InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community received CYBINT data from the Ukrainian hacker group 256 Cyber Assault Division which gained access to the personal email of Pavel Fradkov, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense. Pavel is the son of former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and the brother of Petr Fradkov, the head of Promsvyazbank, a vehicle to finance Russian activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine. 

The analysis of the obtained data gives us a better understanding which of the Russian elites is getting rich from the occupation of Ukrainian lands. In particular, companies close to Ramzan Kadyrov and the father of Putin’s common-law wife Alina Kabaeva are commissioned to do construction in the occupied territories. Read more on this topic below. 

Fradkov in the Administrative Directorate: a caretaker for the elite

During Putin’s second term as President of Russia, his government was headed by Mikhail Fradkov from 2004 to 2007. He remained close to the head of the Kremlin thereafter. This is evidenced by his subsequent career: for almost a decade, he headed the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (2006-2017), and later received a cozy “retirement” post as the head of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.

The activity of Fradkov Sr. laid the foundation for one of the Kremlin’s family clans. He has two sons: Petr Fradkov, born in 1978, and Pavel Fradkov, born in 1981. Both are actively pursuing careers after the retirement of their father. The elder, Petr, went into banking. He currently heads Promsvyazbank, a key financial institution for the Russian defense industry and the main bank in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

The younger one, Pavel, went to work as a government official. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FSB, and in 2015 he joined the Administrative Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, where he became the first deputy head of the agency. On June 17, 2024, Pavel Fradkov was appointed deputy to the newly named Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov.

заместитель министра обороны Российской Федерации Павел Фрадков

Pavel Fradkov is the protagonist who made this text possible. The hacktivist group 256 Cyber Assault Division gained access to the personal mailbox of this Putin’s bureaucrat. 

The mailbox contains personal documents of Pavel Fradkov…

Petr Fradkov…

The wife of Petr Fradkov…

And an array of other personal information, like medical certificates, etc.

All important data about the Fradkovs’ property and locations were transferred to the Ukrainian Defense Forces. 

However, the main topic of this feature is the work of Pavel Fradkov. His role over the years is best described as the “elite property manager.” This is the hallmark of the agency where he worked the longest – the Administrative Directorate (ADP) of the President of the Russian Federation. Despite its name, the structure is not so much concerned with administering Putin’s daily routine, but rather acts as one of the major managers of Russian state property. 

The ADP owns property complexes, in particular, in Russia’s trophy locations, such as Rublevka near Moscow or Sochi at the Black Sea. In addition, this agency owns a significant portion of the former USSR’s real estate holdings abroad – in particular apartments and houses in European capitals. The ADP not only holds all this property, but also actively develops, repairs, leases, and sells it. 

Fradkov’s typical task in the ADP was to distribute dachas among Russian bureaucrats who were considering “exclusively the Rublevka area.”

Another example of Fradkov’s activities is the “grand opening” of a billiard room in a hotel, where, in the midst of the war in Ukraine, “tournaments with the participation of political figures” are planned.

Fradkov’s interests also included more serious issues. For example, in 2022, for some reason, he ordered documents from the archive on a certain Yefim Brandmann, a native of Chernivtsi, Ukraine and now a citizen of Germany, who acts as the Kremlin’s trusted agent in Europe and manages part of the already mentioned foreign property inherited from the USSR. The mailbox contains examples of Fradkov lobbying for the transfer of certain property to certain individuals or companies.

Fradkov’s key responsibilities included overseeing repairs and construction within Russia. This is evidenced by his travel schedules, examples of which are also in the mail.

Fradkov’s kept the same focus in his position at the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Fradkov in the Russian MoD: most favored treatment for Kadyrov’s and Kabayev’s companies in the occupied territories of Ukraine

Pavel Fradkov’s archive contains a document indicating that the current Russian Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov, was involved in war issues long before his formal appointment. In June 2022, Belousov, as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, convened a meeting regarding budget planning for the next three years (i.e. 2023, 2024 and 2025). There were some issues from the competence of the Russian Ministry of Defense among those tackled by Belousov. It was Fradkov who attended the meeting from the Presidential Administration.

Two years passed and in June 2024, Belousov invited Pavel Fradkov to the position of his deputy in the Russian Ministry of Defense. In the MoD, Fradkov continued to deal with issues of construction, real estate management and land resources. Interestingly, during the time of former Minister Sergei Shoigu, the position had been held by Timur Ivanov, who was then arrested after the dismissal of his boss.

Fradkov’s archive shows that he was actively involved in the “repartition of the market” in the area entrusted to him. Some of the documents concern Russia’s economic activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine in the construction and related industries.

In particular, in September 2024, Fradkov, out of habit, forwards a message to his own official email address with a telling subject: “About Ukraine.” He attaches a document listing eight companies, each highlighted in a different color and marked with a note, saying “Approved. Sent to the PA RF” (probably referring to the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation).

The names and owners of these companies are unknown to the general public. Some of the LLCs are notable for the sharp growth in revenue in 2024. For example, Krasnodar’s Stroyotdel K grew by 2738%. Its owner, Zalina Batyrovna Toldieva, does not run any other businesses.

However, a closer look into the companies gives an idea of the earnings of the Russian elite in the occupied territories. For example, IRS 2000 LLC is registered in Chechnya. Its owner, Sultan Abbazovich Usmanov, was previously in the management of Grozny Grazhdanstroy LLC, one of the major contractors in Chechnya. All the business in modern Chechnya has one thing in common: everything belongs to the Kadyrov clan, but nothing is legally registered to the Kadyrovs.

Another company mentioned in the document also leads to Kadyrov: Eurostroy-3 LLC from Tyumen. It is owned by Medni Ruslanovna Ilyasova, who, of course, does not run anything else too. Her company also increased its revenue last year, but by a modest 156%.

There was no obvious connection between Ilyasova and Kadyrov, except for one detail. Kadyrov’s representative office in the Ural Federal District operates in Tyumen, and Adam Ilyasov is its secretary. He is an architect by education and a successful developer, owning the company Alyans-A. Kadyrov’s media outlet Grozny Inform proudly informs us about it.

However, it’s not only the Kadyrovs clan that is milking the Russian budget funds allocated for the construction in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The most interesting company on the Fradkov’s list turned out to be PK Prombeton LLC, managed by one Marat Yagfarovich Khaibulin. This CEO is also rather obscure, with no trace of any other business activity. However, the company under his management has a flashy address: Moscow, Maly Tatarsky lane, 5, room. 1, room 3b. This is the very center of the Russian capital.

The building houses mainly public organizations of Russian Muslims. For example, the same address—Maly Tatarsky lane, 5, room. 1—is shared with an organization with the complex name MOORND Alliance of Civilizations. Its president is Marat Vazikhovich Kabaev, the father of Putin’s common-law wife Alina Kabaeva.

In the Russian media, the Kabaev has long been positioned as a Muslim social activist, an outstanding athlete, and God knows what else, as long as his son-in-law is happy.

However, in reality, Kabaev indirectly controls companies like PK Prombeton, which are “approved” by the Presidential Administration and conduct business in the territories occupied by Russia. Kabaev has repeatedly mocked the sanctions and openly expressed his readiness to do business in the occupied territories even before the full-scale invasion. However, no sanctions have been imposed on him yet.

Why sanctions are still important

A significant portion of the Russian budget spent on maintaining the occupied territories of Ukraine goes into construction. This serves a number of functions. On the one hand, it gives the Russian elite the opportunity to milk the budget. On the other hand, a large number of workers who would spend their wages in the areas where they work can at least slightly reduce the burden of the occupied territories on the Russian budget.

However, Fradkov’s mail makes it abundantly clear that Russia is a country where bureaucracy equals corruption. In order to supply cement to occupied Mariupol, one must not only have the desire and means to do it, but also be “approved” by the Presidential Administration.

This is precisely why sanctions, both international and Ukrainian, are still important. Sanctions force the stakeholders to replace some legal entities with others, which slows down or disrupts supply and cooperation chains. In other words, each new LLC takes time to get “approved”.

And for people like Kabaev, sanctions are harmful to their reputation and business connections in Asian countries.

This text is the first in a series about Russian business interests in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Our goal is to inflict maximum sanctions damage on them. We hope that the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine will enact sanctions against all the persons mentioned in this material, as an initial measure. We encourage our readership to also contribute to this process internationally.

For more relevant investigations visit our CYBINT section

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The post Hacked: Deputy Defense Minister of Russia Pavel Fradkov. Business interests of Kadyrov and Kabaev in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine appeared first on InformNapalm.org (English).