UKRAINE, KHARKIV, May 6 — For the fourth time, classical music sounded for Kharkiv residents against Russian attacks. On May 2, the Kharkiv Music Fest took place at the “loft stage” of the Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre, one of the safe places for art in the city located just 19 miles south from the Russian border.

“Kharkiv Music Fest existed for eight years, but we made just three normal events over all this time. It’s my personal tragedy,” said Serhii Polituchyi, the president of the festival, to Gwara Media.

Russia attacked Kharkiv relentlessly since the start of the full-scale invasion. In 2022, Music Fest’s team planned the concerts of Lucas Debargue and Nils Wanderer, but had to cancel everything. The festival still happened —  in the Kharkiv subway with the symbolic name “Concert between explosions.”

“It should have been a set of events introducing world-famous musicians to Ukrainian fans of classical music. Now, we can’t invite most performers because of war, but we got a new meaning for our festival. The Kharkiv Music Fest is a powerful “code” of our city’s revival, which can fill the empty souls of Kharkiv locals affected by the war,” said Polituchyi.

In the following years, the Kharkiv Music Fest was held under this new motto — revival — uniting those who stayed or come back to Kharkiv, performers, and guests. 

Today, almost all theatrical plays or music shows in Kharkiv begin by the audience going down long stairs to the underground stages, so that performances and the joy at watching them aren’t interrupted by air raid alerts.

The Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre started hosting its opening concerts — it’s one of the few safe venues of the city. 

In 2025, the festival's theme is “The CODES of revival: Gratitude. Calmness. Harmony. Experience. Hope. Tradition. Reflection. Empathy” — and performers aim to uncover how emotions of our time are expressed through music. 

The most famous Kharkiv Music Fest initiative is art-pianos placed around the city so that everyone could play under the open sky or in frequented public areas like university’s hall.

“It is an opportunity to be more open to people — and some of them improvise concerts at piano’s locations. I’m very happy to announce that there will be pianos at different subway stations this year. The first one will be at Yaroslav Mudryi’s station,” said Mariia Horbonos, the program director of the festival.

The National Ensemble of Soloists “Kyiv Camerata” opened the festival with the National anthem of Ukraine and expressing gratitude to the Armed Forces.

The program was divided into two parts. During the first one, Julian Milkis, a famous clarinetist from the States, played “Letters to Friends” by Georgian composer Giya Kancheli — a deep, emotional, and honest message, dedicated to the composer's loved ones.

“This is my fourth visit to Ukraine during the war, and I realized that art and music are now as important as weapons. They give people the impulse to fight and live,” said Milkis.

Bohdana Pivnenko, the violinist (she’s called "Ukrainian Paganini in a skirt") and Kateryna Suprun, the viola player, performed the second part of the opening concert. 

“It is an amazing feeling to come to Kharkiv and see how people need art, music, and culture. All visitors returned after the break, and it says a lot. I’m happy to play for people who prove their unbreakability every day. Last year, we were afraid to come, but there weren’t any questions for this time because people and their emotions countered all (our) fears,” said Kateryna Suprun.

Pivnenko and Suprun played “Sinfonia concertante for violin, viola, and orchestra” by Valentyn Bibik, the world-known composer from Kharkiv.

The performers also said that, in Kharkiv, people react more emotionally to the music by Ukrainian composers than elsewhere — probably because of the close frontline and constant Russian attacks. 

Ukrainian classical music, though, is now living through revival globally. 

“Many Ukrainian classical compositions are performed now (compared to pre-full-scale war), which is very pleasing,” Bohdana Pivnenko says, adding that she feels like the Ukrainian classical music got more popular not only abroad but within the country.

At the end of the concert program, “After reading Lovecraft’s” by contemporary Ukrainian composer Oleksandr Rodin was played in Kharkiv for the first time. The audience heard a mysterious reflection of Lovecraft’s horror stories philosophy, realized through the sound of string orchestra.

Gwara Media talked to people in the audience — they said they enjoyed the professionalism of the soloists, got curious about the concert program, and resonated with the importance of Kharkiv Music Fest’s idea.

“I have been to all the events of Kharkiv Music Fest. I’m a real fan of the team and their work. Art is our cultural defense, and we try to show our resilience through these new meanings. We are not just surviving, we have (methods) of revival, and music is one of the symbols of future Ukrainian renaissance here,” said Volodymyr Chystylin, journalist and activist.

Locals think that Kharkiv Music Fest is vital for people who are subjected to Russian aggression every day.

“We really need music now because it supports our spirit. It is very important to us because life under attack is difficult,” said Kateryna, one of the visitors.

Mariia Horbonos said that the registration for the Music Fest’s opening was closed in one day because the “loft stage” has seat limits. She invites guests to other events of the festival, noting that all of them are free (but require registration.) 

The Kharkiv Music Fest will continue from May 2 to June 10, and each event will be connected with a certain “revival code.”

The organizers said that the schedule could be changed because of the city's safety situation.

In the evening of May 2, after the festival opening concert ended, Russia attacked Kharkiv with drones. More than 17 explosions followed the sounds of music. Russian drones injured more than 50 people, including two children.

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• “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war

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In a significant move, European Union nations are positioned to ramp up their military aid to Ukraine, should President Donald Trump not successfully convince Vladimir Putin to swiftly end the conflict, according to EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. To date, the EU and the U.S. have jointly provided Ukraine with military assistance totaling approximately €40 billion annually; however, Kubilius emphasizes the potential to utilize these funds more efficiently. This strategy could effectively double the weaponry supply to Ukraine without increasing the budget.

Kubilius highlighted a newer tool available for EU countries to assist Ukraine, suggesting that the concept of "Peace through strength" could be put into tangible practice. "Loans are strength for Ukraine!" he proclaimed, underscoring the plan.

As part of an extensive rearmament plan adopted this year, the European Commission is earmarking €150 billion in loans to ensure rapid joint procurement and production of weaponry. These financial avenues enable EU nations to invest in Ukraine's arms manufacturing or collaborate with local companies—integrating Ukraine's defense industry with Europe's.

According to a recent report by The Washington Post, a growing number of EU countries are considering investments into Ukraine's defense sector rather than direct arms shipment. This shift comes amid dwindling weapon supplies across Europe after three years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of tangible contributions, the European Union has already provided Kyiv with €1 billion to bolster howitzer production. Ukrainian manufacturers are rolling out both self-propelled and towed "Bohdana" howitzers, with over 85 percent of components produced domestically. By year’s end, this figure is expected to rise to 95 percent, marking a scale of local production unprecedented in Europe according to Kubilius.

Oil prices have slipped below $60 per barrel, adding pressure to a strained Russian economy. At the same time, China—Moscow’s largest trading partner—is locked in a high-stakes tariff war with the United States, triggered by the new U.S. administration. These converging disruptions are unlikely to leave Russia's economic footing - and by extension, its capacity to fund the war in Ukraine—unaffected.

To better understand the current landscape, we once again spoke with Vladimir Milov, former Russian Deputy Minister of Energy and a prominent critic of the Putin regime. An economist and energy expert, Milov was a close ally of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and currently serves as Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation. Our previous conversation with him took place in December 2024. In this latest interview, we revisit his earlier forecasts and examine how recent developments have altered Russia’s economic trajectory.

Question (Q): There’s increasing talk about a potential easing of economic sanctions on Russia—at least from the U.S. While a full rollback seems unlikely, some form of relief may be on the horizon. In your view, could this act as a lifeline for the Kremlin, enabling it to sustain the war effort?

Answer (A): I have written about it in much detail in a recent op-ed for The Insider - please have a look. Long story short - Trump won't be able to reverse Western sanctions policy, and European actions matter more than those of the U.S. Before the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe was Russia's key investor and trade partner - over 67% of accumulated FDI stock came from Europe and around 50% of Russian exports went to Europe. The U.S. - 1% and 4% respectively. Russia needs markets and investment, and the U.S. won't provide that - even in better times, American investors didn't particularly like Russia.

However, Russia may get some benefits from U.S. sanctions being lifted, which will help to keep Putin's ailing economy afloat for a bit longer. Crucial thing is access to the U.S. technology which may boost the Russian military production - this assessment is shared in a brilliant recent report by the Kyiv School of Economics on the status of the Russian military industries - quite worth a read, I strongly recommend

Another problem is that Europe doesn't have anything comparable to the U.S. global sanctions enforcement mechanism - experienced agencies like the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control and Bureau of Industry and Security. If the U.S. lifts sanctions against Russia - or simply continues the crackdown on its own Government institutions like that executed by DOGE - the EU, Britain, and other Western democracies simply don't have its own institutional capacities to secure proper sanctions enforcement on a global scale, as currently provided by the U.S. There will be a major sanctions enforcement vacuum which Putin will inevitably use for his own benefit, boosting sanctions circumvention.

(Q): The U.S.-China tariff war has dominated headlines in recent weeks, signaling historic geopolitical and economic shifts. While Russia isn't directly involved, key trade partners like China are heavily impacted. Beyond oil, should we expect any spillover effects on the Russian economy?

(A): Yes, there's so much more than just oil. China's economic slowdown closed their market for many Russian products, due to which major Russian industries suffer badly. For once, China-oriented Russian coal industry is collapsing right in front of our eyes. Fisheries suffer from contraction of Chinese imports of Russian fish. Russian steelmakers face output contraction and sharply falling profits because cheap Chinese steel is flooding global markets - Chinese economic slowdown turned China from being a major importer to a net exporter of steel. And so on. Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels, and are not rebounding - China doesn't allow Russia to access its market, and it won't change once Chinese economic growth slows down.

Tariff war will obviously exacerbate Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth - the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.

(Q): In a recent interview, you mentioned that further declines in oil prices might actually benefit Russia more than if prices remain stagnant just below a certain threshold—an idea that might seem counterintuitive to many. Could you explain how that works?

(A): Biggest loser from the falling oil prices is not Russia, and not OPEC - its the American shale oil industry. Oil production costs in the U.S. are significantly higher than in Russia or OPEC. This means that, if global oil prices fall below $50, large part of the U.S. oil production will be wiped off the market, and prices will quickly rebound. We already saw these effects after 2014 and 2020 oil price crashes.

Russians know that, which is why they weren't too scared with Trump's threats to "radically bring down the oil prices". Their strategy is to wait out for mass extinction of the U.S. oil production under $50/bbl, and to wait for prices to rebound thereafter. Russian oil producing companies are OK under $30-40 prices - it is the state budget which will suffer, but Putin and his people believe they can last for some time under low oil prices, given that they will be rebounding later.

In these circumstances, I'd say the best scenario if the international oil prices will stay somewhere around $60. Given the sanctions-driven discounts, that means Russian oil cheaper than $50. These are the prices which will significantly hurt Russia (Russian budget is drafted under $70/bbl oil price assumption), but will prevent the collapse of the U.S. shale oil industry and further rebounding of prices. Oil at $50 or cheaper is a much worse scenario, as it will most likely mean that low oil prices will be short-lived, which will make Putin happy.

(Q): During our last conversation, there was an expectation that Russia’s central bank would raise interest rates, yet it held steady at around 21%. What factors led to that unexpected decision?

(A): After their February Board meeting, Central Bank has admitted that "consequences of further raising rates will be worse than keeping the rates steady" - meaning that it would exacerbate economic slowdown or probably lead to a recession. To avoid that, they partially sacrificed the goal of bringing down inflation - which still remains high, preventing the Central Bank from much-anticipated easing of monetary policies. At the recent March meeting of the Central Bank board, only two signals were discussed - neutral and tough (further increasing the rate).

Central Bank faces tough dilemma now - interest rate of 21% is still very high (Russia has 12th highest Central Bank rate in the world), rapidly cooling the economy, but inflation is not really receding. The root causes of inflation - heavy budgetary spending on the war, output gap created by output not catching up with demand due to Western sanctions against Russian manufacturing sector - are not going away. At the same time, Russian industrial output has zeroed out in February (0,2% year-on-year growth and 0,4% seasonally adjusted growth compared to January), and March figures may be even worse - soon we'll see the statistics. So, Central Bank has managed to rapidly cause stagnation with its tight monetary policies - risking further slipping into recession - but it failed to bring inflation under control.

(Q): Your latest FRF Think Tank report points to high inflation and near-zero output growth in Russia—classic signs of stagflation. However, some economists argue that high unemployment is a necessary component. Given that unemployment remains relatively low, does this mean Russia hasn’t yet entered stagflation, or is this just a statistical distortion due to the mass recruitment of the male population?

(A): True, Russian situation is unique. The term "stagflation" was coined in the 1960s and 1970s in the Western economies none of which experienced such a mass diversion of the workforce to the war as Russia today. If the current war is suddenly over, Russia will indeed experience high unemployment - masses of soldiers returning to civilian life won't easily find jobs.

Russia also continues to experience very high hidden unemployment - workforce which is nominally employed, but in reality is either on unpaid leave, part-time workweek, or downtime. Rosstat estimated hidden unemployment to be as high as 4,7 million people in Q4 2024, or over 6% of the total workforce. Together with official unemployment, that would make about 9% of the workforce.

These workers would have significantly eased the pressure on labor market should they have left their enterprises, but Russian labor market traditionally features low mobility (remember how people in the 1990s preferred to continue working for years at enterprises which haven't paid them salaries, instead of leaving them looking for new jobs). So, companies nominally keep the workers, but effectively don't pay them - hoping for recovery, which is not coming (nearly three quarters of hidden unemployment are people on unpaid leave).

So, if we're into a macroeconomic debate by the book here, Russia does have high unemployment - but in hidden or delayed forms. And stagflation is real. If the current situation lingers on, even nominal unemployment will rise quite soon.

(Q): What is the current situation with Russia's National Wealth Fund — the main financial reserve that has supported Putin's economy through years of war? What are the implications for the Kremlin and the ongoing war?

(A): As of April 1st, the liquidity portion of the National Wealth Fund (NWF) stood at $39 billion, or just over RUR 3 trillion. That's lower than the federal budget deficit recorded in 2024 (RUR 3,5 trillion). As it goes, 2025 budget deficit will likely be much higher - costs are rising (over 20% federal expenditure growth in Q1 2025), while revenues will be depressed by both the falling oil prices, as well as economic slowdown. Already now, non-oil revenue in Q1 2025 grew only by 11% year-on-year, against 26% growth in 2024, and 18% planned growth for 2025. Of which VAT - by just 9%, as opposed to 22% in 2024 and 17% planned for 2025. Slowing economy generates less taxes, which will undermine budget revenues to an extent not lesser than falling oil prices, and lead to further depletion of the NWF. As it looks from today, there's no other way but for the liquidity portion of the NWF to be fully depleted by the end of 2025 (usually they draw the funds from NWF in December to close the fiscal year).

There's also a non-liquidity portion of the NWF, but it largely exists only on paper, with money invested in various securities and not being easily recoverable. For those interested in details, I have analyzed this in my February brief on the Russian economy. The liquidity portion of the NWF has shrank from $116,5 billion in February 2022 to just $39 billion now as a result of heavy war-related spending. Essentially, this was the model of much-praised Putin's "economic resilience": heavily draw the available cash reserves to compensate for the negative effects of sanctions. But this "economic miracle" appears to be over, disappearing along with cash being spent.

What next after the liquidity part of the NWF is fully spent? I also analyze this in one of my recent reports in detail. Bottom line: nothing is working except monetary emission, printing the money. Government can't borrow - they are cut off from international financial markets, and domestically, with yields as high as over 16% for OFZ government bonds, Russia spends more on repaying and servicing the debt than it actually raises from the domestic debt market. Net debt raising was just around zero in 2024 and negative in Q1 2025. They can raise taxes, but that would further undermine economic growth and curb tax base - they'll lose more in the end. Hypothetically, they can try to privatize state assets, but there's not really much to sell if they don't opt to privatize control equity shares in major state companies - and they don't seem to even consider that for strategic reasons. As far as smaller-scale privatization is concerned, it won't solve their fiscal problems on a large scale, and there won't be much demand given the rapid deterioration of investment climate, ongoing rampant nationalization, etc.

So printing the money seems to be the only viable option left. Russian authorities seem to increasingly tolerate high inflation - "we're not Turkey or Argentina yet, so what difference does it make if inflation is 12-13% instead of 10% - let's print a couple of trillion rubles, no one will notice" (that was literally said by some State Duma deputies during Nabiullina's report debate on April 9th). Central Bank clearly shifted to limited emission schemes in the past few months through repo auctions - banks buy government bonds, and are immediately allowed to use them as collateral while borrowing cash from the Central Bank through repo auctions. Central Bank promised to use repo auctions as temporary mechanism in November 2024, but keeps rolling them over - switching from monthly to weekly repo auctions. Effectively, it is little different from Central Bank's credit to the government, or, in simple words, printing the money.

No question that filling the budgetary gap with printed money will lead to even higher inflation, which will destroy any prospect for economic recovery. So, basically, the Western sanctions are working - albeit not as fast as we hoped, but still.

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Russian social media sources report heightened activity by Ukrainian Armed Forces in Russia's Kursk region, particularly in the Glushkovsky district. According to the Russian Telegram channel Upravlenie Z, Ukrainian Forces used FPV drones, and a firefight erupted near a railway station.

The channel noted a tense situation in the Kursk region, specifying that Ukrainian forces fired on the Tetkino settlement using various weapons, alongside a reported skirmish in the vicinity of the railway station involving five Ukrainian combatants, who subsequently retreated to the Ryzhkovka settlement. Ukrainian troops also reportedly blew up a bridge near the Zvan-noe settlement.

“The activity is associated with further actions we are aware of. We are awaiting news,” stated the channel’s authors.

Nikolai Volobuev, head of the Belovsky district in the Kursk region, reported at 9 a.m. on his Telegram channel that a motor road segment between the villages of Shchegolek and Samoryadovo was under FPV drone attack, cautioning residents in the "gray zone" areas about the looming danger.

The General Staff of Ukraine reported as of 8:00 a.m. on May 5 that Ukrainian forces had repelled 23 Russian attacks in the Kursk direction over the previous day. Simultaneously, it was noted that Russian forces conducted 317 artillery attacks, including 11 from multiple launch rocket systems, besides executing 10 aerial strikes across the region.

The Russian command has not commented on the Ukrainian operations in Kursk yet.

On April 23, Russian media reported that Ukrainian Forces allegedly retreated from the Kursk region. The Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council dismissed such claims, indicating that the opponent launched these falsehoods to discredit the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Independent theater Nafta came back to Kharkiv to explore how war transforms not only cities but people — and discover how theater can embrace that transformation.

For seven years, Nafta Theater has navigated both creation and disruption. Founded as an independent, alternative space in Kharkiv, it was displaced by the Russian full-scale invasion. Then, in 2023, the ensemble reignited its presence in the city. As director and co-founder Nina Khyzhna recalls, “Life somewhere else was meaningless for me, so we reopened the theater—it was like a dream.”

By creating socially responsible performances, Nafta Theater puts value in freedom, human-centeredness, mutual respect, — and aims to inspire societal change. In their recent performance Khartede 20, the crew explores postcolonialism, centering on the Executed Renaissance. It was a generation of Ukrainian poets, writers, and artists from the 1920s. Many of them lived in Kharkiv, particularly in the building called “Slovo” (“Slovo” translates from Ukrainian to “word”) before being silenced, — executed or sent to forced labor camps — by the Soviet regime. 

Khartede 20 not only revisits this erased chapter of Ukrainian cultural history but also poses a series of haunting questions: Does memory live in objects, trees, rivers, buildings? Can the presence of those who once walked these streets still be felt? Is reality shaped by the lives of people who were here — and, in some way, still are? 

Kharkiv’s history deeply informed Khyzhna’s preparation for the performance:

“In this landscape near the Slovo building, I imagined what those poets and artists might have seen — how they went hunting farther from (the building), where the city used to end. I thought of how the landscape looked like for them, and what remained of it now. There have been no high-rise apartment buildings yet, but there was this rock, on which, most likely, Khvylovyi and Yohansen (one of the most influential writers of that time – ed.) would walk on. I can’t help but be inspired by that. We live among the same decorations. Nearby, there’s a military hospital, a little further is my home, and farther, there’s Khvylovyi’s grave. All of it coexists in a chimeric symbiosis, all of it forms our urban space,” Khyzhna reflects. 

Nafta crew’s latest production, Cyborg Orgy, confronts the issue of ecocide. The performance reflects on the earth, humus, and the right to die on one’s land—right that’s both political and human.

The play draws a powerful connection between the destruction of nature and human suffering. When weapons tear through buildings, plants, animals, and humans, and when chemicals from rockets contaminate the soil and water, can one recognize the non-human, although living, victims of this violence? The ongoing, unpunished losses of countless creatures and ecosystems remain largely unseen. Uncertain of how to address it, Nafta’s crew takes to the stage to name the crimes, mourn the victims, and bear witness to the disaster unfolding before them (and the audience).

The large-scale environmental damage caused by Russia—such as the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023—represents a clear act of ecocide. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin called it “a crime against Ukraine as a state and (against) our future.” By incorporating non-human agents into their war stories, Nafta is pushing the boundaries of post-war justice to incorporate all the living. 

Healing and rebuilding after conflict must include both human and non-human lives, as well as the planet itself; that is what, in Nafta’s words, Cyborg Orgy is about.

 Shedding light on social responsibility is deeply personal to Khyzhna: “I think the imperfection of this world inspired me. I started looking either for alternative worlds or how to improve this one using some other way of seeing. I did not feel safe in this reality, so I decided to create a safe space; theater became a place of escape and a place of arrival.” 

When Nafta Theater was founded, many people were not ready for its alternative vision. Kharkiv’s theater scene was steeped in conventional traditions, shaped by a Soviet-era dramaturgical school that prioritized socialist realist narratives—idealized depictions of Soviet life that promoted values of communist state ideology. Nafta’s emerging collective of performers challenged that status quo. 

In opposition to the system, the theater pursued experimental and provocative approaches and urged reevaluation of fundamental narratives—such as, for instance, how women should act and exist within the theatrical space. As a child shaped by sexist stereotypes, Khyzhna used to say that she doesn’t like female directing. As she grew, she started to look for other perspectives and ways to think about women's behavior, body, and modalities of both being on stage and beyond it. 

Khyzhna remembers how first performances were perceived: “In the performance Naїve, I took on the roles of both director and actress for the first time. I came back to Kharkiv from Poland in 2015, where I was working in the independent theater Brama. Driven by an extraordinary thirst for creation, I began posting announcements everywhere, inviting people to acting classes—that’s how I found my first crew.”

"I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance"

“Naїve was a performance dedicated to naïve idealism and marginalized segments of society—those who are pushed to the edges of their communities. I felt very frustrated when I realized that theater is a very ephemeral field. That was unfortunate. It was crucial for me to know that I can influence reality somehow. At one point, we contacted an animal rescue center, and started looking for new owners for animals during the performance itself. I remember well how, later, they sent me photos of the cats they adopted. I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance,” Nina Khyzhna says. “In some scenes, we simply sat in silence, looking the audience in the eyes—it was something new. Someone even cried during the performance, which was a striking thing for me — realizing that, through my expression, I could impact someone’s world, start an exchange of feelings. It felt like a door opening into creative subjectivity, into obtaining agency within my profession.”

In spring of 2023, Kharkiv administration introduced a controversial ban on mass events in theaters, concert halls, clubs, museums, libraries, and open spaces for gatherings exceeding 50 people. Citing relentless Russian shelling and a lack of shelters, authorities said the restriction will remain in place until the end of martial law. Active cultural communities found the restriction unbearable. 

As Artem Vusyk, an actor from Nafta Theater, put it: “Obviously, I don’t support these restrictions. Kharkiv is a culturally significant city, and authorities should support its culture. Many theaters have adapted, finding spaces that meet State Emergency Service’s requirements. We’re lucky our partners, Some People [Center of New Culture — ed.], offered their certified venue.” That’s where independent initiatives outshine government-run ones, finding flexible ways to keep culture alive despite restrictions.

When Nafta returned to Kharkiv, their first performance defied expectations.

They staged Rat, an absurd comedy strikingly out of sync with the surrounding reality.

Khyzhna looks back at it with a smile: “There were people who said it was needed. One woman told me, ‘I had forgotten I could be that way—laugh in a theater, experience culture, enjoy things again.’ For some people, like one of my acquaintances whose husband served in the military, it was hard to watch. People are different, and their needs differ, too. We also opened a bar on the first floor, Rat’s Bar; it was like rebooting a life. Of course, life in a different form but still undeniably real.”

In Kharkiv, there's no need for retreats in the mountains to learn the art of "living in the moment." Nothing serves as a sharper lesson than a Russian missile. 

"One hand torn apart while the other one is still filming"

Khyzhna recalls Kharkiv’s landscape as both challenging and inspiring: “Once in a dialogue with Serhii Zhadan (famous Kharkiv poet), he told me that Russians ironically call their aerial bombs 'landscapers' because it literally changes the scenery of the city. We often discuss this idea of blank spaces that missiles leave. What appears in these blank spaces? What do we fill them with? How do we look at them, both physically and metaphorically? I remember a colleague saying that artists in times of war are people who have one hand torn apart while the other one is still filming. A bright metaphor to answer the question of ‘how is it to create art amid war?’ You are part of the city. Your body becomes a part of it. I hope to become the very soil of this land.”

In such an environment, artists must be especially careful not to create an illusion of life, nor to deepen the hole of despair—it's about finding the balance, Khyzhna says. 

For Nafta Theater and Khyzhna, it is crucial not to turn away from wounds and pain, not to create taboos; death and severed limbs exist together with the oncoming spring and new life being born. 

She reflects on that: “It is important for us to be in reality, to have balance between seeing life as it is and as an artistic code. Keep being alive and even playful. The very fact that people come together to live through such a cultural experience is an act of manifestation of life. When we are together, we create a feeling that we are not alone in this experience, in this grief; none of us are unique in a good sense of this word.”

Author: Matvii Suminov

Cover photo: "Nobody Died Today" play, 2022. / Source: Nafta Theater

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The post “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war appeared first on Gwara Media.

As the war draws to a close, Russia faces the threat of an impending catastrophe. President Vladimir Putin is acutely aware of what lies ahead. The ongoing conflict has been the sole factor keeping the Russian economy afloat. Without it, the nation’s defense industry could collapse, triggering a recession, a surge in crime, and a burst of social unrest within the Kremlin’s walls.

Ceasing hostilities with Ukraine might herald not peace, but the fragmentation of Russia. The economy faces a downturn, millions of disgruntled war veterans would return home, and the war machine that the Kremlin has sustained for years would demand even more resources. Peace could spell disaster for a regime ensnared by its own reckless adventures.

According to an analysis by German outlet Bild, ending military actions could unleash profound internal challenges for Russia. The nation’s economy has become increasingly dependent on military expenditure, with hundreds of thousands of Russians deriving their incomes from the war effort. Ending the conflict might trigger an economic downturn and social upheaval.

The signs of a weakening Russian economy are evident. Beyond the defense industry, there’s a marked decline in the production of food, coal, construction materials, metal products, and machinery. The defense sector, fueled by government investment, obscures the actual economic downturn. Yet in sectors like food, coal, and machinery, production is faltering. Only the military industry masks the decline.

Post-conflict, Russia would face challenges in reintegrating veterans. Many veterans, previously receiving high compensation for their roles in the conflict, will return to impoverished regions where only low-paying jobs await. If Putin fails to ensure their loyalty through viable economic prospects, a surge in violence could ensue. The rate of violent crime has escalated since the onset of the war. There's a real danger that some veterans, akin to those returning from Afghanistan and Chechnya, might resort to crime.

Ending the war without achieving its stated goals might undermine the government’s legitimacy. Internal challenges like economic decline and social discontent could pave the way for political instability. Russia finds itself trapped by its own aggression. While ending the war threatens economic and social crisis, continuing it risks resource depletion and international isolation. The Kremlin is caught between two unfavorable scenarios, each presenting significant risks for the future of the country.

In an interview for the film "Moscow. Kremlin. Putin. 25 Years," airing Sunday, May 4, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated there was "no necessity" for the Russian Armed Forces to use nuclear weapons in their ongoing conflict with Ukraine. He emphasized, "They wanted to provoke us into making mistakes. But there was no need to use the weapon you mentioned, and hopefully, it will remain unnecessary." Putin asserted that the Russian military has "enough strength and means to bring what was started in 2022 to a logical conclusion with satisfactory results for Russia."

Putin also responded affirmatively to inquiries about reconciliation with what he termed the "Ukrainian part of the Russian people." Despite admitting the "tragedy of it all," he believes it's only a matter of time. Putin has previously reiterated his view that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people."

Since the start of the full-scale Russian military aggression in Ukraine, Putin has often described nuclear weapon use as a "last-resort security measure." Nonetheless, his circle has repeatedly made near-explicit nuclear threats. Notably, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council, warned on his Telegram channel about the potential consequences if Ukraine attempted to obstruct the May 9 parade in Moscow, hinting that May 10 might not "arrive in Kyiv." American media previously cited sources in suggesting that in the fall of 2022, as Russian forces retreated, the U.S. considered the nuclear threat from Russia serious enough to draw up a response plan.

In November 2024, Putin signed an updated Russian nuclear doctrine. The principal amendment states that aggression from a non-nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear state, will be treated as joint aggression against Russia. Moscow reserves the right to consider a nuclear response upon "verified information on the launch of strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft toward the country." The doctrine further highlights Russia's right to use nuclear weapons in defense of Belarus, as part of the Union State, or in response to a "critical threat to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation using conventional weapons."

The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly launched a significant strike against a Russian command post in the Donetsk region, an area crucial for managing Russian offensives towards Pokrovsk. This command post was strategically located near the occupied city of Bakhmut.

This operation was reported by Ukraine's General Staff, which confirmed that the Ukrainian Air Force recently delivered a devastating blow to the command post of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division in Bakhmut, an area temporarily under Russian occupation. This attack has significantly impaired the Russian forces' ability to direct operations near Pokrovsk, according to the statement. While the extent of Russian casualties is not yet determined, efforts are underway to ascertain the impact.

On May 3, analysts from DeepState reported that Russian forces had made advancements in multiple settlements within Donetsk region. Russian troops have gained ground towards Pokrovsk and near the village of Tarasivka, situated between Pokrovsk and Toretsk. The Russian military is continuously advancing towards Pokrovsk in an attempt to reach the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region, aiming to boast about their "achievements" ahead of May 9th celebrations. Sources indicate that the Russian troops entered the southern part of Novooleksiivka, cleared out residences, and has begun fortifying their positions.

A swarm of drones reportedly attacked the settlement of Suzemka in Russia's Bryansk region, targeting a facility involved in producing electronic components for the Russian defense sector.

Local telegram channels report a large fire following the drone attack.

"A massive plume of smoke was reportedly seen in Suzemka," stated the telegram channel "Incident and Crash Bryansk."

Around 10 p.m. on May 3, local public forums reported UAV sorties into the Bryansk region, advising residents to take shelter.

The Ukrainian telegram account, Ukrainian Militant, claimed that UAVs struck the Strela plant in the settlement of Suzemka, Bryansk region. The facility produces electronics for Russia's defense complex and collaborates with the corporation Rostec. The attack reportedly damaged production workshops, storage, and administrative buildings.

Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko also reported on the fire at the Bryansk region facility.

"A smoke column rises in Bryansk after drone attacks on an electrical equipment facility," he wrote.

Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that 13 drones had been shot down overnight over Russian territory, including 11 over the Rostov region and 3 over Bryansk.

Bryansk region Governor reported that all UAVs had been downed with no casualties or damage.

The Ukrainian side has yet to officially comment on the attack on the facility in Suzemka.

Note that on May 2, explosions were reported at the "Zvezda" military site in Russia's Stavropol region, a facility managed by the GRU and specializing in cyber intelligence.

Ukrainian Forces have successfully downed a second Russian aircraft in Crimea on May 3, reported President Volodymyr Zelensky in his evening address.

"Our sea drone brilliantly struck the Russian plane. A testament to Ukraine's capabilities. Our army accurately targeted military objects in Crimea, taking down another Russian aircraft within 24 hours. Additionally, we've destroyed military depots," noted Zelensky.

The President also stated that Ukraine is ready for a 30-day ceasefire if Russia takes reciprocal steps.

"At the same time, we are prepared to move swiftly, even starting today, towards a ceasefire if Russia is ready for reciprocal actions—complete silence, at least 30 days of calm. This is a fair period to prepare for the next steps. Russia must halt the war, cease assaults, and stop shelling," Zelensky said.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian President announced new defense packages for Ukraine and decisions regarding further cooperation with key nations during and after the war.

The Ukrainian Defense Intelligence special unit, in coordination with the SBU and Ukraine's Defense Forces in the Black Sea, eliminated a Russian Su-30 worth around $50 million on May 2. This marks the world’s first instance of a combat aircraft being destroyed by a sea drone.

Russian propagandist Alexander Sladkov has urged President Putin to end the war following the downing of the Su-30. According to Sladkov, the entire nation is "shaken" by Ukrainian drone attacks, while Russia's navy is scrambling for cover.

In a striking admission, Russian propagandists are voicing concerns over the state of their military forces, acknowledging vulnerability amid ongoing conflict with Ukraine. After the recent downing of a Russian Su-30 fighter jet by a missile launched from a Ukrainian marine drone, notable commentators like war correspondent Alexander Sladkov have expressed indignation at their country's performance, lamenting that their forces are "being swatted like flies".

"I feel sorry for us. We're getting hit. I've reached a point of pity," wrote Sladkov, reflecting on the situation. "There was a period of denial, anger, and more. But now I've come to terms with it. We're being swatted like flies." This sentiment arises as Ukraine's drone strikes force the entire Russian military apparatus into disarray, compelling the Russian navy to seek safety in unknown territories.

Concluding his pointed remarks, Sladkov urged the Kremlin to either de-escalate the war or consider "transitioning to a freeze, truces, or somewhere else." According to him, Russia's military, operating on par with Ukraine, risks depleting its combat-ready forces. His statements also inadvertently highlight significant personnel shortages faced by the Russian forces due to substantial battlefield casualties.

The Russian military has widened its recruitment efforts to the African nation of Togo, as confirmed by the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Togolese government has reported that Ukrainian forces have captured several Togolese nationals, described as "students," in Ukraine, prompting Togo to urge its citizens not to engage in fighting for Russia.

The detainees hail from Togo, a small West African country near the equator that borders the Gulf of Guinea. This report, published on the website of Togoloese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, suggests that Russia's recruitment efforts for its war in Ukraine extend beyond North Koreans, Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis—groups previously reported—as they now include Africans.

Togo's foreign ministry stated that many of its citizens were lured into the conflict under the guise of being "students" with scholarships offered by Russian authorities. The ministry advises its citizens "seeking education abroad" to exercise extreme caution and verify the authenticity of such offers to prevent unwitting involvement in armed conflicts. Ukrainian officials have yet to officially confirm the capture of Togolese nationals fighting for Russia in Ukraine.

Ukrainian naval drones, equipped with Soviet-era R-73 air-to-air missiles, struck a Russian Su-30 fighter jet near the Russian port of Novorossiysk. This information has been confirmed by Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence and corroborated by Z-channels, including the prominent Russian war channel Rybar.

According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence, the strike was carried out by the special unit known as Group 13 using a MAGURA marine drone platform, modified to launch these aviation missiles. The Russian multirole fighter jet, valued at approximately $50 million, burst into flames in the air and crashed into the sea.

The R-73 missile, a Soviet-era development initially designed to be launched from fighter jets, has been adapted over time to be deployed from ground and sea carriers. Even before Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukrainian companies had begun repairing and upgrading these missiles. The installation of the R-73, equipped with an infrared guidance system, on marine drones was officially announced by Ukrainian intelligence last

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has turned down Russian leader Vladimir Putin's proposal for a three-day "ceasefire" on May 9, advocating instead for a 30-day cessation of hostilities. According to Ukrinform, Zelensky made this clear during a press briefing, emphasizing his reluctance to engage in "short-term ceasefires" suggested by Putin. He argued that a 30-day model is the most viable as it is impractical to negotiate within just a few days.

The Ukrainian President clarified, "Ukraine cannot ensure the security of world leaders in Moscow on May 9." Zelensky also aligned his stance with former President Trump, stating, "I agree with Trump that a 30-day ceasefire with Russia is the right first step." He underscored the necessity of rapidly addressing monitoring issues should a month-long ceasefire be agreed upon.

Zelensky elaborated, "If there's a decision for a month, no active war for that month, there will be violations, 100%... But (overall) the scale of war we have now, of course, won't happen. And everyone understands that monitoring issues must be settled quickly. The top issue is a ceasefire, followed by an assessment of the overall trajectory of ending the war," he concluded.