Russians, the Indian PCC is a “RELIABLE supplier of equipment from unfriendly countries” – i.e. from those complying with the sanctions pressure on Russia. Also, PCC is currently performing a number of PROMISING contracts for the Russian defense industry. Which contracts? For operational security reasons, we will not disclose this information publicly at this time.
- Full version of the letter from the Russians: 3942_Письмо об устранении неисправностей [PDF]
AFTERWORD
This investigation showcases specific facts and documents proving that the Indian Park Controls and Communications Private Limited is deliberately violating sanctions against Russia. We would like to receive an official comment from them on the supply of prohibited equipment to Russia, the cooperation with the sanctioned company EMT. We would also very much like to receive a comment from the technical director Mr. Sastri (MP Sastri) on his consultations with the Russian side.
It is also clear from the retrieved documentation that the Israeli company CI Systems has analogues of the French equipment. And if the Russian side does not resolve the problem with the French collimator bench, they will obviously turn to the Israelis. Moreover according to Ludin, similar equipment, the METS-S collimator (manufactured by CI Systems), is standing at the JSC SPA Orion plant in Moscow, and has not been used since 2022.
Moreover, the sanctioned EMT does not even hide the catalog of the Israeli CI Systems from its website:
We sincerely hope that our investigation will show all good-faith suppliers that cooperation with Russians is harmful to their business and reputation. And unscrupulous suppliers from India or other countries trying to deceive manufacturers should remember that their schemes can always be exposed by Ukrainian hackers or OSINT and HUMINT intelligence agents.
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