In the shadow of sanctions: role of Krasnogorsk Plant and Zenit-Investprom in supplying russia’s military-industrial complex
This analytical article contains documents, analysis and examples of typical sanctions dodging schemes by Russian suppliers of the Russian military-industrial complex. Here, you will find names of numerous Russian companies and plants involved in sanctions evasion schemes, learn what typical forgeries Russians resort to in invoices and other documents to conceal supply routes and identifying data of suppliers providing access to Western products. This article provides extensive context so that every reader could follow the logic of the investigation and understand how the Russia finds its way around sanctions. This information can come handy to both experts specializing in sanctions and investigative journalists who can conduct their own investigations on sanctions. Exposing the sanctions evasion schemes and disrupting the logistics of the Russian military-industrial complex makes the Russian army less equipped, which converts into saving the lives of Ukrainian military and civilians and bringing the victory over the aggressor closer.
In March 2025, we published in 14 languages some findings of a high-profile investigation conducted by InformNapalm the international intelligence communitytogether with the Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division.
In this context, let us recall that the operation exposed and disrupted a scheme for the supply of critical sanctioned equipment for the Russian military-industrial complex. The supply scheme was organized by the Russian company EMT. Today’s publication is in a way a continuation of that investigation, so let us recall some of the highlights for better context:
EMT procured the sanctioned European equipment through the Indian company Park Controls & Communications (PCC), which falsified documents by listing India as the end user of the contracted products to circumvent sanctions. Payments were processed via Sberbank India. The Indian company not only passed to the Russians the hardware together with the software keys required for its operation, but also forwarded to them all the communications with the European manufacturer.
EMT, in turn, carried out the procurement on behalf of the Russian company Zenit-Investprom, which is part of the Public Joint Stock Company Krasnogorsk Plant named after S.A. Zverev (KMZ). In this investigation, we will reveal how these two entities operate, the types of products they manufacture, and why they are strategically important to the Russian military-industrial complex.
KMZ is one of the largest optoelectronic equipment producers in Russia. The plant manufactures a wide range of both military and civilian products.
It is located at 8 Rechnaya Street, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region, Russian Federation. OGRN: 1025002863247, INN/KPP: 5024022965 / 502401001
The top governing body of KMZ is the Board of Directors, which includes representatives from Rostec / Shvabe and other shareholders. Operational management is carried out by the General Director, who serves as the sole executive body. As of 2025, the position of General Director is held by Anton Sergeyevich Klokov, appointed on February 3, 2025, by the Board of Directors.
As of December 31, 2023, the Board of Directors of KMZ is composed of the following members:
- Alexander Valeryevich Novikov
- Valery Alexandrovich Tatsky
- Vadim Stanislavovich Kalyugin
- Alexander Nikolayevich Rastorguyev
- Lev Valeryevich Borisov
- Alexander Nikolayevich Statsenko
- Sergey Vladimirovich Voloshin
- Villen Arnoldovich Baloyev
- Sergey Viktorovich Popov
KMZ is part of the optical holding Shvabe, which in turn belongs to the Russian state corporation Rostec. Thus, KMZ functions as a structural unit of Rostec within its optical division, Shvabe. Within KMZ, operate CJSC Zenit-Investprom and JSC Zenit-Techservice, which perform specific functions that will be discussed in more detail later.
KMZ is a diversified manufacturer of optoelectronic devices.
Its main areas of military production include:
- Sight systems for small arms (optical sights, night sights, and thermal imaging attachments for firearms of various calibers);
- Fire control systems for armored vehicles (digital targeting systems for modernized tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, laser rangefinders and target designators, anti-aircraft fire control systems, etc.);
- Targeting and navigation stations for aviation (collimator-type aircraft sights, surveillance and targeting stations for helicopters, and targeting systems for strike UAVs);
- Space and aerial surveillance equipment (optical systems for space monitoring, including satellite telescopes and optical stations for observing space objects, as well as Earth remote sensing systems from satellites and airborne platforms);
- Night vision and thermal imaging devices (goggles, monoculars, night vision sights for small arms, and thermal imagers for military vehicles and infantry. This includes thermal sights for firearms, cupola-type observation devices for armored vehicles, and stationary thermal cameras for security systems);
- Laser rangefinders and target designators (laser rangefinders and laser target illuminators for artillery and aviation).
As we can see, KMZ manufactures strategic equipment for the Russian military-industrial complex using the production capabilities of the Shvabe holding (which will be the subject of a separate investigation).
[Translation] “In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated July 10, 2008, No. 1052, PJSC KMZ is a subordinate entity of the State Corporation Rostekhnologii (hereinafter referred to as the State Corporation Rostec).The legal entity exercising control (clause 7 of RAS 11/2008) over the activities of PJSC KMZ is JSC Shvabe.
Shvabe is an innovative holding company consolidating the main enterprises of Russia’s optoelectronic industry. The holding is fully owned by the State Corporation Rostec.
JSC Shvabe holds a 56.46% stake in the authorized capital of PJSC KMZ.
The State Corporation Rostec holds 100% of the authorized capital of JSC Shvabe.
Most of KMZ’s production is carried out under the State Defense Contracts (SDC) for the Russian Ministry of Defense—ranging from sights for small arms to complex optoelectronic systems for armored vehicles and aircraft. Accordingly, this equipment is actively used by the Russian army in the war against Ukraine. Other major clients include the following entities: enterprises of the defense-industrial complex (the plant supplies components to Uralvagonzavod, the Kazan Instrument Engineering Design Bureau, the Shvabe holding, among others), as well as to Roscosmos and Rosatom (for space vehicles and observation instruments).
Specifically, in its cooperation with Rosatom, some of KMZ’s products are supplied to the Mars Design Bureau (MOKB Mars), which develops autopiloting and navigation systems for aviation and space vehicles, as well as control systems for upper-stage boosters and onboard control systems for the Raduga Design Bureau’s X-series cruise missiles (find more details in this investigation: Not a Peaceful Atom: How “Rosatom” Helps Create Cruise Missiles
KMZ has also supplied optical equipment for remote sensing satellites (such as the Geoton for Resurs-DK and the Aurora for Aist-2D) and for military space systems (such as the Okno system and others).
In addition to military products, KMZ also produces civilian goods, such as medical equipment for Russian health care institutions (clinics, hospitals) and commercial medical centers, photographic equipment (Zenitar lenses and accessories). However, the share of civilian products is much smaller than that of military output.
KMZ and the Russian Military-Industrial Complex
KMZ is one of the key enterprises in the Russian military-industrial complex specializing in optoelectronic instrumentation. Its products are widely used by the Russian Armed Forces: optical sights for small arms are installed on standard-issue sniper rifles (such as the SVD and SVDK), thermal imaging sighting systems are integrated into combat helicopters (notably in the modernization of the Mi-24/35), and laser rangefinders and target designation systems are installed on armored vehicles and artillery systems. The plant also manufactures fire control systems for main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. After France ceased supplying thermal imaging matrices (Thales Catherine-FC) for tank sights, KMZ, together with other Shvabe plants, launched a production of domestic analogs, allowing full replacement of imported components in the Sosna-U sighting system for the T-72B3 and T-90 tanks. According to the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, these domestic photodetectors have been supplied to Uralvagonzavod since 2018 for serial tank production, eliminating a critical bottleneck in equipping armored vehicles. Obviously, KMZ directly impacts the combat readiness of Russia’s ground forces by providing essential targeting systems.
For Russia’s Aerospace Forces, KMZ has historically participated in the development of space surveillance systems. For example, the Okno—an optoelectronic complex located in Tajikistan for tracking space objects—was equipped with KMZ instruments and entered combat duty in 2004. The plant has also produced imaging equipment for reconnaissance satellites (such as the Geoton system used on the Resurs series), which serve both civilian monitoring and military intelligence purposes.
KMZ is an active participant in state arms modernization programs. As an integrated part of Rostec, the plant receives substantial government funding under the State Defense Contracts. In addition to manufacturing, KMZ provides maintenance services for military equipment and conducts technical oversight during its operational lifecycle. Plant specialists support the use of optical equipment in the field, ensuring warranty repairs and life cycle extensions—a critical capability during wartime, as night vision devices, sights, and other gear often require urgent repair.
KMZ’s role in the military-industrial complex also extends to arms exports. KMZ is activey involved in Russia’s international military-technical cooperation (MTC) with its optical instruments integrated in larger systems. For instance, in the sale of T-90S tanks to India or Algeria, the optics (sights, rangefinders) were likely produced by KMZ. The enterprise is authorized to carry out MTC activities under international agreements of the Russian Federation—naturally, through the state special exporter, Rosoboronexport.
In conclusion, KMZ is an indispensable component of the Russian military-industrial complex, supplying the Russian Armed Forces with targeting systems, optics, and specialized equipment. It is a strategically significant defense-related enterprise that has been justly subject to international sanctions due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
However, these sanctions are routinely violated, as KMZ continues to source Western instruments, machinery, and tools to manufacture equipment for Russia’s military sector. Zenit-Investprom and Zenit-Techservice
As previously mentioned, KMZ has two subsidiaries: CJSC Zenit-Investprom and JSC Zenit-Techservice, each fulfilling specific roles.
Zenit-Techservice is located at the same address as KMZ (8 Rechnaya Street, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region) and primarily performs production and servicing functions for the main plant.
The core activity of Zenit-Techservice is the manufacturing of components for devices and instruments used in navigation, control, measurement, and monitoring. This includes the production of optical instrument parts, metal components (the enterprise operates steel and non-ferrous metal foundries), and the provision of maintenance services for technical equipment.
This structure functions essentially as a production branch of KMZ, responsible for a segment of the technological workflow—such as machining, body fabrication, and maintenance of instruments.
Zenit-Techservice is also integrated into the Rostec system: its shareholder registry is managed by JSC RT-Registrar , a Rostec-affiliated entity, indicating direct oversight by the state corporation. Both geographically and administratively, Zenit-Techservice is closely tied to KMZ—its general director reports directly to the KMZ management.

Information on subsidiaries and affiliates. Excerpt from the Audit Report on the Ownership of Zenit-lnvestprom and Zenit-Techservice by KMZ
One of the KMZ-related entities brought to light in the recent investigation mentioned earlier is Zenit-Investprom.
CJSC Zenit-Investprom is a closed joint-stock company that operates under KMZ and serves as its trade, investment, and supply arm.
Zenit-Investprom is procuring equipment and technologies, including the import of critical components and technological systems required by KMZ.
In addition, Zenit-Investprom manages the distribution of civilian products under the Zenit brand (such as photographic equipment and optics) through dealership networks and online stores. This company appears in the privacy policies of the websites selling Zenit-branded optics and medical devices.
While financially much smaller than its parent company KMZ, Zenit-Investprom has experienced a sharp activity spike since 2020. In 2021, the company’s revenue reached approximately 1.376 billion rubles, up from around 187 million rubles in 2020. However, its net profit remained modest at around 6 million rubles,
indicating its function as a low-margin intermediary responsible for procurement and sales of KMZ products.
And now, we turn to the most critical question: how exactly does KMZ circumvent international sanctions?
Zenit-Investprom and the circumvention of international sanctions
As previously noted, Zenit-Investprom operates as an intermediary between its parent company KMZ and both Russian and foreign suppliers that provide imported components and equipment to Russia in violation of international sanctions.
One notable example is the case referenced at the beginning of this report: the investigation into the supply of IRCOL Collimators produced by the French company HGH Infrared Systems. These collimators were initially sold to the Indian firm PCC Pvt. Ltd., which misled the French supplier regarding the end user of their equipment. PCC then transferred the equipment through the Russian intermediary EMT to Zenit-Investprom, a subsidiary of KMZ.
Given that KMZ is part of the Shvabe holding, which in turn is a subsidiary of the Rostec Corporation, it is clear that Zenit-Investprom acts as one of the main conduits for importing sanctioned Western equipment and components for the Russian military-industrial complex.
This represents a typical sanction circumvention scheme employed by Russian defense companies.
Another example of such a scheme is the cooperation between Zenit-Investprom and the Russian company LLC UMAK (Tax ID: 7727655443). The latter is engaged in wholesale trade of industrial equipment and machinery. Its director and sole owner is Mikhail Viktorovich Melyokhin.
UMAK specializes in the supply of high-precision equipment, including computer numerical control (CNC) machines, as well as lathes, milling, and grinding machines. Following the imposition of sanctions against Russia in 2022, the company became a partner of the Chinese firm Dongguan Qiandao, becoming the exclusive distributor of Chinese 5-axis machines to replace European counterparts.
The primary products supplied by UMAK include:
CNC lathes (e.g., German GDW and Spinner), electrical discharge machines (e.g., Japanese FANUC Robocut), grinding and sharpening machines (e.g., Chinese Dongguan Qiandao), universal lathes (domestically manufactured in Russia), milling centers (e.g., Taiwanese Litz and PROMPT).
According to data obtained by the Ukrainian hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division, UMAK was involved in the delivery of CNC machines from China—specifically, the YK36200 model (produced by the Chinese company Push Ningjiang Machine Tool Co.) and the YK5115A model (manufactured by Tianjin No.1 Machine Tool Works)—to Zenit-Investprom (i.e., KMZ). It is evident that this equipment is intended for use in military production.
Another notable fact is that UMAK and Zenit-Investprom agreed to declare the equipment produced by the Italian company SAMS S.r.l. as allegedly originating from a Turkish company called OTASIS MACHINERY, which is difficult to identify or verify. This tactic is common among Russian companies and their international “partners” as a means of complicating tracking efforts and evading sanctions targeting the supplier or the supply chain itself.

Annex whereby UMAC and Zenit-Investprom agree to change the naming of the Italian equipment produced by SAMS Srl to evade sanctions.

Second letter whereby UMAC and Zenit-Investprom agree to change the naming of the Italian equipment produced by SAMS Srl to evade sanctions.
The next company whose equipment is supplied by UMAK to Zenit-Investprom is the German company GDW.
The commercial offer presented by UMAK specifically lists CNC lathes manufactured by GDW.

The next company whose equipment is supplied by UMAK to Zenit-Investprom is the German company GDW.The commercial offer presented by UMAK specifically lists CNC lathes manufactured by GDW.
The delivery time for this equipment is listed as 11–12 months, indicating a degree of effectiveness of sanctions. However, it is still possible for the Russian company to procure European-made equipment for its military-industrial complex, guaranteed within 12 months. This strongly suggests that the company maintains active communication with the supplier and possibly even with the German company GDW itself.
It is evident that there are numerous such examples. But we will continue to identify and expose them.
Regional Production Company and PromInspect
Let us briefly mention two more Russian companies — LLC Regional Production Company (Tax ID: 5012051721, OGRN: 1085012006474) and LLC PromInspect (Tax ID: 9721121400, KPP: 772101001). These companies supply equipment to Zenit-Investprom.
For instance, Regional Production Company is an active player in the high-tech equipment supply market, including for enterprises within the Russian military-industrial complex. It delivered VTT-1100 E2 I R2 vacuum systems to Zenit-Investprom.

Invoice for the supply of VTT-1100 E21R2 vacuum systems from Regional Production Company to Zenit-lnvestprom
More interesting, however, is the delivery from PromInspect, which supplies the Leica TM6100A theodolite manufactured by the Swiss company Leica Geosystems (part of the Hexagon Group).
The Leica TM6100A is frequently used for the measurement and alignment of large-scale equipment, including:
- Radar leveling
- Alignment of launch platforms
- Calibration of satellite and missile systems
As such, this device is classified as dual-use equipment, and its supply to Russia falls under sanctions control, given its potential for military applications.
InformNapalm has officially contacted Leica Geosystems regarding the delivery of their equipment by the Russian company PromInspect to Zenit-Investprom. We received to response at the moment of writing this feature.
Reconstruction and technical modernization of the production facilities at JSC Plant No. 9
In addition to supplying Western equipment, Zenit-Investprom is also involved in the so-called reconstruction and technical modernization of the production facilities at JSC Plant No. 9.

Letters indicating that Zenit-lnvestprom is carrying out reconstruction and technical modernization of the production facilities of JSC Plant No. 9
Plant No. 9 is a leading Russian enterprise specializing in the development and production of cannon artillery, particularly tank guns.
The facility is state-owned and, until mid-2023, was part of the Uralvagonzavod Corporation—one of the key structures under the Rostec State Corporation. In June 2023, Rostec’s supervisory board decided to transfer Plant No. 9, the Burevestnik Central Research Institute, and the Ural Transport Engineering Plant (Uraltransmash) from the Uralvagonzavod conglomerate to the management of the Techmash Concern.
This reorganization is part of Rostec’s strategy to create a vertically integrated “gun to round” production cycle by integrating the development and manufacturing of artillery systems and munitions into a single complex aimed at improving the efficiency of weapons production.
Following the transfer, Plant No. 9 is under the management of Techmash Concern (Moscow), specializing in munitions, while Uralvagonzavod has focused on tank production.
Interestingly, journalists from the German outlet Handelsblatt recently uncovered that the German company EKC, headed by a Russian citizen, had been one of the key suppliers of chromium to Russia for over a year—particularly to Uralvagonzavod, the main tank manufacturer for the Russian army.
From January 2023 to April 2024, EKC exported over €24 million worth of chromium to Russia. This metal is used to coat the barrels of artillery systems and shells, significantly increasing their durability and wear resistance.
It is clear that the chromium did not go exclusively to Uralvagonzavod but also reached Plant No.9, whose reconstruction is being handled by Zenit-Investprom (that is, KMZ).
More on KMZ, Shvabe, and the Belarusian Connection
One of the documents mentions the company TD Belorusskie Stanki LLC (OGRN: 1126732012230, INN: 6732043677). This company, registered in Russia and owned by Belarusian nationals, is responsible for importing machine tool equipment from Belarus, thereby integrating itself into the supply chains of the Russian military-industrial complex.
This company serves as an export trading agent for a number of Belarusian machine-building enterprises. According to its own statements, the trading house is the official dealer of “almost all Belarusian machine tool plants”, supplying their products to Russia and other countries. Confirmed partnerships include at least eight Belarusian factories, among them: OJSC Gomel Machine Tool Units Plant
OJSC Smorgon Optical Machine Tool Plant
Vistan Precision Engineering Plant (Vitebsk)
OJSC Kuzlitmash (Kuznetsk) and others.
This suggests that the company likely supplies both Belarusian and Western-made equipment to KMZ, and by extension, to the Rostec Corporation.
Conclusion
KMZ and Zenit-Investprom are strategic manufacturers of optical instruments for the Russian military. KMZ is part of the Shvabe optical holding, which operates under the umbrella of the Russian state corporation Rostec, ensuring close cooperation with various Russian military structures, including the Ministry of Defense, Roscosmos, and Rosatom. The plant produces a wide range of equipment—from targeting sights to space surveillance systems—that is actively used by the Russian army in its war against Ukraine.
Zenit-Investprom acts as an intermediary, orchestrating the procurement of sanctioned European technologies, often via Indian companies that falsify end-user documentation to evade export restrictions. This scheme is widely employed to deliver Western equipment to KMZ, using Chinese and Belarusian companies as a cover to circumvent international sanctions.
Identifying and exposing such schemes is critical in order to prevent Western technology from reaching the Russian military-industrial complex. Every tank, satellite, or missile produced with this equipment could soon be used against European nations or the United States.
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