In early May, 64-year-old film critic and journalist Ekaterina Barabash made international headlines when it was revealed that she had pulled off a daring escape from house arrest in Russia and sought political asylum in France.

Barabash was put under house arrest in February for posts that she had made criticizing Russia’s war against Ukraine. She was accused of spreading “knowingly false” information about the military on her social media.

The Kremlin has intensified its crackdown on dissent in Russia since the start of its full-scale war against Ukraine, not only targeting those who dare to speak out against the war but also fostering a climate of surveillance that hearkens back to the worst periods of the Soviet era, urging Russian citizens to police one another.

For Barabash, the war struck a personal chord — she is the daughter of a renowned Ukrainian academic and her son lives in Ukraine with his family. Unlike many Russians — who either seek to justify the war or retreat into indifference — Barabash felt a moral imperative to speak out

“Most people in Russia aren’t willing to look for the truth,” Barabash told the Kyiv Independent from France.

“They’ve always been taught that Ukraine is just a part of Russia. But this belief is a kind of poison. It’s something that every Russian grows up with, often without even realizing it.”

In this exclusive interview, Barabash reflects on the moment she decided to risk her life to flee Russia, how her Ukrainian heritage shaped her perspective on Russian culture over the years, why even “good Russians” who oppose the war don’t understand Ukraine, and the bleak future facing anyone with a conscience who chooses to remain in today’s Russia.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The Kyiv Independent: Since the idea for this interview originally came after you escaped house arrest in Russia, I just wanted to start off by asking, how are you doing?

Ekaterina Barabash: I escaped from house arrest in Russia on April 13. I got past the checkpoints and left my home. We had a plan — I was supposed to be free within 24 hours. But things didn’t go as expected, and I ended up having to hide for two and a half weeks. Unfortunately, I can’t share all the details right now. It’s a shame, because some parts are really interesting. Maybe one day I’ll write about it — maybe even a small book.

During that time, I hid in many places — in forests, fields, villages, and so on. It was a bit frightening and definitely dangerous. I knew I had to leave quickly, and that sense of urgency never left me.

We had hoped they wouldn’t notice my absence for at least a few hours, but they realized I was gone very quickly — within just minutes, maybe half an hour. They started searching for me almost immediately. I don’t know all the details of how the search was carried out.

After that, I had to cross the border into a European country. Of course, it was an illegal crossing. From there, things were arranged to help me move forward. A woman from Reporters Without Borders (RSF) came to meet me, and she helped bring me safely to Paris.

The Kyiv Independent: Was there a specific moment when you decided that you would take the risk and escape, or did you know from the moment you were arrested that this was what you had to do?

Ekaterina Barabash: No, I didn’t make the decision right away. At first, when they placed me under house arrest, it felt almost like a breath of fresh air. It was so unexpected — usually, in political cases, people accused of such “crimes” are held in jail while they await trial. But the judge said that because I had a very old mother, and I myself am not so young, they decided to place me under house arrest until the court date.

At first, it gave us hope — even my lawyer believed that I might only receive a large fine rather than jail time. But within a few days, after some conversations with certain people, I realized the risk was very high. The chance of being sentenced to prison was real. I believed I could face five, six, even seven years in a Russian prison — and a Russian prison is worse than death.

That was when some people from Europe, who help political prisoners like me, told me clearly: even though I was at home, I needed to plan my escape.

At first, I was in shock. I never imagined I would have to leave — especially not my mother, who is 96 years old. But eventually, I realized it was the best option. I had to choose between two impossible outcomes: prison or fleeing the country. So, of course, I chose to escape.

That’s when we began the operation. I had coordinators from Europe who guided me through every step. They told me what to do, what to prepare, and explained our plan in detail.

The Kyiv Independent: What makes your case unique among other Russian opposition figures is that you have very strong ties to Ukraine. Does your Ukrainian heritage influence how you view Russia and Russian culture?

Ekaterina Barabash: Yes, I was born in Ukraine, though I was very young when we left — I was only five months old when my parents moved to Moscow. So my entire life has been connected to Russia. I always felt like I had two motherlands: Ukraine and Russia. I was born in Ukraine, but I was raised and educated in Russia, in Moscow.

My family has always had very strong ties to Ukraine. My father, who passed away five months ago, was a well-known figure there. He was a literary critic and the author of many books written in Ukrainian. He was highly respected in the academic community.

Years earlier, my son also moved to Ukraine for personal reasons. He lives there now with his wife and my grandchildren.

So when the war began, my situation was very different from that of my friends in the Russian opposition. For me, it was not just a political crisis — it was a personal tragedy. My closest relatives were there, being targeted by drones and missiles. And I couldn’t stay silent. I couldn’t hold back my grief or outrage.

I couldn’t keep this anger and pain inside me. I started to speak out, openly accusing the Russian government and military of killing innocent people and invading Ukraine. I wrote things like, “I hate you — you are murderers."

My perspective on the war was deeply personal. It wasn’t just politics for me — it was about my family, my roots, and the suffering of people I love.

Even intelligent and well-educated Russian people often don’t truly understand Ukraine. Almost all Russians have been poisoned by imperial propaganda. They’ve been raised with it — it’s part of their worldview.

They’ve always been taught that Ukraine is just a part of Russia. That the Ukrainian language is just a slightly different version of Russian. That Ukrainians are our “younger brothers,” and we are all one people — Russians. I’ve heard this over and over, even from good people, even from those who are against the war.

But this belief is a kind of poison. It’s something that every Russian grows up with, often without even realizing it.

I knew at least a little about Ukrainian culture and history — something most Russians don’t. I’ve done interviews and written about Ukrainian culture. So yes, my point of view was different from the beginning.

The Kyiv Independent: We know that Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014, not 2022. In what ways did Russian public opinion about the war in Ukraine change during those eight years?

Ekaterina Barabash: Most people in Russia simply didn’t care — and they still don’t. Even many anti-Putin individuals, including some of my friends, didn’t grasp that the war actually started in 2014. When the invasion happened in 2022, they acted as if it was the beginning of the war. I had to remind them, “No, the war started eight years ago."

Later on, many of them started to understand, at least a little, what had been happening. But the truth is, almost no one cared. They saw (the invasion of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) as some small conflict in eastern Ukraine, maybe with some Russian soldiers involved, but they didn’t recognize it as the coming of something horrific.

They didn’t understand the connection between the illegal annexation of Crimea and the war that followed. Yes, Crimea was officially part of Ukraine. But they thought that (Soviet leader Nikita) Khrushchev had “given” Crimea to Ukraine many years ago and that Russia had long claimed it.

Then came the war.

The Kyiv Independent: What would you want to say to people still in Russia?

Ekaterina Barabash: You know, I’ve recently realized one thing that I didn’t understand at first: it’s impossible to change their minds. It’s like religion — you either believe or you don’t. If you want to know the truth, you can seek out information, but most people in Russia aren’t willing to look for it.

There’s a common response I get when I ask why they don’t check alternative sources, like Ukrainian media. There are plenty of (Ukrainian) outlets that offer Russian-language versions of the news, and many people understand English, so they could easily access European media, too. Yet, they only rely on Russian sources.

The answer I often hear is, “Everyone lies.” They’re willing to accept the lies from Russian propaganda, but they won’t even consider competing narratives from other sources. “Everyone lies,” they say. It’s an awful argument — a foolish one, really.

It’s unfortunate, really, but what can I say to these people? Honestly, there’s nothing more I can say. If you’re scared, just stay silent. I understand — everyone has families, property, and they don’t want to end up in jail. But if you care, then leave Russia, if you can, if it’s possible.

I know it’s not easy to leave behind elderly parents. I never intended to leave mine. But my father told me several times, “Leave, leave, leave. The end will be very, very dramatic.” Still, I couldn’t bring myself to go. I had to take care of them.

But if you care, if you can leave, then do it. Russia is not a place to stay. If you have any sense, you’ll understand that.

Note from the author:

Hey there, Kate Tsurkan here, thanks for reading my latest interview. It’s horrific that in Russia you’re considered a criminal for calling out the actual criminals who are murdering innocent people, but thankfully we have people in this world like Ekaterina Barabash who are not afraid to call evil what it is. I hope her story inspires you and helps show that if a 64-year-old grandmother can stand up to authoritarianism in this world, then so can you. It you like reading about this sort of thing, please consider supporting The Kyiv Independent.

Decolonizing Russia — what it means and why it matters

Speaking to France’s National Assembly on April 11, Russian opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza did not petition Europe for the Kremlin’s total military defeat. Yet, while answering one of the many questions posed to him, he talked about how a colleague supposedly learned that ethnic Russians find it “psychologically difficult” to kill Ukrainians because they are so “similar.” “They say… we are alike, these are very closely related peoples, as everyone knows: almost the same language, the sa

The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan

For the first time in Ukraine's history, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has dismantled a Hungarian military intelligence spy network operating in Zakarpattia. Experts believe that Budapest is no longer concealing its interests, prompting inquiries into the implications of this exposure.

On Friday, May 9, the Security Service of Ukraine announced the unprecedented exposure of a Hungarian military intelligence network in Zakarpattia region.

According to investigators, the network's primary mission was to survey the region's military infrastructure, specifically identifying vulnerabilities in its ground and air defense systems. Additionally, the operatives analyzed the socio-political climate, particularly public sentiment towards the potential arrival of Hungarian troops. "The agents were tasked with collecting information on Zakarpattia's military defenses and assessing local behavior scenarios in case Hungarian forces entered the region," stated the SBU.

Authorities detained two key network operatives. The first, a 40-year-old from the Berehove district and a former military personnel, had been recruited by Hungarian intelligence back in 2021 and was placed on standby. The second individual is a former member of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, who left military service in 2025. Her role involved gathering intelligence on aviation equipment, including planes and helicopters, and defense systems at her former military base. According to the SBU, the network was overseen by a seasoned Hungarian military intelligence officer, whose identity has been confirmed.

"The network’s overseer was an active-duty officer from Hungary's military intelligence, whose identity has been verified by our services," noted their press office.

According to former SBU employee Ivan Stupak, Hungary has engaged in subversive activities against Ukraine for approximately two decades. This conduct was previously more covert, as Ukraine consciously avoided straining relations given Hungary's EU and NATO membership. However, in the last three and a half years, Hungarian activities have become increasingly transparent, leading Stupak to anticipate further deterioration in relations. Highlighting the recent apprehension of Hungarian spies in Ukraine, which he deems "phenomenal," Stupak clarifies that previously, Hungarian agents weren’t arrested to maintain a diplomatic facade.

Stupak interprets the SBU operation as having received political clearance at the highest level. Without the Ukrainian president's explicit approval, the operation might have been unfeasible. Stupak praises the SBU's efforts, considering them "masterful," given the language barriers involved. "These individuals communicated in Hungarian, recognized as one of the world's most challenging languages, complicating efforts to intercept radio and phone communications," says Stupak. Furthermore, he highlights the challenge in sourcing reliable translators within Zakarpattia's closely-knit Hungarian community. Stupak foresees further arrests among Hungarian intelligence personnel, particularly those operating under the guise of cultural centers.

The former SBU representative suggests that Hungary could have been collecting intelligence to share with Russia. "I think they could have been trading intelligence on Zakarpattia, on what enterprises are functional, what repair depots for Ukrainian equipment exist," Stupak opines. Additionally, Hungary might aim to destabilize the region internally. "While they might not pursue annexation of Zakarpattia themselves, they could incite internal turmoil, leading to unrest," the expert adds.

Political expert Oleg Posternak believes the arrests may not exacerbate Ukraine-Hungary relations since they are already strained. "Hungary currently holds a firm stance. Also contributing to tensions is Orban's maneuver to poll Hungarians on their stance regarding Ukraine's EU membership," Posternak explains. He emphasizes that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is a strategic element of Viktor Orbán's political agenda to maintain his popularity, especially in rural Hungary. The expert suggests that with Orbán’s waning support at home, he is using a tough stance against Ukraine to boost his standing.

However, it’s acknowledged that Ukraine has made substantial gestures to mend ties with Hungary. Notably, Posternak mentions Prime Minister Orban's visit, meetings with Ukrainian officials, and legislative amendments addressing Hungarian grievances. Yet, he cautions, Hungary's posture remains aggressive. Nonetheless, there is hope for reconciliation, especially considering the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to maintain Hungarian language provisions in education. A pivotal aspect, Posternak argues, will be Hungary's approach to sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. "We hope to see significant movement by late May-June, indicating whether Hungary will exercise its veto over Russian sanctions extensions," he concludes.

Posternak acknowledges Hungary's foreign policy is subject to the dynamics in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington. Hungary relies heavily on Russian energy, leveraging this dependency in EU negotiations. Additionally, Prime Minister Orbán remains attuned to Washington’s strategies and has a personal rapport with former U.S. President Donald Trump.

With the announcement that Cardinal Robert Francis Prevost has been chosen as the new pope and leader of the Catholic Church, Ukrainians are wondering what the surprise appointment of the American-born pontiff will mean for their country.

Past comments made by the new pope, who has taken the name Pope Leo XIV, quickly surfaced to form an idea of his views on immigration, gay rights, climate change, and the current U.S. administration. But with no similar public record of statements on Russia’s invasion, Ukrainians are left scrutinizing his public comments and hoping the world leader’s stance toward the ongoing war will benefit their country.

“I am not aware of any statements or actions the current pope has made regarding the war in Ukraine,” said Father Ihor Yatsiv, a spokesperson for the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, which falls under the Vatican’s leadership.

“So we can only operate based on who he is through his experience, his human life experience, his service, where he has been, where he comes from, and, accordingly, also after whom he comes.”

One potential sign of the pope’s future policies is in the selection of his new name, one of the first decisions a new pope makes. While Pope Leo XIV has not yet said why he selected Leo, a pontiff’s new name often refers to previous pontiffs whose footsteps they wish to follow.

Pope Leo XIII, the most recent pope to use this name, is widely remembered for his championing of social policies and social justice.

He was “a pope who paid attention to the socially vulnerable, a pope who stood on the side of the oppressed, a pope who stood for justice and, accordingly, spoke out against the powerful of this world,” noted Yatsiv.

“We identify Pope Leo XIV as a pope of hope for Ukraine,” Yatsiv added.

Many observers have noted that the selection of an American pope — long considered taboo — is likely, in part, a response to the current policies enacted by U.S. President Donald Trump and a rise in isolationism from his administration.

“Trumpism has broken many international taboos in recent months,” said Massimo Faggioli, a professor of historical theology at Villanova University. “The conclave responded in kind by breaking another taboo: that it was not possible for a Catholic from the U.S., a superpower, to become pope, in order to avoid an overlap between political-military supremacy, and the leadership of the church symbolically, at least, heir to the Roman Empire.”

In selecting Pope Leo, the cardinals who voted may have aimed to counter Trump’s policies with a different message about what U.S. exceptionalism and greatness can look like, Faggioli said.

“It remains to be seen what it means for a pope from the U.S., in the world of the crisis of liberal and constitutional democracies today, to speak as the head of the Catholic Church and the Holy See to Russia and Ukraine, to Israel and the Arab world, to China and the two Koreas,” said Faggioli.

Prior to his election as the leader of the Catholic Church, Pope Leo had boosted criticisms aimed at the anti-immigration policies of Trump and his vice president, JD Vance, on X.

In February, he reposted an article titled, "JD Vance is wrong: Jesus doesn't ask us to rank our love for others."

Pope Leo succeeds Pope Francis, who left behind a mixed legacy on the war in Ukraine. His repeated calls for peace often left Ukrainians frustrated by his failure to call out Russia as the aggressor or to condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin.

While this reflects the Vatican’s commitment to neutrality, allowing it to carry out a humanitarian role and negotiate prisoner exchanges, it also came under fire as being influenced by the historic ties between Moscow and the Vatican.

After it was announced that Cardinal Robert Prevost would replace him as the new church leader, President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Pope Leo XIV on social media, saying, “Ukraine deeply values the Holy See’s consistent position in upholding international law, condemning the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine, and protecting the rights of innocent civilians.”

Pope Francis leaves a mixed legacy in wartime Ukraine, overshadowed by historic Vatican-Moscow ties

Pope Francis, who passed away on April 21 at 88, leaves behind a legacy as vast and varied as his global influence. Yet in Ukraine, his track record is far from positive. For many Ukrainians, the Pope’s legacy is shaped by his repeated downplaying of the gravity of Ukraine’s fight for its survival in Russia’s war of aggression. His sweeping calls for peace over the past three years – from calling Ukrainians and Russians “brothers” to urging Ukraine to “have the courage of the white flag” in ne

The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan

Hungary

On March 20, 2025, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated on his X page that Ukraine’s EU membership would cost each Hungarian household 500,000 forints (1,200 euros) annually:

“9,000 billion HUF – that’s how much the war has already cost Hungarian families. 500,000 HUF per household, every year – that’s the price tag of Ukraine’s EU membership.  Brussels wants Hungarians to pay the bill, but no decision will be made without the voice of the Hungarian people. A new member can only join with the unanimous support from all Member States. There can be no decision until the Hungarian people cast their votes. This decision belongs to our citizens, not Brussels!”

First of all, where does this data come from? These are calculations by the Századvég Foundation, a think tank affiliated with Orbán. According to the foundation, “Ukraine has cost each Hungarian household 2.2 million HUF” (5,500 euros) or 9,000 billion HUF (22.5 billion euros) in total. The basis for the supposed losses includes three components: rising prices for imported gas, increased state spending due to higher yields on government bonds, and losses from reduced exports to Russia.

In reality, it refers to increased prices for imported gas due to changes in spot prices at the TTF Gas Hub in the Netherlands and additional budget expenditures due to the higher cost of state debt (due to geopolitical risks and inflation shocks, the yield on 5-year Hungarian government bonds rose from 2% to 4–6%). Additionally, bilateral sanctions – imposed by the EU on Russia and by Russia on the EU – affected Hungary’s trade volumes with the aggressor state. However, the root cause of these losses – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – is not mentioned in the Századvég Foundation’s analysis.

Secondly, what does 500,000 HUF (1,250 euros) from each Hungarian household for Ukraine’s EU accession mean? In reality, Ukraine will not “take” money from every Hungarian family. It is more about potentially foregone aid from the EU budget that the country currently receives, and possible increased expenditures from Hungary’s state budget.

These calculations are based on the potential reduction in receipts from the EU Cohesion Fund and subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), contributions to support Ukraine amounting to 0.25% of GDP, additional pension costs for Ukrainians who supposedly will move to Hungary, and estimates of Hungary’s share in financing Ukraine’s reconstruction.

In general, there are several issues with the 500,000 HUF figure:

• They are based on the assumption that Ukraine would join the EU today. In reality, the years leading up to Ukraine’s EU integration will bring changes both in Ukraine (for example, we need to harmonize legislation with EU standards) and in the EU itself. By the time of Ukraine’s accession, both the CAP and the distribution of Cohesion Fund expenditures will likely have been significantly revised. Discussions on such revisions have already begun.
• Reconstruction costs for Ukraine are a separate international initiative, not part of the EU accession process, and not solely the responsibility of member states. Therefore, treating them as “future losses” for the population related to Ukraine’s EU accession is unfounded and manipulative.
• The calculations of migration and pension burdens are based on speculative assumptions. For example, the claim that 5% of Ukrainian pensioners will move to Hungary. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of February 2025, the share of Ukrainians who chose Hungary as a refuge was about 1% of the total number of refugees in European countries.

Finally, the estimates by the Századvég Foundation do not consider the positive economic effects of enlargement: new markets, investments, enhanced security, and stability in the region. According to IMF calculations, EU enlargement, particularly due to the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan countries, could increase the bloc’s GDP by 14% over 15 years.

By the way, Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 also involved both pre-accession financial aid and post-accession funding to support its integration and development through three programs: ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). Between 1990 and 2006, Hungary received €1.987 billion (in prices of that time). But even after joining, the country continued to receive support — financial aid for 2021–2027 is planned at around €30 billion.

Hungary receives several times more from the Cohesion Fund and other EU funds than it contributes to the EU budget. Its contribution is relatively small (about €2 billion with a GDP of more than €200 billion), while the amount received is one of the highest in the EU among recipient countries (after subtracting contributions, Hungary received around €4.5 billion from the EU budget in 2023). If calculated per capita, each Hungarian hypothetically gives “out of their pocket” about €200, while receiving nearly €700.

Poland and Slovakia

Concerns and myths about Ukraine’s accession to the European Union exist not only in Hungary. Polish presidential candidate from the opposition party Law and Justice (PiS), Karol Nawrocki, stated that Poland cannot afford actions that would harm its economy:

Russian propaganda media, citing Nawrocki’s interview for Sieci, picked up on the narrative that Ukraine’s EU membership would be economically disadvantageous for Poland.

Polish journalist and commentator Łukasz Warzecha pointed out that large amounts of money would go to Ukraine, which would be a direct competitor to Poland:

In Slovakia, social media users circulated several false claims about the negative impact of Ukraine’s accession to the EU on the national economy. In particular, they manipulated the words of MP Ľubica Karvašová from the “Progressive Slovakia” party, who said that Slovak farmers would have to grow different products if Ukraine joins the EU. Social media users claimed the politician proposed that farmers grow camels and oranges. The post added that farmers would go bankrupt because Ukraine would supply products that Slovaks have “been growing for centuries”.

Slovak politician and deputy chair of the “Hungarian Alliance”, György Gyimesi, claims that under current rules, Cohesion Fund money is allocated to those member states where GNI (gross national income) per capita is below 90% of the EU average:

He also noted that if Ukraine joined the EU, supposedly 30% of all money allocated under the Common Agricultural Policy would go to Ukraine. Gyimesi concluded that if Ukraine joined the EU, it would become the largest beneficiary of the EU budget:

A new formula for solidarity: transform, not compete

It is precisely the allocation of funds from these programs – the European Structural and Investment Funds and within the CAP – that Ukraine’s Eastern European neighbors mainly refer to when discussing potential losses (or rather, forgone income) for their households.

For example, the Cohesion Fund supports EU member states with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average to strengthen the EU’s economic, social, and territorial cohesion. Under the current 2021–2027 program, 15 out of 27 countries are eligible for funding (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). And the allocation of funds within the CAP depends on the area of arable land and the number and size of farming households.

Currently, all EU spending estimates related to Ukraine’s accession are based on the “here-and-now” assumption, that is, they consider the country’s current economic status, relative population size, and the configuration of the current EU institutional system. Under these assumptions, the potential volumes of support are impressive. For instance, according to estimates of researchers from the German Economic Institute in Cologne, if Ukraine had been an EU member in 2023, it would have received €130–190 billion: €70–90 billion in agricultural aid and €50–90 billion under cohesion regional policy. EU estimates are similar – €186 billion.

A transformation of budget priorities always accompanies EU enlargement. However, these changes are not a burden but an investment in economic, social, and political stability across the continent. Even before new members join, the EU begins investing in their transformation: supporting reforms, strengthening institutions, and modernizing infrastructure.

The example of Croatia, which joined the Union in 2013, demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach. Between 2007 and 2013, it received €998 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). After accession, Croatia received €12.2 billion through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), of which €9.1 billion came from EU Cohesion Policy funds. Additionally, in 2014–2020, Croatia received €2.3 billion under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Rural Development Programme.

The EU assisted Croatia in building institutional capacity, focusing primarily on preparing government institutions to comply with EU legislation and meet necessary criteria. The main focus was accelerating reforms in key areas such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration reform, public finances, economic restructuring, and the business environment.

This strengthened the Croatian economy and the EU single market, into which local businesses integrated, expanding production chains. Accordingly, trade volumes increased. Add to this the new labor force and strengthened EU influence in the region. Croatia’s EU accession became a signal to other Balkan countries about the possibility of integration, provided reforms are implemented.

Under current conditions, Ukraine could become a net recipient of aid. At the same time, European countries that currently receive support would lose it, since Ukraine has the lowest GNI per capita and a high share of arable land. To integrate current candidates (which, in addition to Ukraine, include Moldova, Balkan countries, and Georgia), the EU needs to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. The EU budget and structural funds should consider current country indicators, growth potential, strategic importance, and benefits to the entire European Union.

Scholars and experts believe that if the EU enacts institutional reform, the costs of adapting Ukraine will be lower. Moreover, the efficiency of Ukraine’s agricultural sector is underestimated, and thus, subsidies for Ukrainian farmers may be significantly lower than the cited estimates.

Support for less developed regions is not only a matter of solidarity but also a mechanism for developing the internal market: new consumers and producers, reduced migration pressure, and strengthened regional security. People stay to live and work at home while purchasing goods produced in other EU countries.

Ukraine will bring unique assets to the EU: digital transformation, military resilience, flexible institutions, and civic engagement. While some European countries are slowly adapting to changes, Ukraine is already acting as a transformation accelerator.

Yes, integration requires investment. But these are investments in a new market, new energy, and a more resilient European space. Ukraine is not a “beneficiary” but a partner capable of strengthening and renewing the European Union.

Oil prices have slipped below $60 per barrel, adding pressure to a strained Russian economy. At the same time, China—Moscow’s largest trading partner—is locked in a high-stakes tariff war with the United States, triggered by the new U.S. administration. These converging disruptions are unlikely to leave Russia's economic footing - and by extension, its capacity to fund the war in Ukraine—unaffected.

To better understand the current landscape, we once again spoke with Vladimir Milov, former Russian Deputy Minister of Energy and a prominent critic of the Putin regime. An economist and energy expert, Milov was a close ally of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and currently serves as Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation. Our previous conversation with him took place in December 2024. In this latest interview, we revisit his earlier forecasts and examine how recent developments have altered Russia’s economic trajectory.

Question (Q): There’s increasing talk about a potential easing of economic sanctions on Russia—at least from the U.S. While a full rollback seems unlikely, some form of relief may be on the horizon. In your view, could this act as a lifeline for the Kremlin, enabling it to sustain the war effort?

Answer (A): I have written about it in much detail in a recent op-ed for The Insider - please have a look. Long story short - Trump won't be able to reverse Western sanctions policy, and European actions matter more than those of the U.S. Before the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe was Russia's key investor and trade partner - over 67% of accumulated FDI stock came from Europe and around 50% of Russian exports went to Europe. The U.S. - 1% and 4% respectively. Russia needs markets and investment, and the U.S. won't provide that - even in better times, American investors didn't particularly like Russia.

However, Russia may get some benefits from U.S. sanctions being lifted, which will help to keep Putin's ailing economy afloat for a bit longer. Crucial thing is access to the U.S. technology which may boost the Russian military production - this assessment is shared in a brilliant recent report by the Kyiv School of Economics on the status of the Russian military industries - quite worth a read, I strongly recommend

Another problem is that Europe doesn't have anything comparable to the U.S. global sanctions enforcement mechanism - experienced agencies like the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control and Bureau of Industry and Security. If the U.S. lifts sanctions against Russia - or simply continues the crackdown on its own Government institutions like that executed by DOGE - the EU, Britain, and other Western democracies simply don't have its own institutional capacities to secure proper sanctions enforcement on a global scale, as currently provided by the U.S. There will be a major sanctions enforcement vacuum which Putin will inevitably use for his own benefit, boosting sanctions circumvention.

(Q): The U.S.-China tariff war has dominated headlines in recent weeks, signaling historic geopolitical and economic shifts. While Russia isn't directly involved, key trade partners like China are heavily impacted. Beyond oil, should we expect any spillover effects on the Russian economy?

(A): Yes, there's so much more than just oil. China's economic slowdown closed their market for many Russian products, due to which major Russian industries suffer badly. For once, China-oriented Russian coal industry is collapsing right in front of our eyes. Fisheries suffer from contraction of Chinese imports of Russian fish. Russian steelmakers face output contraction and sharply falling profits because cheap Chinese steel is flooding global markets - Chinese economic slowdown turned China from being a major importer to a net exporter of steel. And so on. Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels, and are not rebounding - China doesn't allow Russia to access its market, and it won't change once Chinese economic growth slows down.

Tariff war will obviously exacerbate Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth - the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.

(Q): In a recent interview, you mentioned that further declines in oil prices might actually benefit Russia more than if prices remain stagnant just below a certain threshold—an idea that might seem counterintuitive to many. Could you explain how that works?

(A): Biggest loser from the falling oil prices is not Russia, and not OPEC - its the American shale oil industry. Oil production costs in the U.S. are significantly higher than in Russia or OPEC. This means that, if global oil prices fall below $50, large part of the U.S. oil production will be wiped off the market, and prices will quickly rebound. We already saw these effects after 2014 and 2020 oil price crashes.

Russians know that, which is why they weren't too scared with Trump's threats to "radically bring down the oil prices". Their strategy is to wait out for mass extinction of the U.S. oil production under $50/bbl, and to wait for prices to rebound thereafter. Russian oil producing companies are OK under $30-40 prices - it is the state budget which will suffer, but Putin and his people believe they can last for some time under low oil prices, given that they will be rebounding later.

In these circumstances, I'd say the best scenario if the international oil prices will stay somewhere around $60. Given the sanctions-driven discounts, that means Russian oil cheaper than $50. These are the prices which will significantly hurt Russia (Russian budget is drafted under $70/bbl oil price assumption), but will prevent the collapse of the U.S. shale oil industry and further rebounding of prices. Oil at $50 or cheaper is a much worse scenario, as it will most likely mean that low oil prices will be short-lived, which will make Putin happy.

(Q): During our last conversation, there was an expectation that Russia’s central bank would raise interest rates, yet it held steady at around 21%. What factors led to that unexpected decision?

(A): After their February Board meeting, Central Bank has admitted that "consequences of further raising rates will be worse than keeping the rates steady" - meaning that it would exacerbate economic slowdown or probably lead to a recession. To avoid that, they partially sacrificed the goal of bringing down inflation - which still remains high, preventing the Central Bank from much-anticipated easing of monetary policies. At the recent March meeting of the Central Bank board, only two signals were discussed - neutral and tough (further increasing the rate).

Central Bank faces tough dilemma now - interest rate of 21% is still very high (Russia has 12th highest Central Bank rate in the world), rapidly cooling the economy, but inflation is not really receding. The root causes of inflation - heavy budgetary spending on the war, output gap created by output not catching up with demand due to Western sanctions against Russian manufacturing sector - are not going away. At the same time, Russian industrial output has zeroed out in February (0,2% year-on-year growth and 0,4% seasonally adjusted growth compared to January), and March figures may be even worse - soon we'll see the statistics. So, Central Bank has managed to rapidly cause stagnation with its tight monetary policies - risking further slipping into recession - but it failed to bring inflation under control.

(Q): Your latest FRF Think Tank report points to high inflation and near-zero output growth in Russia—classic signs of stagflation. However, some economists argue that high unemployment is a necessary component. Given that unemployment remains relatively low, does this mean Russia hasn’t yet entered stagflation, or is this just a statistical distortion due to the mass recruitment of the male population?

(A): True, Russian situation is unique. The term "stagflation" was coined in the 1960s and 1970s in the Western economies none of which experienced such a mass diversion of the workforce to the war as Russia today. If the current war is suddenly over, Russia will indeed experience high unemployment - masses of soldiers returning to civilian life won't easily find jobs.

Russia also continues to experience very high hidden unemployment - workforce which is nominally employed, but in reality is either on unpaid leave, part-time workweek, or downtime. Rosstat estimated hidden unemployment to be as high as 4,7 million people in Q4 2024, or over 6% of the total workforce. Together with official unemployment, that would make about 9% of the workforce.

These workers would have significantly eased the pressure on labor market should they have left their enterprises, but Russian labor market traditionally features low mobility (remember how people in the 1990s preferred to continue working for years at enterprises which haven't paid them salaries, instead of leaving them looking for new jobs). So, companies nominally keep the workers, but effectively don't pay them - hoping for recovery, which is not coming (nearly three quarters of hidden unemployment are people on unpaid leave).

So, if we're into a macroeconomic debate by the book here, Russia does have high unemployment - but in hidden or delayed forms. And stagflation is real. If the current situation lingers on, even nominal unemployment will rise quite soon.

(Q): What is the current situation with Russia's National Wealth Fund — the main financial reserve that has supported Putin's economy through years of war? What are the implications for the Kremlin and the ongoing war?

(A): As of April 1st, the liquidity portion of the National Wealth Fund (NWF) stood at $39 billion, or just over RUR 3 trillion. That's lower than the federal budget deficit recorded in 2024 (RUR 3,5 trillion). As it goes, 2025 budget deficit will likely be much higher - costs are rising (over 20% federal expenditure growth in Q1 2025), while revenues will be depressed by both the falling oil prices, as well as economic slowdown. Already now, non-oil revenue in Q1 2025 grew only by 11% year-on-year, against 26% growth in 2024, and 18% planned growth for 2025. Of which VAT - by just 9%, as opposed to 22% in 2024 and 17% planned for 2025. Slowing economy generates less taxes, which will undermine budget revenues to an extent not lesser than falling oil prices, and lead to further depletion of the NWF. As it looks from today, there's no other way but for the liquidity portion of the NWF to be fully depleted by the end of 2025 (usually they draw the funds from NWF in December to close the fiscal year).

There's also a non-liquidity portion of the NWF, but it largely exists only on paper, with money invested in various securities and not being easily recoverable. For those interested in details, I have analyzed this in my February brief on the Russian economy. The liquidity portion of the NWF has shrank from $116,5 billion in February 2022 to just $39 billion now as a result of heavy war-related spending. Essentially, this was the model of much-praised Putin's "economic resilience": heavily draw the available cash reserves to compensate for the negative effects of sanctions. But this "economic miracle" appears to be over, disappearing along with cash being spent.

What next after the liquidity part of the NWF is fully spent? I also analyze this in one of my recent reports in detail. Bottom line: nothing is working except monetary emission, printing the money. Government can't borrow - they are cut off from international financial markets, and domestically, with yields as high as over 16% for OFZ government bonds, Russia spends more on repaying and servicing the debt than it actually raises from the domestic debt market. Net debt raising was just around zero in 2024 and negative in Q1 2025. They can raise taxes, but that would further undermine economic growth and curb tax base - they'll lose more in the end. Hypothetically, they can try to privatize state assets, but there's not really much to sell if they don't opt to privatize control equity shares in major state companies - and they don't seem to even consider that for strategic reasons. As far as smaller-scale privatization is concerned, it won't solve their fiscal problems on a large scale, and there won't be much demand given the rapid deterioration of investment climate, ongoing rampant nationalization, etc.

So printing the money seems to be the only viable option left. Russian authorities seem to increasingly tolerate high inflation - "we're not Turkey or Argentina yet, so what difference does it make if inflation is 12-13% instead of 10% - let's print a couple of trillion rubles, no one will notice" (that was literally said by some State Duma deputies during Nabiullina's report debate on April 9th). Central Bank clearly shifted to limited emission schemes in the past few months through repo auctions - banks buy government bonds, and are immediately allowed to use them as collateral while borrowing cash from the Central Bank through repo auctions. Central Bank promised to use repo auctions as temporary mechanism in November 2024, but keeps rolling them over - switching from monthly to weekly repo auctions. Effectively, it is little different from Central Bank's credit to the government, or, in simple words, printing the money.

No question that filling the budgetary gap with printed money will lead to even higher inflation, which will destroy any prospect for economic recovery. So, basically, the Western sanctions are working - albeit not as fast as we hoped, but still.

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Biologist Svitozar Davydenko used to be one of the world's most remote Ukrainians.

For a year, he lived 10,000 miles away from his troubled homeland.

He worked at a scientific center – known as the Akademik Vernadsky Station – in Antarctica.

The ‘White Continent’ is harsh and unyielding, but Ukrainians know how to find beauty in everything.

"I was stunned by the sheer amount of ice, these enormous icebergs. The natural conditions here are quite severe. Cold. Windy. And yet, life thrives here," said Svitozar, recalling his first thoughts upon setting foot in Antarctica."

While Trump imposes tariffs even on penguins near Antarctica, Ukrainians study and care for them. Ukrainians understand that Antarctica is not just a continent for research.

It holds the key to the future.

Today, Antarctica is considered one of the last formally neutral territories, used exclusively for scientific purposes.

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine demonstrates its commitment to protecting nature not only within its own borders but around the world. It is here in Antarctica that Ukrainians study climate change, its impact on wildlife, and contribute to the preservation of flora and fauna on the only continent still without permanent human habitation.

Ukraine cares not only about Russian ecocide on Ukrainian territory, but also about addressing global challenges and safeguarding the planet’s future.

Last year, Svitozar Davydenko was selected as a biologist for Ukraine’s 29th Antarctic Expedition, which set off for the Akademik Vernadsky Station — Ukraine’s only research base on the continent.

Although Svitozar is from Zhytomyr, he has spent most of his life near Kyiv.

In October 2022, the museum of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, where he often worked, was hit nearby by a Russian missile during one of the mass attacks.

"​​I can hardly imagine what it was like for those who were in Antarctica in 2022, but we were still calmer. The situation was still better than at the beginning of the war. Of course, we were worried about our families [while we were in Antarctica]," shared Svitozar.

Despite that, Svitozar decided to test his luck. Since his university years, he has wanted to go to Antarctica. And after he earned a Ph.D. in biology, his dream came true. He matched all the selection criteria from the first try and went to explore Antarctica in March 2024.

The station is located on Galindez Island, just off the western coast of Antarctica. There, Svitozar had the rare opportunity to live among penguins, swim near majestic whales, and even meet a newborn seal pup, which would later be named in his honor.

The Vernadsky Research Base is Ukraine’s only permanent presence in Antarctica.

In fact, Ukraine’s history on the continent is relatively recent.

The station was previously British and known as Faraday. In 1996, the UK handed it over to Ukraine free of charge, since after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had not inherited a single Antarctic base. Russia took over all five of the functioning stations.

The UK didn’t ask for any money in return, but the Ukrainian team still decided not to leave the gesture unanswered. In a symbolic act, a member of the first Ukrainian expedition pulled a one-pound coin from his pocket and handed it to the British representatives.

Since then, the station has been home to a wide range of scientific research. Scientists there collect meteorological data to help forecast global weather patterns, track glacial melt, and measure ozone levels.

In fact, the ozone hole was discovered at this very station, back when it was still operated by the British. They found that the earth's ozone layer, which is supposed to protect the planet from radiation, is much thinner than it should be.

The wildlife of the frozen continent is also a subject of deep study, and that’s where Svitozar Davydenko comes in.

"For me, it was a unique opportunity to understand extinct whales through the living ones," Svitozar told The Counteroffensive.

Since childhood, Svitozar had dreamed of becoming a paleontologist, fascinated by extinct animals — especially ancient whales that once swam through what is now Ukrainian land. At university, some of his professors were veterans of the Vernadsky Station. That’s how he first learned that not only did the station still exist, but that biologists could apply to go there.

And last year, it happened — he was selected through a competitive process to join the expedition. After interviews, psychological evaluations, and time spent living in isolation with the expedition team, he finally got the chance to witness the forbidding Antarctic ice with his own eyes.

The journey to Antarctica was long. To reach the end of the Earth, Svitozar had to travel by bus to Poland, then fly across the Atlantic to Tierra del Fuego in Chile — the bottom tip of South America.

There, the Ukrainian icebreaker Noosfera — a floating laboratory — was waiting for the team of fourteen scientists.

As a biologist, Svitozar had to study the local waters, setting off early each morning in motorboats to search for whales, plants, lichens, and other marine life. Everyone at the station must know how to drive a motorboat, just as they must know how to cook and carry out basic repairs.

Whales and orcas are of particular interest to Svitozar. Usually, the animals are indifferent to humans — you can calmly approach them by boat, for example, to take samples of skin or blubber. For a whale, according to Svitozar, it feels like a mosquito bite. But with the sample scientists can determine, for instance, whether a female is pregnant – or they can analyze the animal’s genetic makeup.

"When whales get curious about your boat, inspect you, stick out their fins and faces, and look straight at you — you realize they’re intelligent creatures, that they’re studying you too," recalled Svitozar.

However, during tourist season – winter in the northern hemisphere – when the Antarctic waters are filled with many boats and ships, whales become skittish.

They get ‘tired’ of people, so sometimes they even flee from the scientists.

Meeting between a humpback whale and Ukrainian scientists, including biologist Svitozar Davydenko:

A large part of his responsibilities also includes studying seals.

It was Svitozar who discovered a Waddell seal pup born near the research station last year.

It was named by subscribers on social media, and his colleagues, as SeaBaby Svitozarovych.

The first part of the name refers to a Ukrainian marine drone. The second part is the patronymic form of Svitozar’s name. So, in a way, this scientist became a father in Antarctica.

According to Svitozar, the animals least afraid of humans are the penguins. Entire colonies live around the station. Just a meter away from their buildings, thousands of penguins nest: they are small, have red beaks, and white stripes on their temples.

"The noise from the station, the light it emits, the warmth — none of it scares them. They've gotten used to it and happily wander around the station," said Svitozar.

Last year, a total of 7,000 penguins were recorded on the island where the station is located. They arrive during the mating season, in September and October, when penguins begin to build nests out of pebbles. Both bird parents take turns incubating the eggs, then feeding their babies and protecting them from predators until the young ones are grown.

Until 2007, subantarctic penguins didn’t live near the station at all. But due to global warming, they have gradually migrated further south in search of a harsher climate.

Scientists do not interfere in the lives of penguins. The Protocol on Environmental Protection, signed in 1991, prohibits touching, feeding, or in any way influencing the lives of penguins.

So, using drones, he monitors the birds, recording how colonies are developing, the number of babies born during the season, and whether penguins are settling on other islands.

Once, during one of Svitozar’s expeditions, an emperor penguin visited the station — a species not usually found at the latitudes where Vernadsky Station is located. The nearest known colonies are over 300 km away from the Ukrainian scientists.

The penguin wandered up to the station to inspect it.

"He spent about a week and a half, maybe two weeks, near the station. Sometimes he went into the water to eat, other times he just rested near the buildings. And then one day, he simply swam off somewhere to go about his business," Svitozar joked.

At first glance, one might wonder, “Why spend money on penguins when there are more urgent problems, like war?”

In 2024, Ukraine allocated approximately $11.6 million to support the operations of its Antarctic research station, Akademik Vernadsky, and to conduct scientific expeditions and research activities.

Beyond being an exceptional opportunity to contribute to global science, its research base means that Ukraine also holds a voice in determining Antarctica’s future.

Since 2004, it has held Consultative Party status, meaning it has veto power. Decisions regarding Antarctica must be made by full consensus — all votes must be ‘yes.’

Although Antarctica is currently a neutral and peaceful continent, this status could change in the future. Given the region’s wealth in natural resources, a scramble for minerals may eventually begin.

Additionally, the continent borders three oceans — the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific — making it strategically important for global trade routes. Eventually, it could even be used for military purposes.

And Russia is already in the game. Like the U.S. and China, it has territorial ambitions on the continent. That’s why Ukraine needs at least some levers of influence to counter Moscow — even in the harsh Antarctic latitudes.

And it's already doing so. For example, in 2024, Ukraine, along with other countries, blocked Belarus from gaining Consultative Party status in the Antarctic Treaty.

"[Presence in Antarctica] is about political weight, prestige, and the country’s scientific potential," Svitozar summarized.

Svitozar’s expedition came to an end in early April. Now that he has left, he plans to continue working at the Institute of Zoology, where he previously worked, and will continue his research on animals.

But it’s unlikely that Antarctica will let Svitozar go easily; he may return for seasonal research or study the continent at other stations.

"Of course, it would be very interesting to return and continue studying whales and perhaps explore other aspects of Antarctica. For example, paleontology can also be studied here, not necessarily at Vernadsky Station, but, for instance, in the vicinity of other stations with which we collaborate," Svitozar said.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

GOP FOR UKRAINE LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN: Republicans for Ukraine are launching a new campaign urging the GOP to support Ukraine. The campaign features over 60 first-person testimonies from lifelong Republicans and conservatives, many former Trump voters.

This initiative comes at a time when the Trump administration wants to get a peace deal done, proposing Ukraine give up Crimea and other regions that Russia occupied.

N. KOREA NOW OFFICIALLY SENDING TROOPS TO RUSSIA: For the first time, North Korea confirmed sending troops to Russia, BBC reported. Pyongyang’s military claimed its soldiers helped Russian forces "completely liberate" the Kursk region.

Days earlier, Moscow praised the "heroism" of North Korean troops, publicly acknowledging their involvement for the first time. However, South Korean and Western intelligence had reported North Korean troop deployments in Russia's war against Ukraine much earlier.

On January 11, 2025, two North Korean soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces. The POWs said they were initially told they would be fighting against South Korea but were instead sent to fight in the Kursk region against Ukraine.

TRUMP BELIEVES ZELENSKYY WILL CEDE CRIMEA: Shortly after meeting in Vatican City, Donald Trump said he believes Zelenskyy is ready to concede Crimea to Russia as a part of a ceasefire deal, France24 reported.

Speaking to reporters, he also mentioned the Ukrainian President asking for more weapons.

Previously, Volodymyr Zelenskyy vowed Ukraine ‘will not legally recognize the occupation of Crimea’. Now Trump’s pressure switched to Moscow as he urged Putin to ‘stop shooting’ and sign a deal.

PENGUINS OF PEACE:

In this photo by the Ukrainian Antarctic Scientific Center, the first newborn penguin chicks of the season were discovered near the Vernadsky Station by Svitozar Davydenko.

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Veronika

Editor’s note: We asked members of the Kyiv Independent community to share the questions they have about the war. Here’s what they asked and how we answered.

Join our community to ask a question in the next round.

Question: Is Ukraine formulating a plan to receive and house refugees from occupied territories? I would expect in that ceding territory many Ukrainians would want to leave Russian control.

Answer: Handling internally displaced people (IDPs) has been a pressing issue for Ukraine ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to the Social Policy Ministry, there are currently nearly 5 million IDPs in Ukraine, 3.6 million of whom left their homes after Feb. 24, 2022.

However, state support is widely considered insufficient, with most IDPs relying primarily on charities and NGO assistance. The monthly amount of financial aid from the state is currently Hr 2,000 ($48) per adult and Hr 3,000 ($72) per child or person with a disability — not enough to maintain a decent standard of living.

The most critical issues for IDPs include the lack of proper and affordable housing, financial instability, difficulty finding employment, and deteriorating mental health. Insufficient support also forces some IDPs to eventually return to front-line or even occupied settlements.

Read this story to find out more — “Thousands of Ukrainian IDPs are struggling to adapt amid housing, employment crises.” — Daria Shulzhenko, reporter

Question: Do Ukrainians still trust and respect President Zelensky? Do they still want him to be their president? Do they agree with how he is handling the war?

Answer: Yes, the majority of Ukrainians still support President Volodymyr Zelensky. Even more so after his brutal encounter with U.S. officials at the White House.

According to the latest poll published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on March 27, 69% of Ukrainians trust the president.

The survey found that only 28% of respondents do not trust Zelensky, resulting in a trust-distrust balance of +41%.

Zelensky remains the most popular politician in the country and the majority of people in Ukraine support him. Yes, there are mistepps, quite a few actually, but I don’t see the country turning on Zelensky.

If the presidential election were held this weekend, Zelensky would definitely advance to the runoff and likely win it. The only potential competitor is former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who now serves as the country’s ambassador to the U.K.

Some polls have Zaluzhnyi in the lead, but the general had never officially announced his intention to run and it remains to be seen what he will do if he does. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: With regard to Russia’s ongoing difficulties recruiting soldiers and their heavy losses on the front line, what actual difference has this made in the fighting? Also, I read about Russia’s losses in your newsletter but not much about Ukraine’s?

Answer: Russian losses in this war are staggering. Will this have an effect on Russia’s ability to continue the war against Ukraine? No.

Ukraine has less people and resources to spare. A neverending manpower shortage is the biggest problem Ukraine is facing in this war. And there are too few options on how to fix it.

While it is believed that Russia has lost twice as many people, maybe three times as many people as Ukraine has, the Kremlin can easily afford it.

Ukraine cannot.

Russia has a population 3.5-4 times larger than that of Ukraine. Russia, unlike Ukraine, is a totalitarian dictatorship where the lives of people mean nothing to the government apparatus. So, they will continue to use all the tools at hand to call up more people to fight.

Russia also has the ability to offer substantial sign-up bonuses to those willing to fight, recruit mercenaries from Asian and African countries, and is willing to throw the disenfranchised, primarily convicts, to storm positions without carrying will those people survive the initial attack.

To follow developments in Russia I recommend our WTF is wrong with Russia? newsletter, to follow the battlefield and the Ukrainian side of things, I would recommend our War Notes newsletter. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: Do we know where the population of the occupied territories stands in relation to Ukraine forfeiting territories in a “peace” deal?

Answer: Recent developments are taking a toll on the people in the occupied territories. Since 2022, Ukrainians living under occupation have kept their hopes they will be liberated the same way that residents of Kyiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts were that year.

Ukrainians living there told me that one of the hardest parts now is listening to all the discussions about territorial concessions from the U.S., and how they often omit that these are real lives, real people who will have to either abandon their homes for an unknown period or live their lives under Russian occupation.

Since the possibility of liberating these territories through force is extremely slim, the atmosphere is very gloomy, and hope is hard to come by. That doesn’t mean that the anti-Russian resistance fizzled out. Resistance groups, both violent and non-violent, still remain active, and for many, it is this resistance that helps them keep going. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

‘Evil must not win’ — how Ukraine’s female partisans resist Russian occupation

Somewhere in the streets of Russian-occupied Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, a woman puts a sticker on the wall. It’s a short message, but if she is seen doing it, she will face arrest, prosecution, and likely, torture. The message is: “Soon, we will be home again.” On another

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Question: Do you believe that the EU can give enough arms and security forces in a timely manner to protect Ukraine?

Answer: Yes. But for that to happen, Europe needs to step up.

Excluding some complex military hardware, such as the Patriot air defense systems and the extremely effective Bradley armored fighting vehicles, Europe knows how to build guns. It’s just not building them enough.

If Europe moves from talking to acting and begins rearming at a proper pace, the EU would be able produce weapons that would keep Ukraine in the fight. Ukraine also now has the know-how of how to build proper weaponry. It just needs the funds to increase production capacities.

The ReArm Europe initiative is a good start. The industry is also there. Now we need to see orders. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor

Question: French President Macron’s position on the war in Ukraine has undergone quite a few changes since the start of the full-scale invasion, and I think it’s fair to say that he is now fully and clearly committed to Ukraine. How is he currently perceived by Ukrainian public opinion, and are there any high expectations of him?

Answer: The public opinion regarding President Macron went through a deep transformation from the early period of his phone calls with Putin to him proposing for European boots on the ground later in the war. In fact, according to one opinion survey last year, Macron was the only foreign leader whose popularity improved in Ukraine. In 2025, European leaders are also perceived much more positively in contrast with the U.S. under the new administration.

At the same time, many reserve judgment. Macron’s pro-Ukraine turn has been mostly about rhetoric, and France still provides much less than it could in comparison to the U.K., Germany, or even smaller countries like Estonia or Denmark, which provide the largest shares compared to GDP. We’ll have to see if Macron’s and Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” can bring something real to the table. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: Trump is killing NATO or is at least withdrawing our country from it. Will Europe replace it with an EU army? Is it time for the EU to form a constitutional union better than what I feel we are losing with Trump and his MAGA party.

Answer: Unfortunately, further integration of the EU in the current political climate is difficult, and a united EU army is a far-off dream.

It is undeniable that the EU has reacted well to Trump’s foreign policy turn, namely in terms of higher defense spending and clearly demonstrating firm support of Ukraine.

But, the EU is still composed of countries with often contradicting interests, and consensus is hard to come by. It’s not only “rogue members” like Hungary and Slovakia — Italy, France, and Germany have different foreign and economic priorities that hamper united decision-making. For example, despite worries about Trump abandoning Ukraine, the EU was not able to agree on a new 40 billion euro package due to opposition from southern members.

Political trends suggest this might only get more difficult, as far-right and Euroskeptic parties are on the rise in both France and Germany.

In terms of military capabilities, Europe is still playing catch-up. Their militaries have been underfunded for decades and are often reliant on NATO infrastructure, which will be very hard to replace. We hear calls for a European alternative to the alliance, but that will demand years — if not decades — of sustained work. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: How does drafting and mobilization work? Do the Ukrainian Armed Forces view draft evasion as a big problem? Is there an issue of corruption or morale among the population?

Answer: The large-scale, forced mobilization of men into the military was, is, and always will be not only incredibly painful and tragic but also the greatest internal political and social challenge in a country that otherwise remains united in its resolve to not capitulate to Russia’s attempt to destroy Ukraine as a nation. No country should have to go through this.

Inside Ukraine’s desperate race to train more soldiers

New recruit Vitalii Yalovyi knew one thing after completing the Ukrainian military’s boot camp: He was not prepared for war. The 37-year-old felt physically unfit, forcing him to miss some courses during the month-long training. His leg was still hurting from long daily walks at a training center i…

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

It’s important to make one thing clear: Ukraine’s manpower crisis refers specifically to the infantry; this is the deadliest, most difficult, and most uncomfortable job in the military. This is where the most casualties are taken, and this is where the most new recruits are needed to fill the ranks. In a war that is now dominated by drones, where anyone or anything moving around on the surface can be hunted by several high-precision drones within a few minutes, the life of the infantryman is truly horrible, and often, no amount of patriotism is enough for the average Ukrainian to take up this job. Lots of people are still joining the military voluntarily, but they are almost all going to other roles, especially in drone units. In fact, some are joining drone units voluntarily, specifically to avoid eventually being drafted into the infantry, while others, as you mentioned, choose to hide at home.

Unfortunately, this situation isn’t really getting better, as more people are still needed to avoid losing the country. If you ask me, the main hope to solve the manpower crisis is for two things to happen: First, the Ukrainian leadership needs to prioritize reforming mobilization, training, and especially how its soldiers are used on the battlefield so that the life of the Ukrainian infantryman is placed at front and center of the planning of operations on all levels. Second — and longer term — the military should learn to play to their strengths of drone warfare and do more and more to change how we understand the way war is being fought, with a wider gray area between positions that can be a great big killzone for Russian troops without Ukrainian infantry to have to be there. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: I have a question related to the new proposal for a one-year military contract for citizens between 18-24. What is the status of this proposal? Is it implemented already or is it currently being discussed in the Rada? Which processes are necessary for it to be adopted, and do we know if this is likely to happen or is it facing many obstacles?

Answer: The Defense Ministry officially launched the “Contract 18-24” project on Feb. 11, and volunteers can already apply online. Deputy head of the Presidential Office Pavlo Palisa described it as a “pilot project” in its “test mode,” however. The project is being carried out on a limited scale so far, including four Ground Forces brigades, one Airborne brigade, and one Marine brigade.

Based on the results, there are plans to further expand the project to other units. The number of people who signed up via this procedure is in the hundreds, not thousands. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor

Question: We, your readers, hear constantly about the need for re-organization and reform of the Ukrainian military. For me, and other non-Ukrainians with a serious interest in Ukraine, can you discuss the current problems, like what happened to Zaluzhnyi, what’s up with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the aspects of corruption and mismanagement in the Ukrainian military?

Answer: Here, I am very happy to direct you to our latest article on this exact topic, by my colleague Natalia Yermak and myself. What’s up is that while Ukraine is waging a brutal struggle against Russian forces in the trenches and fields, it is also waging another battle, an internal one, against a military culture steeped in Soviet-era practices and mentalities that lead to excess loss of life and territories — the two things most dear to Ukraine in this war. There is a lot to go into, from the exact way that this actually manifests itself on the battlefield, to the persona of Oleksandr Syrskyi himself and the efforts to change the system, and for that, you should definitely check out the article. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: In relation to the ongoing discussions about the Russian invasion, why is the Russian side not interested in peace?

Answer: Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with an attack on the capital, Kyiv, as part of a broader attempt to decapitate and destroy the independent Ukrainian state. That attempt failed then, but now, having made progress in their war of attrition, and with the U.S. now abandoning the policy of supporting Ukraine’s struggle and instead looking more and more likely to abandon Kyiv altogether, the Russians are feeling pretty good about their position.

Even their stated minimalist goals call for the handover of a lot more Ukrainian territory in Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, inhabited by millions of Ukrainians. This is what the world, including U.S. President Donald Trump, needs to understand: Russia is absolutely not interested in peace simply because they started this war wanting a lot more, and they feel more confident in their ability to get it than they have in three years. — Francis Farrell, reporter

Question: What is the reason behind the Trump administration’s Russian propaganda talking points?

Answer: Without actually getting inside their heads — which I don’t think I’d enjoy in the slightest  — it’s impossible to say for sure. But, I guess there’s a sort of sliding scale of possible reasons, none of them particularly encouraging.

At one end of the scale, there is the possibility that they’re just underqualified, naive,  inexperienced, and are falling for Russian propaganda.

I’d say Steve Witkoff is perhaps the best example of this — he’s a real estate mogul, with no experience of politics or diplomacy, and was positively swooning about Putin after meeting him in Moscow last month. And all it seemed to take was a bit of a smile from Putin and a painted portrait of Donald Trump as a gift to take back to the White House.

Put yourself in his shoes: going from the world of luxury real estate to suddenly finding yourself in the Kremlin — discussing the future of entire countries — must be pretty intoxicating.

And what’s the result? You fall for the spectacle and take Putin at his word. Next thing you know, you’re chatting to Tucker Carlson, telling him that any Ukrainians who speak Russian are absolutely fine with living under Russian occupation.

In the middle of the scale, there is the possibility that they just don’t actually care about what they’re saying, so long as they get what they want.

Trump is the perfect example of this — he wants the mineral deal signed, and he was willing to say whatever it took to pressure Zelensky to do it. And, if you want to say something bad about Zelensky, and you’re looking for material, then all of those pre-prepared Kremlin lines that propagate so fruitfully on social media are just sitting there waiting for you.

I think this is the most likely reason, which is pretty terrifying. I recently interviewed historian Marci Shore about why she and her husband, Timothy Snyder, are leaving the U.S. to teach in Canada, and she put it perfectly.

Speaking about the Oval Office showdown, she said, “This was the profound moment that exposed that you’re dealing with people for whom there are no first principles, you’re just looking into this abyss of moral nihilism. Everything is a transaction, everything is a deal."

At the other extreme end of the scale, we get into the slightly conspiratorial world of “Is Donald Trump a Russian asset?"

We covered this in another interview with an author who is absolutely convinced he is. He has written two books about it, and there’s a lot of compelling evidence, but no smoking gun.

Regardless, it’s enough of a concern that even a British MP has raised it as a possibility.

But it’s sort of a moot point at the end of the day — whether Trump is a Russian asset or not, he’s sure acting like one. — Chris York, news editor

Question: What is the situation with the Ukrainian troops in Russia’s Kursk Oblast? We hear stories that they are surrounded. Other stories say they are retreating back to Ukraine. Have they got home safely?

Answer: Ukraine has had to withdraw from most of Russia’s Kursk Oblast, a long-expected outcome after the troops on the ground have suffered from critical logistical issues for months.

Ukraine is still holding onto a small patch of territory in Kursk Oblast near the border, which Western military experts have said was likely to prevent a Russian breakthrough into Ukraine’s adjacent Sumy Oblast in the northeast. The withdrawal appears to have been chaotic as always, which — like in the cases of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, and Kurakhove — could have been avoided by withdrawing weeks or a month earlier.

The rise and fall of Ukraine’s Kursk gambit

As Ukraine’s seven-month-long incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast came to what appears to be its end, Ukrainian soldiers and military experts are questioning the operation’s goal and the long-term effect it will have on the war. Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Russia’s Kurs…

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

But the withdrawal wasn’t as bad as it could have been, with no major encirclements, according to both troops on the ground and experts. Soldiers have had to walk on foot though for days, leaving their valuable equipment behind. Many raised concerns over expending manpower and limited resources into invading another country’s territory when they could have been used to defend one’s own, especially as Russia gained ground on the eastern front — where many of the units participating in the cross-border operation were previously deployed — over the second half of 2024. — Asami Terajima, reporter

Question: Ukraine is obviously maintaining the position that the parts of the four oblasts Donetsk, Luhansk, Zhaporizhia, and Kherson that are not in Russian hands can never be ceded to Russia in a ceasefire, nor will the effectively occupied parts legally be recognized as Russia. But how far can Ukraine be forced by the U.S. to make concessions in this respect?

Answer: Zelensky has to walk a fine line on this issue, balancing the need to retain U.S. support — which right now Ukraine definitely does need as Europe isn’t ready to fill the gap just yet — and public opinion.

The latest opinion poll found that 38% percent of Ukrainians were open to conceding territory in a peace deal, up from 8% in December 2022.

But the number of Ukrainians who oppose giving up territories under any circumstances, “even if this would prolong the war and threaten the preservation of independence,” stands at 51%.

Obviously, these numbers could shift further in the future, but right now, Zelensky is in a tricky spot.

But it’s just too early to know what sort of concessions the U.S. will demand of Ukraine, and given the absolute craziness of the last couple of months, it’s impossible to predict.

One point worth stressing, however, is that those polls do not include the views of the millions of Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation. The debate among politicians and the media tends to focus on land, but it’s also lives that are at stake.

Unfortunately, Trump doesn’t seem to take matters like this into account in his pursuit of just getting deals done, so what is abhorrent to you and I, is nothing of the sort in his mind. — Chris York, news editor

Question: Why doesn’t Ukraine conscript women into the military forces like men?

Answer: I don’t know the official reasoning for why Ukraine doesn’t conscript women, but I think it goes back to the traditional war mentality that women could take over the jobs needed to keep the cities running. Despite the critical manpower shortage, many Ukrainian soldiers — predominantly over the age of 45 — that I have met said the last thing they want is for women to be forced into the war, saying that they are fighting at the cost of their lives to protect women and children.

But Ukrainian women have also proven to be excellent soldiers, sometimes successfully taking over leadership roles and conducting extremely dangerous missions. — Asami Terajima, reporter

Ukrainian Valkyries: Women embrace military training to learn to defend their homeland (Photos)

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Kyiv announced a general mobilization, thousands of Ukrainians have been called up to defend their homeland. In Ukraine, conscription is mandatory only for men. Despite that, more than 45,000 women have voluntarily joined the Arm…

The Kyiv IndependentOksana Parafeniuk

Question: There are a fair number of NATO nations individually providing military equipment. But seeing as they are of different origin, operational characteristics, maintenance needs, and “operating manuals,” has this proven a problem for Ukrainian troops on the front lines?

Answer: Yes, this has been a major issue for Ukrainian soldiers, requiring a fair bit of tinkering with the weapons received. This has particularly complicated the match-up between arms and ammunition, with Ukrainian soldiers reporting the need to re-distribute gunpowder between disparate shells and explosives regularly. — Kollen Post, defense reporter

Question: After the recent interruption of weapons deliveries and intelligence, is everything back to normal? Is my country now meeting its commitments under the Trump administration (as the majority of the American people want)?

Answer: As far as we know, yes, but that comes with a few caveats.

The nature of intelligence sharing means few, if any, details about the state of the current relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine are public, or will be made public, so all we have to go on are the statements made by officials. And, according to both sides, it’s back up and running. Whether or not it’s up and running at the same level it was, we don’t know.

As an aside, there was a great piece in the NYT on the intelligence relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion, though notably, it doesn’t cover any of the period since Trump took charge. It’s very much worth a read, though.

As for military aid, that which was allocated by President Joe Biden is still making its way to Ukraine after the pause.

The crucial question here is how long will it last? Trump has yet to authorize any new weapons shipments and has tied future aid to the minerals deal which is still yet to be signed. So it’s all a bit murky as to how it will play out.

One notable recent announcement was that on April 3, U.S. General Christopher Cavoli said more F-16 fighter jets are being prepared for transfer to Ukraine. — Chris York, news editor

Question: What can individuals around the world do to help Ukraine the most?

Answer: This is one of the most frequently asked questions from our readers and members. The most obvious answer is to donate — two well-known organizations that support those on the front line are Come Back Alive and the Hospitallers. Especially since the suspension of USAID funding, donating even a few dollars can make a big difference: Ukraine was the largest recipient of U.S. economic aid, receiving over $14 billion in 2023.

Outside of making a monetary contribution, you can also contact your elected representatives, asking them to vote in favor of initiatives that help Ukraine, boycott companies that still operate within Russia, and read and share news from Ukraine. We’ve even made this list about how to help Ukraine, so it’s easy for you to share. And most importantly, don’t give up — every effort counts. — Brooke Manning, senior community manager

Ukraine’s long-suffering aerospace giants look to Europe to break free from Russian orbit

Where the Donbas meets the Dnipro River, the USSR built out a dense range of massive factories, using the local coal and metal reserves to smelt, weld, and cast the heaviest of machinery — and weaponry — for the whole of the Soviet Union. One of these is Pivdenmash, formerly known by

The Kyiv IndependentKollen Post

The EU has introduced new sanctions against Belarus on March 27, in response to continued repression and the election of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko in January.

Lukashenko was inaugurated into his seventh consecutive term as President of Belarus on March 25. Several Belarusian human rights groups have decried the elections as undemocratic and denounced the regime for human rights violations.

In power since 1994, Lukashenko’s rule has been marked by a harsh crackdown on political opposition, free media, and civil society.

Twenty-five individuals and seven entities have been sanctioned for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

The sanctions also denounce the role of these individuals and entities in human rights violations, repression, and military support of Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Nine judges have been sanctioned for issuing politically motivated sentences to repress civil society and democratic opposition.

Belarus' Election Commission and its members have been sanctioned for their role in holding elections “conducted in a climate of repression and human rights violations,” the European Council said in its press release.

The chair of Belarus’s largest political party, Aleh Ramanau, has been sanctioned.

Tsybulka-Bel LLC, a Belarusian agricultural company, has been imposed with restrictive measures for coordinating with Belarusian authorities to deploy inmates as forced laborers.

Several companies and their leadership have been subject to restrictive measures for their active participation in the Belarusian military-industrial complex. This includes Precise Electro-Mechanics Plant and its director, Yuri Tchorny.

The Belarusian Election Commission claimed that Lukashenko “won” 86.82% of the vote on Jan. 26.

The other candidates in the election were regime-approved and little-known. Sergey Syrankov got 3.21% of the vote, and Oleg Gaidukevich won 2.02% of the votes.

Ukraine war latest: Russia preparing for new spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, Zelensky says

Key developments on March 27: * Russia preparing for new spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, Zelensky says * ‘With or without the US’ — France, UK harden line over Ukraine at ‘Coalition of the Willing’ summit * North Korea sent 3,000 more troops to Russia to offset Ukraine war losses,…

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

This is not the first time Ukraine is participated in such negotiations. However, there are two main differences at this stage of the talks. Previously, Ukraine used to pick from the European acquis the clauses that align with Ukrainian legislation. Now we have to simply transfer to Ukraine “the content, principles and political objectives of the EU Treaties”, as well as all provisions on “common rights and obligations that constitute the body of EU law”. 

Moreover, there is a significant difference between the concepts and principles of EU Treaties and the rules and technical standards of EU law. A common understanding of concepts between Ukraine and the EU is necessary from the very start of the accession negotiations, while Ukraine will have some time for the implementation of laws and technical standards.

Current social discussion on EU accession creates an impression that the major issue of Ukraine’s EU accession is the necessity to adjust a large number of EU technical standards rather than the common understanding of the sense of EU Treaties. This is wrong: Ukraine approaches the EU not to move away from Soviet technical standards but to get rid of Soviet ideology, including  “Michurin” approaches to environmental management.  

As a theoretical physicist with 40 years of experience, I offer the Ukrainian delegation my notes on the key semantic differences between Ukraine and the EU in the field of environment and development formulated during the work on the Policy Roadmap for Environmental Damage Assessment within the framework of the Sweden-UNDP project “Reducing the Risks of Long-Term Environmental Disasters in Ukraine through the Establishment of a Coordination Center for Environmental Damage Assessment” as well as on the development of “Manual for the city’s climate risk assessment” commissioned by GIZ. 

In the European Commission‘s observations on Ukraine’s progress under Chapter 27 “Environment and Climate Change”, the following concepts need special attention (they need to be clarified and rethought during the accession negotiations):

• Environmental Restoration Liability
• Environmental impact assessment (EIA)
• Understanding climate risks and approaches to their reduction (Green Deal)
• Understanding Sustainability

Environmental liability in the USSR and the EU

In 2016, when working on the approximation of the EU Water Framework Directive, a working group of experts, including me, tried to add the first paragraph to the preamble of the Water Code of Ukraine: “Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage that must be protected, defended and treated as such.” Our attempt faced resistance from the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Water Resources Agency, which had just been renamed from the State Water Management Agency without any substantive changes to its functions and responsibilities.

As a physicist who works with the laws of nature, I have always been outraged that according to the Soviet “Michurin” attitude to the environment, environmental liability arises only as a result of violating laws and regulations established by the state, and not as a result of violating the limits established by nature. However, in the post-Soviet Law of Ukraine on Environmental Protection, “environmental damage” is still assessed based on the Soviet “normative” approach as “losses and damages caused to the state as a result of violation of environmental protection legislation.” In the EU, environmental damage is assessed by measurable changes in a natural resource or disruption of natural resource-related services and by the amount of funds required to restore the environment to its original state.

This discrepancy leads to several negative consequences. First, its corruption risks are obvious, when the damage assessment is easily changed hundreds of times by a simple Cabinet of Ministers Resolution. For example, before the war, the State Ecological Inspectorate of Ukraine counted billions of hryvnias of environmental damage per year, and in 2002-2023 – a thousand times more. Second, using such fundamentally different from international methods of environmental damage assessment makes it impossible to integrate this data into the Register of Damage Caused by the Russian Aggression against Ukraine, created by the Council of Europe in Hague.

Thus, after the recent adoption of the EU Nature Restoration Act, we should finally agree to introduce European-style environmental liability in Ukraine before starting negotiations by amending the basic environmental laws accordingly (see my recommendations here, here, and here). Without this, we will see neither EU membership nor environmental restoration projects. What kind of environmental restoration can we talk about if no one in Ukraine is responsible for this restoration?

EIA is not a legal procedure for assessing violations of environmental legislation, but a process of measurable assessment of physical impact on the environment

Another Soviet legacy is that concepts such as “environmental security” and “environmental impact/damage” are not quantified in Ukraine, but are defined dichotomously (either present or absent). The absence of measurable objective data on changes in the state of the environment and the impact on it causes the ineffectiveness of such dichotomous control because if you cannot measure, you cannot effectively manage. 

Another reason for ineffectiveness is that the dichotomy between violators and inspectors is a “zero-sum game” (i.e., a game in which there is necessarily a winner and a loser). In this game, zero is left for the restoration of the environment. This type of management makes it possible to punish violators but it does not allow us to even ask where, how, and why we need to improve the environment. 

Before the negotiations, it is necessary to decide on the proposals for a radical reform of the environmental impact (and damage) assessment process, moving from a “normative” dichotomous assessment to an inclusive management of achieving common development goals at the lowest cost to society. 

Understanding climate risks and ways to reduce them

Legislation inherited from the USSR (the Law on Environmental Protection and the Civil Protection Code) still maintains the understanding that security is the absence of risks and that there are only two states of security – security and insecurity. Therefore, all attempts to shift to climate or environmental risk management are met with resistance and misunderstanding. In the negotiations, it would be worth mentioning that according to the updated Environmental Strategy, security in Ukraine is now understood not as the absence of risks, but as risk reduction, and that the relevant changes will be made to other basic environmental laws.

Green Deal

Regarding the understanding of ways to reduce risks, most experts in Ukraine still believe that the Green Deal is a unilateral Green Course on emissions reduction as the only possible way to combat climate change (CC) and its consequences, and not a deal between the necessity both to reduce emission and to adjust to the life in a different climate. This is reflected in the difference between the Ukrainian and UN understanding of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13:

SDG 13 (UN): Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Target 13.1. Increase resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries

SDG 13 (Ukraine): Mitigate the effects of climate change

Objective 13.1: Limit greenhouse gas emissions in the economy

Indicator 13.1.1. Greenhouse gas emissions, % to 1990 level

The reason for this one-sided approach is, in our opinion, an outdated understanding of risk as the probability of a negative event (as defined by the Soviet Construction Norms), while ISO now defines risk as the “effect of uncertainty”, i.e. probability of event times its impact. Unfortunately, when developing the EIA Law, Ukraine refused to change the definition of risk accordingly. As a result, all environmental management practitioners have the impression that risk can only be reduced by reducing the likelihood of a negative event and not by reducing the impact of that event. In reality, the reduction of climate risks is possible not only by reduction of emissions but also through adaptation, i.e. the reduction of the negative impact of climate change. However, the Ukrainian government does not see “adaptation benefits” in the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.

Despite the officially submitted comments on the discrepancies between Ukrainian climate terminology and the IPCC Glossary (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), the discrepancies were transferred to the new Law on the Basic Principles of State Climate Policy. It would be good to indicate in the negotiations that we are aware of these differences and plan to overcome them

Understanding Sustainability

As for the other SDGs, Ukraine has been debating how to translate Sustainability since the Rio Summit in 1992, but mostly without discussing the meaning of the term.

The situation has become even more confusing with the advent of the EU Taxonomy classification of economic activity. The EU Taxonomy’s approach to Sustainability is rather misleading, as it defines an activity as sustainable if it contributes to the achievement of at least one of the goals: either climate change mitigation or adaptation to climate change. 

At the same time, the IPCC insists that achieving sustainable development requires synergies between these two main actions – mitigation and adaptation. In the Summary for Policymakers of the sixth report of the IPCC, it is explicitly stated:

• “Current development paths, combined with the observed effects of climate change, lead away from sustainable development rather than toward it.

• Mitigation plays a key role in reducing the threat of climate change.

• Adaptation plays a key role in reducing exposure and vulnerability to climate change. 

• Only simultaneous emissions reductions and adaptation can ensure sustainable development for all.

• Climate-resilient development is the process of implementing mitigation and adaptation options to support sustainable development for all.

• The window of opportunity for climate-resilient development is closing fast“.

Commentary by Dennis Meadows

Dennis Meadows describes the situation even better in his lecture dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the concept of “Limits to Growth” (personal communication – AD): 

Meadows’ statement — “We should not strive for sustainable development but for the system’s resilience to external influences” — deserves serious discussion.

Understanding the distinction between resilience and sustainable development is crucial for effective alignment with European policymakers during accession negotiations and for shaping Ukraine’s post-war recovery strategy. For a fragile nation like Ukraine, resilience is even more important. As the saying goes, “Before the fat man loses weight, the thin man dies.”

In a revealing blog post, Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin might need to abandon some of his ambitious plans amid a fallout in Washington.

Despite a tense exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and then U.S. President Donald Trump in the White House, Kovalenko reassured allies that no catastrophe had unfolded. He noted that while Zelensky's visit might not have been a complete success, there’s no and need for panic.

Reflecting on the Oval Office fracas, Kovalenko highlighted a crucial development: a wave of solidarity from European leaders. Presidents, prime ministers, ministers, and other politicians have been vocal in their support for Zelensky and the Ukrainian people.

"By morning, we see Europe united, with urgent measures being prepared. It's not about words; it's about arms. Support and weaponry to Ukraine will continue," Kovalenko emphasized. He also stated that any attempts by Putin to leverage U.S. relations to reenter European affairs are futile.

"In this climate, China is likely to focus its strategic partnership on Europe. Russia is seen by Beijing as merely a raw materials supplier. For the United States, Russia remains just a 'gas station' and a source of rare metals, with Putin ready to offer them 'unconditionally'," Kovalenko explained. He assured that Ukraine has ample resources to continue resisting the aggressor, even without American backing, and Russia's situation is far from ideal.

"In Russia, regional funds are dwindling, evidenced by reported difficulties in paying contractors. The sanctions persist. Consequently, life in Russia is bound to deteriorate," Kovalenko wrote.

He suggested that eventually Russia will have to make concessions to Ukraine, specifically abandoning its plans to occupy Ukrainian territories.

As Ukraine entered its fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war, it was geopolitics, not the war itself, that dominated headlines, as Kyiv’s relationship with new U.S. President Donald Trump nosedived over a proposed minerals deal.

In the meantime though, the battlefield continues to rage on multiple fronts, with daily Russian assaults continuing through a period of consistent sub-zero temperatures across eastern Ukraine.

The most intense fighting continues to be in southern Donetsk Oblast, where, although Russian territorial gains have slowed to a halt outside the key city of Pokrovsk, Ukraine’s defense of the area around Kurakhove buckled over the first months of 2025.

Going forward, many unpredictable factors hang over the next year of the war. Ukraine is trying to solidify its defense with new reforms, Russia faces questions over its ability to sustain its current rate of attacks and losses, while looming largest is the future of U.S. aid.

To reflect on the key conclusions of the third year of the full-scale war and what to look out for in the fourth, the Kyiv Independent sat down with the U.S.-based military analyst and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Rob Lee during a working visit to Kyiv.

The interview has been edited for clarity and length.

The Kyiv Independent: How would you describe how 2024 went for Ukraine, and what kind of core issues have really defined it?

Rob Lee: 2024 was a year in which Russia had a number of advantages. They had scaled the production of ammunition before this – the U.S. and Europe were trying to catch up to that. They had already received significant support from North Korea, from Iran, both in terms of ammunition, equipment, and now obviously troops from North Korea.

Ukraine began the year in a position of weakness, where they struggled to replace manpower losses from the summer of 2023 offensive. And we know the U.S. delayed passing the aid package for about six months until April 2024. So last winter was a quite difficult time for Ukraine, where there was a lack of fortifications. We know that Ukraine has improved on that since then. There’s a lack of manpower, still a problem, and there was a key lack of ammunition too.

I would say on the positive side, it’s obviously been a very difficult year for Ukraine, but the worst-case scenario did not happen. We didn’t see any kind of significant breakthrough, like an operational breakthrough.

We’ve seen incremental attritional assaults. Russia has made advances. It is still a very difficult situation on the front line, but there was a possibility that things would have gotten worse.

We came here three times in 2024. If I gave a summary of the findings from those trips, the manpower situation progressively got worse each time. The brigades we were meeting at the front line were more and more on their strength each time we came.

The average age of Ukrainian infantry was going up each time, so maybe it was 40 at the beginning of the year. It became 45 later on, and we were hearing in October that brigades had an average age of 50-year-olds as infantry.

It was very clear that there was a sense of maybe not exhaustion, but just of being fatigued or tired. Obviously, people have been fighting this war for three years now, a high-intensity conventional war. But look, Ukrainians are still fighting. They’re still putting up a very tough defense.

The Kyiv Independent: The Russian advance now seems to have really slowed down, is that, from the Russian side, more resembling to you an operational pause or a greater kind of lack of this same ability to attack with expendable infantry at the same rate?

Rob Lee: So on both sides, there’s a general sense of weakness. When we look at the forces, both militaries have significant experience now in combat. Three years of experience. But the experience is not evenly distributed across the force. So UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) units, UAV pilots are extremely capable on both sides now.

Artillery crews are very capable because many of these people have three years of experience. The attrition of FPV (first-person view drone) pilots and artillery is lower, and so in many cases you have cohesive units that have operated for years. So they’re very, very capable.

But the infantry side has become degraded on both sides. Most of the attrition and casualties is suffered by the infantry. And so in many cases, in an infantry squad, many of the people are going to be new, with probably less than a month of experience in many cases.

I think Russia made a choice: Instead of trying to develop well-trained, cohesive units, they’ve kind of accepted this attritional fight where we’re going to get a lot of infantry, we’re going to get a lot of manpower, we’re going to throw them into assaults. We’re not going to train them that much. We’re not going to really focus on that. And, of course, the quality is not that great.

On both sides, the average age (of the infantry) is quite high. The Russian side is probably lower than Ukraine, but you’re still getting plenty of people in their 40s, 50s, 60s. You’re getting people who are in debt that need the money.

If you sign a contract to join the Russian military, you go into an assault unit, the likelihood of being killed or wounded within a month is quite high. And I think it’s a question about how much the Russians know about that. Do they know how dire the situation is? That’s not clear.

But it’s certainly an issue where Ukrainian brigades are very understrength. Russia is still struggling to break through them. And that’s partially because Russia has weaknesses. They just don’t have as much equipment as they did before. They don’t have the artillery advantage they had before. Their infantry is not as capable as it was before. So even if their infantry takes a position, they’re not really trying to achieve a breakthrough. It’s kind of trying to take the next tree line, and they’re content doing that.

On the Ukrainian side, despite the issues with infantry, we know they’ve significantly scaled the production of FPVs and UAVs. The Defense Ministry said it was 1.6 million produced last year – very impressive numbers.

The quality of FPVs has gone up tremendously. The best Ukrainian young engineers are all working on these things. And so the innovation is very fast.

You have a number of (drone) regiments that are being formed as separate regiments. And those units are just extremely efficient. They are like industrial-size killing machines at the front line. And they’ve really improved the coordination between UAV units, which was a really significant issue early in the war.

And so I think there are two factors. On one hand, Ukraine has improved a number of things in terms of UAV use. And out of necessity, Ukraine has to innovate because they don’t have enough manpower. There is a greater political sensitivity to catalysts in Ukraine than there is in Russia, where it’s obviously very low. And they can’t fight the same way that Russia can fight. So on one hand, it’s this innovation that Ukraine is succeeding in. On the other hand, it’s Russia – they have resource advantage, but they’re struggling to really capitalize on it as much as they possibly could.

The Kyiv Independent: When we talk with experts and commanders, manpower seems to be the biggest issue. And it almost seems like it can only get worse because Ukraine’s overall manpower is limited. It’s not something that foreign aid can replace. What are the most important steps Ukraine can make?

Rob Lee: One of the things that’s been announced is an attempt to increase the number of volunteers from the 18 to 24-year-old age bracket. Someone mentioned this week that they’d received 10,000 applications – I don’t know all the facts there, we’ll have to wait and see.

In the beginning of the war in 2022, Ukraine obviously had a professional military and then there was a massive influx of volunteers. And those volunteers really sustained the war in 2022. You had very motivated people. You had some of the best, most educated, the highest-ranked people in Ukraine fighting in 2022. And as casualties mounted in 2023 and 2024, it went back to being a kind of mobilized military, in which case you get kind of a mix of results. You get some people who are still motivated to fight, some people who are less motivated to fight.

And of course, the military in 2025, it’s a mobilized military. In the infantry in particular, you’re not getting volunteers. I think the last group of volunteers for the infantry were the convicts.

There are several issues. One of them is trust. It’s about if you were sent to the military and you were given a certain job, to know that you are not going to be sent into infantry.

The Kyiv Independent: But the infantry is where you need the new people in the first place.

Rob Lee: Right. In all wars, it’s the infantry that has the highest burden by far, that shows the burden.

They don’t rotate that often. We should not underestimate how much of a burden these guys are holding. It’s really tremendous. And there’s no end date. There’s no demobilization system. And so it’s very difficult.

The U.S. has been pushing for the mobilization age to be reduced to 18. I don’t know, and I’m not Ukrainian. It’s kind of a political decision, so I don’t want to wade into it. There are Ukrainians who believe that’s the right move to do, but I also know many that don’t think it’s the right move to do, including people who are fighting, who think that the age pool from 30 to 50 is still large enough. There are more people who can mobilize to fight. And if you keep reducing the age pool, then men or boys who are in high school are going to be sent out of the country, so more families are going to be broken apart. You’ll get more people who go AWOL to avoid the war.

And of course, a lot of the most educated, best engineers are 18 to 24-year-olds, and you want them to be able to sustain the economy. So it’s not fully clear that that’s the solution.

But the problem is that we’re three years into the war, and the manpower pool is not what it was at the beginning of the war. And look, Russia has a lot of men, and they clearly have a lot of men who are willing to sign up for contracts to go into fighting. There’s little political sensitivity.

We know Vladimir Putin has been resisting another mobilization campaign, but he probably can do it. He could probably do an unlimited campaign. I think he has enough control domestically in Russia, where it probably won’t create such significant political turmoil.

So this is still a really big issue for 2025 – if Ukraine can at least fix or not let the manpower situation worsen – because I think Russia could probably sustain this war this year.

The Kyiv Independent: Yes, with mobilization, it’s being done here in a democracy, and it is causing tensions. But when people say it will cause real unrest in Russia, I think people forget about what kind of a state Russia is.

Rob Lee: And just one thing to add: In Russia, they can execute soldiers. If soldiers turn around, they will be executed.

And so they don’t, so they get pushed forward. And we also see all these videos of Russian soldiers committing suicide – just kind of can’t imagine a worse situation than basically serving the Russian military. In Ukraine, that’s not going to happen, right?

The Ukrainian commanders are not going to execute soldiers who are unwilling to fight, and so you have to deal with it in different ways. It is a democracy, and there’s greater value for the lives of Ukrainian soldiers than there is for the Russian military.

The Kyiv Independent: How realistic is, maybe not completely, but to what scale can infantry be truly replaced by unmanned systems on the ground?

Rob Lee: Well, we’re going to see this year. One of the key priorities, I think, for Ukraine’s government this year is to scale up the production of unmanned ground vehicles. There are significantly more companies developing new GVs, offering them, than last year.

There are some brigades that are very far forward using new GVs. I was told some things I can’t repeat, so I’ll be careful here, but I do think this year we’re going to see a quite significant expansion in use of new GVs. The main priority is probably going to be logistics.

So as we know, the most dangerous situation right now is the rotation of infantry. This is not when they're in the trenches. Once they've built good dugouts, they can hold them pretty well. But it's rotating between the rear area to the front line, which is quite difficult with vehicles because FPVs present this kind of new threat, which often can fly maybe 10 miles or 10 kilometers past the front line. So if you can replace the use of vehicles for logistics, that can really significantly improve the situation.

Some of these new GVs are quite large. They can bring logs and other things to build better fortifications. And for some of the brigades, a majority of supplies are being moved by UGVs right now.

There are still limitations. So operating UAVs, UGVs is still very manpower intensive. We're talking about four-man teams. Usually, it requires a lot of coordination.

This is how Ukraine has to innovate and adapt to the situation. Russia has more manpower. Ukraine cannot afford to lose more infantry. That is a key issue. And so UGVs are part of this, just as UAVs were for compensating for lack of artillery ammunition or lack of infantry right now.

The Kyiv Independent: We've heard about plans to change the Ukrainian military into a corps system. How do you assess that decision and how can it be executed in a situation where the military is so overstretched along the front line?

Rob Lee: The idea is the right one. A consistent problem throughout the war is that Ukraine is a brigade-style military, and there isn't really much of a command and control structure above that.

You have operational strategic groups, operational tactical groups, but these commands, they're not really responsible for the units under their command. Units kind of come in and leave, whereas you want them to have long-term responsibility because then you're going to be more careful about how you use them, you're not going to have too many casualties.

One of the broader problems in the Ukrainian military the last year and a half, because there's a manpower problem, is that often brigades will be piecemeal deployed across the front line, where a brigade may have two battalions in one direction, a battalion in another direction. Those battalions are attached to other brigades. That other brigade commander, they're probably going to use the attached units more aggressively than their own units, just out of a sense of survival.

This has created a variety of problems. So the move to a corps structure would be useful, and I think the idea that the brigade commanders – I'm not sure if it's official – but like Khartiia Brigade, Azov, 3rd Assault, 92nd, some of the really famous units, taking the lead – it makes sense. One of the problems last year is that Ukraine set up a number of new brigades, the 150 series. Many of them had a variety of problems, which I won't go into, but if you put those brigades under the command of another brigade that has a good culture, that does training the right way, that does leadership the right way, you can in some ways ameliorate those problems, and that's kind of an ideal situation.

But as you mentioned, forming the corps right now is quite difficult. So it's going to be a big question about how it's executed.

The Kyiv Independent: Going back to Russia, it almost seems like in the information space, there are two images of the Russian military. One is that Russia has upscaled its recruiting and its production, and is almost a truly unstoppable military machine. But then other people say that all they can do is human wave attacks and, at the rate of their loss, they'll lose so many million people to take this much of Ukraine. What is the real picture of the Russian military?

Rob Lee: So it's a mix. There are strengths, and there are really serious weaknesses, too.

Russia's certainly not unstoppable. Russia, since October 2023, they've been strategically on the offensive, they've had the initiative, they've advanced in the Avdiivka direction, but other places: In Toretsk, the fight began sometime in the summer, Chasiv Yar, they got there around April, and they've almost taken the city, but it's taken a very long time, heavy casualties. And they're still struggling to take back Kursk.

A lot of this comes back to what Russia's political objectives and the military means are. So Vladimir Putin last year laid out that the minimum conditions for negotiations is control of all four oblasts that he says are part of Russia, right? Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson. Russia is a very long way from taking all those oblasts, right?

So obviously Luhansk, almost all of it is Russia-controlled, although there's still very heavy fighting for the last part of it. Donetsk, there's a lot of fighting to go. Russian forces got to Pokrovsk around August, and they still have not been able to encircle it for a long time at heavy costs, and obviously Ukraine has had some counterattacks the last few weeks, retaking some areas.

So not only have they not taken Pokrovsk, but trying to get to Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk – at this rate, it could take quite a long time. And of course, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, this is something far, far removed. Russia's still very far from achieving its minimum objectives in this war.

But they have a significant manpower advantage. They recruited a large number of contract soldiers last year. That means they can sustain this war for this year, at least, in terms of manpower. As it later goes on, this could be a more significant issue.

Some capabilities Russia has are much more capable now than they were before. They've got FPV units, they have far more ISR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition) units, although, obviously, Ukraine has had success countering them. They've improved and modernized many of the missiles, such as KH-101s and Iskander-Ms.

Their long-range missile strikes, they've improved the tactics behind it. They do adapt. We shouldn't say that they don't. Russian EW (electronic warfare), depending on who you talk to, is still quite effective. And they have some other supporting capabilities that have gotten effective.

And Russian air defenses are not as effective as the air defense systems we've seen in this war, but they still do shoot down a lot of missiles. They have shot down plenty of Storm Shadows and ATACMS. Obviously, these UAV attacks Ukraine conducts on Russia, most UAVs get shot down, although still, if a few get through, that's often enough.

The Kyiv Independent: There is a prospect of the U.S. really abandoning Ukraine in terms of military aid, and then there are other more political questions like intelligence and Starlink. How bad could it be for Ukraine if that's cut off?

Rob Lee: The short answer is I don't know. I think there are different scenarios. One is where the U.S. does not pass an aid package, but they are open to Europe purchasing U.S. weapons or ammunition to form military sales for Ukraine, in which case, that could potentially supplant this, and Europe is still a very rich group, they still have plenty of money, and if they tap into Russian currency reserves, that is another option.

At the same time, if the U.S. does not pass an aid package, then the artillery expenditure rate for Ukraine is going to go down. Instead of 2 to 1, if it's 3 to 1, 4 to 1, what that means in the front line is that more Ukrainian soldiers will die, on a very basic level. It doesn't necessarily mean it will be decisive, but it will become more difficult for Ukraine to fight.

There are other systems that I believe only the U.S. produces, like the interceptors for Patriots, munitions for HIMARS, I'm sure there are a variety of other things, too, like Stingers, Javelins. Some of those things will be really critical.

HIMARS fills a very critical role in the Ukrainian military for operational-level fire. There's nothing else that replaces it. And then Patriot interceptors – Patriot is the main anti-ballistic missile defense system for Ukraine. And that is what is protecting Kyiv and all other cities from ballistic missile threats. Ukraine has the ability to shoot down cruise missiles pretty effectively. We know they can shoot down Shaheds and other UAVs very effectively. But ballistic missiles, the options aren't as great.

If you lose this kind of ballistic missile defense, then that could be a key issue. Russia might go after defense industrial factories again or go after the energy grid more successfully. And that could pose significant issues.

So it won't be a complete breakdown, but a loss of U.S. aid could have significant effects. Starlink, obviously, plays a really important role in communications, in integrating the UAV systems.

If the U.S. not only stops providing aid but also refuses to allow Europe to buy munitions, that could have a really significant effect, particularly because we know Ukraine already has a manpower problem, and that would compound the issues Ukraine faces.

The Kyiv Independent: Russia's going forward and they are advancing, there's no real reason for them to be interested in stopping the war, and I think that's always the key question about a negotiated peace. So if we're looking first and foremost at the battlefield beyond grand geopolitics, what would it take for Russia to feel at this point that they just can't go any further forward and they're happy to take what they have?

Rob Lee: For this war to end, it begins with Russia not being able to advance on the battlefield. As I said before, the minimum objectives that Russia has are to take control of all four of those oblasts, which Russia only partially controls right now.

Russia, at this rate, is quite far from achieving that. I don't think it's likely that Russia would take all of Donetsk Oblast this year, unless there's a kind of catastrophic breakdown of Ukrainian forces. And again, it comes back to the U.S. aid and other factors.

And so for Russia, as long as they're advancing on the battlefield, and they have not achieved taking all of Donetsk Oblast, I think the war is going to continue. Peace negotiations can go on, but the gap there is too significant, and I don't think there's any chance that President Zelensky is going to give up territory that Ukraine currently controls. I just don't think that is politically palatable, and I don't think Ukrainians would allow it. So right now, we have a gap between the Russian demands and the Ukrainian version of what they would be willing to accept as the end of the war.

The other big factor here is that how the war ends is really critical. There's a reason why Ukraine keeps asking for security guarantees, because – people talk that Ukraine is tired of this war, exhausted, and that's true – but I think my sense is that what Ukraine is really tired of is this persistent threat from Russia. This threat has been going on for quite a long time, the war began 11 years ago, and for Ukraine, it's important that however the war ends, that it ends and does not begin again.

There's a chance that if the Trump administration offers concessions that are outside of Ukraine, such as about the security architecture of Europe, maybe that will allow Russia to end the war on different terms in Ukraine because that would be a significant victory for Russia. This war is in part about changing the security architecture of Europe. It's not just about Ukraine.

We saw the demands that Russia made back in December 2021 about going back to what the NATO borders looked like in 1997 and so on. I think Russia still wants that, and they're still talking about that publicly.

My view is that this war is going to continue. It will likely continue as of this summer. Maybe we'll see a ceasefire, but not necessarily a permanent ceasefire because Russia has not achieved even its minimum objectives in the war. It has not been a success for Russia, it's come at a high cost, and even though Putin has very strong control of Russia, can he sell what he's achieved so far as a victory to the Russian people? I'm not sure he can because he really hasn't succeeded, and the costs have been quite significant. So, unfortunately, I think the war is probably going to continue.

We'll see how the U.S. responds because I think negotiations are going to be more difficult than maybe some U.S. officials currently imagine. The way to end this war is to prevent Russia from advancing on the battlefield, to get to a point where Russia can't have success. But as long as Russia advances on the battlefield, it's going to continue. And for the U.S., the best ability to affect that is to continue providing greater aid because then that will enable Ukraine to stop Russian advances.

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The Kyiv IndependentDominic Culverwell

Feb. 24, 2025 marks three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Three years since Ukraine, and the world, ceased to exist as we knew them.

Kyiv Independent staff members have answered the question, “If you could go back in time, what would you tell yourself on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion?” The following reflections offer a window into the profound impact this war has had on a group of people covering the war — and a nation — changed forever.

Asami Terajima, reporter

I would tell myself that everything about your life will change tomorrow: your understanding of war, peace, and life. And that you made a good call convincing your parents not to return to Ukraine, where they had been living, because you had good instincts about what was to come.

Don’t freak out, but the war that is about to consume your life is way worse than you could have ever imagined. The most important thing is that you know you are not alone. You have friends and colleagues who will be there for you, so just keep taking one step at a time. You are only a 21-year-old university student who just stepped into the world of journalism. Nothing is expected of you. So just cherish the last few hours in peace, the calm before the storm before the innocence of youth is taken away from you.

Make sure that you are comfortable with the risk you are taking, and follow your gut — it can sometimes save lives. Don’t panic, and stay true to yourself. You will lose many friends to war, you will attend funerals for the first time, and you will witness horrifying scenes that you were always scared to watch in war movies. But you are loved, and there will be beautiful moments amid the uncertainty and darkness that shine so brightly. You will discover more about yourself along the way.

But also, leave the Kyiv Independent office a little earlier on Feb. 23 so that you can get a good sleep in (I left at 2 a.m. on Feb. 24 and the invasion started a few hours later).

Toma Istomina, deputy chief editor

I didn’t sleep on Feb. 24, 2022. The days leading up to the full-scale invasion were already crazy enough to keep me in the office until late at night, and by late I mean past 2 a.m. By the time I got home, it was already clear that tonight was the night when Russia would go through with its sick plan.

Just 30 minutes before the first explosions rocked Kyiv and Russian tanks started rolling over Ukrainian borders from all sides, I published a post on Instagram, saying:

“Again and again we prove to have something Russia can only envy. We are united, we are courageous, and our values prevail in the face of hundreds of thousands of fully equipped troops encircling our country. We might have been unfortunate to share a border with Russia. But we are damn fortunate to have each other. And nobody will ever take that away.”

Three years later, after everything we’ve been through, I couldn’t say it better. If I could go back in time to the eve of the full-scale invasion, I would take my own phone, open that post, and read it out loud to myself, with a lot of confidence.

No words could have truly prepared me for the horror to come, but knowing my future self stood by this vision might have made it easier to see the light ahead.

Oh, and I would tell myself to call our developers and ask them to prepare our website for record traffic at 5 a.m. Waking them up after the full-scale invasion had already started to fix our crashed website? A bit awkward.

Natalia Yermak, reporter

I had a picnic on a frozen lake with my friends on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion. We fried eggs and sausages over a fire. I would have told myself in that moment that my old life was about to end forever. But I will not be the only one.

I’d also tell myself that my first impression of the war — that it is bigger than just Ukraine, and will change people’s lives all over the world — will prove more true than ever in a few years.

There are so many stories of strength and compassion that I’ll see over three years, and so many tragedies — more than I ever thought I could handle.

Telling these stories will help me to get through. They’ll stay with me, and hopefully, with you, our readers, so that one day, when you or I get to have a picnic with friends, we remember the people who stood up to evil to protect the good in our lives, and we ask ourselves: What can I do to repay them?

Elsa Court, audience development manager

I’d tell myself that it’s going to feel like the end. It’s going to feel like there is no hope, that Ukraine will be completely occupied, that you will never see Kyiv again. You’re also going to feel powerless watching what is happening from abroad, like seeing a tsunami or earthquake rip into a piece of land from afar. You will feel like you are standing there, frozen, as the unthinkable happens, and an unstoppable force swallows Ukraine.

But just because this is how it feels, doesn’t mean it’s true.

First of all, it’s not the end — it’s only the beginning, and not just for Ukraine, but for all of Europe. You are going to see Kyiv again (in fact, you will move there two years later). And you will find working at the Kyiv Independent will make you feel like you have some impact, at least on how other non-Ukrainians like you understand Ukraine and Russia’s war. You will also find out that Russia is not an unstoppable force — but so far, only Ukrainians have dared to stop it.

You will become a lot less fatalist after moving to Ukraine — there’s something about being surrounded by people who continue to live, regardless of their neighbor’s best effort to kill them, that will change your attitude.

That doesn’t mean feelings of hopelessness will ever go away. When I feel particularly hopeless, a good Ukrainian friend tells me, “Elsa, doh kinstya” — Ukrainian for "keep going, until the end." After three years, you still won’t know for sure when, or where, the end will be.

Kate Tsurkan, reporter

If I could go back and tell myself anything on the eve of the invasion, it would be this: prepare yourself.

You know what’s coming — you have no doubt. But you aren’t ready for the full extent of Russia’s cruelty. Prepare yourself for the fact that the country you were born in won’t help the country you love as much as it can or should. And its next president? He might betray us completely.

Prepare yourself to constantly worry about your friends on the front line, and to struggle with the dual feelings of gratitude and guilt from having some semblance of a normal life thanks to them.

Prepare yourself to see a video, after a Russian attack, where your friend is clearly not going to make it. It can happen again. It can happen to anyone you know — even you.

The fact that you will spend two weeks in Kharkiv without hearing a single explosion is dumb luck. Still, you should not shrug off every air raid siren like you will in Chernivtsi. You should not become so acclimated to the sounds of war.

Prepare yourself — because you will have a child. And no matter what happens, you won’t be allowed to cry about any of this in front of her. Your job will be to teach her to cherish her culture above all else, to hate Russia for bringing war to her lands, and most importantly, to survive.

Kateryna Denisova, reporter

Freedom means a lot to millions of Ukrainians, believe in your people — that is what I would tell myself on the eve of the invasion.

I’d also tell myself that this war concerns the whole world; there is no justice, but you should never lose hope and always act.

Back then, on the first day of Russia’s all-out invasion, as a Ukrainian and a journalist, I was sure that the world would not just sit by and watch; it would give us all the weapons we needed, close the skies, and do everything to stop Russia from destroying my nation. But this did not happen.

I would tell myself that it was in fact Ukraine — not other countries that are richer and have more means — that would be the most powerful and decisive in the moment, even as it seemed it was about to fall into Russia’s hands. Will was the only weapon that Russia did not have and will never have.

Dominic Culverwell, business reporter

I would tell myself to be mentally prepared for a hard and emotional three years. And to be strong because tomorrow morning, you are going to wake up and have a panic attack, but just know that your friends are going to survive the battle of Kyiv and the occupation of Bucha.

You are also going to meet some of the most incredible people and make amazing friends. Ukrainians are going to teach you so much about strength and unity but be prepared for a dark shift in your humor — it's a coping mechanism, so don't be alarmed. Ukrainians are good at cracking a joke in bleak times.

I’d tell myself that there's a long road ahead and moving to Kyiv during the war will be one of the best decisions you've ever made. Even though the night-time drone and missile attacks are exhausting and the stories you hear are emotionally gutting, you won't ever question your decision.

1,000 days of full-scale war: Reflections from the Kyiv Independent team

As we mark 1,000 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, members of the Kyiv Independent’s staff have paused to reflect. These reflections offer a glimpse into the profound impact of war — not only on a nation’s struggle for survival but on those who bear

The Kyiv IndependentAnna Belokur

U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy said that the Kremlin shows no interest in pursuing peace in Ukraine, following a speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a closed-door session of the G20 foreign ministers' meeting in Johannesburg on Feb. 20.

Speaking to reporters after the session, Lammy criticized Lavrov’s remarks, saying they did not indicate any willingness to negotiate a settlement, according to the Associated Press. He also noted that Lavrov left the room before Lammy had the chance to deliver his own speech.

The G20 meeting, taking place in South Africa, follows recent U.S.-Russia bilateral talks over ending the war in Ukraine—talks that excluded both Ukraine and its European allies.

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The Kyiv IndependentKollen Post

Tensions have been further heightened by U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments blaming Ukraine for the war and his criticism of President Volodymyr Zelensky.

In his speech, released by the U.K. Foreign Office, Lammy accused Russia of engaging in “Tsarist imperialism” and failing to learn from historical colonial wars. He expressed disappointment in Lavrov’s speech, saying he had hoped for acknowledgment of civilian suffering and a commitment to a durable peace, but instead heard what he described as “the logic of imperialism.” Lammy dismissed Lavrov’s remarks as “tired fabrications” and urged G20 members not to be misled by Russia’s justifications for its actions.

The G20, which includes major global economies alongside the EU and African Union, has struggled to find common ground on key geopolitical issues, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his opening address, urged member states to engage in constructive dialogue amid ongoing global crises, including war, climate change, and economic instability.

However, U.S. disengagement from the summit signals the Trump administration’s continued prioritization of its “America First” agenda over multilateral cooperation.

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The Kyiv IndependentDominic Culverwell

Yuliya Navalnaya, widow of late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and Western leaders decried repression in Russia on Feb. 16, the anniversary of Navalny’s death.

Navalny, an outspoken critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was arrested on politically motivated charges in January 2021. He was convicted and later died in an Arctic penal colony in February 2024.

Western countries, including Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement on the anniversary of Navalny’s death.

“We reiterate that the ultimate responsibility for his death lies with the Russian authorities. One year on, Russia’s dire human rights record continues to deteriorate … All to serve its own interests,” the statement read.

The statement condemned Russia for holding over 800 political prisoners who are tortured and forced into psychiatric detention.

“The Kremlin crushes peaceful dissent, maintains a climate of fear, and undermines the rule of law,” it said.

The countries also claimed that Russia uses the threat of imprisonment to quash opposition to the full-scale war against Ukraine.

“Many (are) imprisoned for speaking out against the Kremlin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality shown towards the Ukrainian people,” the statement said.

The anniversary of Navalny’s death falls during the Munich Security Conference, where European and U.S. officials convened to discuss the status of the war as it approaches its third year.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas issued her own statement regarding Navalny on Feb. 16.

“Navalny gave his life for a free and democratic Russia. Today, his lawyers are unjustly imprisoned along with hundreds of political prisoners,” she said.

“Russia is increasingly waging an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine while continuing its domestic repression, persecuting those who advocate for democracy … The EU calls on Russia to stop its brutal repression of civil society, media, and opposition figures."

Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, also posted a video commemorating her late husband one year after his death.

“To whom he opened their eyes to the truth of Putin’s regime, it is important to continue supporting (Navalny),” she said.

Since her husband’s death, Navalnaya has emerged as a key Russian opposition figure. She spoke at the Munich Security Conference at a panel alongside Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, warning against attempts to negotiate with Putin.

“Even if you decided to negotiate with Putin, just remember he will lie,” she said on Feb. 14.

A vocal opponent of Putin, Navalnaya has expressed ambivalence toward arming Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s invasion.

‘No point trying to negotiate’ with Putin, Yulia Navalnaya says

“Even if you decided to negotiate with Putin, just remember he will lie,” Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the late Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, said at the Munich Security Conference two days before the anniversary of her husband’s death.

The Kyiv IndependentAbbey Fenbert

After promising to quickly resolve the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump and his top officials’ actions on Feb. 12 appeared to undermine Ukraine’s leverage in peace talks, renewing fears that his plans for a quick resolution could amount to a victory for Russia.

Trump announced he had held phone calls with both Russian leader Vladimir Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky, saying peace negotiations would start “immediately” and a ceasefire is in the “not too distant future."

Earlier in the day, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said “returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective,” and that NATO membership for Ukraine is not an option.

By conceding leverage points before negotiations have formally started, Trump’s team has “totally screwed their own negotiating position,” Timothy Ash, an associate fellow at the Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Program, told the Kyiv independent.

“Why, even before negotiations start, would you give away your negotiating leverage?” Ash said. “We might ultimately agree that NATO is not appropriate at this time, or maybe never, but it’s a card that Trump could have used in negotiations. Similarly with territory. Trump could have played hardball."

“It seemed like a rookie error,” Ash added.

‘We cannot trust our partners’

For many in Ukraine, the U.S. voicing concessions on territory and NATO membership — before conducting any formal negotiations involving Ukraine — amounted to a betrayal by a key ally.

“This means that we cannot trust our partners,” said Petro Andryushchenko, former Mariupol mayoral advisor and head of the Center for the Study of Occupation.

“This is exactly what the president (Zelensky) means when he says, ‘If we are not accepted into NATO, we have to build NATO here.’"

Territorial concessions are particularly devastating for those living in difficult conditions under occupation, Andryushchenko said, as they will have to face the idea that they will never rejoin Ukraine.

Roughly one fifth of Ukraine’s territory is occupied by Russia, with Russian forces still advancing slowly in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainians living under occupation experience "widespread" human rights violations, the UN has found, including threats, unlawful imprisonment, and torture.

"Imagine being under occupation, helping to believe in liberation, helping with your every step, your life, reporting information about the presence of Russian troops, their behavior — important things that bring us closer to victory. And now you are told that no, you are not needed, you are there forever," he said.

"I think it destroys the whole basis of democracy and the building of the world after the Second World War."

Since taking office, Trump has had significant military, financial, and diplomatic options at his disposal that could be used against Russia to extract better terms for Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko, a top member of parliament from President Volodymyr Zelensky's party, disputed Hegseth’s comment that restoring Ukraine’s pre-war borders was "unrealistic," calling the prospect "absolutely realistic" if more were done to pressure Russia.

Trump himself had earlier floated the idea of applying high tariffs and sanctions to Russia’s struggling economy if a peace deal was not achieved.

"To (restore the borders), Ukraine needs to get enough contemporary weaponry which would allow it to have, at a minimum, parity with Russia on the battlefield. Additionally, the use of serious financial sanctions against Russia’s banking and financial system could have paralyzed the Russian war machine," Merezhko said.

"Regrettably, we don’t see that yet."

Over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians

Not all were surprised by Hegseth’s comments. John Foreman, the former British ambassador to Moscow, told the Kyiv Independent that they revealed an "ultra-realist approach."

"The Americans aren’t prepared to put NATO troops into Ukraine. We know that, because if they had, they would have done it in 2022. And de facto, Ukraine’s going to lose land as part of any peace deal, because Ukraine can’t push the Russians out," said Foreman.

"I can see why it’s gone down badly in Kyiv, and amongst some European capitals. But to be honest, you shouldn’t be surprised."

The phone call with Putin is still significant, Foreman noted, in terms of signalling how the discussions are being carried out — with Trump speaking directly to Putin without other American allies present.

President Joe Biden previously cut all direct communication with Putin after the 2022 invasion.

"The Russians have got what they really wanted as a start — direct conversation with America, over the head of the Europeans, and over, perhaps, the head of the Ukrainians," said Foreman.

European leaders — suddenly left out of discussions after nearly three years of close involvement with the U.S. on Ukraine-related issues under President Joe Biden’s administration —  scrambled to react to Trump’s comments.

Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, said: "Why are we giving (Russia) everything they want, even before negotiations have started? … If there is an agreement made behind our backs, it simply will not work."

European officials are concerned that they might be left to shoulder the costs of Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and security after being excluded from the discussions between Trump and Putin, the Financial Times reported on Feb. 13.

Six European countries released a statement with Ukraine and the European Commission following Trump’s comments, that read: "Our shared objectives should be to put Ukraine in a position of strength. Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations."

The statement also committed to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Germany, France, the U.K., Poland, Italy, and Spain signed the statement.

'Trump has effectively surrendered'

Within the U.S. as well, Trump and Hegseth’s comments provoked backlash from some officials.

U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal called Hegseth’s message a "surrender and betrayal" of Ukraine, while Senator Adam B. Schiff also condemned Hegseth’s comments and criticized Trump for calling Putin before he spoke with Zelensky.

John Bolton, a former national security adviser to Trump, told CNN: "Trump has effectively surrendered to Putin before the negotiations have even begun."

The terms quoted by Hegseth "could have been written in the Kremlin," Bolton added.

Hegseth pushed back on claims that a swift negotiation would be a “betrayal” at a press conference in Brussels, the Guardian reported. “There is no betrayal — there is a recognition that the whole world and the U.S. is invested in peace, in a negotiated peace,” he said.

Trump’s calls to Putin and Zelensky have nonetheless set the stage for talks to end the Ukraine war, signaling a new phase after nearly three years of war. No negotiations have taken place since the war’s early months.

Zelensky is expected to meet with several top U.S. officials in the next few days at the Munich Security Conference from Feb. 14-16. According to the President’s Office, Trump's Ukraine and Russia envoy Keith Kellogg and Vice President JD Vance are among those he is planning to meet.

Kellogg is also scheduled to visit Ukraine on Feb. 20. Trump has said he may meet with Putin in Saudi Arabia and plans to meet Zelensky soon, though he did not provide details.

Trump says peace talks to start ‘immediately.’ But what terms would be acceptable for Ukraine?

U.S. President Donald Trump on Feb. 12 held phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, saying that negotiations to end the war in Ukraine will start “immediately.” “I just spoke to President Volodymyr Zelensky. The conversation went very well. He,…

The Kyiv IndependentOleg Sukhov

The European Union’s lending arm, the European Investment Bank (EIB), has signed agreements to mobilize close to 1 billion euros ($1.03 billion) in investments into Ukraine’s public and private sectors as the U.S. moves to cut funding to development projects in the country.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze all foreign assistance has cast uncertainty on the future of projects in Ukraine in nearly every sector, from critical infrastructure to civil society development.

Nadia Calvino, the EIB’s president, said at a press briefing on Feb. 10 that she had discussed Ukraine’s urgent funding needs with Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to see where the bank could fill the gaps if international partners withdraw their support.

“We discussed the priority areas where the EIB could step up its support — for example, in the areas of border management, transport, energy, and municipalities,” Calvino said in Kyiv during her first visit to the country since taking up office as head of the EIB a year ago.

“We’re working very closely with the government to finance the necessary investments to rebuild, repair, and make national infrastructure more resilient,” she said.

The investment announced on Feb. 10 includes 420 million euros ($433 million) in Ukraine’s public sector to help restore critical infrastructure such as energy, heating, water supply, hospitals, schools, and social housing.

On the private sector side, the bank has signed an agreement to mobilize close to 500 million euros ($515 million) in financing for small and medium-sized businesses throughout the whole country, including in front-line regions, Calvino said.

The bank also announced the German Economy Ministry is providing a 16.5-million-euro ($17 million) loan through the EIB’s climate initiative fund to finance renewable energy projects in Ukraine.  The EIB is a key lender in funding Europe’s green transition.

Calvino said the EIB has been working with the Ukrainian government to speed up the implementation of projects on the ground over the last year. The bank signed a pledge with Ukraine’s government last year to accelerate the deployment of 560 million euros ($596 million) it had ready to help rebuild Ukraine in 2024.  

“Municipalities and small and medium-sized businesses can start already approaching their banks to see about this financing and we hope that it will be mobilized as soon as possible,” she said at the press briefing.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EIB has delivered over 2.2 billion euros ($2.26 billion) in financing mainly dedicated to repairing and modernizing Ukraine’s municipal infrastructure.

This latest round of investment announcements are part of the bank’s 2-billion-euro ($2.06 billion) contribution to the EU’s 50-billion-euro ($51 billion) Ukraine Facility loan and grant program.

As Trump’s team looks to negotiate an end to Russia’s nearly-three year full-scale invasion of Ukraine, talks of reconstruction in Ukraine have returned to front and center.

Russia’s constant missile and drone attacks since 2022 have seriously damaged Ukraine’s housing, water and energy systems. Costs to rebuild are approaching the $500 billion mark.

Calvino said she is sure the EIB will play an important role in supporting the reconstruction of the country “not only because of our direct investment but because of our ability to mobilize public and private investment to support the public and private sector in Ukraine, and beyond."

Meanwhile, European member states recently called on the EIB to increase its lending to the bloc’s defense industry and beef up its defenses against any possible Russian attack in the future.  

The president said she welcomes the support the bank has received from European membes states on stepping up the EIB’s role in supporting Europe’s defense and security sectors “while safeguarding our financing capacity and AAA rating."

The bank already invested 1 billion euros ($1.03 billion) into the sector last year and plans to double it to 2 billion euros ($2.06 billion) in 2025, she added.

Euroclear to send 2-billion-euro tranche of Russian assets profits for Kyiv

Belgian clearing house Euroclear said in a statement on Feb. 5 that the second payment is expected to be made in March and should amount to approximately 2 billion euros.

The Kyiv IndependentYana Prots

The European Union and NATO must strengthen cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure from attacks, which pose a growing threat to European stability. The Kremlin, with its history of weaponizing energy, remains a prime suspect. NATO must properly secure the Baltic Sea — the so-called NATO lake.

The Baltic states achieved independence from the post-Soviet energy system in February by connecting to the continental grid via Poland. However, this transition is being overshadowed by a series of incidents in the Baltic Sea, underscoring the urgent need to secure the energy bridge from Poland, known as the LitPol Link. Poland and the Baltic states are ramping up their preparations.

Energy ministers from the Baltic states and Poland discussed preparations on Jan. 24 for the synchronization scheduled for Feb. 8-9. They announced plans for joint protection of the infrastructure required for this effort, following multiple incidents in the Baltic Sea. The synchronization will proceed without relying on the Estlink 2 cable, which was damaged in one of these incidents.

The meeting in Riga focused on finalizing preparations for synchronization and strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure. “The damage to the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland to Estonia has not impacted the ability of the Baltic states to safely disconnect from the Belarusian and Russian energy system and connect to the European grid,” the ministers concluded.

Analyses indicate that the Baltic states have sufficient cross-border capacity through Estlink 1, NordBalt, and LitPol Link to synchronize with Europe without relying on Estlink 2. Synchronization entails disconnecting the Baltic states from the post-Soviet BRELL system — which will continue to include Belarus and Russia — and adapting Baltic energy systems to operate on the continental frequency.

The LitPol Link power connection, running through Poland, will facilitate this transition. Synchronizing with the continental grid will eliminate energy exchanges with the BRELL system. This move is particularly significant for Kaliningrad Oblast, which will become an energy island — just as the Baltic states would have been if disconnected from BRELL without European synchronization.

However, we cannot be sure that other parts of the critical infrastructure needed for a successful disconnection from the post-Soviet system are safe from malign activity. The Baltic states and Poland are enhancing the security of LitPol Link and other critical infrastructure elements to protect the synchronization process.

“The resilience and protection of infrastructure have never been more important. The Russian Federation is deliberately destroying Ukraine’s power grid, and its hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea underscore the importance of a well-secured energy system for defense,” said Krzysztof Bolesta, state secretary at Poland’s Ministry of Climate and Environment.

Poland is also taking lessons from another energy bridge to Lithuania, known as Harmony Link. Rising costs and security considerations led Polish and Lithuanian operators to plan Harmony Link as a subsoil cable instead of the originally proposed sea route. Land-based infrastructure is easier to secure and — more importantly — can be repaired faster. If sabotage damage can be repaired within a few weeks, the act of sabotage loses much of its impact. That is why the news that Finnish telecom company Elisa managed to repair two undersea cables in about two weeks was so encouraging.

Another type of threat is emerging as well. Baltic operators have reported the spread of disinformation regarding the synchronization of their energy systems with Europe. “We urge the public to critically evaluate information, resist emotional opinions, and refrain from spreading unverified reports,” participants of the Riga meeting emphasized. Beyond spreading fear, the enemy may be attempting to promote a false economic narrative — that disconnection from BRELL would significantly increase electricity costs.

That narrative is false. According to a study conducted during the preparations, the average increase in energy prices for consumers with an average consumption of 140 kWh per month would be minimal: 50 cents per month in Lithuania, 60 cents in Estonia, and around one euro in Latvia. Relatively speaking, this is not a heavy impact. In return, the Baltic states gain energy independence from the Russian operator and market coupling with Europe, which promotes price decreases.

Energy system operators in Poland and the Baltic states have been instructed by their governments to implement an urgent package of measures to enhance the security of critical energy infrastructure. Lithuania’s Interior Ministry expedited the strengthening of the LitPol Link cable’s protection, advancing the timeline from April to Jan. 15 in response to the severing of the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia on Dec. 26, 2024.

Poland is also taking action. “Polish Transmission System Operator (PSE) ensures the protection of transmission infrastructure within the Republic of Poland’s territory. The company collaborates with relevant national services and institutions, as well as transmission system operators in neighboring countries,” PSE stated in a comment for the Energy Drink podcast.

“Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a state of heightened readiness has been in place, and the infrastructure is continuously monitored, with particular attention given to interconnections with Lithuania, Sweden, and Ukraine. New measures to enhance physical security are also being implemented.”

PSE reports ongoing collaboration with operators in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to strengthen regional infrastructure protection. “Discussions are underway about launching joint projects in this area and securing EU funding for them,” the statement adds.

The increasing frequency of attacks on critical infrastructure — such as the recent incident involving the undersea cable between Latvia and Gotland — highlights the difficulty of attributing blame in a complex and interconnected world. Scandinavian media reports suggest it could have been an accident.

However, there have been too many such “accidents” since Russia’s unlawful aggression against Ukraine began. The West needs to take the initiative and stop retreating. The EU and NATO must develop new tools and strategies to address these challenges and protect collective security — especially in the Baltic Sea, which must be properly secured as a NATO-controlled waterway.

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.

Europe must act on Russian LNG before Trump makes it impossible

Europe’s window to ban Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) is closing faster than we think. As a second Trump administration takes shape, Europe’s opportunity to impose new, meaningful measures on Russian fossil fuels is rapidly diminishing. U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war alleged…

The Kyiv IndependentSvitlana Romanko

A shocking series of sabotage acts in Germany has been traced back to Russian handlers, according to a report by Der Spiegel. The perpetrators damaged over 270 cars across various regions using construction foam, sticking decals featuring Economy Minister Robert Habeck on car windows. Initially mistaken for environmental activists, the trail of evidence reportedly leads back to Moscow. The attacks appeared to be orchestrated to incite hatred towards the Green Party and their candidate for chancellor.

On the night of December 11, 2024, police in Schönefeld stopped an Opel that aroused suspicion. Inside were three young men with documents from Serbia, Bosnia, and Germany. They did not have break-in tools, only construction materials, including foam sealant for windows. Police checked their documents and released them, not finding anything amiss. However, it soon emerged that around the same time, 43 cars in the Alt-Schönefeld area were damaged. The saboteurs had used foam to block exhaust pipes, leaving stickers with the slogan, "Be Greener!" alongside an image of a smiling Robert Habeck.

The action was initially interpreted as the work of radical climate activists, sparking public outrage and negative backlash against Habeck and the Green Party. Those stopped in Schönefeld were allegedly recruited via messaging apps, receiving instructions for the sabotage. They were tasked with using construction foam to damage cars and applying stickers promoting the movement, in exchange for a promised reward of 100 euros per damaged vehicle, part of which had already been distributed.

Law enforcement initiated an investigation after details about the suspects were shared with other German regions. The public prosecutor has confirmed an investigation into four suspects related to the vandalism, noting damages of around 6,000 euros in the Ulm area alone. As of now, none of the suspects are under arrest, and two have reportedly left the country.

U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce on Feb. 4 that the United States will withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Council and extend a freeze on funding for the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, a White House official told Reuters.

The move comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington. Netanyahu has been a vocal critic of UNRWA, accusing the agency of inciting anti-Israel sentiment and alleging that some of its staff members have ties to terrorism.

During his first term from 2017 to 2021, Trump also halted U.S. contributions to UNRWA, arguing that the agency required reforms and that funding should be contingent on Palestinian participation in peace talks with Israel.

His administration withdrew from the 47-member Human Rights Council in 2018, citing what it described as a persistent bias against Israel and a failure to implement reforms. The U.S. later rejoined the council under President Joe Biden, serving a term from 2022 to 2024.

The Human Rights Council is set to review the United States' human rights record in August as part of its routine evaluation of all member states. While the council lacks legal authority, its discussions carry political significance and can generate international pressure for policy changes. Since returning to office for a second term on Jan. 20, Trump has also ordered the U.S. to withdraw from the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement, mirroring decisions made during his first administration.

The U.S. was previously UNRWA’s largest donor, contributing between $300 million and $400 million annually.

However, in January 2024, Biden paused funding after Israel accused about a dozen UNRWA employees of involvement in the deadly Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, which sparked the ongoing war in Gaza. In response, the U.S. Congress formally suspended contributions to the agency until at least March 2025.

UNRWA provides essential aid, healthcare, and education services to millions of Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.

US foreign aid transformed Ukraine. Its suspension threatens decades of work

Editor’s Note: The Kyiv Independent isn’t a recipient of U.S. foreign aid, and its funding wasn’t affected by the aid freeze. With the stroke of a pen, U.S. President Donald Trump last week put a freeze on projects that have helped Ukraine become freer and

The Kyiv IndependentDaria Shulzhenko

On the night of Dec. 15, 2024, two Russian oil tankers, Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, sank in the Kerch Strait, a narrow maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, off the coast of occupied Crimea.

Both vessels were constructed for service on rivers, not on the open sea, and did not have valid sailing documents at the time of the disaster. The tankers also violated a weather-based ban on entering the Kerch Strait.

The vessel crews then attempted for days to obtain an authorization to discharge their oil at a nearby port on the coast of Crimea. To no avail.

A storm picked up, with waves reaching three meters. This brought an end to the service of Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, which had been in use since 1969 and 1973, respectively.

While on Jan. 25, the Russian government officially declared that emergency services had finished an ongoing oil extraction operation, this only concerned one part of Volgoneft-239, which eventually drifted to the coast of Crimea following the wreckage.

The remaining parts of this vessel, and all of Volgoneft-212, are currently only being “examined underwater,” with no attempts yet being made to haul them to shore or extract the fuel oil left in their reservoirs.

According to Eugene Simonov, an expert with the Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group (UWEC) who spoke to the Kyiv Independent, the sunken vessel parts are left untouched because Russian authorities simply do not have the appropriate equipment to extract oil from underwater reservoirs.

As a result, according to Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, the head of science at the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Volgoneft wreckages could evolve into the “worst ecological catastrophe” Russia has seen in the 21st century.

While oil spills have already occurred in the region in the past, the December incident surpasses anything the Black Sea has ever seen. In the closest comparable case, 1,300 tons of fuel oil were released in November 2007, also after a Russian tanker sank in the Kerch Strait.

As for the most recent wreckage, estimates by Russian state-aligned media put the amount of fuel oil released at 3,700 tons.

In late January, the fuel oil reached Ukraine’s Odesa Oblast, with Ukrainian emergency services now also tasked with cleaning up the shores.

When thousands of tons of oil spill into the sea

According to Russian environmental experts, the seabed and the shores of Russia’s Krasnodar Krai will be especially affected by the spill.

Much of this is due to the type of fuel which was spilt. The Volgoneft tankers carried “heavy” oil, known as Mazut, which typically conglomerates into solid lumps that are heavier than water.

As a result, the lumps sink and cannot be easily localized, which makes cleanup operations more difficult. Some lumps of “heavy” oil sink, covering the seabed and squashing life beneath. Others eventually wash up on nearby coasts, polluting shoreline waters and beaches.

In comparison, so-called “light” oil typically floats at the surface, spreading in black pools. While the immediate effects of such a spill can be more drastic, cleanup operations are more straightforward.

In the case of “heavy” oil, lumps can continue washing up on shorelines for months. Some of those that sink remain there until they are dissolved by microorganisms, which can take years if not decades.

According to Natalia Gozak, director of Greenpeace Ukraine, the Black Sea is currently going through its peak of immediate contamination. While this wave might be over soon, the released fuel oil will now move along the maritime food chain, making fish and other wildlife in the sea unsuitable for consumption.

In total, the Black Sea might need 10 to 12 years to rid itself from the oil spill, Gozak told the Kyiv Independent.

Regardless of this, Russian public health officials were quick to claim that fish from the Black Sea was safe to eat, even if it came from affected areas. Certain types of fish are, however, already becoming difficult to find on sale in the Krasnodar Krai, Russian media reported.

As Russians inch closer to Pokrovsk, civilians in the area are left with a choice — stay under fire or leave life behind

BILOZERSKE, Donetsk Oblast — Less than 30 kilometers north of embattled Pokrovsk, a market was in full swing in the town of Bilozerske. Meters away, however, a crowd has gathered in front of a building, nervously awaiting the doors to open. Tensions were visibly mounting as the doors remained close…

The Kyiv IndependentEmmanuelle Chaze

Russia’s ‘appalling’ response

According to a Russian ecologist and oil spill expert who spoke to the Kyiv Independent on conditions of anonymity, the reaction by Russian authorities was in fact “appalling.” Actions taken in the first days following such disasters are crucial, and in the case of the Black Sea oil spill, authorities “hardly reacted at all” within this time frame.

Authorities only started reacting after the disaster went viral on Russian social media, the expert said.

“Normally, in all countries, there are protocols for what to do in such situations. In Russia, there are also such plans for oil spills, and legislation is highly developed. However, the issue is that these plans and legislation were not applied.”

In the first weeks, Russian authorities “acted without any plan” to manage the effects of the disaster, according to Simonov. “The main instinct of the responsible officials was rather classic: to hide from higher-up (authorities) their inability to manage the consequences of a rather trivial (oil) spill,” the expert said.

Authorities only started taking appropriate measures after Vladimir Putin reacted to the situation, Simonov claimed.

Inaction by authorities forced locals in affected Russian regions to self-organize, as explained in turn by the anonymous Russian expert. As a result, cleanup operations were conducted haphazardly, without adequate material, creating serious health risks for the hundreds of volunteers who rushed to the shoreline of Krasnodar Krai.

The region, which lies east of the Black Sea waters, seems for now to be the most affected by the disaster.

As part of the improvised cleanup operation, fuel oil lumps which washed up on its shores were gathered into bags in order to be utilized. However, these bags reportedly never reached processing plants, creating further environmental and public health concerns.

The response by authorities in occupied Crimea was “even weaker,” Gozak claimed, meaning that the disaster will have lasting effects on the peninsula.

According to a Russian environmental expert who spoke to Kedr, an independent news outlet that focuses on environmental issues, Russian authorities likely did not even have enough adequate equipment to deal with the consequences of the oil spill.

Although conditions in the Black Sea were extreme at the time of the incident, authorities should have trained emergency services to respond to such situations, according to the anonymous Russian expert who spoke to the Kyiv Independent.

On a positive note, the Black Sea is a dynamic ecosystem with warm waters, which increases the likelihood that the area will be able to clean itself from the fuel oil, possibly even within a year, the expert claimed.

Simonov, on the other hand, argued that Mazut fuel oil will remain on the seabed and contaminate ecosystems for the next 10 to 20 years.

Black Sea disaster and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

“After the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, this is the second-largest environmental catastrophe in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion,” Gozak said. “These accidents are really dramatic, and the worst is that they could have been prevented.”

Central to understanding this crisis, according to Gozak, is Russia’s use of its so-called “shadow fleet,” which the United States began to go after in the final days of Joe Biden’s presidency.

In 2022, the EU introduced sanctions on Russian oil delivered by sea, making it in theory impossible for Russia to charter or insure oil tankers which did not comply with the sanctions regime.

However, Russia was soon able to circumvent these sanctions, using various schemes to ship its oil worldwide. As these tankers are in a legal gray zone, they often do not comply with security regulations and are not properly insured.

This last element makes it even more difficult to coordinate the ongoing Black Sea cleanup operations, as the responsibility of companies running “shadow fleet” vessels is unclear.

“Stopping this shadow fleet could help prevent such catastrophes, (cut) funding for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and, in the long run, help address climate change,” Gozak said.

Similar disasters could occur in the future if exports by Russia’s “shadow fleet” continue, Simonov added.

As for Ukraine, the environmental effect of the disaster is for now mainly felt in occupied Crimea, as well as in parts of the occupied regions of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, which are located on the shoreline of the Sea of Azov.

While some oil lumps have also reached the Danube Delta south of Odesa, the amounts collected there are for now, symbolic.

As Russia cuts Transnistria from gas, stranded locals search for someone to blame

VARNIȚA, Moldova — The buzzing sound of chainsaws and generators is now common in Varnița, a village of 5,000 that borders Moldova’s Russian-controlled region of Transnistria. Located next to the Russian-controlled city of Bender (Tighina), the village is subordinated to Chișinău but depends on the…

The Kyiv IndependentPaula Erizanu