Editor’s note: We asked members of the Kyiv Independent community to share the questions they have about the war. Here’s what they asked and how we answered.

Join our community to ask a question in the next round.

Question: Is Ukraine formulating a plan to receive and house refugees from occupied territories? I would expect in that ceding territory many Ukrainians would want to leave Russian control.

Answer: Handling internally displaced people (IDPs) has been a pressing issue for Ukraine ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to the Social Policy Ministry, there are currently nearly 5 million IDPs in Ukraine, 3.6 million of whom left their homes after Feb. 24, 2022.

However, state support is widely considered insufficient, with most IDPs relying primarily on charities and NGO assistance. The monthly amount of financial aid from the state is currently Hr 2,000 ($48) per adult and Hr 3,000 ($72) per child or person with a disability — not enough to maintain a decent standard of living.

The most critical issues for IDPs include the lack of proper and affordable housing, financial instability, difficulty finding employment, and deteriorating mental health. Insufficient support also forces some IDPs to eventually return to front-line or even occupied settlements.

Read this story to find out more — “Thousands of Ukrainian IDPs are struggling to adapt amid housing, employment crises.” — Daria Shulzhenko, reporter

Question: Do Ukrainians still trust and respect President Zelensky? Do they still want him to be their president? Do they agree with how he is handling the war?

Answer: Yes, the majority of Ukrainians still support President Volodymyr Zelensky. Even more so after his brutal encounter with U.S. officials at the White House.

According to the latest poll published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on March 27, 69% of Ukrainians trust the president.

The survey found that only 28% of respondents do not trust Zelensky, resulting in a trust-distrust balance of +41%.

Zelensky remains the most popular politician in the country and the majority of people in Ukraine support him. Yes, there are mistepps, quite a few actually, but I don’t see the country turning on Zelensky.

If the presidential election were held this weekend, Zelensky would definitely advance to the runoff and likely win it. The only potential competitor is former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who now serves as the country’s ambassador to the U.K.

Some polls have Zaluzhnyi in the lead, but the general had never officially announced his intention to run and it remains to be seen what he will do if he does. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: With regard to Russia’s ongoing difficulties recruiting soldiers and their heavy losses on the front line, what actual difference has this made in the fighting? Also, I read about Russia’s losses in your newsletter but not much about Ukraine’s?

Answer: Russian losses in this war are staggering. Will this have an effect on Russia’s ability to continue the war against Ukraine? No.

Ukraine has less people and resources to spare. A neverending manpower shortage is the biggest problem Ukraine is facing in this war. And there are too few options on how to fix it.

While it is believed that Russia has lost twice as many people, maybe three times as many people as Ukraine has, the Kremlin can easily afford it.

Ukraine cannot.

Russia has a population 3.5-4 times larger than that of Ukraine. Russia, unlike Ukraine, is a totalitarian dictatorship where the lives of people mean nothing to the government apparatus. So, they will continue to use all the tools at hand to call up more people to fight.

Russia also has the ability to offer substantial sign-up bonuses to those willing to fight, recruit mercenaries from Asian and African countries, and is willing to throw the disenfranchised, primarily convicts, to storm positions without carrying will those people survive the initial attack.

To follow developments in Russia I recommend our WTF is wrong with Russia? newsletter, to follow the battlefield and the Ukrainian side of things, I would recommend our War Notes newsletter. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: Do we know where the population of the occupied territories stands in relation to Ukraine forfeiting territories in a “peace” deal?

Answer: Recent developments are taking a toll on the people in the occupied territories. Since 2022, Ukrainians living under occupation have kept their hopes they will be liberated the same way that residents of Kyiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts were that year.

Ukrainians living there told me that one of the hardest parts now is listening to all the discussions about territorial concessions from the U.S., and how they often omit that these are real lives, real people who will have to either abandon their homes for an unknown period or live their lives under Russian occupation.

Since the possibility of liberating these territories through force is extremely slim, the atmosphere is very gloomy, and hope is hard to come by. That doesn’t mean that the anti-Russian resistance fizzled out. Resistance groups, both violent and non-violent, still remain active, and for many, it is this resistance that helps them keep going. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

‘Evil must not win’ — how Ukraine’s female partisans resist Russian occupation

Somewhere in the streets of Russian-occupied Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, a woman puts a sticker on the wall. It’s a short message, but if she is seen doing it, she will face arrest, prosecution, and likely, torture. The message is: “Soon, we will be home again.” On another

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Question: Do you believe that the EU can give enough arms and security forces in a timely manner to protect Ukraine?

Answer: Yes. But for that to happen, Europe needs to step up.

Excluding some complex military hardware, such as the Patriot air defense systems and the extremely effective Bradley armored fighting vehicles, Europe knows how to build guns. It’s just not building them enough.

If Europe moves from talking to acting and begins rearming at a proper pace, the EU would be able produce weapons that would keep Ukraine in the fight. Ukraine also now has the know-how of how to build proper weaponry. It just needs the funds to increase production capacities.

The ReArm Europe initiative is a good start. The industry is also there. Now we need to see orders. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: French President Macron’s position on the war in Ukraine has undergone quite a few changes since the start of the full-scale invasion, and I think it’s fair to say that he is now fully and clearly committed to Ukraine. How is he currently perceived by Ukrainian public opinion, and are there any high expectations of him?

Answer: The public opinion regarding President Macron went through a deep transformation from the early period of his phone calls with Putin to him proposing for European boots on the ground later in the war. In fact, according to one opinion survey last year, Macron was the only foreign leader whose popularity improved in Ukraine. In 2025, European leaders are also perceived much more positively in contrast with the U.S. under the new administration.

At the same time, many reserve judgment. Macron’s pro-Ukraine turn has been mostly about rhetoric, and France still provides much less than it could in comparison to the U.K., Germany, or even smaller countries like Estonia or Denmark, which provide the largest shares compared to GDP. We’ll have to see if Macron’s and Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” can bring something real to the table. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: Trump is killing NATO or is at least withdrawing our country from it. Will Europe replace it with an EU army? Is it time for the EU to form a constitutional union better than what I feel we are losing with Trump and his MAGA party.

Answer: Unfortunately, further integration of the EU in the current political climate is difficult, and a united EU army is a far-off dream.

It is undeniable that the EU has reacted well to Trump’s foreign policy turn, namely in terms of higher defense spending and clearly demonstrating firm support of Ukraine.

But, the EU is still composed of countries with often contradicting interests, and consensus is hard to come by. It’s not only “rogue members” like Hungary and Slovakia — Italy, France, and Germany have different foreign and economic priorities that hamper united decision-making. For example, despite worries about Trump abandoning Ukraine, the EU was not able to agree on a new 40 billion euro package due to opposition from southern members.

Political trends suggest this might only get more difficult, as far-right and Euroskeptic parties are on the rise in both France and Germany.

In terms of military capabilities, Europe is still playing catch-up. Their militaries have been underfunded for decades and are often reliant on NATO infrastructure, which will be very hard to replace. We hear calls for a European alternative to the alliance, but that will demand years — if not decades — of sustained work. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: How does drafting and mobilization work? Do the Ukrainian Armed Forces view draft evasion as a big problem? Is there an issue of corruption or morale among the population?

Answer: The large-scale, forced mobilization of men into the military was, is, and always will be not only incredibly painful and tragic but also the greatest internal political and social challenge in a country that otherwise remains united in its resolve to not capitulate to Russia’s attempt to destroy Ukraine as a nation. No country should have to go through this.

Inside Ukraine’s desperate race to train more soldiers

New recruit Vitalii Yalovyi knew one thing after completing the Ukrainian military’s boot camp: He was not prepared for war. The 37-year-old felt physically unfit, forcing him to miss some courses during the month-long training. His leg was still hurting from long daily walks at a training center i…

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

It’s important to make one thing clear: Ukraine’s manpower crisis refers specifically to the infantry; this is the deadliest, most difficult, and most uncomfortable job in the military. This is where the most casualties are taken, and this is where the most new recruits are needed to fill the ranks. In a war that is now dominated by drones, where anyone or anything moving around on the surface can be hunted by several high-precision drones within a few minutes, the life of the infantryman is truly horrible, and often, no amount of patriotism is enough for the average Ukrainian to take up this job. Lots of people are still joining the military voluntarily, but they are almost all going to other roles, especially in drone units. In fact, some are joining drone units voluntarily, specifically to avoid eventually being drafted into the infantry, while others, as you mentioned, choose to hide at home.

Unfortunately, this situation isn’t really getting better, as more people are still needed to avoid losing the country. If you ask me, the main hope to solve the manpower crisis is for two things to happen: First, the Ukrainian leadership needs to prioritize reforming mobilization, training, and especially how its soldiers are used on the battlefield so that the life of the Ukrainian infantryman is placed at front and center of the planning of operations on all levels. Second — and longer term — the military should learn to play to their strengths of drone warfare and do more and more to change how we understand the way war is being fought, with a wider gray area between positions that can be a great big killzone for Russian troops without Ukrainian infantry to have to be there. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: I have a question related to the new proposal for a one-year military contract for citizens between 18-24. What is the status of this proposal? Is it implemented already or is it currently being discussed in the Rada? Which processes are necessary for it to be adopted, and do we know if this is likely to happen or is it facing many obstacles?

Answer: The Defense Ministry officially launched the “Contract 18-24” project on Feb. 11, and volunteers can already apply online. Deputy head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa described it as a “pilot project” in its “test mode,” however. The project is being carried out on a limited scale so far, including four Ground Forces brigades, one Airborne brigade, and one Marine brigade.

Based on the results, there are plans to further expand the project to other units. The number of people who signed up via this procedure is in the hundreds, not thousands. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: We, your readers, hear constantly about the need for re-organization and reform of the Ukrainian military. For me, and other non-Ukrainians with a serious interest in Ukraine, can you discuss the current problems, like what happened to Zaluzhnyi, what’s up with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the aspects of corruption and mismanagement in the Ukrainian military?

Answer: Here, I am very happy to direct you to our latest article on this exact topic, by my colleague Natalia Yermak and myself. What’s up is that while Ukraine is waging a brutal struggle against Russian forces in the trenches and fields, it is also waging another battle, an internal one, against a military culture steeped in Soviet-era practices and mentalities that lead to excess loss of life and territories — the two things most dear to Ukraine in this war. There is a lot to go into, from the exact way that this actually manifests itself on the battlefield, to the persona of Oleksandr Syrskyi himself and the efforts to change the system, and for that, you should definitely check out the article. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: In relation to the ongoing discussions about the Russian invasion, why is the Russian side not interested in peace?

Answer: Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with an attack on the capital, Kyiv, as part of a broader attempt to decapitate and destroy the independent Ukrainian state. That attempt failed then, but now, having made progress in their war of attrition, and with the U.S. now abandoning the policy of supporting Ukraine’s struggle and instead looking more and more likely to abandon Kyiv altogether, the Russians are feeling pretty good about their position.

Even their stated minimalist goals call for the handover of a lot more Ukrainian territory in Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, inhabited by millions of Ukrainians. This is what the world, including U.S. President Donald Trump, needs to understand: Russia is absolutely not interested in peace simply because they started this war wanting a lot more, and they feel more confident in their ability to get it than they have in three years. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: What is the reason behind the Trump administration’s Russian propaganda talking points?

Answer: Without actually getting inside their heads — which I don’t think I’d enjoy in the slightest  — it’s impossible to say for sure. But, I guess there’s a sort of sliding scale of possible reasons, none of them particularly encouraging.

At one end of the scale, there is the possibility that they’re just underqualified, naive,  inexperienced, and are falling for Russian propaganda.

I’d say Steve Witkoff is perhaps the best example of this — he’s a real estate mogul, with no experience of politics or diplomacy, and was positively swooning about Putin after meeting him in Moscow last month. And all it seemed to take was a bit of a smile from Putin and a painted portrait of Donald Trump as a gift to take back to the White House.

Put yourself in his shoes: going from the world of luxury real estate to suddenly finding yourself in the Kremlin — discussing the future of entire countries — must be pretty intoxicating.

And what’s the result? You fall for the spectacle and take Putin at his word. Next thing you know, you’re chatting to Tucker Carlson, telling him that any Ukrainians who speak Russian are absolutely fine with living under Russian occupation.

In the middle of the scale, there is the possibility that they just don’t actually care about what they’re saying, so long as they get what they want.

Trump is the perfect example of this — he wants the mineral deal signed, and he was willing to say whatever it took to pressure Zelensky to do it. And, if you want to say something bad about Zelensky, and you’re looking for material, then all of those pre-prepared Kremlin lines that propagate so fruitfully on social media are just sitting there waiting for you.

I think this is the most likely reason, which is pretty terrifying. I recently interviewed historian Marci Shore about why she and her husband, Timothy Snyder, are leaving the U.S. to teach in Canada, and she put it perfectly.

Speaking about the Oval Office showdown, she said, “This was the profound moment that exposed that you’re dealing with people for whom there are no first principles, you’re just looking into this abyss of moral nihilism. Everything is a transaction, everything is a deal."

At the other extreme end of the scale, we get into the slightly conspiratorial world of “Is Donald Trump a Russian asset?"

We covered this in another interview with an author who is absolutely convinced he is. He has written two books about it, and there’s a lot of compelling evidence, but no smoking gun.

Regardless, it’s enough of a concern that even a British MP has raised it as a possibility.

But it’s sort of a moot point at the end of the day — whether Trump is a Russian asset or not, he’s sure acting like one. — Chris York, news editor

Question: What is the situation with the Ukrainian troops in Russia’s Kursk Oblast? We hear stories that they are surrounded. Other stories say they are retreating back to Ukraine. Have they got home safely?

Answer: Ukraine has had to withdraw from most of Russia’s Kursk Oblast, a long-expected outcome after the troops on the ground have suffered from critical logistical issues for months.

Ukraine is still holding onto a small patch of territory in Kursk Oblast near the border, which Western military experts have said was likely to prevent a Russian breakthrough into Ukraine’s adjacent Sumy Oblast in the northeast. The withdrawal appears to have been chaotic as always, which — like in the cases of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, and Kurakhove — could have been avoided by withdrawing weeks or a month earlier.

The rise and fall of Ukraine’s Kursk gambit

As Ukraine’s seven-month-long incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast came to what appears to be its end, Ukrainian soldiers and military experts are questioning the operation’s goal and the long-term effect it will have on the war. Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Russia’s Kurs…

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

But the withdrawal wasn’t as bad as it could have been, with no major encirclements, according to both troops on the ground and experts. Soldiers have had to walk on foot though for days, leaving their valuable equipment behind. Many raised concerns over expending manpower and limited resources into invading another country’s territory when they could have been used to defend one’s own, especially as Russia gained ground on the eastern front — where many of the units participating in the cross-border operation were previously deployed — over the second half of 2024. — Asami Terajima, reporter

Question: Ukraine is obviously maintaining the position that the parts of the four oblasts Donetsk, Luhansk, Zhaporizhia, and Kherson that are not in Russian hands can never be ceded to Russia in a ceasefire, nor will the effectively occupied parts legally be recognized as Russia. But how far can Ukraine be forced by the U.S. to make concessions in this respect?

Answer: Zelensky has to walk a fine line on this issue, balancing the need to retain U.S. support — which right now Ukraine definitely does need as Europe isn’t ready to fill the gap just yet — and public opinion.

The latest opinion poll found that 38% percent of Ukrainians were open to conceding territory in a peace deal, up from 8% in December 2022.

But the number of Ukrainians who oppose giving up territories under any circumstances, “even if this would prolong the war and threaten the preservation of independence,” stands at 51%.

Obviously, these numbers could shift further in the future, but right now, Zelensky is in a tricky spot.

But it’s just too early to know what sort of concessions the U.S. will demand of Ukraine, and given the absolute craziness of the last couple of months, it’s impossible to predict.

One point worth stressing, however, is that those polls do not include the views of the millions of Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation. The debate among politicians and the media tends to focus on land, but it’s also lives that are at stake.

Unfortunately, Trump doesn’t seem to take matters like this into account in his pursuit of just getting deals done, so what is abhorrent to you and I, is nothing of the sort in his mind. — Chris York, news editor

Question: Why doesn’t Ukraine conscript women into the military forces like men?

Answer: I don’t know the official reasoning for why Ukraine doesn’t conscript women, but I think it goes back to the traditional war mentality that women could take over the jobs needed to keep the cities running. Despite the critical manpower shortage, many Ukrainian soldiers — predominantly over the age of 45 — that I have met said the last thing they want is for women to be forced into the war, saying that they are fighting at the cost of their lives to protect women and children.

But Ukrainian women have also proven to be excellent soldiers, sometimes successfully taking over leadership roles and conducting extremely dangerous missions. — Asami Terajima, reporter

Ukrainian Valkyries: Women embrace military training to learn to defend their homeland (Photos)

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Kyiv announced a general mobilization, thousands of Ukrainians have been called up to defend their homeland. In Ukraine, conscription is mandatory only for men. Despite that, more than 45,000 women have voluntarily joined the Arm…

The Kyiv IndependentOksana Parafeniuk

Question: There are a fair number of NATO nations individually providing military equipment. But seeing as they are of different origin, operational characteristics, maintenance needs, and “operating manuals,” has this proven a problem for Ukrainian troops on the front lines?

Answer: Yes, this has been a major issue for Ukrainian soldiers, requiring a fair bit of tinkering with the weapons received. This has particularly complicated the match-up between arms and ammunition, with Ukrainian soldiers reporting the need to re-distribute gunpowder between disparate shells and explosives regularly. — Kollen Post, defense reporter

Question: After the recent interruption of weapons deliveries and intelligence, is everything back to normal? Is my country now meeting its commitments under the Trump administration (as the majority of the American people want)?

Answer: As far as we know, yes, but that comes with a few caveats.

The nature of intelligence sharing means few, if any, details about the state of the current relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine are public, or will be made public, so all we have to go on are the statements made by officials. And, according to both sides, it’s back up and running. Whether or not it’s up and running at the same level it was, we don’t know.

As an aside, there was a great piece in the NYT on the intelligence relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion, though notably, it doesn’t cover any of the period since Trump took charge. It’s very much worth a read, though.

As for military aid, that which was allocated by President Joe Biden is still making its way to Ukraine after the pause.

The crucial question here is how long will it last? Trump has yet to authorize any new weapons shipments and has tied future aid to the minerals deal which is still yet to be signed. So it’s all a bit murky as to how it will play out.

One notable recent announcement was that on April 3, U.S. General Christopher Cavoli said more F-16 fighter jets are being prepared for transfer to Ukraine. — Chris York, news editor

Question: What can individuals around the world do to help Ukraine the most?

Answer: This is one of the most frequently asked questions from our readers and members. The most obvious answer is to donate — two well-known organizations that support those on the front line are Come Back Alive and the Hospitallers. Especially since the suspension of USAID funding, donating even a few dollars can make a big difference: Ukraine was the largest recipient of U.S. economic aid, receiving over $14 billion in 2023.

Outside of making a monetary contribution, you can also contact your elected representatives, asking them to vote in favor of initiatives that help Ukraine, boycott companies that still operate within Russia, and read and share news from Ukraine. We’ve even made this list about how to help Ukraine, so it’s easy for you to share. And most importantly, don’t give up — every effort counts. — Brooke Manning, senior community manager

Ukraine’s long-suffering aerospace giants look to Europe to break free from Russian orbit

Where the Donbas meets the Dnipro River, the USSR built out a dense range of massive factories, using the local coal and metal reserves to smelt, weld, and cast the heaviest of machinery — and weaponry — for the whole of the Soviet Union. One of these is Pivdenmash, formerly known by

The Kyiv IndependentKollen Post

The EU has introduced new sanctions against Belarus on March 27, in response to continued repression and the election of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko in January.

Lukashenko was inaugurated into his seventh consecutive term as President of Belarus on March 25. Several Belarusian human rights groups have decried the elections as undemocratic and denounced the regime for human rights violations.

In power since 1994, Lukashenko’s rule has been marked by a harsh crackdown on political opposition, free media, and civil society.

Twenty-five individuals and seven entities have been sanctioned for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

The sanctions also denounce the role of these individuals and entities in human rights violations, repression, and military support of Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Nine judges have been sanctioned for issuing politically motivated sentences to repress civil society and democratic opposition.

Belarus' Election Commission and its members have been sanctioned for their role in holding elections “conducted in a climate of repression and human rights violations,” the European Council said in its press release.

The chair of Belarus’s largest political party, Aleh Ramanau, has been sanctioned.

Tsybulka-Bel LLC, a Belarusian agricultural company, has been imposed with restrictive measures for coordinating with Belarusian authorities to deploy inmates as forced laborers.

Several companies and their leadership have been subject to restrictive measures for their active participation in the Belarusian military-industrial complex. This includes Precise Electro-Mechanics Plant and its director, Yuri Tchorny.

The Belarusian Election Commission claimed that Lukashenko “won” 86.82% of the vote on Jan. 26.

The other candidates in the election were regime-approved and little-known. Sergey Syrankov got 3.21% of the vote, and Oleg Gaidukevich won 2.02% of the votes.

Ukraine war latest: Russia preparing for new spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, Zelensky says

Key developments on March 27: * Russia preparing for new spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, Zelensky says * ‘With or without the US’ — France, UK harden line over Ukraine at ‘Coalition of the Willing’ summit * North Korea sent 3,000 more troops to Russia to offset Ukraine war losses,…

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

This is not the first time Ukraine is participated in such negotiations. However, there are two main differences at this stage of the talks. Previously, Ukraine used to pick from the European acquis the clauses that align with Ukrainian legislation. Now we have to simply transfer to Ukraine “the content, principles and political objectives of the EU Treaties”, as well as all provisions on “common rights and obligations that constitute the body of EU law”. 

Moreover, there is a significant difference between the concepts and principles of EU Treaties and the rules and technical standards of EU law. A common understanding of concepts between Ukraine and the EU is necessary from the very start of the accession negotiations, while Ukraine will have some time for the implementation of laws and technical standards.

Current social discussion on EU accession creates an impression that the major issue of Ukraine’s EU accession is the necessity to adjust a large number of EU technical standards rather than the common understanding of the sense of EU Treaties. This is wrong: Ukraine approaches the EU not to move away from Soviet technical standards but to get rid of Soviet ideology, including  “Michurin” approaches to environmental management.  

As a theoretical physicist with 40 years of experience, I offer the Ukrainian delegation my notes on the key semantic differences between Ukraine and the EU in the field of environment and development formulated during the work on the Policy Roadmap for Environmental Damage Assessment within the framework of the Sweden-UNDP project “Reducing the Risks of Long-Term Environmental Disasters in Ukraine through the Establishment of a Coordination Center for Environmental Damage Assessment” as well as on the development of “Manual for the city’s climate risk assessment” commissioned by GIZ. 

In the European Commission‘s observations on Ukraine’s progress under Chapter 27 “Environment and Climate Change”, the following concepts need special attention (they need to be clarified and rethought during the accession negotiations):

• Environmental Restoration Liability
• Environmental impact assessment (EIA)
• Understanding climate risks and approaches to their reduction (Green Deal)
• Understanding Sustainability

Environmental liability in the USSR and the EU

In 2016, when working on the approximation of the EU Water Framework Directive, a working group of experts, including me, tried to add the first paragraph to the preamble of the Water Code of Ukraine: “Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage that must be protected, defended and treated as such.” Our attempt faced resistance from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Water Resources Agency, which had just been renamed from the State Water Management Agency without any substantive changes to its functions and responsibilities.

As a physicist who works with the laws of nature, I have always been outraged that according to the Soviet “Michurin” attitude to the environment, environmental liability arises only as a result of violating laws and regulations established by the state, and not as a result of violating the limits established by nature. However, in the post-Soviet Law of Ukraine on Environmental Protection, “environmental damage” is still assessed based on the Soviet “normative” approach as “losses and damages caused to the state as a result of violation of environmental protection legislation.” In the EU, environmental damage is assessed by measurable changes in a natural resource or disruption of natural resource-related services and by the amount of funds required to restore the environment to its original state.

This discrepancy leads to several negative consequences. First, its corruption risks are obvious, when the damage assessment is easily changed hundreds of times by a simple Cabinet of Ministers Resolution. For example, before the war, the State Ecological Inspectorate of Ukraine counted billions of hryvnias of environmental damage per year, and in 2002-2023 – a thousand times more. Second, using such fundamentally different from international methods of environmental damage assessment makes it impossible to integrate this data into the Register of Damage Caused by the Russian Aggression against Ukraine, created by the Council of Europe in Hague.

Thus, after the recent adoption of the EU Nature Restoration Act, we should finally agree to introduce European-style environmental liability in Ukraine before starting negotiations by amending the basic environmental laws accordingly (see my recommendations here, here, and here). Without this, we will see neither EU membership nor environmental restoration projects. What kind of environmental restoration can we talk about if no one in Ukraine is responsible for this restoration?

EIA is not a legal procedure for assessing violations of environmental legislation, but a process of measurable assessment of physical impact on the environment

Another Soviet legacy is that concepts such as “environmental security” and “environmental impact/damage” are not quantified in Ukraine, but are defined dichotomously (either present or absent). The absence of measurable objective data on changes in the state of the environment and the impact on it causes the ineffectiveness of such dichotomous control because if you cannot measure, you cannot effectively manage. 

Another reason for ineffectiveness is that the dichotomy between violators and inspectors is a “zero-sum game” (i.e., a game in which there is necessarily a winner and a loser). In this game, zero is left for the restoration of the environment. This type of management makes it possible to punish violators but it does not allow us to even ask where, how, and why we need to improve the environment. 

Before the negotiations, it is necessary to decide on the proposals for a radical reform of the environmental impact (and damage) assessment process, moving from a “normative” dichotomous assessment to an inclusive management of achieving common development goals at the lowest cost to society. 

Understanding climate risks and ways to reduce them

Legislation inherited from the USSR (the Law on Environmental Protection and the Civil Protection Code) still maintains the understanding that security is the absence of risks and that there are only two states of security – security and insecurity. Therefore, all attempts to shift to climate or environmental risk management are met with resistance and misunderstanding. In the negotiations, it would be worth mentioning that according to the updated Environmental Strategy, security in Ukraine is now understood not as the absence of risks, but as risk reduction, and that the relevant changes will be made to other basic environmental laws.

Green Deal

Regarding the understanding of ways to reduce risks, most experts in Ukraine still believe that the Green Deal is a unilateral Green Course on emissions reduction as the only possible way to combat climate change (CC) and its consequences, and not a deal between the necessity both to reduce emission and to adjust to the life in a different climate. This is reflected in the difference between the Ukrainian and UN understanding of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13:

SDG 13 (UN): Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Target 13.1. Increase resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries

SDG 13 (Ukraine): Mitigate the effects of climate change

Objective 13.1: Limit greenhouse gas emissions in the economy

Indicator 13.1.1. Greenhouse gas emissions, % to 1990 level

The reason for this one-sided approach is, in our opinion, an outdated understanding of risk as the probability of a negative event (as defined by the Soviet Construction Norms), while ISO now defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty”, i.e. probability of event times its impact. Unfortunately, when developing the EIA Law, Ukraine refused to change the definition of risk accordingly. As a result, all environmental management practitioners have the impression that risk can only be reduced by reducing the likelihood of a negative event and not by reducing the impact of that event. In reality, the reduction of climate risks is possible not only by reduction of emissions but also through adaptation, i.e. the reduction of the negative impact of climate change. However, the Ukrainian government does not see “adaptation benefits” in the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.

Despite the officially submitted comments on the discrepancies between Ukrainian climate terminology and the IPCC Glossary (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), the discrepancies were transferred to the new Law on the Basic Principles of State Climate Policy. It would be good to indicate in the negotiations that we are aware of these differences and plan to overcome them

Understanding Sustainability

As for the other SDGs, Ukraine has been debating how to translate Sustainability since the Rio Summit in 1992, but mostly without discussing the meaning of the term.

The situation has become even more confusing with the advent of the EU Taxonomy classification of economic activity. The EU Taxonomy’s approach to Sustainability is rather misleading, as it defines an activity as sustainable if it contributes to the achievement of at least one of the goals: either climate change mitigation or adaptation to climate change. 

At the same time, the IPCC insists that achieving sustainable development requires synergies between these two main actions – mitigation and adaptation. In the Summary for Policymakers of the sixth report of the IPCC, it is explicitly stated:

• “Current development paths, combined with the observed effects of climate change, lead away from sustainable development rather than toward it.

• Mitigation plays a key role in reducing the threat of climate change.

• Adaptation plays a key role in reducing exposure and vulnerability to climate change. 

• Only simultaneous emissions reductions and adaptation can ensure sustainable development for all.

• Climate-resilient development is the process of implementing mitigation and adaptation options to support sustainable development for all.

• The window of opportunity for climate-resilient development is closing fast“.

Commentary by Dennis Meadows

Dennis Meadows describes the situation even better in his lecture dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the concept of “Limits to Growth” (personal communication – AD): 

Meadows’ statement — “We should not strive for sustainable development but for the system’s resilience to external influences” — deserves serious discussion.

Understanding the distinction between resilience and sustainable development is crucial for effective alignment with European policymakers during accession negotiations and for shaping Ukraine’s post-war recovery strategy. For a fragile nation like Ukraine, resilience is even more important. As the saying goes, “Before the fat man loses weight, the thin man dies.”

In a revealing blog post, Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin might need to abandon some of his ambitious plans amid a fallout in Washington.

Despite a tense exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and then U.S. President Donald Trump in the White House, Kovalenko reassured allies that no catastrophe had unfolded. He noted that while Zelensky's visit might not have been a complete success, there’s no and need for panic.

Reflecting on the Oval Office fracas, Kovalenko highlighted a crucial development: a wave of solidarity from European leaders. Presidents, prime ministers, ministers, and other politicians have been vocal in their support for Zelensky and the Ukrainian people.

"By morning, we see Europe united, with urgent measures being prepared. It's not about words; it's about arms. Support and weaponry to Ukraine will continue," Kovalenko emphasized. He also stated that any attempts by Putin to leverage U.S. relations to reenter European affairs are futile.

"In this climate, China is likely to focus its strategic partnership on Europe. Russia is seen by Beijing as merely a raw materials supplier. For the United States, Russia remains just a 'gas station' and a source of rare metals, with Putin ready to offer them 'unconditionally'," Kovalenko explained. He assured that Ukraine has ample resources to continue resisting the aggressor, even without American backing, and Russia's situation is far from ideal.

"In Russia, regional funds are dwindling, evidenced by reported difficulties in paying contractors. The sanctions persist. Consequently, life in Russia is bound to deteriorate," Kovalenko wrote.

He suggested that eventually Russia will have to make concessions to Ukraine, specifically abandoning its plans to occupy Ukrainian territories.

As Ukraine entered its fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war, it was geopolitics, not the war itself, that dominated headlines, as Kyiv’s relationship with new U.S. President Donald Trump nosedived over a proposed minerals deal.

In the meantime though, the battlefield continues to rage on multiple fronts, with daily Russian assaults continuing through a period of consistent sub-zero temperatures across eastern Ukraine.

The most intense fighting continues to be in southern Donetsk Oblast, where, although Russian territorial gains have slowed to a halt outside the key city of Pokrovsk, Ukraine’s defense of the area around Kurakhove buckled over the first months of 2025.

Going forward, many unpredictable factors hang over the next year of the war. Ukraine is trying to solidify its defense with new reforms, Russia faces questions over its ability to sustain its current rate of attacks and losses, while looming largest is the future of U.S. aid.

To reflect on the key conclusions of the third year of the full-scale war and what to look out for in the fourth, the Kyiv Independent sat down with the U.S.-based military analyst and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Rob Lee during a working visit to Kyiv.

The interview has been edited for clarity and length.

The Kyiv Independent: How would you describe how 2024 went for Ukraine, and what kind of core issues have really defined it?

Rob Lee: 2024 was a year in which Russia had a number of advantages. They had scaled the production of ammunition before this – the U.S. and Europe were trying to catch up to that. They had already received significant support from North Korea, from Iran, both in terms of ammunition, equipment, and now obviously troops from North Korea.

Ukraine began the year in a position of weakness, where they struggled to replace manpower losses from the summer of 2023 offensive. And we know the U.S. delayed passing the aid package for about six months until April 2024. So last winter was a quite difficult time for Ukraine, where there was a lack of fortifications. We know that Ukraine has improved on that since then. There’s a lack of manpower, still a problem, and there was a key lack of ammunition too.

I would say on the positive side, it’s obviously been a very difficult year for Ukraine, but the worst-case scenario did not happen. We didn’t see any kind of significant breakthrough, like an operational breakthrough.

We’ve seen incremental attritional assaults. Russia has made advances. It is still a very difficult situation on the front line, but there was a possibility that things would have gotten worse.

We came here three times in 2024. If I gave a summary of the findings from those trips, the manpower situation progressively got worse each time. The brigades we were meeting at the front line were more and more on their strength each time we came.

The average age of Ukrainian infantry was going up each time, so maybe it was 40 at the beginning of the year. It became 45 later on, and we were hearing in October that brigades had an average age of 50-year-olds as infantry.

It was very clear that there was a sense of maybe not exhaustion, but just of being fatigued or tired. Obviously, people have been fighting this war for three years now, a high-intensity conventional war. But look, Ukrainians are still fighting. They’re still putting up a very tough defense.

The Kyiv Independent: The Russian advance now seems to have really slowed down, is that, from the Russian side, more resembling to you an operational pause or a greater kind of lack of this same ability to attack with expendable infantry at the same rate?

Rob Lee: So on both sides, there’s a general sense of weakness. When we look at the forces, both militaries have significant experience now in combat. Three years of experience. But the experience is not evenly distributed across the force. So UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) units, UAV pilots are extremely capable on both sides now.

Artillery crews are very capable because many of these people have three years of experience. The attrition of FPV (first-person view drone) pilots and artillery is lower, and so in many cases you have cohesive units that have operated for years. So they’re very, very capable.

But the infantry side has become degraded on both sides. Most of the attrition and casualties is suffered by the infantry. And so in many cases, in an infantry squad, many of the people are going to be new, with probably less than a month of experience in many cases.

I think Russia made a choice: Instead of trying to develop well-trained, cohesive units, they’ve kind of accepted this attritional fight where we’re going to get a lot of infantry, we’re going to get a lot of manpower, we’re going to throw them into assaults. We’re not going to train them that much. We’re not going to really focus on that. And, of course, the quality is not that great.

On both sides, the average age (of the infantry) is quite high. The Russian side is probably lower than Ukraine, but you’re still getting plenty of people in their 40s, 50s, 60s. You’re getting people who are in debt that need the money.

If you sign a contract to join the Russian military, you go into an assault unit, the likelihood of being killed or wounded within a month is quite high. And I think it’s a question about how much the Russians know about that. Do they know how dire the situation is? That’s not clear.

But it’s certainly an issue where Ukrainian brigades are very understrength. Russia is still struggling to break through them. And that’s partially because Russia has weaknesses. They just don’t have as much equipment as they did before. They don’t have the artillery advantage they had before. Their infantry is not as capable as it was before. So even if their infantry takes a position, they’re not really trying to achieve a breakthrough. It’s kind of trying to take the next tree line, and they’re content doing that.

On the Ukrainian side, despite the issues with infantry, we know they’ve significantly scaled the production of FPVs and UAVs. The Defense Ministry said it was 1.6 million produced last year – very impressive numbers.

The quality of FPVs has gone up tremendously. The best Ukrainian young engineers are all working on these things. And so the innovation is very fast.

You have a number of (drone) regiments that are being formed as separate regiments. And those units are just extremely efficient. They are like industrial-size killing machines at the front line. And they’ve really improved the coordination between UAV units, which was a really significant issue early in the war.

And so I think there are two factors. On one hand, Ukraine has improved a number of things in terms of UAV use. And out of necessity, Ukraine has to innovate because they don’t have enough manpower. There is a greater political sensitivity to catalysts in Ukraine than there is in Russia, where it’s obviously very low. And they can’t fight the same way that Russia can fight. So on one hand, it’s this innovation that Ukraine is succeeding in. On the other hand, it’s Russia – they have resource advantage, but they’re struggling to really capitalize on it as much as they possibly could.

The Kyiv Independent: When we talk with experts and commanders, manpower seems to be the biggest issue. And it almost seems like it can only get worse because Ukraine’s overall manpower is limited. It’s not something that foreign aid can replace. What are the most important steps Ukraine can make?

Rob Lee: One of the things that’s been announced is an attempt to increase the number of volunteers from the 18 to 24-year-old age bracket. Someone mentioned this week that they’d received 10,000 applications – I don’t know all the facts there, we’ll have to wait and see.

In the beginning of the war in 2022, Ukraine obviously had a professional military and then there was a massive influx of volunteers. And those volunteers really sustained the war in 2022. You had very motivated people. You had some of the best, most educated, the highest-ranked people in Ukraine fighting in 2022. And as casualties mounted in 2023 and 2024, it went back to being a kind of mobilized military, in which case you get kind of a mix of results. You get some people who are still motivated to fight, some people who are less motivated to fight.

And of course, the military in 2025, it’s a mobilized military. In the infantry in particular, you’re not getting volunteers. I think the last group of volunteers for the infantry were the convicts.

There are several issues. One of them is trust. It’s about if you were sent to the military and you were given a certain job, to know that you are not going to be sent into infantry.

The Kyiv Independent: But the infantry is where you need the new people in the first place.

Rob Lee: Right. In all wars, it’s the infantry that has the highest burden by far, that shows the burden.

They don’t rotate that often. We should not underestimate how much of a burden these guys are holding. It’s really tremendous. And there’s no end date. There’s no demobilization system. And so it’s very difficult.

The U.S. has been pushing for the mobilization age to be reduced to 18. I don’t know, and I’m not Ukrainian. It’s kind of a political decision, so I don’t want to wade into it. There are Ukrainians who believe that’s the right move to do, but I also know many that don’t think it’s the right move to do, including people who are fighting, who think that the age pool from 30 to 50 is still large enough. There are more people who can mobilize to fight. And if you keep reducing the age pool, then men or boys who are in high school are going to be sent out of the country, so more families are going to be broken apart. You’ll get more people who go AWOL to avoid the war.

And of course, a lot of the most educated, best engineers are 18 to 24-year-olds, and you want them to be able to sustain the economy. So it’s not fully clear that that’s the solution.

But the problem is that we’re three years into the war, and the manpower pool is not what it was at the beginning of the war. And look, Russia has a lot of men, and they clearly have a lot of men who are willing to sign up for contracts to go into fighting. There’s little political sensitivity.

We know Vladimir Putin has been resisting another mobilization campaign, but he probably can do it. He could probably do an unlimited campaign. I think he has enough control domestically in Russia, where it probably won’t create such significant political turmoil.

So this is still a really big issue for 2025 – if Ukraine can at least fix or not let the manpower situation worsen – because I think Russia could probably sustain this war this year.

The Kyiv Independent: Yes, with mobilization, it’s being done here in a democracy, and it is causing tensions. But when people say it will cause real unrest in Russia, I think people forget about what kind of a state Russia is.

Rob Lee: And just one thing to add: In Russia, they can execute soldiers. If soldiers turn around, they will be executed.

And so they don’t, so they get pushed forward. And we also see all these videos of Russian soldiers committing suicide – just kind of can’t imagine a worse situation than basically serving the Russian military. In Ukraine, that’s not going to happen, right?

The Ukrainian commanders are not going to execute soldiers who are unwilling to fight, and so you have to deal with it in different ways. It is a democracy, and there’s greater value for the lives of Ukrainian soldiers than there is for the Russian military.

The Kyiv Independent: How realistic is, maybe not completely, but to what scale can infantry be truly replaced by unmanned systems on the ground?

Rob Lee: Well, we’re going to see this year. One of the key priorities, I think, for Ukraine’s government this year is to scale up the production of unmanned ground vehicles. There are significantly more companies developing new GVs, offering them, than last year.

There are some brigades that are very far forward using new GVs. I was told some things I can’t repeat, so I’ll be careful here, but I do think this year we’re going to see a quite significant expansion in use of new GVs. The main priority is probably going to be logistics.

So as we know, the most dangerous situation right now is the rotation of infantry. This is not when they're in the trenches. Once they've built good dugouts, they can hold them pretty well. But it's rotating between the rear area to the front line, which is quite difficult with vehicles because FPVs present this kind of new threat, which often can fly maybe 10 miles or 10 kilometers past the front line. So if you can replace the use of vehicles for logistics, that can really significantly improve the situation.

Some of these new GVs are quite large. They can bring logs and other things to build better fortifications. And for some of the brigades, a majority of supplies are being moved by UGVs right now.

There are still limitations. So operating UAVs, UGVs is still very manpower intensive. We're talking about four-man teams. Usually, it requires a lot of coordination.

This is how Ukraine has to innovate and adapt to the situation. Russia has more manpower. Ukraine cannot afford to lose more infantry. That is a key issue. And so UGVs are part of this, just as UAVs were for compensating for lack of artillery ammunition or lack of infantry right now.

The Kyiv Independent: We've heard about plans to change the Ukrainian military into a corps system. How do you assess that decision and how can it be executed in a situation where the military is so overstretched along the front line?

Rob Lee: The idea is the right one. A consistent problem throughout the war is that Ukraine is a brigade-style military, and there isn't really much of a command and control structure above that.

You have operational strategic groups, operational tactical groups, but these commands, they're not really responsible for the units under their command. Units kind of come in and leave, whereas you want them to have long-term responsibility because then you're going to be more careful about how you use them, you're not going to have too many casualties.

One of the broader problems in the Ukrainian military the last year and a half, because there's a manpower problem, is that often brigades will be piecemeal deployed across the front line, where a brigade may have two battalions in one direction, a battalion in another direction. Those battalions are attached to other brigades. That other brigade commander, they're probably going to use the attached units more aggressively than their own units, just out of a sense of survival.

This has created a variety of problems. So the move to a corps structure would be useful, and I think the idea that the brigade commanders – I'm not sure if it's official – but like Khartiia Brigade, Azov, 3rd Assault, 92nd, some of the really famous units, taking the lead – it makes sense. One of the problems last year is that Ukraine set up a number of new brigades, the 150 series. Many of them had a variety of problems, which I won't go into, but if you put those brigades under the command of another brigade that has a good culture, that does training the right way, that does leadership the right way, you can in some ways ameliorate those problems, and that's kind of an ideal situation.

But as you mentioned, forming the corps right now is quite difficult. So it's going to be a big question about how it's executed.

The Kyiv Independent: Going back to Russia, it almost seems like in the information space, there are two images of the Russian military. One is that Russia has upscaled its recruiting and its production, and is almost a truly unstoppable military machine. But then other people say that all they can do is human wave attacks and, at the rate of their loss, they'll lose so many million people to take this much of Ukraine. What is the real picture of the Russian military?

Rob Lee: So it's a mix. There are strengths, and there are really serious weaknesses, too.

Russia's certainly not unstoppable. Russia, since October 2023, they've been strategically on the offensive, they've had the initiative, they've advanced in the Avdiivka direction, but other places: In Toretsk, the fight began sometime in the summer, Chasiv Yar, they got there around April, and they've almost taken the city, but it's taken a very long time, heavy casualties. And they're still struggling to take back Kursk.

A lot of this comes back to what Russia's political objectives and the military means are. So Vladimir Putin last year laid out that the minimum conditions for negotiations is control of all four oblasts that he says are part of Russia, right? Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson. Russia is a very long way from taking all those oblasts, right?

So obviously Luhansk, almost all of it is Russia-controlled, although there's still very heavy fighting for the last part of it. Donetsk, there's a lot of fighting to go. Russian forces got to Pokrovsk around August, and they still have not been able to encircle it for a long time at heavy costs, and obviously Ukraine has had some counterattacks the last few weeks, retaking some areas.

So not only have they not taken Pokrovsk, but trying to get to Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk – at this rate, it could take quite a long time. And of course, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, this is something far, far removed. Russia's still very far from achieving its minimum objectives in this war.

But they have a significant manpower advantage. They recruited a large number of contract soldiers last year. That means they can sustain this war for this year, at least, in terms of manpower. As it later goes on, this could be a more significant issue.

Some capabilities Russia has are much more capable now than they were before. They've got FPV units, they have far more ISR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition) units, although, obviously, Ukraine has had success countering them. They've improved and modernized many of the missiles, such as KH-101s and Iskander-Ms.

Their long-range missile strikes, they've improved the tactics behind it. They do adapt. We shouldn't say that they don't. Russian EW (electronic warfare), depending on who you talk to, is still quite effective. And they have some other supporting capabilities that have gotten effective.

And Russian air defenses are not as effective as the air defense systems we've seen in this war, but they still do shoot down a lot of missiles. They have shot down plenty of Storm Shadows and ATACMS. Obviously, these UAV attacks Ukraine conducts on Russia, most UAVs get shot down, although still, if a few get through, that's often enough.

The Kyiv Independent: There is a prospect of the U.S. really abandoning Ukraine in terms of military aid, and then there are other more political questions like intelligence and Starlink. How bad could it be for Ukraine if that's cut off?

Rob Lee: The short answer is I don't know. I think there are different scenarios. One is where the U.S. does not pass an aid package, but they are open to Europe purchasing U.S. weapons or ammunition to form military sales for Ukraine, in which case, that could potentially supplant this, and Europe is still a very rich group, they still have plenty of money, and if they tap into Russian currency reserves, that is another option.

At the same time, if the U.S. does not pass an aid package, then the artillery expenditure rate for Ukraine is going to go down. Instead of 2 to 1, if it's 3 to 1, 4 to 1, what that means in the front line is that more Ukrainian soldiers will die, on a very basic level. It doesn't necessarily mean it will be decisive, but it will become more difficult for Ukraine to fight.

There are other systems that I believe only the U.S. produces, like the interceptors for Patriots, munitions for HIMARS, I'm sure there are a variety of other things, too, like Stingers, Javelins. Some of those things will be really critical.

HIMARS fills a very critical role in the Ukrainian military for operational-level fire. There's nothing else that replaces it. And then Patriot interceptors – Patriot is the main anti-ballistic missile defense system for Ukraine. And that is what is protecting Kyiv and all other cities from ballistic missile threats. Ukraine has the ability to shoot down cruise missiles pretty effectively. We know they can shoot down Shaheds and other UAVs very effectively. But ballistic missiles, the options aren't as great.

If you lose this kind of ballistic missile defense, then that could be a key issue. Russia might go after defense industrial factories again or go after the energy grid more successfully. And that could pose significant issues.

So it won't be a complete breakdown, but a loss of U.S. aid could have significant effects. Starlink, obviously, plays a really important role in communications, in integrating the UAV systems.

If the U.S. not only stops providing aid but also refuses to allow Europe to buy munitions, that could have a really significant effect, particularly because we know Ukraine already has a manpower problem, and that would compound the issues Ukraine faces.

The Kyiv Independent: Russia's going forward and they are advancing, there's no real reason for them to be interested in stopping the war, and I think that's always the key question about a negotiated peace. So if we're looking first and foremost at the battlefield beyond grand geopolitics, what would it take for Russia to feel at this point that they just can't go any further forward and they're happy to take what they have?

Rob Lee: For this war to end, it begins with Russia not being able to advance on the battlefield. As I said before, the minimum objectives that Russia has are to take control of all four of those oblasts, which Russia only partially controls right now.

Russia, at this rate, is quite far from achieving that. I don't think it's likely that Russia would take all of Donetsk Oblast this year, unless there's a kind of catastrophic breakdown of Ukrainian forces. And again, it comes back to the U.S. aid and other factors.

And so for Russia, as long as they're advancing on the battlefield, and they have not achieved taking all of Donetsk Oblast, I think the war is going to continue. Peace negotiations can go on, but the gap there is too significant, and I don't think there's any chance that President Zelensky is going to give up territory that Ukraine currently controls. I just don't think that is politically palatable, and I don't think Ukrainians would allow it. So right now, we have a gap between the Russian demands and the Ukrainian version of what they would be willing to accept as the end of the war.

The other big factor here is that how the war ends is really critical. There's a reason why Ukraine keeps asking for security guarantees, because – people talk that Ukraine is tired of this war, exhausted, and that's true – but I think my sense is that what Ukraine is really tired of is this persistent threat from Russia. This threat has been going on for quite a long time, the war began 11 years ago, and for Ukraine, it's important that however the war ends, that it ends and does not begin again.

There's a chance that if the Trump administration offers concessions that are outside of Ukraine, such as about the security architecture of Europe, maybe that will allow Russia to end the war on different terms in Ukraine because that would be a significant victory for Russia. This war is in part about changing the security architecture of Europe. It's not just about Ukraine.

We saw the demands that Russia made back in December 2021 about going back to what the NATO borders looked like in 1997 and so on. I think Russia still wants that, and they're still talking about that publicly.

My view is that this war is going to continue. It will likely continue as of this summer. Maybe we'll see a ceasefire, but not necessarily a permanent ceasefire because Russia has not achieved even its minimum objectives in the war. It has not been a success for Russia, it's come at a high cost, and even though Putin has very strong control of Russia, can he sell what he's achieved so far as a victory to the Russian people? I'm not sure he can because he really hasn't succeeded, and the costs have been quite significant. So, unfortunately, I think the war is probably going to continue.

We'll see how the U.S. responds because I think negotiations are going to be more difficult than maybe some U.S. officials currently imagine. The way to end this war is to prevent Russia from advancing on the battlefield, to get to a point where Russia can't have success. But as long as Russia advances on the battlefield, it's going to continue. And for the U.S., the best ability to affect that is to continue providing greater aid because then that will enable Ukraine to stop Russian advances.

‘First, we need peace:’ US-Ukraine minerals deal only one step on long road to investment

As Kyiv and Washington celebrate agreeing to jointly develop Ukraine’s natural resources after weeks of tense negotiations, the deal still has a long way to go before the money starts flowing. Officials, experts, and those close to the deal say the current version of the agreement is an improvement

The Kyiv IndependentDominic Culverwell

Feb. 24, 2025 marks three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Three years since Ukraine, and the world, ceased to exist as we knew them.

Kyiv Independent staff members have answered the question, “If you could go back in time, what would you tell yourself on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion?” The following reflections offer a window into the profound impact this war has had on a group of people covering the war — and a nation — changed forever.

Asami Terajima, reporter

I would tell myself that everything about your life will change tomorrow: your understanding of war, peace, and life. And that you made a good call convincing your parents not to return to Ukraine, where they had been living, because you had good instincts about what was to come.

Don’t freak out, but the war that is about to consume your life is way worse than you could have ever imagined. The most important thing is that you know you are not alone. You have friends and colleagues who will be there for you, so just keep taking one step at a time. You are only a 21-year-old university student who just stepped into the world of journalism. Nothing is expected of you. So just cherish the last few hours in peace, the calm before the storm before the innocence of youth is taken away from you.

Make sure that you are comfortable with the risk you are taking, and follow your gut — it can sometimes save lives. Don’t panic, and stay true to yourself. You will lose many friends to war, you will attend funerals for the first time, and you will witness horrifying scenes that you were always scared to watch in war movies. But you are loved, and there will be beautiful moments amid the uncertainty and darkness that shine so brightly. You will discover more about yourself along the way.

But also, leave the Kyiv Independent office a little earlier on Feb. 23 so that you can get a good sleep in (I left at 2 a.m. on Feb. 24 and the invasion started a few hours later).

Toma Istomina, deputy chief editor

I didn’t sleep on Feb. 24, 2022. The days leading up to the full-scale invasion were already crazy enough to keep me in the office until late at night, and by late I mean past 2 a.m. By the time I got home, it was already clear that tonight was the night when Russia would go through with its sick plan.

Just 30 minutes before the first explosions rocked Kyiv and Russian tanks started rolling over Ukrainian borders from all sides, I published a post on Instagram, saying:

“Again and again we prove to have something Russia can only envy. We are united, we are courageous, and our values prevail in the face of hundreds of thousands of fully equipped troops encircling our country. We might have been unfortunate to share a border with Russia. But we are damn fortunate to have each other. And nobody will ever take that away.”

Three years later, after everything we’ve been through, I couldn’t say it better. If I could go back in time to the eve of the full-scale invasion, I would take my own phone, open that post, and read it out loud to myself, with a lot of confidence.

No words could have truly prepared me for the horror to come, but knowing my future self stood by this vision might have made it easier to see the light ahead.

Oh, and I would tell myself to call our developers and ask them to prepare our website for record traffic at 5 a.m. Waking them up after the full-scale invasion had already started to fix our crashed website? A bit awkward.

Natalia Yermak, reporter

I had a picnic on a frozen lake with my friends on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion. We fried eggs and sausages over a fire. I would have told myself in that moment that my old life was about to end forever. But I will not be the only one.

I’d also tell myself that my first impression of the war — that it is bigger than just Ukraine, and will change people’s lives all over the world — will prove more true than ever in a few years.

There are so many stories of strength and compassion that I’ll see over three years, and so many tragedies — more than I ever thought I could handle.

Telling these stories will help me to get through. They’ll stay with me, and hopefully, with you, our readers, so that one day, when you or I get to have a picnic with friends, we remember the people who stood up to evil to protect the good in our lives, and we ask ourselves: What can I do to repay them?

Elsa Court, audience development manager

I’d tell myself that it’s going to feel like the end. It’s going to feel like there is no hope, that Ukraine will be completely occupied, that you will never see Kyiv again. You’re also going to feel powerless watching what is happening from abroad, like seeing a tsunami or earthquake rip into a piece of land from afar. You will feel like you are standing there, frozen, as the unthinkable happens, and an unstoppable force swallows Ukraine.

But just because this is how it feels, doesn’t mean it’s true.

First of all, it’s not the end — it’s only the beginning, and not just for Ukraine, but for all of Europe. You are going to see Kyiv again (in fact, you will move there two years later). And you will find working at the Kyiv Independent will make you feel like you have some impact, at least on how other non-Ukrainians like you understand Ukraine and Russia’s war. You will also find out that Russia is not an unstoppable force — but so far, only Ukrainians have dared to stop it.

You will become a lot less fatalist after moving to Ukraine — there’s something about being surrounded by people who continue to live, regardless of their neighbor’s best effort to kill them, that will change your attitude.

That doesn’t mean feelings of hopelessness will ever go away. When I feel particularly hopeless, a good Ukrainian friend tells me, “Elsa, doh kinstya” — Ukrainian for "keep going, until the end." After three years, you still won’t know for sure when, or where, the end will be.

Kate Tsurkan, reporter

If I could go back and tell myself anything on the eve of the invasion, it would be this: prepare yourself.

You know what’s coming — you have no doubt. But you aren’t ready for the full extent of Russia’s cruelty. Prepare yourself for the fact that the country you were born in won’t help the country you love as much as it can or should. And its next president? He might betray us completely.

Prepare yourself to constantly worry about your friends on the front line, and to struggle with the dual feelings of gratitude and guilt from having some semblance of a normal life thanks to them.

Prepare yourself to see a video, after a Russian attack, where your friend is clearly not going to make it. It can happen again. It can happen to anyone you know — even you.

The fact that you will spend two weeks in Kharkiv without hearing a single explosion is dumb luck. Still, you should not shrug off every air raid siren like you will in Chernivtsi. You should not become so acclimated to the sounds of war.

Prepare yourself — because you will have a child. And no matter what happens, you won’t be allowed to cry about any of this in front of her. Your job will be to teach her to cherish her culture above all else, to hate Russia for bringing war to her lands, and most importantly, to survive.

Kateryna Denisova, reporter

Freedom means a lot to millions of Ukrainians, believe in your people — that is what I would tell myself on the eve of the invasion.

I’d also tell myself that this war concerns the whole world; there is no justice, but you should never lose hope and always act.

Back then, on the first day of Russia’s all-out invasion, as a Ukrainian and a journalist, I was sure that the world would not just sit by and watch; it would give us all the weapons we needed, close the skies, and do everything to stop Russia from destroying my nation. But this did not happen.

I would tell myself that it was in fact Ukraine — not other countries that are richer and have more means — that would be the most powerful and decisive in the moment, even as it seemed it was about to fall into Russia’s hands. Will was the only weapon that Russia did not have and will never have.

Dominic Culverwell, business reporter

I would tell myself to be mentally prepared for a hard and emotional three years. And to be strong because tomorrow morning, you are going to wake up and have a panic attack, but just know that your friends are going to survive the battle of Kyiv and the occupation of Bucha.

You are also going to meet some of the most incredible people and make amazing friends. Ukrainians are going to teach you so much about strength and unity but be prepared for a dark shift in your humor — it's a coping mechanism, so don't be alarmed. Ukrainians are good at cracking a joke in bleak times.

I’d tell myself that there's a long road ahead and moving to Kyiv during the war will be one of the best decisions you've ever made. Even though the night-time drone and missile attacks are exhausting and the stories you hear are emotionally gutting, you won't ever question your decision.

1,000 days of full-scale war: Reflections from the Kyiv Independent team

As we mark 1,000 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, members of the Kyiv Independent’s staff have paused to reflect. These reflections offer a glimpse into the profound impact of war — not only on a nation’s struggle for survival but on those who bear

The Kyiv IndependentAnna Belokur

U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy said that the Kremlin shows no interest in pursuing peace in Ukraine, following a speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a closed-door session of the G20 foreign ministers' meeting in Johannesburg on Feb. 20.

Speaking to reporters after the session, Lammy criticized Lavrov’s remarks, saying they did not indicate any willingness to negotiate a settlement, according to the Associated Press. He also noted that Lavrov left the room before Lammy had the chance to deliver his own speech.

The G20 meeting, taking place in South Africa, follows recent U.S.-Russia bilateral talks over ending the war in Ukraine—talks that excluded both Ukraine and its European allies.

‘We cannot survive’ without foreign weapons, say Ukrainian soldiers fearing looming Trump cuts

A looming dropoff in U.S. weapons deliveries is threatening to strain Ukraine’s budding domestic arms production to the breaking point. As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration prepares negotiations with their Russian counterparts, Ukrainians fear being cut out of negotiations — and cut off…

The Kyiv IndependentKollen Post

Tensions have been further heightened by U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments blaming Ukraine for the war and his criticism of President Volodymyr Zelensky.

In his speech, released by the U.K. Foreign Office, Lammy accused Russia of engaging in “Tsarist imperialism” and failing to learn from historical colonial wars. He expressed disappointment in Lavrov’s speech, saying he had hoped for acknowledgment of civilian suffering and a commitment to a durable peace, but instead heard what he described as “the logic of imperialism.” Lammy dismissed Lavrov’s remarks as “tired fabrications” and urged G20 members not to be misled by Russia’s justifications for its actions.

The G20, which includes major global economies alongside the EU and African Union, has struggled to find common ground on key geopolitical issues, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his opening address, urged member states to engage in constructive dialogue amid ongoing global crises, including war, climate change, and economic instability.

However, U.S. disengagement from the summit signals the Trump administration’s continued prioritization of its “America First” agenda over multilateral cooperation.

Exploitation or opportunity? Ukrainian business sees potential in Trump resource deal — if done right

Within weeks of U.S. President Donald Trump saying he wanted to do a deal with Kyiv on its “rare earths and other things,” it became clear the U.S. wasn’t just interested in Ukraine’s critical minerals and rare earth elements. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent visited

The Kyiv IndependentDominic Culverwell

Yuliya Navalnaya, widow of late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and Western leaders decried repression in Russia on Feb. 16, the anniversary of Navalny’s death.

Navalny, an outspoken critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was arrested on politically motivated charges in January 2021. He was convicted and later died in an Arctic penal colony in February 2024.

Western countries, including Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement on the anniversary of Navalny’s death.

“We reiterate that the ultimate responsibility for his death lies with the Russian authorities. One year on, Russia’s dire human rights record continues to deteriorate … All to serve its own interests,” the statement read.

The statement condemned Russia for holding over 800 political prisoners who are tortured and forced into psychiatric detention.

“The Kremlin crushes peaceful dissent, maintains a climate of fear, and undermines the rule of law,” it said.

The countries also claimed that Russia uses the threat of imprisonment to quash opposition to the full-scale war against Ukraine.

“Many (are) imprisoned for speaking out against the Kremlin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality shown towards the Ukrainian people,” the statement said.

The anniversary of Navalny’s death falls during the Munich Security Conference, where European and U.S. officials convened to discuss the status of the war as it approaches its third year.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas issued her own statement regarding Navalny on Feb. 16.

“Navalny gave his life for a free and democratic Russia. Today, his lawyers are unjustly imprisoned along with hundreds of political prisoners,” she said.

“Russia is increasingly waging an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine while continuing its domestic repression, persecuting those who advocate for democracy … The EU calls on Russia to stop its brutal repression of civil society, media, and opposition figures."

Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, also posted a video commemorating her late husband one year after his death.

“To whom he opened their eyes to the truth of Putin’s regime, it is important to continue supporting (Navalny),” she said.

Since her husband’s death, Navalnaya has emerged as a key Russian opposition figure. She spoke at the Munich Security Conference at a panel alongside Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, warning against attempts to negotiate with Putin.

“Even if you decided to negotiate with Putin, just remember he will lie,” she said on Feb. 14.

A vocal opponent of Putin, Navalnaya has expressed ambivalence toward arming Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s invasion.

‘No point trying to negotiate’ with Putin, Yulia Navalnaya says

“Even if you decided to negotiate with Putin, just remember he will lie,” Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the late Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, said at the Munich Security Conference two days before the anniversary of her husband’s death.

The Kyiv IndependentAbbey Fenbert

After promising to quickly resolve the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump and his top officials’ actions on Feb. 12 appeared to undermine Ukraine’s leverage in peace talks, renewing fears that his plans for a quick resolution could amount to a victory for Russia.

Trump announced he had held phone calls with both Russian leader Vladimir Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky, saying peace negotiations would start “immediately” and a ceasefire is in the “not too distant future."

Earlier in the day, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said “returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective,” and that NATO membership for Ukraine is not an option.

By conceding leverage points before negotiations have formally started, Trump’s team has “totally screwed their own negotiating position,” Timothy Ash, an associate fellow at the Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Program, told the Kyiv independent.

“Why, even before negotiations start, would you give away your negotiating leverage?” Ash said. “We might ultimately agree that NATO is not appropriate at this time, or maybe never, but it’s a card that Trump could have used in negotiations. Similarly with territory. Trump could have played hardball."

“It seemed like a rookie error,” Ash added.

‘We cannot trust our partners’

For many in Ukraine, the U.S. voicing concessions on territory and NATO membership — before conducting any formal negotiations involving Ukraine — amounted to a betrayal by a key ally.

“This means that we cannot trust our partners,” said Petro Andryushchenko, former Mariupol mayoral advisor and head of the Center for the Study of Occupation.

“This is exactly what the president (Zelensky) means when he says, ‘If we are not accepted into NATO, we have to build NATO here.’"

Territorial concessions are particularly devastating for those living in difficult conditions under occupation, Andryushchenko said, as they will have to face the idea that they will never rejoin Ukraine.

Roughly one fifth of Ukraine’s territory is occupied by Russia, with Russian forces still advancing slowly in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainians living under occupation experience "widespread" human rights violations, the UN has found, including threats, unlawful imprisonment, and torture.

"Imagine being under occupation, helping to believe in liberation, helping with your every step, your life, reporting information about the presence of Russian troops, their behavior — important things that bring us closer to victory. And now you are told that no, you are not needed, you are there forever," he said.

"I think it destroys the whole basis of democracy and the building of the world after the Second World War."

Since taking office, Trump has had significant military, financial, and diplomatic options at his disposal that could be used against Russia to extract better terms for Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko, a top member of parliament from President Volodymyr Zelensky's party, disputed Hegseth’s comment that restoring Ukraine’s pre-war borders was "unrealistic," calling the prospect "absolutely realistic" if more were done to pressure Russia.

Trump himself had earlier floated the idea of applying high tariffs and sanctions to Russia’s struggling economy if a peace deal was not achieved.

"To (restore the borders), Ukraine needs to get enough contemporary weaponry which would allow it to have, at a minimum, parity with Russia on the battlefield. Additionally, the use of serious financial sanctions against Russia’s banking and financial system could have paralyzed the Russian war machine," Merezhko said.

"Regrettably, we don’t see that yet."

Over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians

Not all were surprised by Hegseth’s comments. John Foreman, the former British ambassador to Moscow, told the Kyiv Independent that they revealed an "ultra-realist approach."

"The Americans aren’t prepared to put NATO troops into Ukraine. We know that, because if they had, they would have done it in 2022. And de facto, Ukraine’s going to lose land as part of any peace deal, because Ukraine can’t push the Russians out," said Foreman.

"I can see why it’s gone down badly in Kyiv, and amongst some European capitals. But to be honest, you shouldn’t be surprised."

The phone call with Putin is still significant, Foreman noted, in terms of signalling how the discussions are being carried out — with Trump speaking directly to Putin without other American allies present.

President Joe Biden previously cut all direct communication with Putin after the 2022 invasion.

"The Russians have got what they really wanted as a start — direct conversation with America, over the head of the Europeans, and over, perhaps, the head of the Ukrainians," said Foreman.

European leaders — suddenly left out of discussions after nearly three years of close involvement with the U.S. on Ukraine-related issues under President Joe Biden’s administration —  scrambled to react to Trump’s comments.

Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, said: "Why are we giving (Russia) everything they want, even before negotiations have started? … If there is an agreement made behind our backs, it simply will not work."

European officials are concerned that they might be left to shoulder the costs of Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and security after being excluded from the discussions between Trump and Putin, the Financial Times reported on Feb. 13.

Six European countries released a statement with Ukraine and the European Commission following Trump’s comments, that read: "Our shared objectives should be to put Ukraine in a position of strength. Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations."

The statement also committed to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Germany, France, the U.K., Poland, Italy, and Spain signed the statement.

'Trump has effectively surrendered'

Within the U.S. as well, Trump and Hegseth’s comments provoked backlash from some officials.

U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal called Hegseth’s message a "surrender and betrayal" of Ukraine, while Senator Adam B. Schiff also condemned Hegseth’s comments and criticized Trump for calling Putin before he spoke with Zelensky.

John Bolton, a former national security adviser to Trump, told CNN: "Trump has effectively surrendered to Putin before the negotiations have even begun."

The terms quoted by Hegseth "could have been written in the Kremlin," Bolton added.

Hegseth pushed back on claims that a swift negotiation would be a “betrayal” at a press conference in Brussels, the Guardian reported. “There is no betrayal — there is a recognition that the whole world and the U.S. is invested in peace, in a negotiated peace,” he said.

Trump’s calls to Putin and Zelensky have nonetheless set the stage for talks to end the Ukraine war, signaling a new phase after nearly three years of war. No negotiations have taken place since the war’s early months.

Zelensky is expected to meet with several top U.S. officials in the next few days at the Munich Security Conference from Feb. 14-16. According to the President’s Office, Trump's Ukraine and Russia envoy Keith Kellogg and Vice President JD Vance are among those he is planning to meet.

Kellogg is also scheduled to visit Ukraine on Feb. 20. Trump has said he may meet with Putin in Saudi Arabia and plans to meet Zelensky soon, though he did not provide details.

Trump says peace talks to start ‘immediately.’ But what terms would be acceptable for Ukraine?

U.S. President Donald Trump on Feb. 12 held phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, saying that negotiations to end the war in Ukraine will start “immediately.” “I just spoke to President Volodymyr Zelensky. The conversation went very well. He,…

The Kyiv IndependentOleg Sukhov

The European Union’s lending arm, the European Investment Bank (EIB), has signed agreements to mobilize close to 1 billion euros ($1.03 billion) in investments into Ukraine’s public and private sectors as the U.S. moves to cut funding to development projects in the country.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze all foreign assistance has cast uncertainty on the future of projects in Ukraine in nearly every sector, from critical infrastructure to civil society development.

Nadia Calvino, the EIB’s president, said at a press briefing on Feb. 10 that she had discussed Ukraine’s urgent funding needs with Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to see where the bank could fill the gaps if international partners withdraw their support.

“We discussed the priority areas where the EIB could step up its support — for example, in the areas of border management, transport, energy, and municipalities,” Calvino said in Kyiv during her first visit to the country since taking up office as head of the EIB a year ago.

“We’re working very closely with the government to finance the necessary investments to rebuild, repair, and make national infrastructure more resilient,” she said.

The investment announced on Feb. 10 includes 420 million euros ($433 million) in Ukraine’s public sector to help restore critical infrastructure such as energy, heating, water supply, hospitals, schools, and social housing.

On the private sector side, the bank has signed an agreement to mobilize close to 500 million euros ($515 million) in financing for small and medium-sized businesses throughout the whole country, including in front-line regions, Calvino said.

The bank also announced the German Economy Ministry is providing a 16.5-million-euro ($17 million) loan through the EIB’s climate initiative fund to finance renewable energy projects in Ukraine.  The EIB is a key lender in funding Europe’s green transition.

Calvino said the EIB has been working with the Ukrainian government to speed up the implementation of projects on the ground over the last year. The bank signed a pledge with Ukraine’s government last year to accelerate the deployment of 560 million euros ($596 million) it had ready to help rebuild Ukraine in 2024.  

“Municipalities and small and medium-sized businesses can start already approaching their banks to see about this financing and we hope that it will be mobilized as soon as possible,” she said at the press briefing.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EIB has delivered over 2.2 billion euros ($2.26 billion) in financing mainly dedicated to repairing and modernizing Ukraine’s municipal infrastructure.

This latest round of investment announcements are part of the bank’s 2-billion-euro ($2.06 billion) contribution to the EU’s 50-billion-euro ($51 billion) Ukraine Facility loan and grant program.

As Trump’s team looks to negotiate an end to Russia’s nearly-three year full-scale invasion of Ukraine, talks of reconstruction in Ukraine have returned to front and center.

Russia’s constant missile and drone attacks since 2022 have seriously damaged Ukraine’s housing, water and energy systems. Costs to rebuild are approaching the $500 billion mark.

Calvino said she is sure the EIB will play an important role in supporting the reconstruction of the country “not only because of our direct investment but because of our ability to mobilize public and private investment to support the public and private sector in Ukraine, and beyond."

Meanwhile, European member states recently called on the EIB to increase its lending to the bloc’s defense industry and beef up its defenses against any possible Russian attack in the future.  

The president said she welcomes the support the bank has received from European membes states on stepping up the EIB’s role in supporting Europe’s defense and security sectors “while safeguarding our financing capacity and AAA rating."

The bank already invested 1 billion euros ($1.03 billion) into the sector last year and plans to double it to 2 billion euros ($2.06 billion) in 2025, she added.

Euroclear to send 2-billion-euro tranche of Russian assets profits for Kyiv

Belgian clearing house Euroclear said in a statement on Feb. 5 that the second payment is expected to be made in March and should amount to approximately 2 billion euros.

The Kyiv IndependentYana Prots

The European Union and NATO must strengthen cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure from attacks, which pose a growing threat to European stability. The Kremlin, with its history of weaponizing energy, remains a prime suspect. NATO must properly secure the Baltic Sea — the so-called NATO lake.

The Baltic states achieved independence from the post-Soviet energy system in February by connecting to the continental grid via Poland. However, this transition is being overshadowed by a series of incidents in the Baltic Sea, underscoring the urgent need to secure the energy bridge from Poland, known as the LitPol Link. Poland and the Baltic states are ramping up their preparations.

Energy ministers from the Baltic states and Poland discussed preparations on Jan. 24 for the synchronization scheduled for Feb. 8-9. They announced plans for joint protection of the infrastructure required for this effort, following multiple incidents in the Baltic Sea. The synchronization will proceed without relying on the Estlink 2 cable, which was damaged in one of these incidents.

The meeting in Riga focused on finalizing preparations for synchronization and strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure. “The damage to the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland to Estonia has not impacted the ability of the Baltic states to safely disconnect from the Belarusian and Russian energy system and connect to the European grid,” the ministers concluded.

Analyses indicate that the Baltic states have sufficient cross-border capacity through Estlink 1, NordBalt, and LitPol Link to synchronize with Europe without relying on Estlink 2. Synchronization entails disconnecting the Baltic states from the post-Soviet BRELL system — which will continue to include Belarus and Russia — and adapting Baltic energy systems to operate on the continental frequency.

The LitPol Link power connection, running through Poland, will facilitate this transition. Synchronizing with the continental grid will eliminate energy exchanges with the BRELL system. This move is particularly significant for Kaliningrad Oblast, which will become an energy island — just as the Baltic states would have been if disconnected from BRELL without European synchronization.

However, we cannot be sure that other parts of the critical infrastructure needed for a successful disconnection from the post-Soviet system are safe from malign activity. The Baltic states and Poland are enhancing the security of LitPol Link and other critical infrastructure elements to protect the synchronization process.

“The resilience and protection of infrastructure have never been more important. The Russian Federation is deliberately destroying Ukraine’s power grid, and its hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea underscore the importance of a well-secured energy system for defense,” said Krzysztof Bolesta, state secretary at Poland’s Ministry of Climate and Environment.

Poland is also taking lessons from another energy bridge to Lithuania, known as Harmony Link. Rising costs and security considerations led Polish and Lithuanian operators to plan Harmony Link as a subsoil cable instead of the originally proposed sea route. Land-based infrastructure is easier to secure and — more importantly — can be repaired faster. If sabotage damage can be repaired within a few weeks, the act of sabotage loses much of its impact. That is why the news that Finnish telecom company Elisa managed to repair two undersea cables in about two weeks was so encouraging.

Another type of threat is emerging as well. Baltic operators have reported the spread of disinformation regarding the synchronization of their energy systems with Europe. “We urge the public to critically evaluate information, resist emotional opinions, and refrain from spreading unverified reports,” participants of the Riga meeting emphasized. Beyond spreading fear, the enemy may be attempting to promote a false economic narrative — that disconnection from BRELL would significantly increase electricity costs.

That narrative is false. According to a study conducted during the preparations, the average increase in energy prices for consumers with an average consumption of 140 kWh per month would be minimal: 50 cents per month in Lithuania, 60 cents in Estonia, and around one euro in Latvia. Relatively speaking, this is not a heavy impact. In return, the Baltic states gain energy independence from the Russian operator and market coupling with Europe, which promotes price decreases.

Energy system operators in Poland and the Baltic states have been instructed by their governments to implement an urgent package of measures to enhance the security of critical energy infrastructure. Lithuania’s Interior Ministry expedited the strengthening of the LitPol Link cable’s protection, advancing the timeline from April to Jan. 15 in response to the severing of the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia on Dec. 26, 2024.

Poland is also taking action. “Polish Transmission System Operator (PSE) ensures the protection of transmission infrastructure within the Republic of Poland’s territory. The company collaborates with relevant national services and institutions, as well as transmission system operators in neighboring countries,” PSE stated in a comment for the Energy Drink podcast.

“Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a state of heightened readiness has been in place, and the infrastructure is continuously monitored, with particular attention given to interconnections with Lithuania, Sweden, and Ukraine. New measures to enhance physical security are also being implemented.”

PSE reports ongoing collaboration with operators in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to strengthen regional infrastructure protection. “Discussions are underway about launching joint projects in this area and securing EU funding for them,” the statement adds.

The increasing frequency of attacks on critical infrastructure — such as the recent incident involving the undersea cable between Latvia and Gotland — highlights the difficulty of attributing blame in a complex and interconnected world. Scandinavian media reports suggest it could have been an accident.

However, there have been too many such “accidents” since Russia’s unlawful aggression against Ukraine began. The West needs to take the initiative and stop retreating. The EU and NATO must develop new tools and strategies to address these challenges and protect collective security — especially in the Baltic Sea, which must be properly secured as a NATO-controlled waterway.

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.

Europe must act on Russian LNG before Trump makes it impossible

Europe’s window to ban Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) is closing faster than we think. As a second Trump administration takes shape, Europe’s opportunity to impose new, meaningful measures on Russian fossil fuels is rapidly diminishing. U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war alleged…

The Kyiv IndependentSvitlana Romanko

A shocking series of sabotage acts in Germany has been traced back to Russian handlers, according to a report by Der Spiegel. The perpetrators damaged over 270 cars across various regions using construction foam, sticking decals featuring Economy Minister Robert Habeck on car windows. Initially mistaken for environmental activists, the trail of evidence reportedly leads back to Moscow. The attacks appeared to be orchestrated to incite hatred towards the Green Party and their candidate for chancellor.

On the night of December 11, 2024, police in Schönefeld stopped an Opel that aroused suspicion. Inside were three young men with documents from Serbia, Bosnia, and Germany. They did not have break-in tools, only construction materials, including foam sealant for windows. Police checked their documents and released them, not finding anything amiss. However, it soon emerged that around the same time, 43 cars in the Alt-Schönefeld area were damaged. The saboteurs had used foam to block exhaust pipes, leaving stickers with the slogan, "Be Greener!" alongside an image of a smiling Robert Habeck.

The action was initially interpreted as the work of radical climate activists, sparking public outrage and negative backlash against Habeck and the Green Party. Those stopped in Schönefeld were allegedly recruited via messaging apps, receiving instructions for the sabotage. They were tasked with using construction foam to damage cars and applying stickers promoting the movement, in exchange for a promised reward of 100 euros per damaged vehicle, part of which had already been distributed.

Law enforcement initiated an investigation after details about the suspects were shared with other German regions. The public prosecutor has confirmed an investigation into four suspects related to the vandalism, noting damages of around 6,000 euros in the Ulm area alone. As of now, none of the suspects are under arrest, and two have reportedly left the country.

U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce on Feb. 4 that the United States will withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Council and extend a freeze on funding for the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, a White House official told Reuters.

The move comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington. Netanyahu has been a vocal critic of UNRWA, accusing the agency of inciting anti-Israel sentiment and alleging that some of its staff members have ties to terrorism.

During his first term from 2017 to 2021, Trump also halted U.S. contributions to UNRWA, arguing that the agency required reforms and that funding should be contingent on Palestinian participation in peace talks with Israel.

His administration withdrew from the 47-member Human Rights Council in 2018, citing what it described as a persistent bias against Israel and a failure to implement reforms. The U.S. later rejoined the council under President Joe Biden, serving a term from 2022 to 2024.

The Human Rights Council is set to review the United States' human rights record in August as part of its routine evaluation of all member states. While the council lacks legal authority, its discussions carry political significance and can generate international pressure for policy changes. Since returning to office for a second term on Jan. 20, Trump has also ordered the U.S. to withdraw from the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement, mirroring decisions made during his first administration.

The U.S. was previously UNRWA’s largest donor, contributing between $300 million and $400 million annually.

However, in January 2024, Biden paused funding after Israel accused about a dozen UNRWA employees of involvement in the deadly Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, which sparked the ongoing war in Gaza. In response, the U.S. Congress formally suspended contributions to the agency until at least March 2025.

UNRWA provides essential aid, healthcare, and education services to millions of Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

US foreign aid transformed Ukraine. Its suspension threatens decades of work

Editor’s Note: The Kyiv Independent isn’t a recipient of U.S. foreign aid, and its funding wasn’t affected by the aid freeze. With the stroke of a pen, U.S. President Donald Trump last week put a freeze on projects that have helped Ukraine become freer and

The Kyiv IndependentDaria Shulzhenko

On the night of Dec. 15, 2024, two Russian oil tankers, Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, sank in the Kerch Strait, a narrow maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, off the coast of occupied Crimea.

Both vessels were constructed for service on rivers, not on the open sea, and did not have valid sailing documents at the time of the disaster. The tankers also violated a weather-based ban on entering the Kerch Strait.

The vessel crews then attempted for days to obtain an authorization to discharge their oil at a nearby port on the coast of Crimea. To no avail.

A storm picked up, with waves reaching three meters. This brought an end to the service of Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, which had been in use since 1969 and 1973, respectively.

While on Jan. 25, the Russian government officially declared that emergency services had finished an ongoing oil extraction operation, this only concerned one part of Volgoneft-239, which eventually drifted to the coast of Crimea following the wreckage.

The remaining parts of this vessel, and all of Volgoneft-212, are currently only being “examined underwater,” with no attempts yet being made to haul them to shore or extract the fuel oil left in their reservoirs.

According to Eugene Simonov, an expert with the Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group (UWEC) who spoke to the Kyiv Independent, the sunken vessel parts are left untouched because Russian authorities simply do not have the appropriate equipment to extract oil from underwater reservoirs.

As a result, according to Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, the head of science at the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Volgoneft wreckages could evolve into the “worst ecological catastrophe” Russia has seen in the 21st century.

While oil spills have already occurred in the region in the past, the December incident surpasses anything the Black Sea has ever seen. In the closest comparable case, 1,300 tons of fuel oil were released in November 2007, also after a Russian tanker sank in the Kerch Strait.

As for the most recent wreckage, estimates by Russian state-aligned media put the amount of fuel oil released at 3,700 tons.

In late January, the fuel oil reached Ukraine’s Odesa Oblast, with Ukrainian emergency services now also tasked with cleaning up the shores.

When thousands of tons of oil spill into the sea

According to Russian environmental experts, the seabed and the shores of Russia’s Krasnodar Krai will be especially affected by the spill.

Much of this is due to the type of fuel which was spilt. The Volgoneft tankers carried “heavy” oil, known as Mazut, which typically conglomerates into solid lumps that are heavier than water.

As a result, the lumps sink and cannot be easily localized, which makes cleanup operations more difficult. Some lumps of “heavy” oil sink, covering the seabed and squashing life beneath. Others eventually wash up on nearby coasts, polluting shoreline waters and beaches.

In comparison, so-called “light” oil typically floats at the surface, spreading in black pools. While the immediate effects of such a spill can be more drastic, cleanup operations are more straightforward.

In the case of “heavy” oil, lumps can continue washing up on shorelines for months. Some of those that sink remain there until they are dissolved by microorganisms, which can take years if not decades.

According to Natalia Gozak, director of Greenpeace Ukraine, the Black Sea is currently going through its peak of immediate contamination. While this wave might be over soon, the released fuel oil will now move along the maritime food chain, making fish and other wildlife in the sea unsuitable for consumption.

In total, the Black Sea might need 10 to 12 years to rid itself from the oil spill, Gozak told the Kyiv Independent.

Regardless of this, Russian public health officials were quick to claim that fish from the Black Sea was safe to eat, even if it came from affected areas. Certain types of fish are, however, already becoming difficult to find on sale in the Krasnodar Krai, Russian media reported.

As Russians inch closer to Pokrovsk, civilians in the area are left with a choice — stay under fire or leave life behind

BILOZERSKE, Donetsk Oblast — Less than 30 kilometers north of embattled Pokrovsk, a market was in full swing in the town of Bilozerske. Meters away, however, a crowd has gathered in front of a building, nervously awaiting the doors to open. Tensions were visibly mounting as the doors remained close…

The Kyiv IndependentEmmanuelle Chaze

Russia’s ‘appalling’ response

According to a Russian ecologist and oil spill expert who spoke to the Kyiv Independent on conditions of anonymity, the reaction by Russian authorities was in fact “appalling.” Actions taken in the first days following such disasters are crucial, and in the case of the Black Sea oil spill, authorities “hardly reacted at all” within this time frame.

Authorities only started reacting after the disaster went viral on Russian social media, the expert said.

“Normally, in all countries, there are protocols for what to do in such situations. In Russia, there are also such plans for oil spills, and legislation is highly developed. However, the issue is that these plans and legislation were not applied.”

In the first weeks, Russian authorities “acted without any plan” to manage the effects of the disaster, according to Simonov. “The main instinct of the responsible officials was rather classic: to hide from higher-up (authorities) their inability to manage the consequences of a rather trivial (oil) spill,” the expert said.

Authorities only started taking appropriate measures after Vladimir Putin reacted to the situation, Simonov claimed.

Inaction by authorities forced locals in affected Russian regions to self-organize, as explained in turn by the anonymous Russian expert. As a result, cleanup operations were conducted haphazardly, without adequate material, creating serious health risks for the hundreds of volunteers who rushed to the shoreline of Krasnodar Krai.

The region, which lies east of the Black Sea waters, seems for now to be the most affected by the disaster.

As part of the improvised cleanup operation, fuel oil lumps which washed up on its shores were gathered into bags in order to be utilized. However, these bags reportedly never reached processing plants, creating further environmental and public health concerns.

The response by authorities in occupied Crimea was “even weaker,” Gozak claimed, meaning that the disaster will have lasting effects on the peninsula.

According to a Russian environmental expert who spoke to Kedr, an independent news outlet that focuses on environmental issues, Russian authorities likely did not even have enough adequate equipment to deal with the consequences of the oil spill.

Although conditions in the Black Sea were extreme at the time of the incident, authorities should have trained emergency services to respond to such situations, according to the anonymous Russian expert who spoke to the Kyiv Independent.

On a positive note, the Black Sea is a dynamic ecosystem with warm waters, which increases the likelihood that the area will be able to clean itself from the fuel oil, possibly even within a year, the expert claimed.

Simonov, on the other hand, argued that Mazut fuel oil will remain on the seabed and contaminate ecosystems for the next 10 to 20 years.

Black Sea disaster and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

“After the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, this is the second-largest environmental catastrophe in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion,” Gozak said. “These accidents are really dramatic, and the worst is that they could have been prevented.”

Central to understanding this crisis, according to Gozak, is Russia’s use of its so-called “shadow fleet,” which the United States began to go after in the final days of Joe Biden’s presidency.

In 2022, the EU introduced sanctions on Russian oil delivered by sea, making it in theory impossible for Russia to charter or insure oil tankers which did not comply with the sanctions regime.

However, Russia was soon able to circumvent these sanctions, using various schemes to ship its oil worldwide. As these tankers are in a legal gray zone, they often do not comply with security regulations and are not properly insured.

This last element makes it even more difficult to coordinate the ongoing Black Sea cleanup operations, as the responsibility of companies running “shadow fleet” vessels is unclear.

“Stopping this shadow fleet could help prevent such catastrophes, (cut) funding for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and, in the long run, help address climate change,” Gozak said.

Similar disasters could occur in the future if exports by Russia’s “shadow fleet” continue, Simonov added.

As for Ukraine, the environmental effect of the disaster is for now mainly felt in occupied Crimea, as well as in parts of the occupied regions of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, which are located on the shoreline of the Sea of Azov.

While some oil lumps have also reached the Danube Delta south of Odesa, the amounts collected there are for now, symbolic.

As Russia cuts Transnistria from gas, stranded locals search for someone to blame

VARNIȚA, Moldova — The buzzing sound of chainsaws and generators is now common in Varnița, a village of 5,000 that borders Moldova’s Russian-controlled region of Transnistria. Located next to the Russian-controlled city of Bender (Tighina), the village is subordinated to Chișinău but depends on the…

The Kyiv IndependentPaula Erizanu

Nearly three years into the war, Ukrainians have grown used to bracing for brutal winters with electricity blackouts and heating cuts from Russian attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure.

This winter was predicted to be one of the toughest ones of the war yet. In a worst-case scenario, blackouts were expected to reach 20 hours a day. Greenpeace warned in November that Ukraine’s power grid faced a “heightened risk of catastrophic failure.”

But thanks to a combination of unseasonably warm weather, and Ukraine’s ability to adapt to a third year of Russian campaigns against its energy system, the worst has not come to pass.

Since Russia began targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in late 2022, the country has learned to better protect the power grid, figuring out how to make repairs in record time following Russian strikes.

Climate change — which has been causing warmer winters each year in Ukraine — has also become Ukraine’s unexpected ally in resisting Russia’s tactic of freezing Ukrainians into submission.

“The fact that we have such warm weather of 6, 7 degrees Celsius (42-44 degrees Fahrenheit) is fantastically positive for us,” said Oleksandr Kharchenko, managing director of the Energy Industry Research Center, crediting the mild winter as a main factor for the lack of problems with power in Ukraine.

‘There’s almost no winter’

In the past, Ukraine had hot summers and cold winters, consistent with its mostly continental climate.

Snow and temperatures below zero degrees Celsius (32 degrees Fahrenheit) characterized every winter, including the one in 2014 when the Euromaidan Revolution unfolded and protesters on Independence Square in Kyiv danced to patriotic chants to warm up.

Things are different now. Ukraine’s Environment Ministry on Jan.19 went as far as to say in a social media post that, “Due to global warming, there is no climatic winter in Ukraine (this year).”

“If the winter used to be a season of frost and snow, then now the weather often reminds of late autumn or early spring,” the ministry wrote.

The Central Geophysical Observatory declared 2024 “the warmest year on record” in Kyiv, with the December average at zero degrees Celsius. Temperatures were above zero every day the last week of January, a record for the country, the observatory said.

“Ukraine is one of the regions of the planet where the temperature has been rising at the highest rate over the past decade,” said Svitlana Krakovska, head of the applied climatology laboratory at the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute.

“And the main warming occurs primarily in winter,” she was cited as having said in the ministry’s post on social media.

Climate change keeps the lights on

Ukraine hasn’t yet had to implement any country-wide rolling blackouts in 2025, according to open data collected by the Energy Map.

These scheduled limitations of electricity supply for businesses and households were put in place at various times throughout the previous years to cut the consumption in peak hours to avoid the collapse of the country’s strained power system.

Hours-long blackouts were widely used throughout the country for much of the spring and summer of 2024 following Russia’s bombing of power plants and transmission stations, and during scheduled repairs of the nuclear power plants. The power cuts were implemented sporadically throughout December.

“As you can see, electricity is now being supplied without restrictions almost all over the country, apart from the front-line regions, where the situation is difficult in general,” Kharchenko told the Kyiv Independent.

As the temperature continues to hover at or above zero, the country’s energy system hasn’t yet entered a red zone where it has to start cutting power.

“Every degree below zero Celsius requires an additional 200 megawatts (MW) of power,” he added. “With our current operating capacities, we simply don’t have enough (to cater) for temperatures of minus three and four degrees Celsius (24-26 degrees Fahrenheit) and below.”

Freezing Ukrainians into submission

Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure since it began its campaign in 2022, destroying over half of the country’s pre-war power system capacities.

“In 2022-2023, Ukraine's power system lost about 21 gigawatts (GW) of capacity,” out of the 47 GW before the full-on war, wrote Oksana Zueva, a senior expert in open data at Kyiv-based think tank DiXi Group.

To take that much capacity out, Moscow carried out at least thirty massive attacks on energy facilities, according to open data gathered by the Energy Map.

The attacks evolved over time to use various weapons and tactics, while Russia’s goal remained the same: plunging Ukraine into a humanitarian crisis, making regular citizens’ lives as difficult as possible, and destabilizing the country before any possible peace talks in the future.

Around 10 GW of energy generation was knocked out in 2024 due to Russia’s missile and drone attacks, the Energy Ministry told the Kyiv Independent.

Since mid-November, six massive attacks were launched by Russia over the two and a half months of this winter season, causing “much greater damage and destruction than in previous years,” the ministry added. The attacks included anywhere between 70 to 90 cruise or ballistic missiles and 90 to 120 drones each time, as well as internationally banned cluster munitions.

“But they didn’t reach their goals,” Kharchenko told the Kyiv Independent.

Securing energy

According to Kharchenko, Ukraine has also gotten much better in resisting Russia’s attacks on energy in over two years since they began. It improved coordination with air defense protecting the power system and built some fortifications that have already proved effective.

Experience also helps when the attacks succeed: at this point, there are reserves of equipment to restore the damaged facilities and clear plans for bypassing them in the grid and restoring them as quickly as possible, Kharchenko said.

A lot of that equipment is pledged or financed by international partners, the Energy Ministry told the Kyiv Independent.

“In 2024, Ukrenergo's repair teams set an absolute record by replacing an autotransformer at one of its substations within three weeks,” Ukraine's state grid operator Ukrenergo told the Kyiv Independent.

“This included transportation, installation, and connection. For comparison, in EU countries, such works are carried out in three to four months,” the statement said.

Warm weather also contributed to the speed of repairs, Ukrenergo said.

However, with temperatures projected to drop in the coming days, Ukraine needs to secure its energy supply for any weather.

“For the Ukrainian power system to operate efficiently and confidently, we need to build about 4-4.5 GW of additional peaking power plants,” Kharchenko said.

Peaking power plants are meant to step in during peak periods of consumption to avoid blackouts. They should be able to quickly increase or decrease the energy output, which is impossible for the three Ukrainian-controlled nuclear power plants that currently supply up to 55-60% of the country’s energy, according to Kharchenko.

Peaking power plants could be coal-based, hydroelectric, or gas-powered, Kharchenko added, as other types of power are either dependent on weather conditions or too long to develop.

But so far, it was coal-based thermal plants, hydroelectric plants, and the transmission grid around them that were targeted by Russian attacks the most.

Eighty percent of Ukraine’s pre-war coal-fired power capacities were destroyed, though some of them were restored, Kharchenko said.

Nine Ukrainian hydroelectric plants remaining after Russia's destruction of the Kakhovka dam still generate up to 12% of the country’s energy despite Russian attacks.

“Unfortunately, we can’t build many of them,” Kharchenko said, referring to the limitations of the country’s natural river resources needed to build more hydroelectric generation.

Over the last week, Ukraine House Davos opened its doors to world leaders and investors for the sixth year in a row during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland.

Ukraine House this year was adorned with the slogan “Your Country First, Win With Us.” The message set the tone for the discussions from Jan. 20-23, which focused on the benefits Ukraine can offer other countries in return for peace and economic recovery, namely lucrative investment opportunities.

Throughout the week, the Ukrainian delegation highlighted Ukraine’s estimated $26 trillion in natural resources and minerals, a topic that has picked up amid the return of Donald Trump, inaugurated on the first day of the forum. The new U.S. president has vowed to bring a swift end to the war, which could potentially usher in a wave of investment.

The Kyiv Independent spoke with Ulyana Khromyak, Ukraine House’s executive Director since 2023, as she wrapped up what she called a packed event.

Khromyak said part of the delegation’s mission was to convince investors to come to Ukraine now, rather than getting stuck waiting in line after the end of Russia’s war.

Ukraine’s natural resources provide a lot of investment potential, alongside the country’s agricultural and defense sectors, she said.

Regarding whether Trump will abandon Ukraine in its fight against Russia, Khromyak is hopeful the president can help achieve a sustainable peace in Ukraine and set the country on a path to recovery.  

This interview has been edited for clarity.

Kyiv Independent: What was Ukraine House’s key message and mission this week in Davos? How has this changed from the last few years?  

Khromyak: For the past three years, the messages were about what is needed to win this war, the opportunities in Ukraine, how Ukraine can contribute to the world, and why Ukraine is valuable to the world.

Our message this year was a just and sustainable peace. We had a lot of discussions about how we can achieve this through strength on the battlefield as well as a strengthened position at the negotiation table.

The second message was that Ukraine is not a burden, but a country of opportunity. We showed a lot of opportunities, including how rich Ukraine is in mineral resources. We have about $26 trillion in natural resources in Ukraine, out of which $12 trillion is in minerals.

We also discussed the successes of the existing investors who are currently working under these (wartime) conditions and also the successes of small and medium businesses. The country is resilient, the economy is working.

We talked about investment in the defense sector, which was also a hot topic, to make Ukraine a defense hub. We have the practical experience on the battlefield, as well as the technologies and the knowledge of how to scale this up.

Kyiv Independent: Do you think that there is a positive view that President Trump could be beneficial for Ukrainian businesses and its economy?

Khromyak: Yes, I truly believe there is. You can see this from his World Economic Forum speech. He delivered strong messages supporting Ukraine. Let’s believe that his political will can help us strengthen these relations and achieve a just and sustainable peace as well as try to start the recovery of the country.

Kyiv Independent: One of the panels differed from the rest in that it focused on Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian churches. Why is this an important message, particularly for Christian Republicans who have not always been supportive of Ukrainian aid?

Khromyak: That’s why we raised this topic. We see it’s a hot topic for the Republicans, so we try to reflect this.

We are saying that Ukraine is a country where we have a lot of religions and it’s one of the most spiritual countries in the world. Different religions are very important to us. Freedom is our religion as well, but we also need to emphasize that we have a lot of (religious) persecution from the Russians.

We showed a lot of videos about the persecution of religion in Ukraine. The audience said that this is an important message to the White House.  

Faith under fire: Russia’s war on religion in Ukraine’s occupied territories

Russia’s war and occupation of large swaths of Ukraine have led to hundreds of churches being damaged or destroyed, dozens of priests killed or kidnapped, and entire religious groups that don’t conform to Moscow’s brand of Orthodoxy being banned. With entire Ukrainian cities being leveled by Russia…

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Kyiv Independent: Ukraine House also lent a lot of attention to Ukraine’s investment climate and resilience. What sense do you get from investors about their interest in Ukraine currently?

Khromyak: There are a lot of possibilities to develop in innovation, infrastructure, agro-sector, and then definitely the minerals and energy sector. These sectors are very important for the world and Ukraine has all of these resources. We just need to increase their efficiency and therefore we need the investment for this to run independently.

There were a lot of discussions about the frozen Russian assets as well; how we can unfreeze and invest them and efficiently use them to strengthen our economy.  

Kyiv Independent: Do you get a feeling that investors are taking Ukraine seriously as a place to invest?

Khromyak: Yes, I do, considering the discussions that we had in the House. We had first Vice Prime Minister and Economics Minister Yulia Svyrydenko speaking, and her deputy was in the House as well, talking about war risk insurance.

The government is supporting it from their side and that’s why investors took it seriously. The investors asked a lot of questions about how they could invest, and what would be the security and guarantees provided to them.

Kyiv Independent: Has that changed since you’ve been in your position since 2023?

Khromyak: Yes, the interest increased. In 2023, no one knew what was going to happen. But right now, we have President Trump’s messages and support from the leaders of the European Union.

Right now we have no other option. We have no choice other than to win this war and to make the country stronger.  

Kyiv Independent: Do you get a sense that investors are willing to come into Ukraine now, or are they still talking about coming in after the war?  

Khromyak: We were trying to persuade them to come now and show the opportunities because everyone will be queuing after the war. There will be a lot of competition, so first come first serve. They will get better conditions right now, rather than coming after the war.

We showed this deal of the year in the telecom sector, (the $1.5 billion Datagroup-Volia-Lifecell merger) saying that, look, the investors are investing and there are a lot of success stories, so please come and invest now.

Kyiv Independent: Is there a clearer path now to securing war risk insurance?

Khromyak: Yes. We work with Marsh McLennan, who was on the panel, and we had Aon among the audience. These are two main players in the insurance sector who are working with the government right now and with the investment institutions to provide war risk insurance.

We have already had the first successes. The speakers discussed how to involve more people and how to make insurance for those who would like to invest now.

The Aon and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transaction that jointly provided insurance to the companies is a good development.

Kyiv Independent: One of the final panels discussed utilizing the frozen Russian assets. With some Western businesses lobbying against this idea in Europe, how much support do you think this idea has?

Khromyak. We need the whole amount of the frozen Russian assets, not just the proceeds. Therefore we need the political will from different countries. A lot of people from the Ukrainian government, opinion leaders, and NGOs on different levels are lobbying for this issue.

We are getting there. It’s a long and hard path and a lot of countries still need to implement a lot of internal regulations to pass and transfer these assets.

But we systematically need to work on this. The message is that we should not just accept the proceeds, but we need the whole $350 billion.

Zelensky touts Ukraine’s potential in meeting with global investors at Davos forum

President Volodymyr Zelensky met leading American and European executives and business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 22, emphasizing Ukraine’s investment potential and the importance of international support in achieving a just peace.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

OSCE observers not invited to monitor upcoming presidential election in Belarus.

Belarus to host over 13,000 Russian troops for Zapad-2025 joint military drills with Russia.

Belarus sentences EU diplomatic staffer to four years in prison.

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Irregular crossings into EU from eastern borders more than triple in 2024, Frontex reports.

Belarusian state TV airs a propaganda film with jailed journalists, attempting to discredit their coverage of 2020 elections ahead of upcoming vote.

Belarusian opposition announced it will issue “New Belarus” passports, yet legal uncertainty remains for exiles.

Belarus refuses to invite OSCE observers to upcoming election

Minsk has not invited observers from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions to monitor the upcoming presidential elections in Belarus, the OSCE announced on Jan. 9.

The presidential elections, which are expected to provide Belarus’s longtime dictator Alexander Lukashenko with a seventh term in office, are scheduled for Jan. 26. The poll, dismissed as a “sham” by the Belarusian opposition, will be the first presidential race since the 2020 election — which sparked an unprecedented wave of anti-government protests and an ongoing domestic political crisis.

The OSCE said Belarus’ decision not to invite its member states via the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was “regrettable” and “deprives the country’s citizens of a transparent and full assessment of the entire process.”

“The lack of transparency further undermines faith in the electoral system of Belarus,” said OSCE PA President Pia Kauma.

This is the third time the office will be unable to observe elections in Belarus since the contested 2020 vote — it was not invited to observe the 2022 constitutional referendum or parliamentary elections.

Speaking at a meeting with the chairs of regional executive committees on Jan. 3, Lukashenko mentioned the idea of inviting international observers, saying, “We should meet with the Central Commission once again and decide whether we will invite these foreigners (Western observers) to the elections.”

However, Lukashenko raised the issue less than three weeks before the elections, with the key stages of the campaign — the nomination of candidates, the formation of local electoral committees, and the selection of national observers — already having been carried out.

The rushed presidential election campaign is being held nearly half a year earlier than is stipulated in Belarus’s election law. The Belarusian Central Election Committee (CEC) cleared the heads of three loyalist parties — Aleh Haidukevich, Alexander Hizhnyak, and Siarhei Syrankou — along with another sham candidate representing the so-called “constructive opposition” — Hanna Kanapatskaya — to “challenge” Lukashenko for the presidency.

As of Jan. 8, the Belarusian Central Electoral Committee (CEC) had accredited 362 foreign observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (PA CSTO) — all Russia-led international alliances favoring the Lukashenko regime.

Among the 28,330 national observers, 79% come from political parties or pro-government professional unions, the independent news outlet Pozirk reports. Since 2020, Lukashenko has eliminated all but four loyal political parties and liquidated over 1,800 civil society organizations.

The expert observation mission organized by the Viasna Human Rights Center and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee claims that the electoral campaign is organized in a “repressive climate of threat, fear-mongering, pressure, and persecution in connection with any civil activity unauthorized by the state.”

Will Transnistria’s gas crisis lead to its collapse and reintegration into Moldova?

By halting natural gas supplies to Moldova on Jan. 1, Russia created an unprecedented economic crisis in the Russian-occupied part of the country — Transnistria. The crisis prompted a question: will the breakaway region, occupied by Russia since 1992, survive without Russian gas? Free-of-charge Ru…

The Kyiv IndependentOleg Sukhov

Minsk expects 13,000 Russian troops to take part in joint military drills in 2025

Over 13,000 Russian troops will participate in the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise, the Belarusian Defense Ministry announced on Jan. 10, citing Major General Valery Revenka.

Military allies Russia and Belarus have been conducting the Zapad (“West” in Russian) strategic drills every two years since 2009. Approximately 12,800 Russian soldiers were hosted in Belarus in 2021. Another military drill, “Union Resolve 2022,” followed the Zapad-2021, and was used to disguise a troop buildup on the Ukrainian border ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022.

In an interview with a state-owned TV channel, Major General Revenka said that Belarus has already notified OSCE member states about the drills in line with the Vienna Document, extending an invitation to “allies, friends, partners” to observe the exercises.

According to Revenka, Belarus “views positively” only some EU and NATO member countries — without specifying which ones. Noting that Belarus had not been invited to observe European military drills last year, Revenka said that a decision regarding an invitation to NATO members remained to be taken.

The date of the Zapad-2025 drills has not officially been announced, but they are believed to be scheduled for September 2025. In October 2024, the Belarusian Air Force announced “major drills with Russia in September 2025,” right after a meeting of the joint board of the Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries approved a concept plan for the Zapad-2025 joint strategic exercise.

The Vienna Document on security and confidence-building requires its members to provide notification 42 days or more prior to holding military drills.

Aside from Zapad-2025, Belarus plans to host three military drills — Search, Interaction, and Echelon — along with members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led bloc Moscow set up in 2002, over a decade after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

While not committing Belarusian troops to Russia’s war on Ukraine, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a jumping off point for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, provided supplies to the Russian army, and offered to host Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

EU diplomatic staffer in Belarus sentenced to 4 years in prison

Minsk City Court has handed down a four-year prison sentence to a local staff member of the European Union’s diplomatic service in Belarus, Politico reported on Jan. 9.

The sentence, issued in late December 2024, has only now been made public. The court found the EU staffer, Mikalai Khilo, guilty of “incitement of hatred and calls for actions harming Belarus’s national security.”

The EU’s External Action Service condemned the decision and reiterated calls for Khilo to be released.

“We continue calling for Mikalai Khilo’s immediate and unconditional release,” EU spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Anitta Hipper said in a statement shared with Politico.

The EU diplomatic service previously called for Khilo’s release ahead of his trial, which was held on Dec. 23. At the time, a Lithuanian member of the European Parliament, Petras Auštrevičius, told Politico that Minsk was “testing the EU” by arresting its employee. He said Belarusian diplomats should be expelled from the EU if Khilo was convicted.

Forty-one-year-old Khilo split his time between working for the EU diplomatic mission and serving as a preacher in a local Baptist church, as confirmed by CV (formerly known as Christian Vision) — an international Christian ministry that monitors the repression of clergy and religious groups.  

According to an unnamed EU official, Khilo was detained by the Belarusian KGB security service in front of the EU delegation office on April 24, 2024. The Viasna Human Rights Center, a human rights organization based in Belarus, recognizes Khilo as a political prisoner.

Although there have recently been eight rounds of pardons of political prisoners in Belarus, 1,240 political prisoners remain behind bars in the country. According to CV, 86 clergymen from various confessions are behind bars because of their public support for anti-government protests in 2020.

‘You’ll die here’ – Belarusian political prisoners recount experiences ahead of Lukashenko’s reelection

Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, who has been in power for 30 years, is looking to reelect himself for the seventh time. In the run-up to the January 2025 presidential elections, Lukashenko has pardoned prisoners convicted of extremism, claiming that it was a “humane gesture” toward those…

The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan

EU border agency: Irregular crossings of eastern border more than tripled in 2024

The number of detected cases of migrants irregularly entering the European Union through its eastern borders more than tripled in 2024, to 17,000, the European border agency Frontex said in a report on Jan. 14.

Following the introduction of European sanctions in 2021 over the contested 2020 presidential election and crackdown on dissent, the regime of Lukashenko orchestrated an artificial migration crisis, allowing migrants from the Middle East and African to storm Belarus-EU borders.

Frontex preliminary data show that while the overall number of irregular border crossings to the European Union declined by 38% (returning to the post-pandemic level of 2021), the eastern border route (including Belarus and Ukraine) bucked the general trend: There were 17,000 illegal crossings of the bloc’s eastern border out of a total of 239,000 crossings recorded in Europe last year.

In 2021, the EU recorded 8,000 illegal crossings of its eastern border, in what Frontex monitoring described as a “hybrid operation targeting the EU external border.” Following an initial settlement that led to a decline in the registered irregular border crossings to 5,608 in 2023, the artificial migration crisis reignited again, with Russia joining the effort.

In late 2024, the EU authorities revealed that 90% of the migrants arriving via Belarus had Russian student or travel visas. The bloc pledged 170 million euros to its eastern members — Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Finland — and to Norway to fortify their borders.

As “hybrid warfare” involving migrants continues, the border security agencies of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have thwarted a total of 36,291 attempts to illegally cross their borders from Belarus in 2024.

In 2024, Poland reimposed a 200-meter-wide buffer zone next to its border with Belarus, and considered temporarily suspending the right to asylum.

Belarusian state TV shows jailed journalists ahead of 2025 vote

The Belarusian state-owned TV channel ONT aired on Jan. 14 the first segment of propaganda interviews with journalists held in Belarusian prisons, in an apparent attempt to discredit the work of independent media during the 2020 presidential elections.

In the aftermath of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, widely viewed as neither free nor fair, the free media field in Belarus was eradicated. Thirty-seven journalists remain behind bars on politically motivated charges, and hundreds were forced into exile. In 2024 alone, 35 independent media were branded as “extremist” and banned in Belarus.

The first part of the series “about employees of American Media,” was filmed in prisons, yet is titled “Freedom of Speech.” RFE/RL’s Belarus Service freelancer and political prisoner Andrey Kuznechyk, who was charged with six years of imprisonment for allegedly “creating and participating in an extremist formation.”

In the interview, Kuznechyk appears in a black robe in the prison yard, looking emaciated. The interviewer urges him to condemn the independent media in Belarus for biased coverage and “trying to set Belarus on fire” during the 2020 elections.

The program is airing ahead of the Jan. 26 presidential elections, the first presidential vote since the contested 2020 race, which is expected to provide Lukashenko with a seventh consecutive term in office. After winning the country’s first and last fair election in 1994, Lukashenko remained in power for 30 years, gradually giving up parts of Belarusian sovereignty to Russia.

Other segments are to feature RFE/RL Belarus Service journalist Ihar Losik, who has been held incommunicado for nearly two years, as well as former reporter Ihar Karney and opposition activist Yuras Zyankovich, who hold dual citizenship of Belarus and the United States.

The international press freedom watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF)  placed Belarus 167th out of 180 countries in its 2024 Press Freedom Index, calling the country the fourth largest jailer of journalists in the world, and Europe's most dangerous country for journalists up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Belarusian opposition announces issuing ‘New Belarus’ passports

Political opponents of the regime of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko will start accepting applications for the alternative identity documents for exiled Belarusians on Jan. 26, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has announced on her Telegram channel.

In September 2023, Lukashenko barred Belarusian embassies from issuing or renewing passports of Belarusians living abroad, forcing the regime’s critics to return to Belarus — risking arrest — to renew their essential documents. As a result of Lukashenko’s move, over 300,000 exiles who have fled Belarus since the contested 2020 elections risk finding themselves in legal limbo, unable to prove their identity, renew residence permits, or access essential services in host countries with expired passports.

In response, the Belarusian opposition in exile announced the “New Belarus” passport project in 2023, but there was little progress on it in 2024. After a change of leadership of the project and a scandal involving the Lithuanian contractor for producing the passports — which was found to have ties with the Lukashenko regime — the opposition has since produced the first prototypes of the passport.

However, the new document has yet to be recognized as suitable for travel or as official proof of identity, and it will initially be available only to EU-based Belarusians due to verification constraints, according to project head Marius Gudelaitis.

Franak Viachorka, a chief advisor to Tsikhanouskaya, said that the passports will have “specific functionality” within a year.

“Our goal is that this document can replace a foreign passport, be used for travel, and also replace expired (Belarusian) passports when submitting documents for legalization, for example,” Viachorka told news outlet Zerkalo.

However, the former head of the passport project, Valery Kavaleuski, who earlier resigned from Tsikhanouskaya’s Transitional Cabinet, has warned that gaining recognition for the document under present conditions is unlikely. According to Kavaleuski, the issuing center has had to undergo an independent audit before issuing the documents. Besides, the passport will reportedly use a new country code, instead of the existing Belarusian one, which Kavaleuski described as a "dead end" for the recognition process.

The passport will be presented to the public at the “Belarusians Deserve Better” congress in Warsaw, Poland on Jan. 26 – the same day as Lukashenko's latest presidential election, which has been dismissed as a sham by the Belarusian opposition. Meanwhile, Belarusian prosecutors have already issued warnings that congress participants could face criminal prosecution.

Belarusian soldiers fighting for Ukraine say time is running out for their brother-in-arms extradited to Belarus

In Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus, helping to defend Ukraine against Russia gets you labeled as a terrorist. Vasil Verameichyk, a Belarusian who enlisted in Ukraine’s Armed Forces just four days after Russia launched its all-out war, was detained on Nov. 13 in Vietnam in a suspected covert operatio…

The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan

As morning arrived this past Friday, Los Angeles residents awoke to reports of spreading, deadly wildfires – with courageous firefighters trying to hold the line.

Half a world away in Kyiv, the morning also started with a call for rescuers. The remnants of a drone had hit a residential building in Kyiv during a Russian raid, and first responders rushed to the scene.

As a result of Russia’s war, more than 6,000 fires of various sizes were recorded across Ukraine in 2024. That’s actually less than in previous years: in 2022, the year the war began, shelling and air attacks caused more than 12,000 fires. Over the last few years, Ukraine’s firefighters have sadly become some of the world’s most experienced in fighting blazes in urban areas.

But from the ashes, the L.A. fires foreshadow how Ukraine’s experience may be turned into something good in the post-war period – the ability to export the lessons they have learned to colleagues and allies all around the world. In fact, as the war-torn country rebuilds, Ukraine has a sense of solidarity with Los Angeles that few others can match.

The latest outbreak of ferocious California wildfires began last Tuesday. Just a few days later the consequences are excruciating. At least 24 people have been killed, and about 105,000 people are still under mandatory evacuation. There are around 12,000 destroyed buildings, while around 35,000 homes and businesses in the area are without electricity. The fire is forcing more than 14,000 firefighters to work tirelessly in the California region, using 84 aircrafts and 1,354 fire engines.

Behind every massive disaster like this stand those who risk their lives to contain the uncontrollable – the firefighters. Whether it’s wildfires consuming acres of forests or urban blazes caused by war, dedication and courage are necessary traits.

Last week, the Counteroffensive met Serhii*, a first responder in Kyiv. As so often, his day had started with an emergency call – this time due to a gas explosion. He said that at least three fire engines respond to every call in Kyiv. Fortunately, this time no one was hurt.

Serhii has been a first responder for almost three years, starting after Russian forces destroyed his family home in Kyiv region and killed his father.

Serhii tells this with notes of optimism, which is both surprising and inspiring.

"You have to take these things lightly. When I joined the rescue service, I realized this was just the beginning," he said.

The Counteroffensive visited a fire station just as the firefighters had returned from the call. Every fire engine is thoroughly washed after a mission.

Serhii explained that in emergencies, ensuring there is enough water for large-scale fires is critical.

"The water in the trucks only lasts for about 8 minutes of work," he said. Each tanker on the truck holds 4,000 liters of water, and with one hose, about 500 liters are used per minute.

Los Angeles also faced a water issue, particularly thanks to the loss of water pressure in its hydrants. California Governor Gavin Newsom called for an investigation into why the Santa Ynez Reservoir was empty and closed for maintenance.

Despite the heavy mental and physical toll of Serhii’s work – his full gear weighs about 80 kilograms – he is always full of energy.

Serhii was also on duty in July, when Russian forces struck the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv. Firefighters have a call ranking system, with Level 5 being the most severe. Serhii says that the strike on Okhmatdyt was one of the highest levels he has seen.

Staying in the right mindset for the job isn’t always easy, and Serhii advises his colleagues and new recruits to always support one another. Dark humor helps them cope.

Don’t forget about your own health – if possible, drink plenty of water and remember to eat regularly,” Serhii told his Los Angeles colleagues. “As for the public, trust your rescuers, listen to their advice, and remember that they are doing an incredible job, helping and saving people's lives.”

Climate change is one of the key reasons why the number of uncontrolled fires of this magnitude is increasing every year. For example, between 1980 and 2023, there were 22 large-scale fires recorded in the U.S. 18 of these occurred after 2000, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

In all, about 62,000 wildfires occur annually in the U.S., and climate change has been a contributor to these too. Climate change heating and drying caused between two-thirds and 99 percent of the increase in California’s fire weather over the last few decades, according to a team of scientists from the ClimaMeter project. This year, strong winds and a harsh drought are adding to difficulties.

Climate change doesn’t only affect the U.S. – it is a problem for every country in the world, including Ukraine. In September 2024, 33 wildfires were extinguished in Ukraine during the dry season. Of course, Russia also contributes to the creation of such fires in Ukraine. Last year, shelling caused 60 percent of wildfires across Ukraine.

In some areas of Ukraine, the fires are particularly dangerous, such as in Chornobyl, where fires significantly increase the chance of radiation being released into the air. On top of that, Ukrainian firefighters in many areas also have to deal with the possibility of mined forests and abandoned Russian ammunition that could detonate at any moment.

Petro*, another firefighter who spoke to The Counteroffensive, worked under these dangerous conditions, comparing his experience to the situation in L.A. He started his career as a firefighter in the summer of 2022.

“If it’s a missile strike call, we put additional body armor over our firefighting gear. It’s extra weight that you feel,” he noted. “This is how the guys work, especially in the Eastern regions, where missile strikes happen daily.”

After watching several videos of large-scale fires in Los Angeles, Petro recalled the days when he was fighting forest fires in Chornobyl. There too, the wind could change the situation in a matter of minutes, meaning the fire was out of control, and spreading rapidly. High winds can make it almost impossible for firefighters to work using aviation.

“I think the Los Angeles rescuers are doing their best. They have deployed all available resources,” he said.

Petro and his colleagues express their support for the Los Angeles firefighters and believe that they will be able to stop the fire as soon as possible.

“All firefighters and rescuers have our own difficult, risky job and only those who have tried it can understand this, but we don't ask to be understood,” Petro said. “We do this because we want to do it. We have chosen this path!”

The ongoing disaster in Los Angeles has particularly affected the Pacific Palisades neighborhood and the Hollywood Hills, the capital of the American film industry.

Much like in Ukraine, the situation in California can change in an instant. Last month, there were no signs of fires during the holiday season. As it happens, one of our correspondents visited Santa Monica just a few weeks before the fires broke out:

Here's a comparison of how Santa Monica Pier looked on December 13 vs on January 7.

In some ways, the fires in the U.S. are easier to predict than those in Ukraine. In Los Angeles, fires are mostly caused by natural phenomena; while the residents of California are prepared in advance thanks to alert systems such as ‘Watch Duty,’ clear evacuation plans, and the presence of specialized services.

Experts and investigators are considering the possibility that the new fire could have reignited due to strong winds in Los Angeles, as firefighters had already extinguished the fire at the very same location on New Year's Eve. Old fires can reignite due to underground smoldering.

Russia, on the other hand, creates artificial fire by launching missile strikes on Ukraine.

Krystyna Zahrebelna, originally from Kharkiv, has been living in California for five and a half years. She has gotten used to the annual wildfires, but the scale of this fire is shocking – it's the first time she's seen anything like this during her time living there.

The situation fluctuates: sometimes it's better, sometimes worse. The wind is expected to continue this week, which is a real cause for concern, as it helps spread the fire.

California has become a second home for Krystyna, and it pains her deeply to see how people, animals, and nature suffer.

She draws a worried parallel:

“Visually, the Pacific Palisades area after the fires looks roughly like Vovchansk [a destroyed city in the Kharkiv region] – scorched earth, as if dozens of bombs were dropped.”

Disasters often test the strength of friendship. Even though she is thousands of miles away, and they are living in a warzone, Krystyna has received many generous messages of support from Ukrainians.

Similarly, President Zelenskyy has expressed his condolences over the fires in California and the loss of lives. This past weekend, in his evening address, the President of Ukraine stated that 150 trained Ukrainian firefighters would be assisting their American colleagues.

*Serhii and Petro’s last names cannot be disclosed for security reasons.

NEWS OF THE DAY

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

SANCTIONED TANKERS CARRYING RUSSIAN OIL ARE LYING IDLE OFF CHINA: Tankers carrying more than 2 million barrels of Russian oil have become stuck off the eastern coast of China after being hit with U.S. sanctions on Friday. One of the tankers, Huihai Pacific, was scheduled to arrive at a port in China on January 15, but changed course and is now anchored at sea. Other tankers are also blocked due to sanctions targeting Russian oil exports.

India, like China, plans to stop accepting oil tankers that have been hit by U.S. sanctions regarding Russia. After January 10, restrictions will apply to sanctioned vessels that were chartered in Indian ports.

DONALD TRUMP EXTENDS WAR DEADLINE: Donald Trump has postponed his promise to end the war in Ukraine in ‘24 hours,’ stating that it may take several months. His team has not yet decided on a strategy, but support for Kyiv will continue in the interim.

Trump suggests that six months is a realistic goal for ending the war, while the special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, said in an interview with Fox News on Wednesday that the goal is to stop the conflict in '100 days'.

ZELENSKYY PROPOSES EXCHANGE INVOLVING NORTH KOREAN SOLDIERS: The President of Ukraine is ready to hand over two captured North Korean soldiers to Pyongyang in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war held in Russia.

Moreover, when prisoners are asked about returning to North Korea in the video of the interrogation shared by Zelensky, one replies that he would like to return, while the other wishes to stay in Ukraine.

DOG OF WAR:

Today’s Dog of War is Helios, a pup from State’s Emergencies Service station. He almost knocked Nastia down as she was about to leave, but with permission from the head of station, he posed for a couple of photos.

Stay safe out there.

Best,

Yelyzaveta

“We just have to get through the winter.”

“If only it wasn’t so cold, and there were no blackouts.”

For three years in a row, Ukrainians have been repeating these words to themselves.

But not Oleksandr. Despite being almost in his eighties, he built an entire power plant from scrap metal in his backyard. For the past eight years, his inventions have ensured he hasn’t experienced a single day without electricity.

As blackouts and shelling of the power grid continue, many Ukrainians might soon find themselves following in his footsteps.

Just over a week ago, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened to cut off electricity supplies to Ukraine — jeopardizing a critical lifeline for Ukraine’s hobbled energy system. This was Bratislava's response to Kyiv halting the transit of Russian gas through its territory.

During the full-scale invasion, energy has become not only a target for Russian attacks but also a bargaining chip for the West. With all thermal power plants and almost all hydroelectric capacity in Ukraine destroyed by Russia, renewable energy sources offer a promising solution for a theoretical post-war reconstruction period. They could make Ukraine greener and more energy-secure – and a model for the entire world.

Long before renewable energy became a wartime topic, Oleksandr Klymenko embraced it as a necessity. Thus, on the outskirts of Dnipro, just over 100 kilometers from the front line, stands a wind generator of his design, its silhouette reminiscent of the Eiffel Tower.

Oleksandr Klymenko has loved tinkering since he was a boy. Throughout his life, he repaired cars and motorcycles. These days, he sometimes helps his neighbors, though he doesn’t charge money—unless, he jokes, they buy him a round of drinks.

Still, Oleksandr has never been one to sit idle. After retiring, he set out to build a wind generator, which took him six months.

Despite his age, Oleksandr has outpaced many in Ukraine when it comes to adapting to an unstable energy landscape.

For decades, Ukraine has struggled with energy dependence on Russia. Knowing this, Moscow has repeatedly used it as a weapon to coerce political concessions. Despite its vast energy potential — both conventional and renewable — Ukraine has found itself in crises again and again.

Moreover, Moscow kept Ukraine dependent on the Cold War-era joint power grid. Ukrainian authorities feared that leaving it would escalate relations with Russia on the eve of a full-scale invasion.

This created the risk that Russia would be able to simply cut off the electricity supply to Ukraine at any time. It was not until the night of February 24, 2022, that Ukraine left the joint electricity system, integrating into the European system.

Despite the horror caused by Russia over the past three years, it's possible that there may be hard-fought positives that come out of the war. Many hope that it may serve as a catalyst for Ukraine to rebuild its energy system into something far more resilient and modern than the one it inherited from the Soviet Union.

Previously, Ukraine's energy generation was dominated by traditional fossil fuel power and nuclear energy, while renewable sources made up less than 10 percent. The country’s centralized system, which relied on just a few sources, left it highly vulnerable to attack.

For instance, targeting a single thermal or hydroelectric power plant could disrupt the electricity supply nationwide. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest – not only cut off a significant portion of Ukraine’s electricity but also raised global concerns about the future of nuclear energy.

All this provoked the need to find new solutions, namely to understand the need to stop relying on large energy facilities, and to decentralize production among smaller ones. Vital in this is the use of renewable sources: the sun, wind, water, or biological waste.

«[The transition to green energy is necessary] not only because we are aiming to join the European Union. Around the world, including in Ukraine, there is a shift toward new technologies simply because they are cheaper than investing in lengthy traditional projects,” said Anna Ackermann, an analyst at the International Institute for Sustainable Development, which recommends policies on climate change and energy.

Among other things, decentralization means that some electricity consumers will also become producers of electricity, especially green energy. For example, many Ukrainians could build local wind generators, like Oleksandr Klymenko. This could also be done at the level of individual companies and communities.

In some parts of Ukraine, energy stability is getting worse. One such place is the city of Dnipro, which is frequently attacked – and often targeted for its power system. As the front gradually approaches due to Russian advances, this significantly increases the number of weapons that can be used to attack the city, leading to more devastation of energy infrastructure.

But Oleksandr is sheltered from the worst effects. Even though he prepares for the worst-case scenario – he's built his own shelter at home, where "the bomb can't get in" – he had no problems with electricity even when the whole of Ukraine was in blackout for a day.

Oleksandr's house has become a self-organized "point of invincibility.” This is the name given to places with electricity, heat and Internet where people can wait out long power cuts. Local authorities set them up in schools, as tents on the street, or in other buildings.

Even though energy made by him can not be distributed across the street, Oleksandr is happy to welcome neighbors to his home.

“I always have light. When there’s no electricity and their phone is dead, they come here to charge,” Oleksandr told The Counteroffensive.

Currently, Ukraine remains focused on repairing damaged energy infrastructure as a condition for survival. However, Anna Ackermann notes that there is still a significant emphasis on nuclear energy. Ukraine has even begun constructing new reactors at one of its nuclear power plants to compensate for the capacity lost at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

According to Ackerman, this approach is not particularly effective. Nuclear power is inherently expensive, and construction takes years. But electricity is needed now.

According to Anna Ackermann, despite hesitance in some quarters, the transition to green energy is critical to Ukraine’s Euro-integration process. The move toward decentralized, renewable sources not only addresses immediate needs but also lays the foundation for a more sustainable and resilient energy future for Ukraine.

One of the key conditions for Ukraine’s future membership in the European Union is decarbonization – the reduction of carbon emissions from electricity production. Kyiv will have to align its legislation with EU standards.

Ukraine has developed a strategy to generate more than one-third of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050. The ultimate goal is to transform Ukraine into an energy hub for Europe. This would help the continent eliminate its reliance on Russian fossil fuels, replacing them with clean energy produced in Ukraine.

“If we talk about the near future, Ukraine will rely on wind and solar energy for its renewable energy development. In particular, there are big plans to build wind power plants – more than 800 megawatts in 2025 alone,” Ukraine’s energy minister Herman Halushchenko told The Counteroffensive.

This planned capacity is nearly half of the total wind power capacity Ukraine had in 2021. In 2022, after Russia launched the full-scale invasion, Kyiv lost almost all of its wind power.

Oleksandr Klymenko embodies this green energy revolution like no one else. His Eiffel Tower-inspired structure isn’t just a wind generator – it’s equipped with six solar panels. His backyard became one of more than 50,000 households that installed solar panels in Ukraine.

Despite investing in them, Oleksandr acknowledges the limitations of solar panels in his area. When there’s a lot of sun, electricity is usually not needed. And in winter, when Ukraine is under constant shelling, the sun isn’t enough to light the house.

His local challenges highlight a broader issue: renewable energy sources like wind and solar power remain constrained by seasonal and geographical factors. Wind farms perform best in Ukraine’s northern regions, while solar power is most effective in the south – territories that are largely under occupation.

Yet Oleksandr, ever resourceful, has found a workaround. This year, he built a new device using simple components: a car seat, a small generator, and part of a bicycle. He usually looks for all the items at home or in the market. It cost him less than $100.

Oleksandr Klymenko pedals on his ‘bicycle’ generator

“I spent two months on it this summer,” he explained. “I’d pedal slowly for 15 minutes, and then the light would stay on for 8 hours.”

Visitors from other regions now come to see his inventions, eager to learn from him. Oleksandr welcomes them gladly.

There is no doubt that the transition to green energy will be accompanied by many challenges. But given Oleksandr's wind and solar pioneering are being adopted by Ukrainians… perhaps very soon the whole of Ukraine will be pedaling too.

NEWS OF THE DAY

UK TO DISCUSS DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPERS TO UKRAINE: British Prime Minister Keir Starmer may visit Ukraine in the coming weeks to discuss the potential deployment of an international peacekeeping force after the war with Russia, Bloomberg reported. This would mark his first visit to Ukraine since taking office.

Discussions among European leaders about deploying peacekeepers have started, partly in response to Donald Trump's claims that the war in Ukraine would end swiftly if he becomes president. Volodymyr Zelenskyy views the deployment of peacekeepers as a potential component of security guarantees following a ceasefire with Russia.

BREAKTHROUGH IN HISTORIC POLISH-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT: Ukraine has issued its first permits for the exhumation of Polish victims from the Volyn tragedy, a massacre during World War II​​, according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. It is a significant step in addressing a long-standing historical conflict that has fueled misunderstandings and tension between the two nations.

Earlier, some Polish officials said they would support Ukraine's EU membership only if this issue was resolved.

The Counteroffensive has already done a deep dive into the historical scar tissue between two allies, click here to read it.

UK ANNOUNCES SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIAN OIL: The UK government has imposed sanctions on two major Russian oil companies, Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas. These companies produce over 1 million barrels of oil daily, generating approximately $23 billion annually — more than Jamaica's GDP. The profits from these firms enable Russia to sustain its military-industrial complex and continue its war against Ukraine.

This move follows US sanctions against more than 30 Russian oil service companies, which Washington imposed yesterday. Russia could lose up to 20% of its oil exports as a result.

RUSSIA PREPARING TO MOBILIZE UKRAINIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: Russia is planning a new wave of forced mobilization of Ukrainians in the occupied territories this spring, despite previous failures. The move follows an expansion of military enlistment office staff in these areas and intensified efforts to compel Ukrainians to obtain Russian passports.

Many residents of the temporarily occupied territories who were forcibly mobilized last fall are currently serving in Crimea.

CAT OF CONFLICT

During the visit to Oleksandr’s home in Dnipro, Mariana met his cat, Thomas. Oleksandr calls the cat “his joy” – but Thomas didn’t look so happy to meet Mariana…

Stay safe out there.

Best,

Mariana

Ukraine’s decision to end the gas transit deal with Russian energy giant Gazprom has been hailed by President Volodymyr Zelensky as one of Moscow’s biggest defeats.

“When (Russian President) Vladimir Putin was handed power in Russia over 25 years ago, the annual gas pumping through Ukraine to Europe stood at over 130 billion cubic meters. Today, the transit of Russian gas is zero. This is one of Moscow’s biggest defeats,” Zelensky said on Jan. 1 just as the deal expired.

Moscow and Kyiv signed the agreement in 2019 to transit 40 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually through Ukraine to buyers in the EU. Gazprom raked in an estimated $5–$6.5 billion annually from the deal with Ukraine.

Europe began to wean itself off Russian gas after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine while Gazprom steadily reduced flows to the EU to pressure Ukraine’s allies.

Russian pipeline gas deliveries to Europe dropped to around 29 bcm last year with around 14 bcm traveling through Ukraine before Kyiv terminated the deal, according to Argus Media, a market analyst group. The Ukrainian route transited nearly half of Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe, while the rest went through the TurkStream pipeline in the Balkans.

Kyiv’s decision to end the deal will further undermine gas revenue to Russia’s economy as Moscow will struggle to find alternatives to replace this lost gas market in the near future.

For now, Russia still has its claws on Europe with cheap liquified natural gas (LNG) and growing gas transit through the TurkStream pipeline. Those two revenue streams could run out, however, as sanctions bite and Europe looks to continue distancing itself from Russian energy.

The majority of European states have already looked to gas alternatives from the U.S., Norway, and Algeria to reduce dependency on Russia. The end of the agreement forces those who clung to the Ukraine route, namely Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria, to find other options.

“This development is a step toward a Europe that is less susceptible to energy blackmail, marking a geopolitical win for Ukraine and its allies,” the former head of Ukraine’s gas transport operator (GTSOU) Sergiy Makogon told the Kyiv Independent.

Limited options

The last three years have put a “significant strain” on Gazprom, Makogon noted. The company suffered a sharp reduction in gas production from 515 bcm in 2021 to 355 bcm in 2023, which it largely blamed on Europe’s move away from Russian gas, while also paying hefty taxes to prop up Moscow’s war machine.

Europe’s efforts to wean itself off Russian gas meant volumes dropped from 150 bcm pre-war to less than 50 bcm in 2023, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson said on Sept. 11, 2024. The end of the Ukraine route is another amputation for Gazprom after the loss of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and the Yamal pipeline through Poland in 2022.

“Moscow has limited options for now to sell more gas to other markets to make up for the loss of Ukrainian transit,” Natasha Fielding, the head of European gas pricing at Argus Media, told the Kyiv Independent.

Russia’s final lifeline to Europe is the TurkStream pipeline that delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary via Turkey. TurkStream is sanctioned by the U.S. and a Dutch court withdrew the export license of the Netherlands-based Russian company operating the pipeline in September 2022 but renewed it weeks later following pressure from Moscow and Budapest.

“Europe can completely phase out Russian pipeline gas including by stopping the TurkStream pipeline,” said Martin Vladimirov, the Director of the Energy and Climate Program at the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD).

Even if Europe does not embargo TurkStream, there is little room for more gas to flow through the pipeline. Deliveries jumped from 12.2 bcm in 2023 to 14.95 bcm in 2024, but the pipeline has a maximum capacity of 15.75 bcm per year, Fielding notes.

Zelensky also mentioned the possibility of increasing U.S. gas imports to Europe which would lower prices. If the U.S. boosts LNG exports by 22.5 bcm this year, it would “wipe out” Russian pipeline gas supply in Central and Eastern Europe, said Vladimirov.

Even China, which overtook Europe as the biggest guzzler of Russian pipeline gas last year, consuming 31 bcm, is a limited market for now, Fielding said. Russia cannot reroute gas flows through the 38 bcm “Power of Siberia” pipeline as it is not connected to the gas fields serving Europe and its transit already hit full capacity in December. Russia’s two future pipeline projects with China are also yet to get off the ground.

“Russia will find it hard to get to pre-war gas export levels even if it is able to redirect exports to Asia after potentially losing all gas exports to Europe by the end of the decade,” Vladimirov said.

The LNG question

Russia’s main LNG company, Novatek, has hooked European companies on its cheap LNG with 20% discounts leading to record-high purchases in 2024 of nearly 17 million tons, according to the CSD.

While Brussels has not directly banned the chilled Russian fuel, it has sanctioned LNG transshipment — transferring LNG from one ship to another— making it harder for Moscow to sell beyond the European market.

This could have helped spike Russian LNG sales to the EU, said Georg Zachmann, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a think tank, and at the Helmholtz Center Berlin, a research institute.

The EU gobbled up 48% of Russia’s total LNG exports in November 2024. One of the biggest consumers, France, imported Russian LNG worth 252 million euros ($262 million) during that month, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).

While less profitable than pipeline gas, Russia still makes close to $2 billion a month from its LNG sales to Asia and Europe, said Vladimirov.

“With no sanctions imposed on Russian LNG, companies are operating in their own self-interest and buying increasing quantities of gas from the cheapest supplier — Russia,” Vaibhav Raghunandan, EU-Russia Analyst at CREA, told the Kyiv Independent.

Despite this, Russia’s LNG sector is constrained. Its LNG terminals are already producing at near full capacity and it cannot easily reroute the gas originally transited through Ukraine to its two LNG export plants.

In theory, Russia’s new LNG export projects, like the Arctic LNG 2 project, could bolster sales abroad by 80 bcm, Vladimirov said. But Western sanctions on all new and future projects, including on Arctic LNG 2, are biting Moscow’s progress by blocking its access to critical equipment like tankers and liquefaction technology.

The Arctic LNG 2 project was launched in late 2023 and aimed to produce 20 bcm of gas annually, but Novatek cut production to almost zero in November 2024. Novatek’s setbacks show that “it would be very difficult for Russia not only to complete the infrastructure but also buy the ice-breaker LNG carriers necessary to facilitate bigger exports to Asia,” said Vladimirov.

Moscow has increasingly relied on its shadow tankers to continue its LNG trade as sanctions hamper shipping logistics, he added.

Finding secure buyers if output is increased will also be challenging, particularly if the EU heeds the calls to ban Russian LNG imports this year. Threats of secondary sanctions are also likely to turn off potential buyers.

Fall out

Russia paid Ukraine $800 million annually to transport its gas. However, net revenue only totaled between $200-300 million after transit costs, according to Makogon.

Kyiv considered the economic consequences but ultimately made the decision to kill the deal in the “interest of national security,” the Energy Ministry told the Kyiv Independent. Moreover, it also undermines Russia’s leverage on Europe’s energy sector.

“Russia has used gas transit as both an economic and political weapon, influencing EU policies and creating divisions among member states,” Makogon said.

Europe will feel an expensive knock-on effect in exchange for its security, Fielding said, as Slovakia, Austria, and Czechia will have to pay more to source and transport non-Russian gas. Western Europe, particularly Germany, will have to increase gas flows to the east to replace the lost Russian gas, she added.

Slovakia, which could pay an extra 90 million euros to replace the Russian gas this year, has ramped up rhetoric against Ukraine with Prime Minister Robert Fico threatening to cut electricity exports to Ukraine last month. However, the country’s electricity transmission system operator, SEPS, confirmed on Jan 4 that it will continue to send electricity to Ukraine.

“Slovakia and Austria had long prepared for this moment by signing contracts with alternative suppliers and keeping their underground gas reserves topped up. They must now put this plan into action,” Fielding said.

Ukraine is also preparing for Russia to attack its gas transit network in retaliation, said CEO of the GTSOU Dmytro Lyppa on Dec. 4. Russia has already relentlessly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including gas storage sites, and Makogon said that Ukraine is “well prepared” to repair and restore damaged infrastructure.

“Additionally, we would not hesitate to retaliate by targeting Russia’s gas networks and storages, just as we have targeted their oil refineries,” he added.

Ukraine war latest: Ukraine strikes Russian oil depot, command post; Moscow bombs civilians in Zaporizhzhia

Key developments on Jan. 8: * Ukraine strikes Russian oil depot supplying fuel to Engels-2 airbase, military confirms * Ukraine strikes Russian command post in Donetsk Oblast, military reports * Russian airstrike on Zaporizhzhia industrial site kills 13, injures at least 63 * French-trained bri…

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy