Russia’s annual Victory Day parade is taking place in Moscow on May 9, in a week dramatically marked by a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on the city, and a dubious unilateral ceasefire announced by the Kremlin.

Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, which mark the Soviet Union’s role in defeating Nazi Germany in World War II, are one of the country’s biggest public events of the year.

The annual event is a key part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda efforts to justify aggression against what the Kremlin falsely describes as “Nazis” in Ukraine.

The parade takes place after Ukraine reportedly attacked Moscow with drones for three days in a row from May 4-6, repeatedly forcing the closure of several airports in the region.

In an effort to provide some semblance of security to the event, Russia last month unilaterally announced a “humanitarian” truce from May 8 until midnight on May 11.

Under no obligation to sign up for a ceasefire it wasn’t consulted on, Ukraine has not agreed to adhere to it, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissing it as a “theatrical performance."

Zelensky said Ukraine cannot guarantee the safety of foreign officials planning to attend Moscow on May 9, warning that any incidents on Russian territory fall solely under the Kremlin’s control.

Who’s attending Moscow’s parade?

At least 29 world leaders were expected to attend the event, Russian state-controlled media reported on May 6.

“We have invited many foreign guests. And we expect 29 leaders of the countries we have invited to be present at the Victory Parade,” Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov told reporters.

Last year, only nine foreign leaders joined Russian President Vladimir Putin at the parade. Ukraine and most European nations mark May 8 as Victory in Europe Day.

The most high-profile guest in attendance this year will be Chinese President Xi Jinping who arrived in Moscow on May 8 to “sign a number of bilateral inter-governmental and inter-departmental documents” to strengthen Chinese-Russian relations, according to the Kremlin.

It is Xi’s second trip to Russia, after he met with Putin in Moscow in 2023 during his first foreign visit since his re-election.

China, which portrays itself as a neutral party in the war, has become the Kremlin’s largest supplier of dual-use goods essential for weapons manufacturing.

Tensions between Ukraine and China have risen in recent weeks after Zelensky on April 9 said that 155 Chinese citizens were fighting for Russia on the territory of Ukraine.

A day prior, Kyiv captured the first two Chinese nationals in Donetsk Oblast. China has denied any role in Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Xi was originally scheduled to fly to Russia on May 7 — it’s now known if Ukraine’s drone strikes delayed his arrival.

President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is also in Moscow in show of support to Putin.

According to Brazilian media, Lula will hold a bilateral meeting with Putin during which he hopes to position himself as a mediator in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

In 2024, Lula jointly developed a Ukraine peace plan with China that was dismissed as “destructive” by Kyiv.

European officials absent on Red Square

Europe is sparsely represented at the parade — Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico represents the only EU member state, while Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is also attending.

All other EU leaders are boycotting the parade once again. The U.S. also doesn’t plan to send representatives, despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s sharp turn of American foreign policy towards renewing diplomatic contacts with Russia that were severed after its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

According to Russian state media, the other world leaders in attendance are those from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Palestine, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Representatives from North Korea and Russian-controlled Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as defense ministers from 31 countries, will also be present.

A number of countries are also contributing troops to the parade. Military personnel from 13 countries — Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Egypt, Laos, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — are expected to march through Moscow.

Other security measures

As well as the unilateral truce, Russia on May 7 confirmed that mobile internet restrictions will be enforced in Moscow and several Russian regions while foreign officials visit the country.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed the measures, which may last through May 10, are necessary due to “dangerous neighbors."

‘The front is noisy’ — for Ukraine’s soldiers, Russia’s Victory Day ‘ceasefire’ is yet another sham

Moscow’s self-declared truce which came into force at midnight on May 8 is not being felt on the front lines, Ukrainian soldiers have told the Kyiv Independent, reporting numerous cases of Russian military activity throughout the day. “There is no truce. There is shelling, artillery, drone and FPV (bomb) drops,” Petro Kuzyk, a battalion commander at the National Guard, said. The Kremlin announced the measure on April 28, claiming all military actions would halt on May 8 to midnight on May 11 t

The Kyiv IndependentChris York,

Hungary

On March 20, 2025, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated on his X page that Ukraine’s EU membership would cost each Hungarian household 500,000 forints (1,200 euros) annually:

“9,000 billion HUF – that’s how much the war has already cost Hungarian families. 500,000 HUF per household, every year – that’s the price tag of Ukraine’s EU membership.  Brussels wants Hungarians to pay the bill, but no decision will be made without the voice of the Hungarian people. A new member can only join with the unanimous support from all Member States. There can be no decision until the Hungarian people cast their votes. This decision belongs to our citizens, not Brussels!”

First of all, where does this data come from? These are calculations by the Századvég Foundation, a think tank affiliated with Orbán. According to the foundation, “Ukraine has cost each Hungarian household 2.2 million HUF” (5,500 euros) or 9,000 billion HUF (22.5 billion euros) in total. The basis for the supposed losses includes three components: rising prices for imported gas, increased state spending due to higher yields on government bonds, and losses from reduced exports to Russia.

In reality, it refers to increased prices for imported gas due to changes in spot prices at the TTF Gas Hub in the Netherlands and additional budget expenditures due to the higher cost of state debt (due to geopolitical risks and inflation shocks, the yield on 5-year Hungarian government bonds rose from 2% to 4–6%). Additionally, bilateral sanctions – imposed by the EU on Russia and by Russia on the EU – affected Hungary’s trade volumes with the aggressor state. However, the root cause of these losses – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – is not mentioned in the Századvég Foundation’s analysis.

Secondly, what does 500,000 HUF (1,250 euros) from each Hungarian household for Ukraine’s EU accession mean? In reality, Ukraine will not “take” money from every Hungarian family. It is more about potentially foregone aid from the EU budget that the country currently receives, and possible increased expenditures from Hungary’s state budget.

These calculations are based on the potential reduction in receipts from the EU Cohesion Fund and subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), contributions to support Ukraine amounting to 0.25% of GDP, additional pension costs for Ukrainians who supposedly will move to Hungary, and estimates of Hungary’s share in financing Ukraine’s reconstruction.

In general, there are several issues with the 500,000 HUF figure:

• They are based on the assumption that Ukraine would join the EU today. In reality, the years leading up to Ukraine’s EU integration will bring changes both in Ukraine (for example, we need to harmonize legislation with EU standards) and in the EU itself. By the time of Ukraine’s accession, both the CAP and the distribution of Cohesion Fund expenditures will likely have been significantly revised. Discussions on such revisions have already begun.
• Reconstruction costs for Ukraine are a separate international initiative, not part of the EU accession process, and not solely the responsibility of member states. Therefore, treating them as “future losses” for the population related to Ukraine’s EU accession is unfounded and manipulative.
• The calculations of migration and pension burdens are based on speculative assumptions. For example, the claim that 5% of Ukrainian pensioners will move to Hungary. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of February 2025, the share of Ukrainians who chose Hungary as a refuge was about 1% of the total number of refugees in European countries.

Finally, the estimates by the Századvég Foundation do not consider the positive economic effects of enlargement: new markets, investments, enhanced security, and stability in the region. According to IMF calculations, EU enlargement, particularly due to the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Balkan countries, could increase the bloc’s GDP by 14% over 15 years.

By the way, Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 also involved both pre-accession financial aid and post-accession funding to support its integration and development through three programs: ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). Between 1990 and 2006, Hungary received €1.987 billion (in prices of that time). But even after joining, the country continued to receive support — financial aid for 2021–2027 is planned at around €30 billion.

Hungary receives several times more from the Cohesion Fund and other EU funds than it contributes to the EU budget. Its contribution is relatively small (about €2 billion with a GDP of more than €200 billion), while the amount received is one of the highest in the EU among recipient countries (after subtracting contributions, Hungary received around €4.5 billion from the EU budget in 2023). If calculated per capita, each Hungarian hypothetically gives “out of their pocket” about €200, while receiving nearly €700.

Poland and Slovakia

Concerns and myths about Ukraine’s accession to the European Union exist not only in Hungary. Polish presidential candidate from the opposition party Law and Justice (PiS), Karol Nawrocki, stated that Poland cannot afford actions that would harm its economy:

Russian propaganda media, citing Nawrocki’s interview for Sieci, picked up on the narrative that Ukraine’s EU membership would be economically disadvantageous for Poland.

Polish journalist and commentator Łukasz Warzecha pointed out that large amounts of money would go to Ukraine, which would be a direct competitor to Poland:

In Slovakia, social media users circulated several false claims about the negative impact of Ukraine’s accession to the EU on the national economy. In particular, they manipulated the words of MP Ľubica Karvašová from the “Progressive Slovakia” party, who said that Slovak farmers would have to grow different products if Ukraine joins the EU. Social media users claimed the politician proposed that farmers grow camels and oranges. The post added that farmers would go bankrupt because Ukraine would supply products that Slovaks have “been growing for centuries”.

Slovak politician and deputy chair of the “Hungarian Alliance”, György Gyimesi, claims that under current rules, Cohesion Fund money is allocated to those member states where GNI (gross national income) per capita is below 90% of the EU average:

He also noted that if Ukraine joined the EU, supposedly 30% of all money allocated under the Common Agricultural Policy would go to Ukraine. Gyimesi concluded that if Ukraine joined the EU, it would become the largest beneficiary of the EU budget:

A new formula for solidarity: transform, not compete

It is precisely the allocation of funds from these programs – the European Structural and Investment Funds and within the CAP – that Ukraine’s Eastern European neighbors mainly refer to when discussing potential losses (or rather, forgone income) for their households.

For example, the Cohesion Fund supports EU member states with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita below 90% of the EU-27 average to strengthen the EU’s economic, social, and territorial cohesion. Under the current 2021–2027 program, 15 out of 27 countries are eligible for funding (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). And the allocation of funds within the CAP depends on the area of arable land and the number and size of farming households.

Currently, all EU spending estimates related to Ukraine’s accession are based on the “here-and-now” assumption, that is, they consider the country’s current economic status, relative population size, and the configuration of the current EU institutional system. Under these assumptions, the potential volumes of support are impressive. For instance, according to estimates of researchers from the German Economic Institute in Cologne, if Ukraine had been an EU member in 2023, it would have received €130–190 billion: €70–90 billion in agricultural aid and €50–90 billion under cohesion regional policy. EU estimates are similar – €186 billion.

A transformation of budget priorities always accompanies EU enlargement. However, these changes are not a burden but an investment in economic, social, and political stability across the continent. Even before new members join, the EU begins investing in their transformation: supporting reforms, strengthening institutions, and modernizing infrastructure.

The example of Croatia, which joined the Union in 2013, demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach. Between 2007 and 2013, it received €998 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). After accession, Croatia received €12.2 billion through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), of which €9.1 billion came from EU Cohesion Policy funds. Additionally, in 2014–2020, Croatia received €2.3 billion under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Rural Development Programme.

The EU assisted Croatia in building institutional capacity, focusing primarily on preparing government institutions to comply with EU legislation and meet necessary criteria. The main focus was accelerating reforms in key areas such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration reform, public finances, economic restructuring, and the business environment.

This strengthened the Croatian economy and the EU single market, into which local businesses integrated, expanding production chains. Accordingly, trade volumes increased. Add to this the new labor force and strengthened EU influence in the region. Croatia’s EU accession became a signal to other Balkan countries about the possibility of integration, provided reforms are implemented.

Under current conditions, Ukraine could become a net recipient of aid. At the same time, European countries that currently receive support would lose it, since Ukraine has the lowest GNI per capita and a high share of arable land. To integrate current candidates (which, in addition to Ukraine, include Moldova, Balkan countries, and Georgia), the EU needs to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. The EU budget and structural funds should consider current country indicators, growth potential, strategic importance, and benefits to the entire European Union.

Scholars and experts believe that if the EU enacts institutional reform, the costs of adapting Ukraine will be lower. Moreover, the efficiency of Ukraine’s agricultural sector is underestimated, and thus, subsidies for Ukrainian farmers may be significantly lower than the cited estimates.

Support for less developed regions is not only a matter of solidarity but also a mechanism for developing the internal market: new consumers and producers, reduced migration pressure, and strengthened regional security. People stay to live and work at home while purchasing goods produced in other EU countries.

Ukraine will bring unique assets to the EU: digital transformation, military resilience, flexible institutions, and civic engagement. While some European countries are slowly adapting to changes, Ukraine is already acting as a transformation accelerator.

Yes, integration requires investment. But these are investments in a new market, new energy, and a more resilient European space. Ukraine is not a “beneficiary” but a partner capable of strengthening and renewing the European Union.

Russian forces remain resolute in their plans to seize territories on the right bank of the Kherson region, including the regional center and parts of Mykolaiv. In an interview with Novini.LIVE, Yuriy Tkachuk, an officer of the "Omega" National Guard unit of Ukraine, revealed that the occupiers have already readied boats and vessels for a large-scale landing operation.

"We are seeing increased activity. The enemy is preparing for an amphibious operation, and hundreds of boats have been spotted, about 300 in total. These preparations include landing on small islands currently under the control of Ukrainian Defense Forces.

These attempts are being countered, and enemy targets are being eliminated," Tkachuk explained. He noted that by capturing the Dnipro islands, the Russian objective is to extend their strike zone on the right bank, aiming to push back Ukrainian forces to land more substantial airborne troops.

Additionally, Russian forces are active along the Kinburn Spit in the Mykolaiv region, shelling Ochakiv, while Defense Forces continue to neutralize Russian personnel and equipment.

With the Kremlin preoccupied by military operations in Ukraine and preparations for grand parades, tensions in Dagestan—still part of the Russian Federation—are nearing a boiling point that could exceed the Kremlin’s ability to control them.

Dmitry Steshin, a well-known Russian correspondent, paints a grim picture of the current situation in Dagestan: rampant radicalization, unemployment, a record-high birth rate, and the collapse of administrative verticals. In a post on May 6, he acknowledges that the region functions under its own set of rules, drifting further away from Moscow's influence. Steshin notes that despite a staggering birth rate—59% higher than Russia's average--Dagestan lacks jobs and real opportunities, pushing youth to emigrate en masse. Those who remain often find themselves drawn into radical movements. According to locals, "brashness and bluster are valued over intellect," Steshin reports.

Of particular concern to Steshin is the rise of radical Islam's appeal among educated families. He references a 2010 incident where one of the Moscow metro bombers was a young woman from a family of a school principal and PhD candidate. The father, reportedly thrilled by his daughter's act, exemplifies the alarming indoctrination, as Steshin highlights, “Father congratulated his daughter for becoming a martyr.”

Steshin insists that given the multitude of nationalities, languages, and clan structures, no effective governance exists within the republic. Officials are less concerned with lawfulness and more with not offending anyone, he notes.

The depth of the crisis transcends radical elements, reflecting a tapestry of systemic issues: frail state infrastructure, chronic poverty, tribal allegiances, rampant crime, and a sense of impunity amid a burgeoning population. Increasingly, this transforms Dagestan from a "Russian region" to an autonomous political zone.

With memories of Russia's bloody campaigns in Chechnya just two decades ago, today's escalating tensions in Dagestan evoke a threatening déjà vu. The 1950s and 1990s illustrated a disgruntled Caucasus's capacity for widescale insurgency.

Dagestan was ground zero in August 1999 for notorious warlords Basayev and Khattab's incursion, sparking the Second Chechen War. Recent hostilities, including an assault on police resulting in two officer fatalities, eerily resemble that lethal narrative.

Against the backdrop of a demographic decline in Central Russia and a growing southern population, Russia's power dynamics are under flux. Although Moscow maintains a façade of control, effective governance is fracturing—exacerbated by an army embroiled in Ukraine and an overworked National Guard and Interior Ministry.

In stark contrast to its external military pursuits, Russia faces a growing internal crisis. With failing regional governance and social decay, Moscow squanders trillions on expansionist politics, overlooking its domestic instability.

Ukrainian forces have killed Russian Colonel Abduzazid Shikhabidov, personally appointed by President Vladimir Putin to lead a key airborne division. Shikhabidov, commander of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, was killed less than two months into his appointment, according to a report by Agentsvo.

His death was announced on May 6 by schools in Dagestan, where mourning activities have commenced. Widely known for his leadership in one of Russia's most renowned airborne divisions, Shikhabidov’s death has been confirmed by several regional sources and pro-military channels.

Dagestan schools and public forums reported that farewell ceremonies were held at the Troyekurovskoye Cemetery in Moscow. In his hometowns of Kaspiysk and Buynaksk, commemorative events featuring photos, speeches, and symbols were organized. The Ministry of Education in the republic distributed a message to students following the colonel's passing. Notably, some mentions of his death were later removed, though the information surfaced across many pro-war Telegram channels and “VKontakte” communities.

The 76th Guards Air Assault Division, often referred to as the Pskov Division, has played a significant role in Ukraine since 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. Its troops have been active in fierce clashes in the Donetsk region and, post-2022, in areas such as occupied Bucha within the Kyiv region. An investigation by Reuters linked this division to civilian violence, highlighting its involvement in the most intense parts of the conflicts. Since the onset of the full-scale war, the division has reportedly sustained significant casualties amounting to thousands.

Prior to leading the 76th Division, Shikhabidov served in other conflict zones including South Ossetia and Syria and was awarded multiple honors, including the Orders of Courage and Suvorov, as well as "For Bravery" and "For Merit to the Fatherland" medals of both first and second degree. Following his appointment by Putin in March, the Russian President had publicly praised the division’s "daily successes." In Dagestan, Shikhabidov was celebrated with billboards and classroom sessions dedicated to him. His demise marks another event in the continuous loss streak among high-level military officers.

Shikhabidov's death underscores a troubling trend of high attrition in the officer ranks of Russian Armed Forces. In recent months, multiple reports have confirmed the fatalities of battalion, regiment, and brigade commanders. Operating in grueling war conditions, Russian forces face not just the loss of personnel but a significant erosion of their leadership echelon—officers whose positions are hard to swiftly replace. Even appointments made with "Putin’s blessing" appear to serve as one-way tickets.

Ukrainian Alina Petrauskaite has chosen to live her life in the service of God. Although she once dreamed of having a family, a deeper calling led her to the convent to serve as a nun.

In their daily prayers, many Catholic believers worldwide pray for Ukraine, and were previously led by Pope Francis until his death last month.

Now, during the election for the new pope, Alina and her fellow nuns are intensifying their prayers so that the cardinals can choose a good pope.

"We desire the Holy Spirit to show them who it should be," she said.

The death of Pope Francis has revived discussions about the Vatican's role in the world’s most pressing conflicts. In the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Holy See has long walked a diplomatic tightrope, criticized for ambiguity – yet it continues to maintain dialogue with both Kyiv and Moscow.

Unlike other world powers, the Vatican offers no weapons, only moral leverage — and increasingly, it is using it to help Ukraine reclaim prisoners, deported children, and even the remains of fallen soldiers.

With protocol-breaking moments like Zelenskyy’s placement at the papal funeral, quiet signals from Moscow – such as the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to papal appeals for peace – and even a brief, symbolic meeting with Trump, the Vatican is emerging as an unlikely but important ally for Ukraine — and a rare channel of dialogue in a polarized world.

Alina is a Roman Catholic nun who belongs to the Congregation of the Little Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was founded in Poland in 1888 and began operating in Ukraine in 1969. She and her fellow sisters serve God and do charitable work through social, educational, and pastoral activities. They do not wear traditional monastic habits like other nuns to stay closer to other people and serve among them.

Just like priests, nuns prepare for life in a monastery, which can take several years, gradually discerning their calling. After that, the nuns have to take three vows – of purity, poverty, and obedience – pledging to dedicate themselves to God, community, and service to others.

Alina now serves in Kyiv at the Catholic Media Centre. She is the editor-in-chief of the official website of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine. She has commented on Pope Francis' foreign trips, meetings, and solemn services on major holidays. They also cover the activities and life of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine.

Ukraine is a predominantly Orthodox country where traditional Catholicism represents a small share of the population – just 1 percent. In addition, about 9 percent of the population identify as Greek Catholics, mostly in western Ukraine. Most Ukrainians belong to Orthodox churches – around 70 percent.

But Christians and non-Christians all around the world are awaiting the election of the next pope – and its geopolitical consequences. Alina says she doesn’t focus on individual candidates — she believes that the most worthy one will be chosen.

The Pope is elected during a conclave, a secret vote of cardinals in the Sistine Chapel. Only cardinals under 80 can vote, and the winning candidate has to gain a majority of two-thirds of the votes in order to be elected. After a successful conclave, white smoke comes out of the Chapel's chimney, to signal that a new pope has been chosen.

Whoever the next Pope is, there will be consequences for Ukraine, as different candidates have different views on the war.

Possible Papal Candidates:

1. Pietro Parolin: Many believe that the most likely successor to Pope Francis is his former chief advisor, the Vatican Secretary of State. Parolin recognizes Ukraine's right to self-defense, but is cautious about Western military support for fear of escalation. In 2024, he visited Kyiv, and in 2025, he supported the idea of negotiations with Russia for a just and lasting peace.

   

2. Luis Antonio Tagle: The Filipino would be the first ever Asian pope if selected. Tagle has spoken about the war mainly in a humanitarian context, without mentioning Russia.

“No gun can kill hope, the goodness of the spirit in the human person. There are so many testimonies to this… The mission to always remind the world that every conflict, every disaster has a human face…. For example, the war in Ukraine and conflicts in other countries of the world are generally presented as political, military conflicts but people are forgotten!” said Tagle in an interview.

3. Matteo Zuppi: Zuppi – who was chosen by Pope Francis to lead an initiative for peace in Ukraine – has visited Kyiv and Moscow, but has avoided condemning Russian aggression, speaking instead of suffering and the need for peace. Like Tagle, he’s known for being progressive but also cautious in their statements about Ukraine and Russia.
   

4. Peter Tarkson: Hailing from Ghana, Tarkson avoids political statements. Calls for prayer for peace and often blames world leaders for nuclear threats, but does not directly condemn Russia.

“With war, everything is lost; but with peace, there is everything to gain. The devastation of Ukraine corresponds to Russia's wobbling economy, Germany's recession & U.S.A's mounting domestic debt etc. But talk about Economic malaise skips pain their economies cause in Ukraine,” Tarkson wrote on Twitter.

5. Péter Erdő: сlose to Hungarian Prime Minister Orban - a close ally of Russia. For example the cardinal has largely avoided critisizing Orban over democratic backsliding and rule-of-law concerns, including the controversial 2021 anti-LGBT law that closely mirrors Russian legislation, and shares his cautious rhetoric on the war.
   
   Although not openly pro-Russian, he refrains from criticizing Russia and maintains a dialogue with both Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

6. Pierbattista Pizzaballa: Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pizzaballa expressed concern over the war in Ukraine. In 2022, he performed a rite of consecration of Ukraine and Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary – a symbolic request to help the two peoples to rebuild trust, without which, according to him, peace is impossible – and called for the restoration of trust between nations.

“So that they may listen to each other again, that she may help them to rebuild relationships of trust between them, without which there will be no future," said Pizzaballa in 2022.

The conclave will begin on May 7th, and many predict it will not last long, Andrii Yurash, Ukraine's Ambassador to the Holy See, explained that there are different views in the modern church.

"I think that in this situation, it would be more logical for the Church to choose someone who can represent and be acceptable to those groups that envision and plan the future development of the Church. So, a centrist would currently seem to have the strongest prospects," Yurash said.

Today’s cardinals are divided into different groups. Some seek to continue Pope Francis' socially progressive course, others want to return to traditional forms of church life, while some centrists try to combine these approaches, he told The Counteroffensive.

Far from the cardinals’ deliberations in Rome, Alina’s journey into religious life began in Kyiv.

The monk who founded this group believed that sisters should serve in the areas where they came from. That is why Alina continues her ministry in Ukraine.It wasn’t always easy for Alina to become a nun. Alina was baptised in a Catholic church. She attended church with her family only on major holidays. But her life changed when, at age 15, her friends invited her to participate in religious classes at St Alexander Church in the centre of Kyiv.

“At that time, being closer to the church, I realized that I also wanted to be like the nuns I had seen, that I wanted to be in the church like them, and serve God more in this way,” Alina told.

Since then, she has seen the Church as a place of personal faith and a global voice in the world’s most challenging moments.

The Vatican is not involved in military conflicts and does not support any side with arms. Instead, it acts as a moral mediator in wars and conflicts.

Although Alina mentioned that the Pope’s position may not directly influence the aid level, she believes it still matters.

“It’s not just about Pope Francis — this is a long-standing Vatican policy, developed over centuries, with its justification and tradition. Pope Francis, in particular, was more of a pastor at heart than a diplomat,” Alina explained.

Pope Francis's statements have often been quite controversial among Ukrainians. His messages about fraternal nations and the importance of a truce, even with territorial concessions from Ukraine, were not universally popular.

"They are brothers, cousins. Let them come to an understanding! War is always a defeat. Peace to the whole world!" said Pope Francis, addressing the bishops, clergy and religious of the French island of Corsica in December 2024.

“Perhaps we [Ukrainians] wanted to put our words in the pope's mouth and expected the pope to say precisely that. But we see that certain things have now opened up to what the pope did. I realized one thing: Evaluating the pope's words and actions is challenging because we don't know the truth and the mechanisms,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

Russia has systematically taken steps to develop relations with the Holy See for centuries.

“It was [Francis’] dream because no pope had ever been to Moscow, and he wanted to establish closer contacts, ” Yurash said.

After 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in Eastern Ukraine, the Vatican found itself in a difficult diplomatic position, trying to balance condemnation of aggression with maintaining a dialogue with Moscow.

The ‘Pope for Ukraine’ initiative was created to allow people worldwide to donate funds for Ukrainians affected by the war in the country's east. In its first two years, the initiative raised around €16 million, including a personal contribution from Pope Francis.

During the full-scale invasion, a special humanitarian mission, headed by Cardinal Konrad Krajewski, was established. Ten such missions have been carried out since March 2022.

The Pope had general audiences every Wednesday and Sunday, and speeches were broadcast all over the world. In almost all of his speeches, he reminded people about the war in Ukraine, Alina explained.

" While the whole world has forgotten, the news doesn't talk about it anymore, because the bombings are not so tragic, the casualties are not so great, we are all used to the same shelling, but the Pope kept saying ‘Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine.’”

Even in his last Easter address in 2025, Francis mentioned Ukraine.

"Pope Francis, in his Urbi et Orbi [traditional Pope`s address to the ‘city and the world’] address, spoke to the world about the most painful places. He said, "We pray and call on everyone to support martyred Ukraine and to establish a just and lasting peace," Yurash told The Counteroffensive.

Pope Francis died on Monday, 21 April, as a result of a stroke and cardiac arrest. He was 88.

According to the rules, the funeral seating arrangements for world leaders are allocated alphabetically by their country's name in French, the traditional language of diplomacy in which protocols were established.

As President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy should have been seated in the third row or even further back. Instead, he was put in the front row, 11 seats away from Donald Trump, who sat to his right, and next to French President Emmanuel Macron.

The Vatican broke protocol and ensured the Ukrainian president was at the centre of attention at the ceremony. Zelenskyy was also greeted with spontaneous applause when he took his seat in St Peter's Square after a brief meeting with Trump in St Peter's Basilica.

Despite previous agreements between the two sides, this “would not have happened without coordination with the Vatican,” because everything that happens on Vatican territory must be agreed upon in advance, explained Tetiana Izhevska, a former ambassador for Ukraine to the Holy See. “This is definitely an exception to the general rule.”

The meeting lasted 15 minutes and took place in private before the farewell ceremony. Details of the conversation were not disclosed, but Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it good. “It was a very symbolic meeting that could become historic if we achieve joint results,” the Ukrainian President wrote in his Telegram channel.

As the Cardinals weigh the future direction of the Catholic Church, many believers in Ukraine carry their faith through darkness, far from the Vatican.

The Pope's position has not always been clear to all Ukrainians, but perhaps this was his strength - his choice to act not loudly but carefully, considering each life.

“It seems that Pope Francis was given to us at this time to show that the church should be merciful, simple, and close to everyone,” Alina told The Counteroffensive.

NEWS OF THE DAY:

Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

RUSSIA TRIES TO INFLUENCE POLAND'S ELECTIONS: Poland is witnessing unprecedented attempts by Russia to interfere in the presidential election, according to Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski.

According to him, Moscow is using disinformation and hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, such as water utilities, thermal power plants and government agencies, to paralyze the state. The number of cyber attacks has doubled since last year, and dozens of incidents were recorded during his speech alone.

Gawkowski believes its support for Ukraine has made it a target for Russian sabotage. Poland has already faced cyber attacks on its space agency and state media, and accuses Russia of arson and sabotage in Europe.

PRICE OF RUSSIAN OIL FALLS TO RECORD LOW: The average price of Russian Urals and ESPO crude oil fell to 3,987 rubles per barrel, more than 40 percent below the planned budget level and the lowest in two years. This collapse is due to the growth of global reserves, OPEC+'s decision to increase production, and expectations of a slowdown in the global economy. In March, oil cost more than 5,000 rubles, and in April it was 4,562 rubles.

The collapse in prices forced the Russian government to cut its energy revenue forecast by a quarter and raise the expected budget deficit for 2025. At the same time, Moscow is increasing military spending to a record 6.3 percent of GDP, which is putting more pressure on finances. Analysts believe that the Kremlin will have to raise taxes, cut social spending, or increase borrowing if it does not plan to reduce funding for the war.

LITHUANIA TO INVEST €1.1 BILLION TO PROTECT THE BORDER WITH RUSSIA, BELARUS: Lithuania plans to invest €1.1 billion to strengthen the defense of its eastern border over the next decade. The bulk of the funds - 800 million euros - will be spent on installing anti-tank mines to deter possible aggression from Russia or Belarus. The measure is aimed at blocking and slowing down a potential invasion, in particular through the strategically important Suwalki corridor.

Vilnius also announced an increase in the defense budget to 5-6 percent of GDP starting in 2026. In March, Lithuania, along with Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, announced its intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, which bans anti-personnel mines, which provoked a sharp reaction from Moscow.

DOG OF WAR:

Today’s Dog of War is the cute dog Myroslava saw in the coffee shop near our office.

Stay safe out there.

Best,
Myroslava

UKRAINE, KHARKIV, May 6 — For the fourth time, classical music sounded for Kharkiv residents against Russian attacks. On May 2, the Kharkiv Music Fest took place at the “loft stage” of the Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre, one of the safe places for art in the city located just 19 miles south from the Russian border.

“Kharkiv Music Fest existed for eight years, but we made just three normal events over all this time. It’s my personal tragedy,” said Serhii Polituchyi, the president of the festival, to Gwara Media.

Russia attacked Kharkiv relentlessly since the start of the full-scale invasion. In 2022, Music Fest’s team planned the concerts of Lucas Debargue and Nils Wanderer, but had to cancel everything. The festival still happened —  in the Kharkiv subway with the symbolic name “Concert between explosions.”

“It should have been a set of events introducing world-famous musicians to Ukrainian fans of classical music. Now, we can’t invite most performers because of war, but we got a new meaning for our festival. The Kharkiv Music Fest is a powerful “code” of our city’s revival, which can fill the empty souls of Kharkiv locals affected by the war,” said Polituchyi.

In the following years, the Kharkiv Music Fest was held under this new motto — revival — uniting those who stayed or come back to Kharkiv, performers, and guests. 

Today, almost all theatrical plays or music shows in Kharkiv begin by the audience going down long stairs to the underground stages, so that performances and the joy at watching them aren’t interrupted by air raid alerts.

The Kharkiv National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre started hosting its opening concerts — it’s one of the few safe venues of the city. 

In 2025, the festival's theme is “The CODES of revival: Gratitude. Calmness. Harmony. Experience. Hope. Tradition. Reflection. Empathy” — and performers aim to uncover how emotions of our time are expressed through music. 

The most famous Kharkiv Music Fest initiative is art-pianos placed around the city so that everyone could play under the open sky or in frequented public areas like university’s hall.

“It is an opportunity to be more open to people — and some of them improvise concerts at piano’s locations. I’m very happy to announce that there will be pianos at different subway stations this year. The first one will be at Yaroslav Mudryi’s station,” said Mariia Horbonos, the program director of the festival.

The National Ensemble of Soloists “Kyiv Camerata” opened the festival with the National anthem of Ukraine and expressing gratitude to the Armed Forces.

The program was divided into two parts. During the first one, Julian Milkis, a famous clarinetist from the States, played “Letters to Friends” by Georgian composer Giya Kancheli — a deep, emotional, and honest message, dedicated to the composer's loved ones.

“This is my fourth visit to Ukraine during the war, and I realized that art and music are now as important as weapons. They give people the impulse to fight and live,” said Milkis.

Bohdana Pivnenko, the violinist (she’s called "Ukrainian Paganini in a skirt") and Kateryna Suprun, the viola player, performed the second part of the opening concert. 

“It is an amazing feeling to come to Kharkiv and see how people need art, music, and culture. All visitors returned after the break, and it says a lot. I’m happy to play for people who prove their unbreakability every day. Last year, we were afraid to come, but there weren’t any questions for this time because people and their emotions countered all (our) fears,” said Kateryna Suprun.

Pivnenko and Suprun played “Sinfonia concertante for violin, viola, and orchestra” by Valentyn Bibik, the world-known composer from Kharkiv.

The performers also said that, in Kharkiv, people react more emotionally to the music by Ukrainian composers than elsewhere — probably because of the close frontline and constant Russian attacks. 

Ukrainian classical music, though, is now living through revival globally. 

“Many Ukrainian classical compositions are performed now (compared to pre-full-scale war), which is very pleasing,” Bohdana Pivnenko says, adding that she feels like the Ukrainian classical music got more popular not only abroad but within the country.

At the end of the concert program, “After reading Lovecraft’s” by contemporary Ukrainian composer Oleksandr Rodin was played in Kharkiv for the first time. The audience heard a mysterious reflection of Lovecraft’s horror stories philosophy, realized through the sound of string orchestra.

Gwara Media talked to people in the audience — they said they enjoyed the professionalism of the soloists, got curious about the concert program, and resonated with the importance of Kharkiv Music Fest’s idea.

“I have been to all the events of Kharkiv Music Fest. I’m a real fan of the team and their work. Art is our cultural defense, and we try to show our resilience through these new meanings. We are not just surviving, we have (methods) of revival, and music is one of the symbols of future Ukrainian renaissance here,” said Volodymyr Chystylin, journalist and activist.

Locals think that Kharkiv Music Fest is vital for people who are subjected to Russian aggression every day.

“We really need music now because it supports our spirit. It is very important to us because life under attack is difficult,” said Kateryna, one of the visitors.

Mariia Horbonos said that the registration for the Music Fest’s opening was closed in one day because the “loft stage” has seat limits. She invites guests to other events of the festival, noting that all of them are free (but require registration.) 

The Kharkiv Music Fest will continue from May 2 to June 10, and each event will be connected with a certain “revival code.”

The organizers said that the schedule could be changed because of the city's safety situation.

In the evening of May 2, after the festival opening concert ended, Russia attacked Kharkiv with drones. More than 17 explosions followed the sounds of music. Russian drones injured more than 50 people, including two children.

Read more

• “I cried when I saw Kharkiv laugh again.” Nina Khyzhna on how Nafta Theater embraces changes that come with war

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In a significant move, European Union nations are positioned to ramp up their military aid to Ukraine, should President Donald Trump not successfully convince Vladimir Putin to swiftly end the conflict, according to EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. To date, the EU and the U.S. have jointly provided Ukraine with military assistance totaling approximately €40 billion annually; however, Kubilius emphasizes the potential to utilize these funds more efficiently. This strategy could effectively double the weaponry supply to Ukraine without increasing the budget.

Kubilius highlighted a newer tool available for EU countries to assist Ukraine, suggesting that the concept of "Peace through strength" could be put into tangible practice. "Loans are strength for Ukraine!" he proclaimed, underscoring the plan.

As part of an extensive rearmament plan adopted this year, the European Commission is earmarking €150 billion in loans to ensure rapid joint procurement and production of weaponry. These financial avenues enable EU nations to invest in Ukraine's arms manufacturing or collaborate with local companies—integrating Ukraine's defense industry with Europe's.

According to a recent report by The Washington Post, a growing number of EU countries are considering investments into Ukraine's defense sector rather than direct arms shipment. This shift comes amid dwindling weapon supplies across Europe after three years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of tangible contributions, the European Union has already provided Kyiv with €1 billion to bolster howitzer production. Ukrainian manufacturers are rolling out both self-propelled and towed "Bohdana" howitzers, with over 85 percent of components produced domestically. By year’s end, this figure is expected to rise to 95 percent, marking a scale of local production unprecedented in Europe according to Kubilius.

Oil prices have slipped below $60 per barrel, adding pressure to a strained Russian economy. At the same time, China—Moscow’s largest trading partner—is locked in a high-stakes tariff war with the United States, triggered by the new U.S. administration. These converging disruptions are unlikely to leave Russia's economic footing - and by extension, its capacity to fund the war in Ukraine—unaffected.

To better understand the current landscape, we once again spoke with Vladimir Milov, former Russian Deputy Minister of Energy and a prominent critic of the Putin regime. An economist and energy expert, Milov was a close ally of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and currently serves as Vice President of the Free Russia Foundation. Our previous conversation with him took place in December 2024. In this latest interview, we revisit his earlier forecasts and examine how recent developments have altered Russia’s economic trajectory.

Question (Q): There’s increasing talk about a potential easing of economic sanctions on Russia—at least from the U.S. While a full rollback seems unlikely, some form of relief may be on the horizon. In your view, could this act as a lifeline for the Kremlin, enabling it to sustain the war effort?

Answer (A): I have written about it in much detail in a recent op-ed for The Insider - please have a look. Long story short - Trump won't be able to reverse Western sanctions policy, and European actions matter more than those of the U.S. Before the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe was Russia's key investor and trade partner - over 67% of accumulated FDI stock came from Europe and around 50% of Russian exports went to Europe. The U.S. - 1% and 4% respectively. Russia needs markets and investment, and the U.S. won't provide that - even in better times, American investors didn't particularly like Russia.

However, Russia may get some benefits from U.S. sanctions being lifted, which will help to keep Putin's ailing economy afloat for a bit longer. Crucial thing is access to the U.S. technology which may boost the Russian military production - this assessment is shared in a brilliant recent report by the Kyiv School of Economics on the status of the Russian military industries - quite worth a read, I strongly recommend

Another problem is that Europe doesn't have anything comparable to the U.S. global sanctions enforcement mechanism - experienced agencies like the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control and Bureau of Industry and Security. If the U.S. lifts sanctions against Russia - or simply continues the crackdown on its own Government institutions like that executed by DOGE - the EU, Britain, and other Western democracies simply don't have its own institutional capacities to secure proper sanctions enforcement on a global scale, as currently provided by the U.S. There will be a major sanctions enforcement vacuum which Putin will inevitably use for his own benefit, boosting sanctions circumvention.

(Q): The U.S.-China tariff war has dominated headlines in recent weeks, signaling historic geopolitical and economic shifts. While Russia isn't directly involved, key trade partners like China are heavily impacted. Beyond oil, should we expect any spillover effects on the Russian economy?

(A): Yes, there's so much more than just oil. China's economic slowdown closed their market for many Russian products, due to which major Russian industries suffer badly. For once, China-oriented Russian coal industry is collapsing right in front of our eyes. Fisheries suffer from contraction of Chinese imports of Russian fish. Russian steelmakers face output contraction and sharply falling profits because cheap Chinese steel is flooding global markets - Chinese economic slowdown turned China from being a major importer to a net exporter of steel. And so on. Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels, and are not rebounding - China doesn't allow Russia to access its market, and it won't change once Chinese economic growth slows down.

Tariff war will obviously exacerbate Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth - the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.

(Q): In a recent interview, you mentioned that further declines in oil prices might actually benefit Russia more than if prices remain stagnant just below a certain threshold—an idea that might seem counterintuitive to many. Could you explain how that works?

(A): Biggest loser from the falling oil prices is not Russia, and not OPEC - its the American shale oil industry. Oil production costs in the U.S. are significantly higher than in Russia or OPEC. This means that, if global oil prices fall below $50, large part of the U.S. oil production will be wiped off the market, and prices will quickly rebound. We already saw these effects after 2014 and 2020 oil price crashes.

Russians know that, which is why they weren't too scared with Trump's threats to "radically bring down the oil prices". Their strategy is to wait out for mass extinction of the U.S. oil production under $50/bbl, and to wait for prices to rebound thereafter. Russian oil producing companies are OK under $30-40 prices - it is the state budget which will suffer, but Putin and his people believe they can last for some time under low oil prices, given that they will be rebounding later.

In these circumstances, I'd say the best scenario if the international oil prices will stay somewhere around $60. Given the sanctions-driven discounts, that means Russian oil cheaper than $50. These are the prices which will significantly hurt Russia (Russian budget is drafted under $70/bbl oil price assumption), but will prevent the collapse of the U.S. shale oil industry and further rebounding of prices. Oil at $50 or cheaper is a much worse scenario, as it will most likely mean that low oil prices will be short-lived, which will make Putin happy.

(Q): During our last conversation, there was an expectation that Russia’s central bank would raise interest rates, yet it held steady at around 21%. What factors led to that unexpected decision?

(A): After their February Board meeting, Central Bank has admitted that "consequences of further raising rates will be worse than keeping the rates steady" - meaning that it would exacerbate economic slowdown or probably lead to a recession. To avoid that, they partially sacrificed the goal of bringing down inflation - which still remains high, preventing the Central Bank from much-anticipated easing of monetary policies. At the recent March meeting of the Central Bank board, only two signals were discussed - neutral and tough (further increasing the rate).

Central Bank faces tough dilemma now - interest rate of 21% is still very high (Russia has 12th highest Central Bank rate in the world), rapidly cooling the economy, but inflation is not really receding. The root causes of inflation - heavy budgetary spending on the war, output gap created by output not catching up with demand due to Western sanctions against Russian manufacturing sector - are not going away. At the same time, Russian industrial output has zeroed out in February (0,2% year-on-year growth and 0,4% seasonally adjusted growth compared to January), and March figures may be even worse - soon we'll see the statistics. So, Central Bank has managed to rapidly cause stagnation with its tight monetary policies - risking further slipping into recession - but it failed to bring inflation under control.

(Q): Your latest FRF Think Tank report points to high inflation and near-zero output growth in Russia—classic signs of stagflation. However, some economists argue that high unemployment is a necessary component. Given that unemployment remains relatively low, does this mean Russia hasn’t yet entered stagflation, or is this just a statistical distortion due to the mass recruitment of the male population?

(A): True, Russian situation is unique. The term "stagflation" was coined in the 1960s and 1970s in the Western economies none of which experienced such a mass diversion of the workforce to the war as Russia today. If the current war is suddenly over, Russia will indeed experience high unemployment - masses of soldiers returning to civilian life won't easily find jobs.

Russia also continues to experience very high hidden unemployment - workforce which is nominally employed, but in reality is either on unpaid leave, part-time workweek, or downtime. Rosstat estimated hidden unemployment to be as high as 4,7 million people in Q4 2024, or over 6% of the total workforce. Together with official unemployment, that would make about 9% of the workforce.

These workers would have significantly eased the pressure on labor market should they have left their enterprises, but Russian labor market traditionally features low mobility (remember how people in the 1990s preferred to continue working for years at enterprises which haven't paid them salaries, instead of leaving them looking for new jobs). So, companies nominally keep the workers, but effectively don't pay them - hoping for recovery, which is not coming (nearly three quarters of hidden unemployment are people on unpaid leave).

So, if we're into a macroeconomic debate by the book here, Russia does have high unemployment - but in hidden or delayed forms. And stagflation is real. If the current situation lingers on, even nominal unemployment will rise quite soon.

(Q): What is the current situation with Russia's National Wealth Fund — the main financial reserve that has supported Putin's economy through years of war? What are the implications for the Kremlin and the ongoing war?

(A): As of April 1st, the liquidity portion of the National Wealth Fund (NWF) stood at $39 billion, or just over RUR 3 trillion. That's lower than the federal budget deficit recorded in 2024 (RUR 3,5 trillion). As it goes, 2025 budget deficit will likely be much higher - costs are rising (over 20% federal expenditure growth in Q1 2025), while revenues will be depressed by both the falling oil prices, as well as economic slowdown. Already now, non-oil revenue in Q1 2025 grew only by 11% year-on-year, against 26% growth in 2024, and 18% planned growth for 2025. Of which VAT - by just 9%, as opposed to 22% in 2024 and 17% planned for 2025. Slowing economy generates less taxes, which will undermine budget revenues to an extent not lesser than falling oil prices, and lead to further depletion of the NWF. As it looks from today, there's no other way but for the liquidity portion of the NWF to be fully depleted by the end of 2025 (usually they draw the funds from NWF in December to close the fiscal year).

There's also a non-liquidity portion of the NWF, but it largely exists only on paper, with money invested in various securities and not being easily recoverable. For those interested in details, I have analyzed this in my February brief on the Russian economy. The liquidity portion of the NWF has shrank from $116,5 billion in February 2022 to just $39 billion now as a result of heavy war-related spending. Essentially, this was the model of much-praised Putin's "economic resilience": heavily draw the available cash reserves to compensate for the negative effects of sanctions. But this "economic miracle" appears to be over, disappearing along with cash being spent.

What next after the liquidity part of the NWF is fully spent? I also analyze this in one of my recent reports in detail. Bottom line: nothing is working except monetary emission, printing the money. Government can't borrow - they are cut off from international financial markets, and domestically, with yields as high as over 16% for OFZ government bonds, Russia spends more on repaying and servicing the debt than it actually raises from the domestic debt market. Net debt raising was just around zero in 2024 and negative in Q1 2025. They can raise taxes, but that would further undermine economic growth and curb tax base - they'll lose more in the end. Hypothetically, they can try to privatize state assets, but there's not really much to sell if they don't opt to privatize control equity shares in major state companies - and they don't seem to even consider that for strategic reasons. As far as smaller-scale privatization is concerned, it won't solve their fiscal problems on a large scale, and there won't be much demand given the rapid deterioration of investment climate, ongoing rampant nationalization, etc.

So printing the money seems to be the only viable option left. Russian authorities seem to increasingly tolerate high inflation - "we're not Turkey or Argentina yet, so what difference does it make if inflation is 12-13% instead of 10% - let's print a couple of trillion rubles, no one will notice" (that was literally said by some State Duma deputies during Nabiullina's report debate on April 9th). Central Bank clearly shifted to limited emission schemes in the past few months through repo auctions - banks buy government bonds, and are immediately allowed to use them as collateral while borrowing cash from the Central Bank through repo auctions. Central Bank promised to use repo auctions as temporary mechanism in November 2024, but keeps rolling them over - switching from monthly to weekly repo auctions. Effectively, it is little different from Central Bank's credit to the government, or, in simple words, printing the money.

No question that filling the budgetary gap with printed money will lead to even higher inflation, which will destroy any prospect for economic recovery. So, basically, the Western sanctions are working - albeit not as fast as we hoped, but still.

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Russian social media sources report heightened activity by Ukrainian Armed Forces in Russia's Kursk region, particularly in the Glushkovsky district. According to the Russian Telegram channel Upravlenie Z, Ukrainian Forces used FPV drones, and a firefight erupted near a railway station.

The channel noted a tense situation in the Kursk region, specifying that Ukrainian forces fired on the Tetkino settlement using various weapons, alongside a reported skirmish in the vicinity of the railway station involving five Ukrainian combatants, who subsequently retreated to the Ryzhkovka settlement. Ukrainian troops also reportedly blew up a bridge near the Zvan-noe settlement.

“The activity is associated with further actions we are aware of. We are awaiting news,” stated the channel’s authors.

Nikolai Volobuev, head of the Belovsky district in the Kursk region, reported at 9 a.m. on his Telegram channel that a motor road segment between the villages of Shchegolek and Samoryadovo was under FPV drone attack, cautioning residents in the "gray zone" areas about the looming danger.

The General Staff of Ukraine reported as of 8:00 a.m. on May 5 that Ukrainian forces had repelled 23 Russian attacks in the Kursk direction over the previous day. Simultaneously, it was noted that Russian forces conducted 317 artillery attacks, including 11 from multiple launch rocket systems, besides executing 10 aerial strikes across the region.

The Russian command has not commented on the Ukrainian operations in Kursk yet.

On April 23, Russian media reported that Ukrainian Forces allegedly retreated from the Kursk region. The Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council dismissed such claims, indicating that the opponent launched these falsehoods to discredit the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Independent theater Nafta came back to Kharkiv to explore how war transforms not only cities but people — and discover how theater can embrace that transformation.

For seven years, Nafta Theater has navigated both creation and disruption. Founded as an independent, alternative space in Kharkiv, it was displaced by the Russian full-scale invasion. Then, in 2023, the ensemble reignited its presence in the city. As director and co-founder Nina Khyzhna recalls, “Life somewhere else was meaningless for me, so we reopened the theater—it was like a dream.”

By creating socially responsible performances, Nafta Theater puts value in freedom, human-centeredness, mutual respect, — and aims to inspire societal change. In their recent performance Khartede 20, the crew explores postcolonialism, centering on the Executed Renaissance. It was a generation of Ukrainian poets, writers, and artists from the 1920s. Many of them lived in Kharkiv, particularly in the building called “Slovo” (“Slovo” translates from Ukrainian to “word”) before being silenced, — executed or sent to forced labor camps — by the Soviet regime. 

Khartede 20 not only revisits this erased chapter of Ukrainian cultural history but also poses a series of haunting questions: Does memory live in objects, trees, rivers, buildings? Can the presence of those who once walked these streets still be felt? Is reality shaped by the lives of people who were here — and, in some way, still are? 

Kharkiv’s history deeply informed Khyzhna’s preparation for the performance:

“In this landscape near the Slovo building, I imagined what those poets and artists might have seen — how they went hunting farther from (the building), where the city used to end. I thought of how the landscape looked like for them, and what remained of it now. There have been no high-rise apartment buildings yet, but there was this rock, on which, most likely, Khvylovyi and Yohansen (one of the most influential writers of that time – ed.) would walk on. I can’t help but be inspired by that. We live among the same decorations. Nearby, there’s a military hospital, a little further is my home, and farther, there’s Khvylovyi’s grave. All of it coexists in a chimeric symbiosis, all of it forms our urban space,” Khyzhna reflects. 

Nafta crew’s latest production, Cyborg Orgy, confronts the issue of ecocide. The performance reflects on the earth, humus, and the right to die on one’s land—right that’s both political and human.

The play draws a powerful connection between the destruction of nature and human suffering. When weapons tear through buildings, plants, animals, and humans, and when chemicals from rockets contaminate the soil and water, can one recognize the non-human, although living, victims of this violence? The ongoing, unpunished losses of countless creatures and ecosystems remain largely unseen. Uncertain of how to address it, Nafta’s crew takes to the stage to name the crimes, mourn the victims, and bear witness to the disaster unfolding before them (and the audience).

The large-scale environmental damage caused by Russia—such as the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023—represents a clear act of ecocide. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin called it “a crime against Ukraine as a state and (against) our future.” By incorporating non-human agents into their war stories, Nafta is pushing the boundaries of post-war justice to incorporate all the living. 

Healing and rebuilding after conflict must include both human and non-human lives, as well as the planet itself; that is what, in Nafta’s words, Cyborg Orgy is about.

 Shedding light on social responsibility is deeply personal to Khyzhna: “I think the imperfection of this world inspired me. I started looking either for alternative worlds or how to improve this one using some other way of seeing. I did not feel safe in this reality, so I decided to create a safe space; theater became a place of escape and a place of arrival.” 

When Nafta Theater was founded, many people were not ready for its alternative vision. Kharkiv’s theater scene was steeped in conventional traditions, shaped by a Soviet-era dramaturgical school that prioritized socialist realist narratives—idealized depictions of Soviet life that promoted values of communist state ideology. Nafta’s emerging collective of performers challenged that status quo. 

In opposition to the system, the theater pursued experimental and provocative approaches and urged reevaluation of fundamental narratives—such as, for instance, how women should act and exist within the theatrical space. As a child shaped by sexist stereotypes, Khyzhna used to say that she doesn’t like female directing. As she grew, she started to look for other perspectives and ways to think about women's behavior, body, and modalities of both being on stage and beyond it. 

Khyzhna remembers how first performances were perceived: “In the performance Naїve, I took on the roles of both director and actress for the first time. I came back to Kharkiv from Poland in 2015, where I was working in the independent theater Brama. Driven by an extraordinary thirst for creation, I began posting announcements everywhere, inviting people to acting classes—that’s how I found my first crew.”

"I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance"

“Naїve was a performance dedicated to naïve idealism and marginalized segments of society—those who are pushed to the edges of their communities. I felt very frustrated when I realized that theater is a very ephemeral field. That was unfortunate. It was crucial for me to know that I can influence reality somehow. At one point, we contacted an animal rescue center, and started looking for new owners for animals during the performance itself. I remember well how, later, they sent me photos of the cats they adopted. I was looking for distinct actions that could affect reality through performance,” Nina Khyzhna says. “In some scenes, we simply sat in silence, looking the audience in the eyes—it was something new. Someone even cried during the performance, which was a striking thing for me — realizing that, through my expression, I could impact someone’s world, start an exchange of feelings. It felt like a door opening into creative subjectivity, into obtaining agency within my profession.”

In spring of 2023, Kharkiv administration introduced a controversial ban on mass events in theaters, concert halls, clubs, museums, libraries, and open spaces for gatherings exceeding 50 people. Citing relentless Russian shelling and a lack of shelters, authorities said the restriction will remain in place until the end of martial law. Active cultural communities found the restriction unbearable. 

As Artem Vusyk, an actor from Nafta Theater, put it: “Obviously, I don’t support these restrictions. Kharkiv is a culturally significant city, and authorities should support its culture. Many theaters have adapted, finding spaces that meet State Emergency Service’s requirements. We’re lucky our partners, Some People [Center of New Culture — ed.], offered their certified venue.” That’s where independent initiatives outshine government-run ones, finding flexible ways to keep culture alive despite restrictions.

When Nafta returned to Kharkiv, their first performance defied expectations.

They staged Rat, an absurd comedy strikingly out of sync with the surrounding reality.

Khyzhna looks back at it with a smile: “There were people who said it was needed. One woman told me, ‘I had forgotten I could be that way—laugh in a theater, experience culture, enjoy things again.’ For some people, like one of my acquaintances whose husband served in the military, it was hard to watch. People are different, and their needs differ, too. We also opened a bar on the first floor, Rat’s Bar; it was like rebooting a life. Of course, life in a different form but still undeniably real.”

In Kharkiv, there's no need for retreats in the mountains to learn the art of "living in the moment." Nothing serves as a sharper lesson than a Russian missile. 

"One hand torn apart while the other one is still filming"

Khyzhna recalls Kharkiv’s landscape as both challenging and inspiring: “Once in a dialogue with Serhii Zhadan (famous Kharkiv poet), he told me that Russians ironically call their aerial bombs 'landscapers' because it literally changes the scenery of the city. We often discuss this idea of blank spaces that missiles leave. What appears in these blank spaces? What do we fill them with? How do we look at them, both physically and metaphorically? I remember a colleague saying that artists in times of war are people who have one hand torn apart while the other one is still filming. A bright metaphor to answer the question of ‘how is it to create art amid war?’ You are part of the city. Your body becomes a part of it. I hope to become the very soil of this land.”

In such an environment, artists must be especially careful not to create an illusion of life, nor to deepen the hole of despair—it's about finding the balance, Khyzhna says. 

For Nafta Theater and Khyzhna, it is crucial not to turn away from wounds and pain, not to create taboos; death and severed limbs exist together with the oncoming spring and new life being born. 

She reflects on that: “It is important for us to be in reality, to have balance between seeing life as it is and as an artistic code. Keep being alive and even playful. The very fact that people come together to live through such a cultural experience is an act of manifestation of life. When we are together, we create a feeling that we are not alone in this experience, in this grief; none of us are unique in a good sense of this word.”

Author: Matvii Suminov

Cover photo: "Nobody Died Today" play, 2022. / Source: Nafta Theater

Read more

• “Dali: I will get my life back.” Kharkiv remembers poet, soldier Maksym Kryvtsov 1 year after he was killed in combat mission in Russia’s war
• “Kharkiv is a printing capital.” Consequences of Russians destroying largest printing house in Kharkiv 

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As the war draws to a close, Russia faces the threat of an impending catastrophe. President Vladimir Putin is acutely aware of what lies ahead. The ongoing conflict has been the sole factor keeping the Russian economy afloat. Without it, the nation’s defense industry could collapse, triggering a recession, a surge in crime, and a burst of social unrest within the Kremlin’s walls.

Ceasing hostilities with Ukraine might herald not peace, but the fragmentation of Russia. The economy faces a downturn, millions of disgruntled war veterans would return home, and the war machine that the Kremlin has sustained for years would demand even more resources. Peace could spell disaster for a regime ensnared by its own reckless adventures.

According to an analysis by German outlet Bild, ending military actions could unleash profound internal challenges for Russia. The nation’s economy has become increasingly dependent on military expenditure, with hundreds of thousands of Russians deriving their incomes from the war effort. Ending the conflict might trigger an economic downturn and social upheaval.

The signs of a weakening Russian economy are evident. Beyond the defense industry, there’s a marked decline in the production of food, coal, construction materials, metal products, and machinery. The defense sector, fueled by government investment, obscures the actual economic downturn. Yet in sectors like food, coal, and machinery, production is faltering. Only the military industry masks the decline.

Post-conflict, Russia would face challenges in reintegrating veterans. Many veterans, previously receiving high compensation for their roles in the conflict, will return to impoverished regions where only low-paying jobs await. If Putin fails to ensure their loyalty through viable economic prospects, a surge in violence could ensue. The rate of violent crime has escalated since the onset of the war. There's a real danger that some veterans, akin to those returning from Afghanistan and Chechnya, might resort to crime.

Ending the war without achieving its stated goals might undermine the government’s legitimacy. Internal challenges like economic decline and social discontent could pave the way for political instability. Russia finds itself trapped by its own aggression. While ending the war threatens economic and social crisis, continuing it risks resource depletion and international isolation. The Kremlin is caught between two unfavorable scenarios, each presenting significant risks for the future of the country.

In an interview for the film "Moscow. Kremlin. Putin. 25 Years," airing Sunday, May 4, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated there was "no necessity" for the Russian Armed Forces to use nuclear weapons in their ongoing conflict with Ukraine. He emphasized, "They wanted to provoke us into making mistakes. But there was no need to use the weapon you mentioned, and hopefully, it will remain unnecessary." Putin asserted that the Russian military has "enough strength and means to bring what was started in 2022 to a logical conclusion with satisfactory results for Russia."

Putin also responded affirmatively to inquiries about reconciliation with what he termed the "Ukrainian part of the Russian people." Despite admitting the "tragedy of it all," he believes it's only a matter of time. Putin has previously reiterated his view that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people."

Since the start of the full-scale Russian military aggression in Ukraine, Putin has often described nuclear weapon use as a "last-resort security measure." Nonetheless, his circle has repeatedly made near-explicit nuclear threats. Notably, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council, warned on his Telegram channel about the potential consequences if Ukraine attempted to obstruct the May 9 parade in Moscow, hinting that May 10 might not "arrive in Kyiv." American media previously cited sources in suggesting that in the fall of 2022, as Russian forces retreated, the U.S. considered the nuclear threat from Russia serious enough to draw up a response plan.

In November 2024, Putin signed an updated Russian nuclear doctrine. The principal amendment states that aggression from a non-nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear state, will be treated as joint aggression against Russia. Moscow reserves the right to consider a nuclear response upon "verified information on the launch of strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft toward the country." The doctrine further highlights Russia's right to use nuclear weapons in defense of Belarus, as part of the Union State, or in response to a "critical threat to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation using conventional weapons."

The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly launched a significant strike against a Russian command post in the Donetsk region, an area crucial for managing Russian offensives towards Pokrovsk. This command post was strategically located near the occupied city of Bakhmut.

This operation was reported by Ukraine's General Staff, which confirmed that the Ukrainian Air Force recently delivered a devastating blow to the command post of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division in Bakhmut, an area temporarily under Russian occupation. This attack has significantly impaired the Russian forces' ability to direct operations near Pokrovsk, according to the statement. While the extent of Russian casualties is not yet determined, efforts are underway to ascertain the impact.

On May 3, analysts from DeepState reported that Russian forces had made advancements in multiple settlements within Donetsk region. Russian troops have gained ground towards Pokrovsk and near the village of Tarasivka, situated between Pokrovsk and Toretsk. The Russian military is continuously advancing towards Pokrovsk in an attempt to reach the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region, aiming to boast about their "achievements" ahead of May 9th celebrations. Sources indicate that the Russian troops entered the southern part of Novooleksiivka, cleared out residences, and has begun fortifying their positions.